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OPINIONS ON THE USE OF A BANK TRANSACTIONS TAX AS A 
SINGLE TAX 
 
 
 
“My position about the subject has always been clear.  I believe the Single Tax is the 
most modern and most economical tax collecting instrument available.” 
Roberto Campos 
 
“The classical structure of taxes, to which we hold so tightly, is a curious handicraft 
relic in the electronic age.” 
Roberto Campos 
 
“A fair tax is one you can collect.” 
Mário Henrique Simonsen 
 
“I have not the least respect for conventional wisdom that enthrones, as 
indispensable, the classical taxes, such as income tax and circulatory value-added 
taxes.  Both are intolerably obsolete.” 
Roberto Campos 
 
“If Marcos Cintra’s Single Tax hauls into the state coffers…the same levels of 
revenue as the maddening current scheme, what we need to do is…to enact it.” 
Ives Gandra da Silva Martins 
 
“A good tax is not an “old tax” or even a “classical tax”.  A good tax is one that is 
evasion-proof and automatically collected.  Any tax that can be evaded is socially 
unfair.  And if collection depends on complex and bureaucratic paperwork, it 
becomes a waste.  Automation and evasion-proof are precisely the features of the 
Single Tax.” 
Roberto Campos 
 
“The Single Tax makes possible the simultaneous attainment of objectives such as 
maximizing the tax base, deep and unheard-of simplification, and the virtual                
eradication of fiscal corruption, promoting more transparent effective and equitable 
taxation.” 
Folha de São Paulo (Editorial) 
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“Unfortunately, the simplifying methodology of the single tax was undermined by the 
fact that the government, on two occasions – through the IPMF (1993) and the 
CPMF (1996) – took advantage of the tax’s automatic “method”, without absorbing 
its simplifying “ideology”.  It is a sophisticated instrument that became brutish 
through misuse, as a fencing sword would be misused if employed to cut sugar 
cane.” 
Roberto Campos 
 
“Abolishing income tax, whether for individuals or corporations, must be the first 
step.” 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger 
 
“Bank transactions are one of the few potential bases for future taxation upon which 
it is possible to anchor an increase in public revenue without penalizing the 
productive sectors and the social segments…” 
Maria da Conceição Tavares 
 
“Financial circulation is a tax base for the future, given that, in addition to the fact 
that it is constantly expanding, it allows for electronic controls and, therefore, 
should deter evasion more than current taxes.” 
Maria da Conceição Tavares 
 
 
“The Single Tax is not, contrary to what is assumed by conventional wisdom and by 
tax specialists, naïve or impossible to execute.  It is merely an idea that is insolent in 
its novelty, and whose time has arrived.” 
Roberto Campos 
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PREFACE 
TAX PARADIGMS, GLOBALIZATION, 
 AND THE ELECTRONIC AGE 
The urgent need for a new tax system has been one of the most intensely 
debated topics on Brazil’s list of pressing domestic issues. Clearly, tax reform can no 
longer be postponed, since it addresses a major element of the country’s economy 
and is a decisive factor in determining choices of all economic agents, both public 
and private. 
Over the past fifteen years, debate on the Brazilian tax system has been greatly 
intensified. During this period several propositions for tax reform have been 
introduced, creating a clear division of opinions between two schools of thought on 
the subject. On one side, stands orthodoxy, based on traditional concepts of public 
finance and on conventional canons of tax law. Some of these concepts and canons 
have been superseded by the effects of recent technological advances, most 
importantly, electronic information and new means of asset transfers. 
On the other side of the divide is the innovative and anti-dogmatic school of 
thought which proposes the elimination of conventional tax models and which is 
epitomized by the resurgence of the age-old concept of the Single Tax, which, in its 
modern version makes extensive use of non-declaratory taxes and of electronic 
technology.1  
The first school of thought – associated with the use of conventional declaratory 
taxes – believes that “old taxes are good taxes”. This school mistakenly sustains (so 
claim such conservative reformers) the continuation of paradigms which, 
inadvertently to them, have become outdated, and which have been superseded by 
the peculiar impacts of modern economies, characterized by globalization and by the 
overwhelming effects of the digital information age. The great Brazilian economist, 
diplomat, and public figure Roberto Campos, an active participant in the tax reform 
debate, once stated that that to defend this school of thought is to engage in a 
melancholic and poorly disguised exercise of trying “to perfect the obsolete.” 
The second school of thought calls for the elimination of declaratory taxes and 
                                                 
1
 For brief references on the history of the single-tax concept, see [SELIGMAN, 1914]; [HUGON, 
1945] and  [GROSCLAUDE and HERZOG, 1990]. More recently, proposals for implementation of a 
single-tax have arisen within the “poujadist” movement in France, in the 1950s: see [FAUVET and  
MENDRAS, 1958] and [HOFFMAN, 1956]. There was also an energy single tax proposal upheld by 
E. Schüller, also in France. In the US, the most important contribution to the Single Tax debate was 
carried out by Henry George; see [GEORGE, 1879].  See also [MILLS, 1990] and [HALL and 
RABUSHKA, 1995]. These two proposals refer to the simplification of the Income Tax. 
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for their substitution by electronic taxes operating through the bits and bytes of the 
data-processing centers and clearinghouses of the banking system, such as a bank 
transactions tax. Traditionalists call this an audacious proposition, bordering on 
illusion. Despite the proven capacity of such taxes to generate impressive amounts of 
revenue and to show an almost universal pattern of incidence and coverage, 
researchers and defenders of this school of thought usually draw the wrath of 
traditionalists who oppose it. The guardians of orthodoxy, the bureaucratic 
establishment, and the recurrent tax evaders refuse to relinquish their decades-old 
professional and intellectual investments – despite the fact that all evidence proves 
them increasingly obsolete. 
In this book, the terms “declaratory” and “non-declaratory” tax are used here 
after to express the distinguishing features of conventional versus non-conventional 
taxes. Conventional taxes, in current use throughout the world, make extensive use, 
by the taxpayer, of self-prepared filing of paper tax-returns based on tax accounting 
procedures set up by tax authorities. The non-conventional, non-declaratory taxes 
make no use of paper tax filings, and are usually collected automatically, 
administratively, by electronic means, such as the bank transaction tax in use in 
Brazil from 1993 to 2007. 
The clash between these two tax paradigms, the declaratory versus the non-
declaratory tax system (which might be rephrased as the “with” versus the “without” 
paperwork tax system) draws to the surface questions concerning not only the deep 
changes that are occurring within the modern world economic environment, but also 
the academic posture of taxation (and even of public finance) as a science. 
Thomas Kuhn says that a field of study becomes a science when a community 
of experts consensually accepts a paradigm – that is, a set of problems and uniform 
standards of approach – with a foundational theory and a common set of explanatory 
and interpretative traditions.2 “The authority of a scientific proposition is founded on 
its capacity to generate consensus within a given community. This consensus, for its 
part, does not depend on whether the scientific propositions provide an indisputable 
vision of the intimate configuration of reality. It does, however, depend on whether 
its development has been guided by demarcation criteria that are authoritatively 
prevalent in the environs of that community.” Kuhn goes on to state that, “It is for 
this reason that paradigms distinguish themselves by their incommensurability. If 
each paradigm sets forth the conditions of the scientific nature of the knowledge 
produced in its environs, the proofs invoked in favor of other paradigms tend to be 
disqualified a priori.”3 In other words, a proposal that contradicts “conventional 
wisdom”, paraphrasing John Kenneth Galbraith,4 is summarily considered 
“unscientific”, not because of lack of objective analysis of its scientism, but simply 
                                                 
2
 [KUHN, 1962] , quoted by [FARIA,1999] pp. 48-51. 
3
 [FARIA, 1999] p.49.   
4
 [GALBRAITH, 1958]. On his concept of  “conventional wisdom”, see pp 6-17. 
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because it does not apply methods and models considered “correct”, “truthful” or 
“evident”.  
This perspective of conceptual advances within the domain of science (which 
can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to life in society) allows us, furthermore, to 
understand the defensive arguments of “traditionalists,” who tend to reject the single-
tax proposal on the pretext that, “if it were good, it would have already been adopted 
by more advanced economies.” This sad argument acknowledges the inertial weight 
of entrenched concepts of tax systems or, inversely, it ignores the revolution that 
electronic technology has inspired in some countries, but not in all of them. For 
example, Brazil has a banking system that is significantly more modern than that of 
most of the advanced economies, including the United States, and this is the 
foundation that supports the paradigm shift towards the single-tax concept. 
Furthermore, such an attitude ignores that there are cultural, social, political, and 
economic differences among countries that make some urgently need a new tax 
system, while others do not, as least not with the same intensity. 
Regarding tax systems, it becomes increasingly evident that the conventional 
paradigm is gradually becoming exhausted. In tax matters, the conventional 
paradigm is following the steps described by Thomas Kuhn to justify a “scientific 
revolution”: old beliefs become less capable of providing answers to concrete 
problems, and for each solved problem others appear of even greater complexity.  
An illustrative example is found in the changing perception of tax administrators 
regarding the Income Tax. After the Second World War the global income tax 
became almost universally used. “This tax was an ideal instrument for the time and 
came to be seen by many policymakers and tax experts as a “dream tax”. In the 
United States, 90 per cent of taxpayers had considered the income tax as a fair tax 
during World War Two, according to survey data published by the American 
Enterprise Institute (2005)”. Nevertheless, perceptions about this form of taxation 
are gradually changing because of new circumstances present in the world, but also 
because of some characteristics of the income tax which were persistently ignored by 
policy makers. “It was considered an efficient tax because most economists 
dismissed its potential negative effects on work effort and incentives. Few academic 
articles, if any, dealt with these potential disincentives. Furthermore, though it now 
seems strange, books on income taxation did not even mention ´tax evasion´ or ´the 
underground economy´ as potential problems associated with income taxes”. 5 
The conventional tax paradigm faces a serious crisis due to its incapacity to 
provide explanations, diagnostics, justifications, and solutions to new facts and 
circumstances that are rising on the contemporary economic scenario.6  Indeed, what 
we see is the erosion of traditional mechanisms of tax collection. Such mechanisms 
                                                 
5
 [TANZI, 2006] pp. 7-8. 
6
 For an analysis of  how tax paradigms have evolved in Brazil from  colonial times to the present, see 
[CINTRA, 2008(c)] pp. 16-34; see also [CINTRA, 2008(b)] pp.45-126. 
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are based on the notion that the taxpayer is a potential defrauder, until proven 
otherwise, and this has led to the creation of a significant number of control, 
inspection, auditing and surveillance systems that turn out to be expensive, complex, 
and highly bureaucratic, but nonetheless, incapable of preventing tax evasion. 
In truth, the outcome of this debate tends to become more predictable, insofar as 
two fundamental phenomena of modern history will impose their inevitable 
consequences in favor of the non-declaratory system. These two phenomena are: 
first, the technological revolution of the information age; and secondly (but no less 
important), the current globalization of world economic relations. 
The information age has profoundly altered the aggregate production function of 
modern economies. Decision-making has been greatly streamlined by the increasing 
number of methods for processing massive amounts of information. Data collection 
and analysis have improved through increased sophistication in electronic 
processing. The supply and control of massive amounts of information have become 
key decision-making inputs for modern businesses. Furthermore, the use of paper 
currency is being steadily replaced by electronic money; the concept of wealth and 
money is being constantly redefined.7 These changes bring into stark relief the 
precariousness of tax reporting and the handicraft mechanisms used in conventional 
tax systems, which, historically, were developed in response to the technological and 
organizational environment that existed immediately following the industrial 
revolution. 
Furthermore, growth of the service sector’s share of GDP has significantly 
reduced the effectiveness of the tax collection, auditing, and control mechanisms 
currently in use. The productive sector has become ever more intangible and 
dematerialized, and this has only stressed the dwindling effectiveness of 
conventional mechanisms for tax assessment and enforcement. In fact, intangible 
services traded over the Internet (as for example, new accounting software, with high 
initial production cost but currently reduced to bits and bytes for delivery and 
utilization) are actually beyond the reach of tax authorities, kept outside the realm of 
such type of exchange. It becomes increasingly more difficult to levy specific taxes 
on trade of either products or services if the resulting payment transaction takes place 
in a tax haven, where no specified origin or destination of any good or service can be 
readily identified. At that moment a non-declaratory tax, such as a bank transaction 
tax, begins to make sense because it is levied on that agent’s banking activity and not 
on its reported accounting statements.  
Traditional tax models assume that production, and its resulting taxable income, 
is carried out through manual production processes (or later, through mechanical 
production processes) concentrated within finite geographical spaces, centered in 
organizational structures that are autonomous, independent, and subject to domestic 
rules established by a sovereign State. This is the world of the industrial revolution, 
                                                 
7
 See [TOFFLER and TOFFLER, 2006]; [THE ECONOMIST, 2001] pp.73-4; [CINTRA, 1998]. 
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later modified by mass production, where production and exchange are strategically 
concentrated on a relatively small number of large national corporations. Tax 
assessment and enforcement have, therefore, to be directed and adjusted to that 
reality.  
But that kind of a world is swiftly dying, a fact readily visible to anyone versed 
in the realities of world globalization.8 
Historically, the entire universe of individuals and businesses, of all sizes and in 
all sectors, soon became subjected to the obligation to pay taxes. Levying taxes 
across the board greatly expanded the pool of taxpayers. Whereas the taxpayers’ 
universe had previously consisted of those few large units of production and 
exchange that typified the early stages of the industrial economy, soon it began to 
encompass all businesses and individuals in modern societies. Tax collection, 
assessment, and control functions now demand operations on a scale wholly 
incompatible with the declaratory, bureaucratic, paper filing systems typical of the 
traditional tax method of “self-assessment, self-levying, self-collection, and public 
audits,” which typify conventional declaratory tax systems. 
The electronic revolution provided an indispensable new instrument for 
collecting and analyzing the enormous mass of data and information needed for tax 
control, monitoring, and collection processes. But such technological change is not 
restricted to a mere increase in speed of data processing within the old tax paradigm, 
although it has been successfully serving this purpose. Now it becomes possible to 
underscore the creation of a new tax paradigm, of a new tax species, such as payment 
taxes, which were never possible before.  
Brazil’s current banking and payment systems are among the most modern 
known in the world, and this enables them to bring about such paradigm shift. The 
importance of the information age is not limited to being an auxiliary method for 
controlling, auditing, and analyzing tax data. Its importance extends beyond this, as 
it became a determining factor in the conceptualization of new taxation models, 
primarily in configuring new tax bases, such as bank transactions, electronic flows, 
telephone pulses, electronic wavelengths, and other intangible bases, which are 
impossible to be reached by conventional taxes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 For an interesting report on the difficulties faced by conventional tax systems in dealing with the 
realities of the modern world, such as globalization, the internet, harmonization, tax havens, transfer 
prices, evasion and tax bureaucracy, see [THE ECONOMIST, 2000(a)] pp.-3-18; [KELLERMANN, 
RIXEN, and UHL, 2007]; [LEBOWITZ 1999]. 
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ILLUSTRATION 1 
Traditional Nuclear firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A second factor to demand deep changes in conventional tax models is 
globalization. This is a multi-faceted, complex element, which is having a strong 
impact on economic and social life of humankind. According to José Eduardo Faria, 
globalization has been responsible for the “relativity of several important concepts, 
principles, and categories – such as sovereignty, legality, the hierarchy of laws, 
subjective rights, formal equality, citizenship, balance of powers, security, and 
certainty – that have been heavily affected by economic, social, political, and 
cultural changes that have taken place largely apart from legal structures, judicial 
mechanisms, institutional structures, democratic procedures, and the capacity for 
regulation, control, management, direction, planning, and concession-granting of 
nation-states.”9 
Indeed, globalization has weakened the power of national public 
administrations, by decentralizing and fragmenting the decision-making capacity of 
traditional governments. Even more visibly, it has “debilitated the taxation and 
regulation capacity of governments.”10 José Eduardo Faria argues that, “within this 
                                                 
9
 See [FARIA, 1999], p. 7. Comments on the influence of globalization on law, economics, and by 
extension, on taxation, are based on this instigative and provocative study on the phenomenon of 
globalization. See also [CINTRA, 2003], p.48. 
10
 [FARIA, 1999] p.7. The author states that this fact was the result of “integrating markets at an 
overwhelming speed and engendering the intensification of circulation of goods, services, technology, 
capital, cultures, and information on a worldwide scale, thanks to the development of technology, 
expansion of communications, and the perfecting of transportation systems.” According to Faria, 
globalization also “opened the way for new and original geopolitical configurations, with the power 
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highly unstable scenario, positive law... came to face a cruel dilemma: if it remains 
concerned with its logical integrity and with its formal rationality, in view of all 
these profound and intense changes, it runs the risk of not accompanying the 
dynamics of facts, of becoming functionally ineffective and, ultimately, socially 
discredited, ignored, and (in the worst case) even disposable. If it allows itself to be 
seduced into attempting directly to control and discipline all sectors of social, 
economic, and political life that are increasingly tense, unstable, unpredictable, 
heterogeneous, and complex... it runs the risk of becoming disfigured as a normative 
reference.”11 
The divorce between the conceptual foundations of government that emerged 
from the post-war period, and the realities of modern world globalization brings out 
what José Eduardo Faria called the “systemic ungovernability” of the traditional 
State.12 This begs the question: to what extent are traditional taxation models 
assimilating this new reality, marked so deeply by the information revolution and by 
intensive globalization?13  
The traditional tax system presupposes that the taxpayer is a nuclear firm (the 
same principle applies to individuals) that produces tangible goods with one or not 
more than a few physical facilities concentrated within a single national State (or tax 
territory), surrounded by suppliers and buyers that have the same basic 
characteristics. ILLUSTRATION 1 above describes this situation. In this system, it 
is easy to assess the taxpaying capacity of the nuclear company. It is also simple to 
enforce tax regulations by cross-referencing data with peripheral supplier and buyer 
companies, or individuals. 
                                                                                                                                          
to direct, disturb, move, and influence productive, commercial, monetary, and migratory flows. It 
caused the hierarchical structures of business activities to be transformed into networked 
organizations, built on the basis of partnerships, cooperation, and flexible contractual relations. It 
stimulated the creation of new financial instruments, and introduced new and differential criteria in 
transnational investments, while at the same time increasing its risks. It generated a plurality of 
original, differentiated, and particularistic situations, and demanded new standards of responsibility, 
control, and security. It changed the profile and scale of conflicts. It made ineffective those 
procedural regulations and mechanisms that had traditionally been used to resolve conflict through 
use of the legal system. It redefined the size, weight, and scope of the very functions and roles of the 
State. It blurred the lines that define what is federal and external… and it led to new forms of political 
action and new legal models. 
11
 [FARIA, 1999] p.9. 
12
 [FARIA, 1999] p.126. The author continues, stating the “ineffectiveness of its laws, its legal 
systems, its procedural mechanisms, and its judicial structures. No matter how much the legal texts 
are revised to coordinate, manage, induce, direct, control, discipline, and plan the behavior of 
productive agents… this regulatory framework can no longer ‘penetrate’ directly, fully, and 
absolutely on the essence of the socioeconomic system.” 
13
 [THE ECONOMIST, 1997] states that: “a new industrial revolution is under way. Advances in 
computing and telecommunications press relentlessly on, shrinking distance, eroding national 
boundaries and enlarging the domain of the global economy. Increasingly, these changes render 
governments mere servants of international markets.” 
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The situation is radically different, however, if the operational strategies of these 
businesses are executed through decentralized networks that spread across several 
nation-states, producing both tangible goods and, ever more frequently, services, as 
shown in ILLUSTRATION 2. By their very nature, services are intangible, highly 
mobile and easily transported through electronic media. The illustration below shows 
the operational complexity of these businesses operating globally, involving federal 
and external variables, international trade and logistics, cross-ownership of 
investment capital, fast technological change and market-share strategies. These 
factors imply the need for increased sophistication of concepts and of operational 
methods that are not adequately addressed by conventional tax models. 
ILLUSTRATION 2: 
Processes and strategies in the globalized economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Source: [FARIA, 1999] p. 38. 
 
Examples of such challenges to the conventional tax paradigm are the growing 
incapacity of nation-states to deal with problems created by “tax havens”, by 
increasingly complex means for laundering money, and by the uncontrolled flows of 
foreign funds between companies belonging to a single global conglomerate 
(transfer-prices).14  
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 According to [THE ECONOMIST, 2007], p.10,  tax havens “sap tax revenues from “real” 
countries limiting their ability to pay for public services and forcing them to tax less mobile factors, 
such as labor, housing and consumption (p.4)…the real problem is that globalization has rendered 
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In testimony before the Special Commission on Cumulative Taxation in the 
Chamber of Deputies, on April 2, 2002, the Secretary of the Federal Revenue, 
Everardo Maciel, stated that: “the extraordinary changes occurring throughout the 
world also explain the large differences occurring between nations. One of these 
changes is globalization, which has brought very intense transformations. It is 
important to remember that one-third of foreign trade takes place between 
companies; another third is comprised of transactions within multinational 
corporations(…) These factors demonstrate the growing importance of these 
multinational firms, which raise a modern and worrisome question about the future 
of the corporate income tax or about the so called “ transfer price” (…) Today, 
some countries assert the existence of transfer-prices point to the unlikely survival of 
taxes such as the corporate income tax in the future. Comments frequently made in 
the press, in international seminars, and in international tax conferences point to 
this fact as something new, which calls for a review of traditional tax models, most of 
which are of Anglo-Saxon extraction.” 
Globalization has, therefore, significantly changed the social, political, and 
economic environment in which tax systems must operate. The main changes have 
been the extraordinary growth in international trade of goods and services, increased 
mobility of labor and capital, and growth of multinational, transnational and 
international companies. Tax administrators nowadays speak of taxation on world 
bases. Tax competition between countries has mushroomed. Unfortunately, such 
changes have gone in the direction of increasing complexity, interdependence and 
fiscal competition between countries. “Tax termites”15, such as electronic and 
internet commerce, plastic and electronic money, transfer pricing, tax havens, 
foreign shopping, and complex financial instruments have contributed to decrease 
the revenue raising efficiency of national governments. “The work of ´fiscal 
termites´ (is) busily gnawing at the foundations of the tax systems” 16  Firms and 
people do not hesitate to abandon countries where they are located to seek any point 
on the planet that offers less progressive and lower taxes.  
Tanzi believes that the effect of the fiscal termites in national economies is to 
decrease tax revenues. In fact, this has not been occurring. The tax burden has been 
increasing worldwide, but at the cost of tax shifting and increasing burden on less 
mobile taxpayers, such as wage earners and producers of non-tradables, worsening 
the domestic patterns of incidence and equity. 
The perplexity facing tax administrators when confronted with such difficulties 
                                                                                                                                          
the current system of taxing multinationals archaic. Taxation is based on national boundaries, but 
companies operate across continents and can easily shift money and physical assets around. Until tax 
systems reflect that reality, the difficulties will persist.” For a brief description of the conceptual and 
operational difficulties of controlling transfer prices, and also to evaluate the costs and the 
bureaucratic apparatus necessary to tax such payments see [ZILVETI et alii, 2007], pp.83-112. 
15
 [TANZI, 2005]; see also, [TANZI, 2000].  
16
 [TANZI, 2000] p.4. 
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in preserving their national taxing capacity has led to a twofold solution: one, is 
objectively trying to typify each possible problem or situation (which is obviously 
impossible to enumerate and extremely costly to operate). The problem is becoming 
so acute to the point of motivating governments, especially in the European Union, 
to discuss the creation of a super national layer of global government, capable of 
coordinating, or more appropriately, of attenuating, through unconditional or 
supervised delegation, the tensions and stresses that are evolved in international tax 
relations among national states.17  
The second alternative is to endow tax authorities with subjective power to 
analyze each situation on a case by case basis, as they arise, and thereby decide what 
should be considered legitimate tax planning and what should be considered an 
illegitimate “legal” form of evasion.  
If the first line of conduct implies high compliance and administrative costs due 
to the mushrooming bureaucracy that would probably result from it, the second 
alternative would imply juridical insecurity and potentially mistaken or arbitrary 
judgments.18 
Needless to say that such “solutions” may greatly increase the compliance and 
administrative costs of tax systems throughout the world, which, in turn, could 
induce the growth of evasion and of the informal economy. Thus, tax evasion and the 
flight toward the underground economy would further reduce the taxing capacity of 
national governments. 
Edgar Feige, a pioneer in the study and measurement of the underground 
economy, coined the term, tax revolt, stating that: “the irregular economy appears to 
have little respect for conventional geopolitical boundaries. Indeed, it is being 
increasingly noticed in almost all developed societies.” Feige says further: “I wish to 
note that I began this investigation suspecting that the irregular economy was 
smaller than previous estimates had suggested. I am now convinced that the 
irregular economy is indeed of staggering proportions and growing rapidly.”19 
Tax reformers in a country like Brazil should not become prisoners of 
conventional wisdom, nor be restricted to old tax models which have surpassed their 
useful lives. A country’s tax system must be able to adapt to the dynamics of the 
modern economic world. Taxation falls on ever changing economic bases, and not 
on consolidated juridical facts20. Tax reform, therefore, should allow for enough 
flexibility and realism to be able to adjust itself to a society’s environment, and to its 
social, economic, political, and cultural characteristics.  
                                                 
17
 [TANZI, 2007]. 
18
 In Brazil there is an ongoing debate about such tax norms called anti-elisão (anti-escape norms). 
See [GRECO and LIBERTUCI, 1999] p.10.  
19
 [FEIGE, 1979], pp. 5, 12. 
20
 [SECRETARIA DA RECEITA FEDERAL, 2002(c)]. 
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“Since around 1980, the annoyance of taxpayers worldwide has been directed 
with increasing intensity not only at the high levels of taxation, but also at the 
complexity and instability of the tax systems. This annoyance has become a major 
factor in the changing attitudes of citizens towards taxation recorded in many 
countries during that period. In addition therefore to the level of taxation, such 
issues as complexity, instability and fairness of the tax systems have become 
important in many countries…instability, inefficiency and absence of fiscal 
coherence have characterized the tax systems.”  21  
Such dissatisfaction with conventional tax systems, which are still being used 
extensively around the word, cause even more amazement as they still find 
economists who strongly uphold them, despite all evidence to the contrary.  The 
amazement at this state of affairs is precisely described by the following statement: 
“no one would design such a system on purpose and nobody did. Only an historical 
explanation of how it came about can be offered as justification. That is not a 
justification, but a demonstration of how seemingly individually rational decisions 
can have absurd effects in aggregate”.22  
In other words, citizens and policy makers are in search of a new “tax 
technology”, paraphrasing Vito Tanzi. Maybe he is foreseeing the future, although 
with a certain bias in emphasis, when he mentions that “the discovery of value-added 
taxes in the 1950´s and its widespread use in later years must be considered the most 
important technological development in taxation in the past 50 years. [But also] … 
gross assets taxes and taxes on financial transactions have been less important 
technological developments in Latin America.” 
The first part of his statement is gradually becoming less true, although in the 
past it has certainly helped to improve tax systems in the world. The second part, 
however, is becoming an increasingly crucial technological development in taxation, 
as will be demonstrated in this text. 
Unfortunately, “the first law of finance is inertia”, as we are painfully reminded 
by Prof. Richard Bird. “It is surprising that the many governments in the world, most 
of which are trying to raise more revenues, have not come up with more ingenious 
ways of doing so. The lure of the familiar and the apparent desire of most 
governments- like most people- not to be the first to do anything new doubtlessly 
account for the relative lack of fiscal innovation in the last 50 years.…For the most 
part, however, a first lesson suggested by history is that the fiscal problems of the 
next 50 years will probably have to be dealt with using taxes very much like those on 
hand today. As with most social and political institutions, there seems to be little or 
no chance of a quick technological fix.”23 
Prof. Joseph Stiglitz seems equally skeptical about this issue when he states that 
                                                 
21
 [TANZI, 2006], p.13. 
22
 [KAY and KING, 1978] p. 1, quoted by [TANZI, 2006] p.13. 
23
 [BIRD, 1988] pp.19-20. 
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“I do not see that any likely changes in technology in the near future will have a 
revolutionary effect on the design of our tax system”. 24 
In spite of the impressive weight of such opinions, we hope this text will 
confirm Vito Tanzi´s remarks on the technological significance of both the electronic 
age and of its offspring, the financial transaction taxes, in constructing future tax 
systems in the world.  
  
                                                 
24
 [STIGLITZ, 1988], p.278. 
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1 
THE SINGLE TAX ON BANK TRANSACTIONS 
The publication of the article entitled “For a tax revolution”, in the Folha de São 
Paulo, in January 1990, was a turning point in the debate on tax reform in Brazil. 
The article introduced the Single Tax on Bank Transactions. I proposed that current 
paper-ridden (declaratory) taxes be replaced by a single paperless (non-declaratory) 
bank transaction tax.25 
SINGLE TAX ON TRANSACTIONS  
The Single Tax is a centuries-old idea. If first appeared in the 18th century when 
the physiocrats argued for taxation of land as the sole source of government revenue. 
In the 19th century, Canada and the United States also discussed similar ideas. France 
discussed a single tax in the post-war period, and in the 1990’s, in Brazil this same 
proposal reappeared in a new format, as a bank transaction tax.  
Historically, the difficulty (and the recurrent failures) involved in applying 
single tax proposals has been to find a tax base that, by itself, is broad enough to 
generate sufficient revenue for the government without requiring that tax rates be so 
high as to stimulate evasion.  
The modern concept of bank transactions meets this requirement. 
Several countries have implemented a tax on bank transactions, such as 
Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela and Australia, among others, although not as a 
single levy, as has been proposed in Brazil. As a regulatory tax on the financial 
markets, with the purpose of slowing down the flow of speculative money, both 
                                                 
25
 [CINTRA, 1990] transcribed in [CINTRA, 1994(a)]. Concerning the Single Tax bill presented 
before the Brazilian Congress in 2001, and the controversies that were raised, with arguments for and 
against the bill, see various papers in [CINTRA, 1994(a)], especially [CINTRA 1990] pp. 85-89, and 
[CINTRA, 1994(b)] pp.203-245. In the United States a similar proposal called “Automatic Payment 
Transaction” tax (APTTAX) was presented by [FEIGE, 2000]; an earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the International Institute of Public Finance conference held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, 
in August 1989. A similar proposal called “Withdrawals Tax” was presented by [COLABELLA and 
COPPINGER, 1995] from St. John´s University, New York. Also, the introduction of a single federal 
tax in the US, in the form of a  single consumption (retail sales) tax, is under discussion in the US 
Congress under the FairTax Act (HR 25, S 1025), and is sponsored by politicians, economists such as 
Laurence Kotlikoff  of Boston University, and researchers  such as David Tuerck of the Beacon Hill 
Institute at Suffolk University in Boston; see also [BACHMAN  et alii, 2006], [KOTLIKOFF, 2008] 
and [TUERCK, 2008]. 
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internally and on an international scale, transaction taxes have either been used, or 
are being considered for use, in a large number of countries around the world, such 
as India, Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, UK, USA, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and many others.26 
The financial, or bank transaction was first noticed as a potential tax base after 
the advent of digital currency, as it began to replace paper currency, and as banking 
transactions began to be processed electronically. The success in the search for such 
a single tax base and the solidification of an economic system based on digital 
money made possible, and maybe inevitable, the birth of the Single Tax proposal in 
Brazil. 
Though the Single Tax has a long and respectable tradition in the evolution of 
economic thought, it has never come to fruition because, before the growth of digital 
transactions, no society in history had ever satisfied two basic conditions necessary 
for its effective implementation, which modern bank transactions make possible. The 
first condition is a highly digitized and technologically sophisticated banking sector 
with a nationwide system for clearing checks and other documents. The second 
condition is a cultural predisposition within a society not to use paper currency, 
replacing it with digital currency. In other words, digital bank transactions made 
possible the birth of a broad tax base, large enough to generate enough revenue to 
support the public sector of modern societies. 
Brazil is the only country that fully meets these two requirements. It has one of 
the most advanced and digitized banking systems in the world, with technological 
standards that surpasses those found in developed countries such as the United States 
and the European Union. In truth, “Brazil is the banking benchmark of the world”.27 
Further, it is one of world’s economies that is least dependent on paper currency. 
And culturally, it has already absorbed the unavoidable replacement of paper 
currency by fiduciary money, such as checks, electronic debit and credit cards, 
                                                 
26
 Such securities transactions taxes, used in the context of the famous “Tobin tax” are justified in 
terms of a stabilization tool to be used against speculative flows of short term capital. There is a large 
literature evaluating the efficiency of such instrument. See for further references [SINGH, 2001]. The 
Tobin tax was first proposed by James Tobin in 1972 in his Janeway Lectures at Princeton University. 
For further details see [TOBIN, 1978] where the author stated the following: “I am aware of the 
distortions and allocational costs that can be attributed to tariffs, including tariffs on imports of 
foreign currency assets. I don’t deny their existence. I say only that they are small compared to the 
world macroeconomic costs of the present system.” (p.14). 
27
 [FONSECA, 2002]. In this article the Director of Technology of the Federação Brasileira de Bancos 
[Brazilian Federation of Banks] (Febraban) transcribes data from a research report conducted by 
McKinsey & Company and by the Fundação Getulio Vargas, and he states, “in Brazil, banks are the 
biggest investors in technology, earmarking 8.5% of net worth each year toward improving bank 
technology, more than double the national average”. The startup of the Sistema de Pagamentos 
Brasileiro [Brazilian Payments System] (SPB), in April 2002, attests to the advances in banking 
digitization in Brazil, as bank clearing began to take place online and in real time. 
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internet and email transactions, and other forms of digital currency.28 
The Single Tax proposal stresses two fundamental points. 
First, it reduces all taxes to one single tax. All others would be extinguished, 
except the extra-fiscal taxes such as customs fees and other non-revenue taxes used 
as instruments of economic policy by the government. No longer would there be an 
individual or corporate income tax, or a sales tax such as the ICMS (a state value-
added tax), or the ISS (a municipal turnover tax on services). Wages would not be 
subjected to any withholdings whatsoever, either as an advance toward income tax or 
to finance social security. Corporations and individuals would no longer have to file 
tax returns of any kind.  
Secondly, the fundamental premise of this proposal lies in transferring the tax 
base exclusively to banking transactions, ending the multiplicity of tax bases that 
exist today. Every time an economic agent makes a payment through the banking 
system there will be a tax incidence assessed to the value of the transaction. The tax 
will be divided into equal parts and charged both to the issuer and the beneficiary of 
the payment. And, importantly, it will not be charged to transactions in the financial 
and capital markets. 
COST EFFECTIVENESS 
The impact of the Single Tax on Bank Transactions model has triggered a 
nationwide movement to reform Brazil’s tax structure. Those who favor a paper-free 
tax system embrace the Single Tax proposal, whereas defenders of paper-driven 
taxes discredit it, stressing its undesirable cumulativeness. 
The single tax has countless advantages as a taxation system. Auditing becomes 
simpler; taxation criteria are more transparent; bureaucratic and compliance costs 
both to the public and to the private sectors are lessened. The simplification of the 
fiscal process becomes evident when all revenue is concentrated in a single tax, 
levied on a single tax base. Public administration costs decrease. 
Only recently have economists and public officials begun to estimate auditing 
and other administrative costs related to tax collection in Brazil. The results of such 
studies are leading to important conclusions about the advantages and disadvantages 
of alternative tax models. 
In the United States, federal tax collection costs equal 0.5% of revenue. For 
personal income tax, the compliance costs for individual taxpayers represent from 5 
                                                 
28
 The underlying cause of the hyper development of the banking system and of the generalized 
rejection of paper currency as a means of payment in Brazil is the result of the hyperinflation spiral 
that took place during nearly 40 years. Under those circumstances, non-indexed paper currency was 
abandoned by economic agents. Furthermore, banking activity, stimulated by ‘float’ that resulted from 
high inflation, increased its profitability in direct proportion to the speed with which bank deposits 
could be captured and quickly transferred to be invested in the open market. This led to the use of 
advanced electronic technology and to the hyper development of banking activity in Brazil.  
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to 7% of the revenue raised by the federal and state income tax systems combined.29 
Administrative tax costs in the United States are estimated at 1.13% of revenue. 
Compliance costs related to sales tax are estimated to be 3.93% of revenue.30 In 
1986, the cost of fiscal administration in France was 3 to 4% of revenue, or 1.5% of 
GDP, not including private compliance costs.31 Data from research conducted in 
other countries and reported at the International Fiscal Association Conference in 
Rio de Janeiro in 1988 are reproduced in TABLE 1. 
TABLE 1 
Tax compliance and administrative costs, as a percentage of GDP 
Country Compliance costs Administrative costs Operational tax costs 
Germany 2.40% 0.60% 3.00% 
Argentina 1.30% No data No data 
Canada No data 0.40% No data 
France No data 1.50% No data 
Israel 1.10% 0.50% 1.60% 
Netherlands 1.50% No data No data 
Portugal No data 0.70% No data 
United Kingdom 1.00% 0.50% 1.50% 
Sweden 0.70% 0.30% 1.00% 
Switzerland No data 0.70% No data 
Australia 2.10% 0.20% 2.30% 
New Zealand 2.50% 0.50% 3.00% 
Brazil (total) 0.80% 0.20% 1.00% 
Brazil (firms with gross income 
up to R$ 100,000,000) 5.80% 1.50% 7.30% 
Brazil (firms with gross income 
From R$ 100 to 1,000,000,000) 1.90% 0.50% 2.40% 
Brazil (firms with gross income 
From R$ 1 to 5,000,000,000) 1.30% 0.30% 1.60% 
Brazil (firms with gross income 
From R$ 1 to 5,000,000,000) 0.20% 0.05% 0.25% 
     Source: [BERTOLUCCI, 2001] p.163. 
 
In Brazil, tax administration costs to the government are probably much higher, 
not only because of the inefficiency of the tax collection apparatus, but also because 
of the multiplicity of fiscal obligations to which individuals and corporations are 
                                                 
29
 [SLEMROD and SORUM, 1984]. [TANZI, 2006], p. 14, referring to a study made by Edwards C., 
of the Cato Institute in Washington  mentions that in the US the federal income tax  legislation had 
400 pages in 1913, when it was first introduced, 8200 pages of rules in 1945, 26300 pages in 1984, 
and 66498 pages in 2006. 
30
 According to [THE ECONOMIST, 2005(a)], p.25, tax legislation in the US is over 60.000 pages 
long, and annual tax compliance costs amount to US$ 115 billion.; see also [THE ECONOMIST, 
2005(b)], pp.59-61, and [THE ECONOMIST, 2004(b)]. 
31
 For estimates of compliance costs in the world see [GALLAGHER, 2004], p.9. 
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subjected. Add to these the costs of tax reporting to which private agents are 
subjected in Brazil, and it is no exaggeration to state that total costs can be as high as 
20% of tax revenue. This is unproductive effort, which translates solely into 
expenditures, without in any way contributing to increases in production or social 
well-being. 
It is worthwhile noting the statements made by former Secretary of Federal 
Revenue, Everardo Maciel, while testifying before the Comissão Parlamentar de 
Inquérito [Parliamentary Inquiry Committee] (CPI) on May 8, 2002. The Secretary’s 
sympathy for the CPMF (a bank transactions tax used in Brazil since 1996 and which 
would be the hegemonic tax in the single tax model) is noteworthy. He said, “my 
presence here is solely to quickly state for the record that the bank debit transaction 
tax  (CPMF) has been an extremely valuable instrument from a revenue collection 
standpoint, precisely because it manages to produce public revenue at low cost, with 
extreme efficiency, and, additionally, serves primarily as an auxiliary instrument for 
tax auditing.” 
Nevertheless, when asked about the Single Tax model, Secretary Maciel stated, 
“Even if I were totally favorable that the CPMF be converted into a permanent tax, I 
recognize nonetheless that if we go to the trough too eagerly, that is, if its tax rates 
increases, we could begin to induce ever more sophisticated, ever more elaborate tax 
evasion procedures. My experience tells me that anytime the rate increases, anytime 
fiscal pressure turns heavy, taxpayers will seek ways to free themselves of it, and 
usually through tax evasion. The second point, and Deputy Marcos Cintra knows 
this, I do not believe that the Single Tax is the best solution for the tax system. We 
have a large cast of alternatives and options. Rest assured, your Excellencies that 
every time we build a tax system around a single point, taxpayers will try to run 
away from that point; they will try to find a way to dodge it. So, we must always have 
somewhere else to go; if we do not reach it through this avenue, we will reach it 
through another. And that has been the history of taxes throughout the world; this is 
how tax theories developed. But I think that, today, the bank debit transaction tax 
(CPMF) occupies a place of capital importance, a place of distinction in tax theory, 
especially for taxation in countries that have weak tax collection traditions, as is the 
case in Brazil.”  
Though Secretary Everardo Maciel argues for the permanence of a bank 
transactions tax, the fear of possible evasion blocks him from fully supporting the 
Single Tax. Ironically, the bank transaction tax has been showing strong evidence to 
be capable of minimizing, if not eliminating, tax avoidance in Brazil. 
It is also worth noting an opinion that claims that criticisms of the Single Tax 
are born of “...small and easily correctible details which are enumerated in order to 
bombard the most brilliant idea, I dare say, that has ever arisen on tax matters in 
modern times, in the era of financial capitalism, not by the fact that it is single, but 
primarily because of the characteristics of the tax, which is practically impervious to 
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evasion. Therein resides the fear of its creation.”32 
THE CREATION OF THE IPMF/CPMF 
Less than three years after the Single Tax proposal was published, it was 
quickly misused by the government into becoming one more tax laid atop the many 
others already existing in Brazil. 
Indeed, ignoring the single tax philosophy, in 1993 the government proposed the 
creation of a bank transaction tax (the IPMF - Provisional Bank Debit Tax - 
instituted that year), initially for the purpose of helping eliminate the public deficit, 
and later with the express purpose of financing health expenditures (called CPMF, 
created in 1996). The Brazilian stabilization plan (known as the Real Plan) put an 
end to the inflationary tax, and the federal government chose to increase tax revenue 
in order to balance the budget. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s fiscal policy 
was responsible for raising tax revenue from 27.9% of GDP in 1994 to almost 32% 
of GDP in 2001 (in 2008 it reached 36% of GDP). The CPMF greatly contributed to 
this result, raising revenues at an extremely low collection cost to the Government. 
Criticism soon began to be heard, claiming that such a tax would be harmful to 
domestic production, especially due to its cumulativeness. Even though historical 
facts proved false many catastrophic prophecies attributed to a tax on bank 
transactions, such belief persists up to the present moment, to the point of making 
public opinion believe that the main distortion that must be eradicated from Brazil’s 
tax system is the cumulativeness of taxes such as the CPMF.  
To rebut such argument I published an article in Folha de São Paulo [the most 
important newspaper in the country] in which I defended the CPMF as an efficient 
tax mechanism, despite its misuse by the Government.33 
The CPMF achieved several intents: to guarantee fiscal equilibrium, to fund 
public health expenditures, to capitalize an anti-poverty fund, to detect tax evaders, 
and to finance the impact of an increase in the minimum wage. Nevertheless, its 
opponents persistently refuse to acknowledge its qualities, such as bringing relief to 
taxpayers from necessary increases in other taxes. After all, if the CPMF did not 
exist, conventional taxes, which are almost always inefficient and inequitable, would 
necessarily have higher rates, adding to the heavy burden already borne by 
taxpayers. 
The CPMF, which is the backbone of the Single Tax proposal, is a revenue-
effective tax. Despite the fact that some economic distortions can be attributed to it, 
its advantages far outweigh its disadvantages. 
The usual objection to the CPMF has to do with the harmful impacts of its 
cumulativeness on the financial markets and on foreign trade. This is an undeserved 
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 [BARRETO, 1998], p.26. 
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criticism. There is nothing to prevent the government from exempting exports, from 
taxing imports in identical conditions as those applied to domestic products, and 
from exempting the turnover in financial and capital markets from taxation. It is 
worth mentioning that government authorities have been making considerable efforts 
to improve tax exemption mechanisms for exports and to levy an Economic 
Equalization Contribution on imports in order to remove any tax discrimination 
against domestic production. 
The CPMF has one undeniable advantage, conveniently ignored by several of its 
critics: it eliminates the greatest anomaly present in the current Brazilian tax system, 
namely, the artificial differences in production costs caused by widespread tax 
evasion. Because the Brazilian tax system provides generous possibilities for 
evasion, the pattern of tax incidence becomes extremely uneven, leading to even 
more serious economic distortion than the alleged changes in relative prices caused 
by turnover taxes such as the CPMF. In fact, by making evasion practically 
impossible, the CPMF attenuates this serious distortion, as will be shown in the next 
chapter. 
Nevertheless, it irritates and enrages powerful interest groups because of this 
evasion-proof form of operation. For the CPMF, the cost of tax avoidance usually 
exceeds tax savings. This is the greatest advantage of this type of non-declaratory 
tax. Because of its evasion-free characteristic, it allows for low rates. 
This tax also displeases tax collectors, tax accountants, and attorneys who both 
defend and prosecute tax evaders, as it makes their intervention in the fiscal process 
unnecessary. This type of tax reduces costs, eliminates corruption, and results in a 
pattern of incidence exactly proportional to the volume of financial transactions 
performed by taxpayers. By doing so, those who presently are disproportionately 
overtaxed, such as payroll wage earners will be taxed less, heavily while tax evaders 
will pay their share. This is the essence of the Single Tax proposal. 
The issue of cumulativeness is an easily refutable criticism raised against this 
type of electronic tax, as will be shown later. What must be stressed is that the main 
objective of tax reform in Brazil is to eliminate the main source of strong economic 
distortions in Brazil, which is tax avoidance and tax evasion, which are encouraged 
by the conventional taxes that make up its current tax system.34 Furthermore, the 
increasing complexity and irrationality the Government has introduced into the 
Brazilian tax system in the last decades encourages informality and other forms of 
tax avoidance, producing corruption and an unfair pattern of tax incidence. 
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 [CINTRA, 2001(a); [CINTRA, 2001(b)]. 
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TURNOVER VERSUS VALUE-ADDED TAXES: DISTORTIONS AND 
ADVANTAGES35 
Productivity and competitiveness 
A BNDES paper states that cumulative taxes such as a bank transaction tax “are 
easier to collect and pay.”, whereas valued added taxes are “more complex to 
calculate and even to comprehend.” 36 
Arguing their opposition to cumulative taxes, the authors list two of their 
undesirable characteristics, supposedly inexistent in VATs. They say cumulative 
taxes “are most damaging to the competitiveness of domestic production because of 
the difficulty in exempting their incidence on exported goods and because of the 
advantage they grant to imports, which usually are not subjected to the same 
treatment in the country of origin.” 
Concerning this observation, it is interesting to note the reaction of Professor J. 
A. Scheinkman when invited to lecture on trade competitiveness and tax 
harmonization in Brazil. He said, “Competitiveness is a notion that does not make 
sense for a country as a whole. All countries have greater or lesser competitiveness 
in different products.” He adds, “The idea that the tax system… affects 
competitiveness, as I see it, does not make sense.” 37 
Professor Scheinkman demonstrates that tax evasion and the informal economy 
are factors that depress an economy’s productivity. If a tax system induces high rates 
of tax evasion and avoidance, productivity loses its correlation with investments in 
technology, or with administrative and managerial efficiency. A company that has 
low production costs may be less “competitive” when compared to a company that 
evades taxes, even if the tax evader has significantly higher cost of production. This 
causes inefficient companies to survive and depresses a country’s economic 
productivity. Because Brazil’s tax system encourages tax evasion and the flight to 
the informal economy, it “depresses productivity in a very significant way”. We see, 
therefore, that “national competitiveness” is not hurt by cumulativeness, but rather 
by a tax system that induces tax evasion, as usually occurs when conventional 
declaratory taxes are employed. 
He adds, “The need for tax reform has nothing to do with matters of the 
country’s integration into a trade bloc,” and, “we need a tax reform that is taken 
seriously, that lowers the high rates prevalent in Brazil which make people simply 
avoid and evade taxes.” 
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 For comprehensive discussions of VAT´s, especially of its advantages and problems in emerging 
countries that lack strong fiscal tradition, see the following works: [BIRD, 2003], [BIRD and 
GENDRON, 1998, 2000, 2001(b), and 2005], [PIFFANO, 2003, 2007], [FENOCHIETTO and 
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 [AFFONSO and ARAUJO, 2000]. 
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In other words, removing cumulative taxes will not increase the economy’s 
productivity and competitiveness. Their elimination will result in the need for higher 
rates of conventional taxes in order to keep revenues constant and, therefore will lead 
to increased tax evasion. The great villain of the current tax system is not 
cumulativeness per se, but rather tax evasion that results from the complexity and 
high rates inherent in current declaratory tax models. 
It should also be noted that adequate tax policy can fully remove the 
“disadvantages” of cumulative taxes pointed out in the BNDES paper mentioned 
above. In fact, the tax reform the Government announced in July 2001 moved in 
exactly these two directions; that is, zero-rating for exports and the creation of a bank 
transaction tax on imported goods and services. The objective of these measures was 
to guarantee absolute isonomy between domestic and foreign producers, which 
redresses the two criticisms of the CPMF presented by the authors of the BNDES 
paper. 38 
Allocative Efficiency 
Cumulative taxes are often criticized on the basis of comparisons with value-
added taxes. In general tax analysts follow the usual text-book conclusions that make 
extensive use of optimal tax theory in reaching normative conclusions about their 
respective impacts on allocative efficiency. Such conclusions, however, are fragile to 
the extent that such theoretical work depends heavily on strong assumptions, which 
are seldom, or never, found in the real world.  
Good economic analysis requires that each type of tax be evaluated not only for 
its intrinsic characteristics, but must also take account of the empirical circumstances 
surrounding its application. Failure to consider these circumstances, coupled with a 
naïve, automatic and uncontested acceptance of the simplifying hypothesis found in 
the theoretical compendia of public finance, implies running the risk of making gross 
mistakes. Such is the case when the VAT is discussed in Brazil. 39 
One advantage claimed on behalf of VATs is that they cause fewer distortions in 
relative prices than would be caused by cumulative taxes. However, for this 
statement to be true, one must accept the premise that perfectly competitive markets 
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 A project which I sponsored as a Member of Congress (Chamber of Deputies; Bill for Supplemental 
Law No. 190/2001), creates an Equalization Contribution with the purpose of guaranteeing equal 
competitive conditions between imports and local products. Such tax has long been considered 
necessary as can be seen in various specialized papers. See [FIESP, 2001] and also [VARSANO et 
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exist, such as assumed in conventional optimal tax theories, based on excess-burden 
analytics.40 
We know, however, that such a hypothesis is essentially heuristic and that, in 
practice, markets do not meet the criteria needed to be considered perfect. As stated 
by the Federal Revenue Service “the superiority of value-added taxes in terms of 
distortionary impacts is readily recognized in the case of easily administered tax 
systems that are nationally harmonized, with low evasion rates…and with one or two 
tax rates. However, given the actual restrictions, and considering that the ideal 
situation cannot be easily reached in the short run, it is wise to adjust the debate and 
avoid making decisions which can hurt the system”41.   
In an interesting paper that seeks to establish normative conclusions on the 
allocative impact of different taxes, Cláudia and Ibrahim Eris use Leontief’s linear 
model in seeking tax policy guidelines. They write, “the task of ranking taxes as 
‘better’ or ‘worse’ is very complex, even in simple models such as the one adopted 
above; and the literature on this matter has been reduced to a few scarce studies that 
are sometimes even erroneous.” 42 The authors conclude by saying, “truthfully, the 
world of Public Finance is a second-best world, and as such the traditional graphs 
of utility frontiers are often irrelevant, because the system’s distortions place the 
economy at a point below such frontiers. The upward movement of the utility frontier 
says nothing about the point (below the frontier) in which the economy finds itself.” 
On the validity of policy prescriptions of optimal tax theory it is worth quoting 
Frank Hahn, who says “…while these studies have increased our understanding of 
what is involved, the tax formulas which they contain cannot be taken very 
seriously…Welfare economics is the grammar of arguments about policy, not the 
policy.” 43   
On this same line of thought Sandmo states that “The theory obviously has its 
limitations. It is at its best in yielding rules for the optimal structuring of a given tax 
system and has less to contribute to the discussion of major problems of tax reform, 
which typically involves the choice between alternative tax systems. A difficulty with 
the extension of the theory to cover these global problems is that the costs of 
administration have not been incorporated into the theory; this is one aspect of the 
neglect of transactions costs in the theory of general equilibrium….This raises the 
question of whether optimum tax formulae can have any claim to be taken seriously, 
given that they abstract from such central concerns as administrative costs and 
incomplete information….it may well be that we shall find the models of optimal 
taxation to be useful, even though we may have to supplement them with 
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considerations which are exogenous to the models themselves.”44  
Indeed, welfare theory demonstrates that society will not choose a point which 
is allocatively efficient if, compared to another situation (even if inefficient), it is 
capable of reaching a superior point in its social welfare function. In other words, 
even though ideally the VATs may theoretically introduce fewer distortions in 
relative prices, it is possible that cumulative taxes would be preferable if, for 
example, it can be proven that it decreases tax evasion, or that it requires a lower 
nominal tax rate to collect a given amount of revenue, and as a result the pattern of 
tax incidence is considered more acceptable to society, as demonstrated below. 45 
It is generally assumed that efficiency is the only criterion for choosing a 
particular allocation of resources. However, even assuming a perfectly competitive 
economy, one may not state that a Pareto-efficient allocative situation resulting from 
such market configuration will necessarily maximize social welfare. 
The implication of this statement is that one cannot guarantee that the use of a 
neutral tax, such as the VAT is assumed to be (even though in fact it may not always 
be so), will necessarily maximize the social utility function. Distributive 
considerations can make possible the attainment of a higher point in the social 
welfare function of a society through the use of a cumulative tax. In other words, 
from the standpoint of maximizing the social welfare function of an economy, the 
use of a tax that is non-neutral and “inefficient” from an allocative standpoint, and 
thus configuring a Pareto-inefficient situation, may be preferable to a Pareto-efficient 
position resulting from the use of a neutral tax. This possibility demonstrates the 
error contained is statements to the effect that VATs are necessarily better and 
always preferable to cumulative taxation. 
A resource allocation is Pareto-efficient if, in order to improve one person’s 
position it is necessary to worsen the situation of at least one other individual. A 
situation is deemed Pareto-superior if, it is possible to improve one person’s initial 
welfare state without diminishing another’s. 
The Fundamental Theorem of Social Welfare Economics says that if producers 
and consumers act competitively, strictly as price takers, a market in perfect 
competition will produce a Pareto-efficient situation. 
To maximize utility, consumers will equate prices of goods and services to their 
respective marginal utilities; that is, with two products (X and Y) and two consumers 
(A and B), the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between the products will be 
equal to their relative prices (P(X)/P(Y) If consumers are price takers, 
MRS (A) = MRS (B) = P(X)/P(Y).   (1) 
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This equality is a necessary condition for a Pareto-efficient situation in an 
exchange market economy. 
In an Edgeworth Box (GRAPH 1), the points where the condition expressed by 
equation (1) is satisfied are found on the Contract Curve that results from the 
tangential points between the indifference curves for consumers A and B. 
 
GRAPH 1 
The Contract Curve: Efficiency in an exchange economy 
 
 
Assuming perfect competition and that the production of X and Y requires the 
use of scarce resources, firms will maximize their profits equating product prices 
with their marginal costs (MgC). Firms are also price takers. Thus, P(X) = MgC(X), 
and P(Y) = MgC(Y). 
From the Transformation Curve (GRAPH 2), we know that a Pareto-efficient 
situation requires the impossibility of increasing production of one good without 
reducing production of another, from which results that the marginal rate of 
transformation (MRT) in production of both goods be equal to their relative prices. 
MRT= MgC(X)/MgC(Y) = P(X)/P(Y).   (2) 
Considering equations (1) and (2), it follows that MRT= MRS (A) = MRS (B).  
Thus, producers and consumers, as price takers in competitive markets and acting so 
as to maximize profits and utilities, will produce a set of Pareto-efficient positions in 
production and in exchange. 
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GRAPH 2 
The Transformation Curve: Efficiency in a production economy  
 
 
GRAPH 3 depicts the points of competitive equilibrium in a production and 
exchange economy. Considering an initial factor endowment distribution between 
individuals A and B, competitive markets will result in such prices and costs of X 
and Y as given by the marginal rate of transformation T.  It is important to remember 
that, starting at an initial point O of factor distribution, it will be possible to achieve a 
Pareto-efficient point located in the Contract Curve. Through exchange and 
production adjustments, the economy will move from the initial point O and attain a 
Pareto-efficient point E where competitive equilibrium is reached.  
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GRAPH 3 
Competitive equilibrium: 
Efficiency in a production and exchange economy 
 
 
The question now is to find out whether the Pareto-efficient situation resulting 
from a given initial factor endowment and from the functioning of a competitive 
market will always be preferable to any other possible situation. The response is 
clearly negative.  
A Pareto-inefficient point can be socially preferable to the point of competitive 
equilibrium. GRAPH 4 demonstrates such a situation. Given an initial endowment, 
competitive equilibrium is found at E1. Can one, however, state that this point is 
preferable to point M?  E1 is a competitive equilibrium, and therefore Pareto-
efficient, solution, while M is a point not on the Contract Curve and, therefore, is 
inefficient. 
Point M could be preferred if the Social Welfare Function attributes value to the 
pattern of wealth and income distribution among individuals A and B.  Point E1 
determines a strong concentration of wealth in favor of individual B. If society 
prefers a more equitable pattern of distribution, point M could be preferable, even 
though it is inefficient from an allocative standpoint.  Pareto-efficiency alone is 
insufficient to assess social preferences of a society. I addition to a mere evaluation 
of allocative efficiency, it may become necessary to use other criteria for choosing a 
social optimum.46 
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 With alteration of the relative prices of P(X)/P(Y) to P(X)’)/P(Y)’ it is possible to achieve Pareto-
efficiency point E2, a Pareto–superior point relative to point M. What can be said, then, is that if there 
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GRAPH 4 
Efficiency and distribution 
 
 
GRAPH 5 shows the Utility Possibility Frontier (UPC) between individuals A 
and B resulting from the Contract Curve in GRAPH 4. Given the utility functions of 
A and B, U(A) = U(X,Y), and U(B) = V(X,Y), each point on the Contract Curve 
determines a point on the UPC.  Assuming a Social Welfare Function W = W(U(A), 
U(B)) that reflects the preferences of society, it is possible to construct the Social 
Indifference Curves (IS). The maximization of social welfare occurs at the Pareto-
efficiency point W.  Pareto-efficient point E1, however, is inferior to Pareto-
inefficient point M, from the standpoint of social values of such a society.  In this 
example, it prefers a more equitable income distribution, even though it implies an 
inefficient solution from the standpoint of competitive equilibrium. 
                                                                                                                                          
is a Pareto-inefficient point socially preferable to a given Pareto-efficient solution, there will always 
be another preferable Pareto-efficient point on the Contract Curve. In other words, a point in the 
Contract Curve is not always Pareto-superior to any other point not situated on it. But there will 
always be a point on the Contract Curve which is Pareto-superior a point not situated on it.  
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GRAPH 5 
Utility Possibility Curve (UPC) 
Maximization of social welfare 
 
 
The Fundamental Theorem of Social Welfare Economics proves that under 
perfect competition the market searches for an efficient competitive equilibrium at 
some point on the Utility Possibility Curve. Nothing guarantees, however, that it will 
be the point of maximum social utility. 
It is possible to draw parallels between this situation and choices involving 
taxation. 
Tax systems based on value-added taxes suffer from higher evasion rates than 
do cumulative tax systems, such as a bank transactions tax. Though we admit that 
theoretically VATs are neutral, and therefore more efficient from an allocative point 
of view (although this may not be true from an empirical standpoint), we cannot 
conclude that they necessarily result in a resource allocation pattern capable of 
maximizing the Social Utility Function. This stems from the perverse distributive 
consequences caused by VATs’ patterns of tax incidence, such as higher rates of 
evasion and higher administrative and operational costs, as compared to cumulative 
taxes on bank transactions. 
In other words, there is a trade-off between tax efficiency and social evaluation 
of alternative patterns of tax incidence. A non-neutral tax, such as the bank 
transactions tax, may be preferable from the social standpoint because it drains less 
real resources from society due to its lower operational and compliance costs, and 
also because it does not encourage evasion, and therefore has a better pattern of 
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incidence than is the case with VATs. 
GRAPHs 6 and 7 demonstrate a situation in which a tax introduces distortions, 
but at the same time is preferred by society. 
Initially, the economy is at competitive equilibrium E.  It is a Pareto-optimal 
situation, with income distribution favoring individual B.  However, the government 
seeks a fiscal policy that aims to redistribute income in favor of individual A, and 
therefore wants the economy to be located at a point in the shaded area, where social 
preferences for greater equity in income distribution are satisfied, preferably at some 
point along the contract curve within the area of the government’s preference. 
GRAPH 6 
Tax policy, evasion, and competitive equilibrium 
 
 
One option is to adopt a conventional tax model, such as a VAT, which is 
considered to be neutral and efficient from the standpoint of relative-price 
determination, such as point E1.  In order for this new equilibrium to be attained, 
relative prices would have to be P(X)1/P(Y)1, compatible with the competitive 
equilibrium E1. 
However, if the conventional VAT tax model stimulates evasion, the change to 
point E1 will be frustrated, re-concentrating income and dislocating the new 
equilibrium, to E2, outside the government’s area of preference. In this sense, the 
option of a Pareto-inefficient solution as the point E* can be preferable, even if it is 
not a competitive equilibrium solution. In this situation the economy will stand at 
point E*, with relative prices that are incompatible with a Pareto-optimal situation 
given by the tangency point between the Indifference Curves I(A) and I(B) on the 
Contract Curve.  However, this point (E*), as demonstrated in GRAPH 7, is 
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preferable to points E and E2, despite the fact that it is Pareto-inferior relative to the 
solution originally desired by the government, point E1. 
GRAPH 7 
Tax policy and social welfare 
 
 
What these examples demonstrate is that one cannot state a priori that the best 
tax policy must necessary be made up of taxes that are considered allocatively 
efficient. In principle, neither cumulative nor any other type of tax system should be 
rejected strictly due to judgments about their allocative efficiency.  There may be 
room for them in configuring a tax system capable of improving the social welfare of 
an economy. It is an empirical question. 
A second reason why one cannot state a priori that a VAT is preferable to a 
turnover tax is that the assumptions required for a perfectly competitive market to 
exist are not usually met in the real world. What happens when the conditions for 
obtaining a Pareto optimum are not met?  Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, in 
pioneer writing on “second-best economics”, discussed this issue in 1956.47 
The second-best theory has shown that it is impossible to reliably rank different 
market situations without empirical analysis of each specific scenario. “The general 
theorem for the second best optimum states that if there is introduced into a general 
equilibrium system a constrain which prevents the attainment of one of the Paretian 
conditions, the other Paretian conditions, although still attainable, are, in general, 
                                                 
47
 [LIPSEY and LANCASTER, 1956]. 
 - 41 - 
no longer desirable. In other words, given that one of the Paretian optimum 
conditions cannot be fulfilled, then an optimum situation can be achieved only by 
departing from all other Paretian conditions. The optimum situation finally attained 
may be termed a second best optimum because it is achieved subject to a constraint 
which, by definition, prevents the attainment of a Paretian optimum. From this 
theorem there follows the important negative corollary that there is no a priori way 
to judge as between various situations in which some Paretian optimum conditions 
are fulfilled, while others are not. Specifically, it is not true that a situation in which 
more, but not all, of he optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or even likely, 
to be superior to a situation with in which fewer are fulfilled….It follows from the 
above that there is no a priori way to judge as between various situations in which 
none of the Paretian optimum conditions are fulfilled. In particular, it is not true 
than a situation in which all departures from the optimum conditions are of the same 
direction and magnitude is necessarily superior to one in which the deviations vary 
in direction and magnitude.”48  
The “second best” theorem proves that if any one of the conditions necessary for 
obtaining a Pareto Optimum situation is not satisfied, then the best possible situation 
( the second-best) in general can only be attained if all other Pareto conditions are 
relaxed. In other words, as stated by Paul Samuelson “a given divergence in a subset 
of the optimum conditions necessitates alterations in the remaining ones”. 
What is interesting in this theorem is the counterintuitive result that sometimes 
when one variable does not achieve its desired value, the best policy choice will 
involve moving other variables away from their first-best position. 
Obviously, the postulates of the second best theorem are violated when critics of 
cumulative taxes, such as the bank transactions tax, declare, a priori, that value-
added taxes are more efficient than turnover taxes. Thus, the ranking of alternative 
tax regimes become problematic in the presence of market failures, tax avoidance, 
transaction costs, and other important departures from the postulates of perfect and 
complete markets.  
According to second-best theory, as interpreted by J.A. Kay, “tax reform 
proposals must not be evaluated by counting the number of distortions, and 
arguments based on ‘double-taxation’ disregard the fact that it is the relative level of 
taxation, not the number of times the tax is levied, which is relevant in economic 
decision-making.”49  
One must recall that economic models impose conditions, hypothesis, and 
assumptions from which logical conclusions are drawn. The conclusions of a model 
depend on satisfying a set of given conditions for equilibrium. In economics, 
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conditions of equilibrium depend on the behavior of consumers and producers who 
seek to simultaneously optimize their objective functions. Economic models usually 
assume a large number of behavioral hypotheses and conditions. One can assert that 
a second-best situation occurs when all conditions of equilibrium are not 
simultaneously met. 
Lancaster and Lipsey demonstrated that usually when a single condition of 
equilibrium is not met, all other conditions must be altered, that is, satisfying all 
other conditions of equilibrium falls short of being the optimal behavior of economic 
agents. Therefore, it is possible to state that under such conditions, in order to 
achieve optimal equilibrium, the introduction of other distortions that correct the 
initial distortion may become necessary. 
Therefore, given that the real world does not satisfy the rigorous requirements 
for achieving a Pareto optimum, it is easy to understand the futility of systematically 
avoiding the introduction of economic variables deemed to be allocatively inefficient 
on the arguments that society wishes to reach a perfectly competitive equilibrium. 
Usually, in order to achieve allocative efficiency targets that are almost always 
unachievable, such arguments ignore considerations about equity and income 
distribution, about fairness and about public and private costs.  In so doing, issues of 
equity and ethics are sacrificed, albeit their importance when it comes to maximizing 
the social welfare function. 
This is an important argument in the debate on tax reform in Brazil, where fierce 
battle is waged between those who support taxes that are deemed more efficient, 
such as the VAT, and those who call for bank transaction taxes, which are fairer 
because they are less prone to evasion. 
In the debate, which involves matters of efficiency versus equity, the 
conclusions of the second-best theory become highly relevant, in that they demystify 
the need to attempt to satisfy competitive equilibrium conditions at any cost, even if 
this means reducing levels of social welfare, and compromising the social goals of 
tax justice and equity. 
But perhaps, the most deadly criticism of the neo-classical analytics used in 
appraising the efficiency of taxation through the measurement of the excess burden 
caused by each type of tax (inspired by the path-breaking formulations of optimal 
taxation by Edgeworth and Ramsey) comes from the School of Public Choice led by 
James Buchanan and Richard Wagner.  
“Excess burden is used widely throughout public finance for both normative and 
positive analyses…Both the normative and the positive uses of excess burden in 
contemporary fiscal theory start from the same analytical point of departure, where 
a tax is said to distort some margin of choice. The analytical task is then to appraise 
the extent of the loss brought by the distortion.  Although (excess burden) is 
generally treated as a universal quality of all but lump-sum taxation…it is not a 
universal quality of taxation, but it is at most a contingent feature of a subset of the 
possible institutional frameworks within which fiscal outcomes emerge. The 
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conventional excess-burden analytics transpose results from individual experiments 
where they do apply, onto market experiments where they do not apply… In an 
exchange each of the participants may well be modeled as maximizing utility, but 
there is nothing that is maximizing over the set of those participants…In 
democracies, taxation is something that citizens do to themselves…taxation emerges 
from inside the body politic of taxpayers…taxation in a democratic regime cannot 
lower utility for everyone …(excess-burden approaches to taxation) are inept 
because they show everyone losing utility…To the extent governance is mutually 
beneficial…there is no excess burden from taxation because taxation is the price that 
allows gains from trade to be exploited…” Wagner concludes by stating that “Within 
the context of democratic ideology, even if perhaps not democratic practice, taxation 
would seem to be judged good or bad according to its ability to facilitate or impede 
mutually profitable fiscal exchange and not according to some excess burden metric 
that is assessed independently of the fiscal process and the institutions that frame it. 
Excess burden would seem truly to be a grin without a cat.50  
Such considerations give weight to tax appraisals which are based on each tax’s 
own advantages and disadvantages, independently of the alleged allocative 
distortions derived from conventional neoclassical analyses. As will be shown by the 
simulations presented in the next chapter, even according to conventional excess-
burden metrics, VATs can be more distortionary than cumulative taxes if we assume 
the existence of evasion and of differential tax rates among products.  
Furthermore, it will be shown that they also introduce other serious distortions 
as they require comparatively higher tax rates for any given revenue target and 
impose extremely high operational and compliance costs. Cumulative taxes are 
levied on the total value of production, whereas VATs are levied solely on wages, 
profits, interests, and rents at each stage of the productive process. Consequently, for 
a given revenue target, the VATs need rates that are higher than those of cumulative 
taxes. This means taxing factors, including labor, at rates that are higher than those 
of cumulative taxes. Thus, it is clear that VATs discriminate against labor, especially 
in the highly labor intensive sectors, such as the service sector. 
According to the well-known Meade Report51 on tax reform in the United 
Kingdom “the economist distinguishes between the ‘income effect’ and the 
‘substitution effect’ of a tax burden.... ‘income’ effects are not a symptom of 
economic efficiency… but ‘substitution’ effects are an indication of economic 
inefficiencies and wastes… Avoidance of economic inefficiencies would involve 
avoidance of high marginal rate of tax where these substitution sensitivities were 
great. One corollary of this need to keep marginal tax rates down is a general 
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presumption in favor of tax systems which provide a broad basis for revenue-raising 
purposes. To raise a given revenue by means of low rates of tax spread over a large 
tax base may be assumed to cause less marked ‘substitution’ distortions than to raise 
the same revenue by concentrating high rates of tax on a few activities, unless 
special circumstances suggest that those particular activities show exceptionally low 
substitution sensitivities”.  
Regarding the allocative effects of a tax system, it should be observed that, 
ideally, in order to minimize distortions, taxes should not cause any changes in 
economic decisions that would have been made in the absence of taxes. The ideal tax 
system would minimize dead-weight tax loss. However, we know that only a tax on 
life, that is, a fixed value per capita tax would achieve this desideratum. But being 
an unacceptable option in modern societies, we are left with trying to minimize, not 
avoid, losses in efficiency. Thus, a basic rule would be the use of taxes with high 
average rates, but low marginal rates, as recommended by Martin Feldstein when he 
says that it is the marginal tax rates that determine their dead-weight loss caused by 
excess-burden.52 Because economic decisions are always made at the margin, the use 
of taxes with this characteristic would be more desirable than taxes that show equal 
average and marginal rates (such as VATs), or even marginal rates that are higher 
than average rates (such as a progressive income tax).53 
Thus we see that, by requiring lower marginal rates for raising a given revenue 
target, the bank transaction tax can be less distortionary than value-added taxes, 
which require significantly higher marginal rates. This assertion clears up the 
mistake that surrounds assertions about the supposedly natural evils of 
cumulativeness and the supposedly natural merits of value-added taxes. The Meade 
Report actually concludes that, “it is an impossible task to trace through the 
complete efficiency and distributional effects of a tax change in a complex economy 
in which there is a complicated network of market and productive inter-relationships 
between a large number of products and activities and in which there many kinds of 
market imperfection and of environmental and similar side effects.” 54 
All in all it is important to remember when designing tax systems or when 
proposing tax reform, that theoretical models used by economists require strong 
assumptions for optimality, always highly unrealistic, which turns them into 
inadequate guides for policy purposes.  
“The theory of optimal taxation has, for the past two decades, been the reigning 
                                                 
52
 [FELDSTEIN, 2006]. 
53
 For more on this, see [ECKSTEIN, 1964] p.73. 
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normative approach to taxation. This paper argues that, in its current state, optimal 
tax theory is incomplete as a guide to action concerning many critical issues in tax 
policy. It is incomplete because it has not yet come to terms with taxation as a system 
of coercively collecting revenues from individuals who will tend to resist. The 
coercive nature of collecting taxes implies that the resource cost of implementing a 
tax system has been and will continue to be a critical determinant of appropriate tax 
policy…production efficiency is in general not desirable when there are constraints 
on how commodities and profits can be taxed…that the apparent triumph of 
production efficiency as a goal is somewhat surprising in view of the strong 
assumptions needed to demonstrate its desirability.55  
Joel Slemrod, the author of this quote presents us with a demolishing view of 
optimal tax theory as a guide to policy. Indeed, many of the critical issues in tax 
policy nowadays lie “outside the domain of optimal taxation theory” and of its 
efficiency implications. He goes on to say, “I believe that its critical problem is the 
failure to consider the technology of collecting taxes…the leap from the blackboard 
to the real world is a large one when it comes to taxation…integrating the issue of 
administrative ease into optimal tax theory will require a shift of emphasis away 
from the structure of preferences, which has been the principal focus of optimal tax 
theory, toward the technology of tax collection”. 56 
Also, as quoted elsewhere in this text, Frank Hahn has stated that due to its 
inherent limitations optimal tax theory “cannot be taken very seriously” as policy 
prescriptions.57 
In sum, the entire optimal taxation theory, of which the excess burden analysis 
represents its main analytical construct, has been forcefully challenged by Public 
Choice economists such as James Buchanan and Richard Wagner. Their main 
argument states that conventional excess burden analyses are limited in their 
usefulness at most to a contingent subset of possible institutional frameworks, such 
as a “monopolistic or exploitative state to explain fiscal outcomes”, which represent 
and “secure advantages to the dominant classes or groups at the expense of the 
remainder of society. Such exploitive models assimilate the state more strongly to the 
practice of brigandage and rent extraction than to the supply of public goods”. 
According to them, excess burden analytics are not adequate for modern societies 
that act through a “cooperative state to explain fiscal outcomes… (through which) 
fiscal programs advance the common interests of everyone, evoking images of public 
goods and the benefit principle in the process”. As such, taxation does not allow for 
measurement of losses and of inefficiencies such as implied by excess burden 
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analysis. Instead of being an autocratic regime that rulers impose on their subjects, in 
democracies it becomes a mutual and voluntary relationship among citizens, and 
“taxation is something that citizens do to themselves”. Thus, “taxation in a 
democratic regime cannot lower utility for everyone. At least some people must gain 
utility, and in the limit everyone could gain”. In conclusion, “excess burden analytics 
make no relevant analytical contribution and would seem to represent a grin without 
a cat…there is no excess burden from taxation because taxation is the price that 
allows gains from trade to be exploited.” 58 
Enforcement and compliance 
Another situation could result from comparing the high operational costs of the 
VATs to the cost of tax collecting through cumulative taxes such as bank 
transactions tax or the Single Tax. By being non-declaratory and electronically 
collected, they show extremely low operational costs both to the public and to the 
private sectors. 
The administrative costs of VATs are absurdly high, especially in federative 
countries such as Brazil.59 From an operational perspective, they are complex and 
inefficient if imposed by sub-national governments. VATs are appropriate for 
centralized countries. Few federative nations use them, and the ones that do, incur 
high costs and enormous bureaucratic complications, as happens in Brazil and 
Canada.60 The United States have kept away from them for good reason. And in 
Brazil the attempt to unify the ICMS (a VAT administered by each of the States) is 
warranted by the unfortunate experience of having in place an absurdly complex 
system. 
A paper written in the United Kingdom showed that even in countries with 
centralized administration the operational costs of VATs are high.61 After the 
personal income tax, value-added taxes are the most costly to collect, absorbing 
4.72% of revenue, as shown TABLE 2. Excise taxes carry the lowest operational 
costs. Because they have essentially non-declaratory characteristics, their operational 
cost is only 0.45% of revenue. 
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TABLE 2 
Operational costs of the tax system – United Kingdom 
(1986-1987) 
Tax Revenue Administrative Costs Compliance Costs Total Tax Pounds 
(000,000,000) 
Pounds 
(000,000) % (000,000) % % 
Personal Income Tax and 
contributions 65.1 997 1.53 2,212 3.40 4.93 
VAT 21.4 220 1.03 791 3.69 4.72 
Corporate income tax 13.5 70 0.52 300 2.22 2.74 
Excise 16.5 42 0.25 33 0.20 0.45 
Others 5.8 40 0.70 73 1.25 1.95 
Subtotal (central governments) 122.3 1,369 1.12 3,409 2.79 3.91 
Local governments 15.5 236 1.52 58 0.37 1.89 
Total 137.8 1,605 1.16 3,467 2.52 3.68 
  Source: BERTOLUCCI, A. op.cit. p.52. 
 
Following this line of analysis, the conclusions of the International Symposium 
on Tax Reform, held in São Paulo and attended by some of the world’s major tax 
professionals (including Arnold Harberger, Charles McLure, Richard Bird, James 
Buchanan, Vito Tanzi, Anwar Shah, and John Edwards) were unanimous in 
condemning the Brazilian tax system for empowering sub-national government units 
to collect VATs.62 
Furthermore, in federative countries this type of tax leads to federal tax 
competition, and to the raising of customs barriers between states and even between 
cities. It is the paradise on earth for tax attorneys and corrupt tax collectors. 
Everardo Maciel, former Secretary of the Federal Revenue, said, “we committed 
a grave tax policy mistake in this country during the 1960s. Brazil was extremely 
reckless and bold when it introduced … the value-added tax, the ICM… and imposed 
it down the line until the retail sector. Certainly the country was not prepared for 
this type of tax mainly because of its pervasive culture of tax evasion. Another error 
was committed…making the ICM replace the IVC (a turnover sales tax collected by 
states). Basically, the mistake lay in conferring on the States the competence for 
collecting a value-added tax on consumption, which resulted in two almost insoluble 
problems. The first was related to tax exemptions for exports… the second appeared 
in interstate transactions. Value-added taxes on consumption do not lend themselves 
to co-existing comfortably with federal customs barriers.” 63 
Ives Gandra teaches us that the Gordian knot in tax reform in Brazil rests in the 
ICMS.64 It is a VAT-type tax. The vast majority of countries throughout the world 
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have adopted this type of tax, but almost always under the responsibility of the 
central government. Rarely are they used in federations such as Brazil. The ICMS 
should be a federal tax, not a state tax, and stubbornness in keeping it in the hands of 
the states has caused serious distortions in its operation. 
In Brazil, organized groups use the tax system as a weapon in their political 
battles for conquering greater economic space. The criticisms raised by certain 
groups opposed to more innovative tax reform proposals, such as the Single Tax, are 
markedly pseudo-scientific. As such, they must be interpreted as being merely an 
instrument in the struggle for economic power. 
Intuitive perceptions indicate that tax evasion, fraud and avoidance vary in 
direct proportion to the level of nominal tax rates and to the complexity of the tax 
system in use. Although theoretical models that simulate tax compliance do not come 
to clear conclusions or to correct indications of taxpayers behavior when faced with 
varying tax rates or with changing levels of difficulty in tax assessment procedures, 
it is safe to say that under usual assumptions about risk preferences a rise in the 
marginal tax rate or in revenue-neutral progressivity increases the flight to the 
underground economy and increases the tax gap65. That is, the higher the rates, the 
greater the stimulus and the reward for tax evasion and avoidance, such as suggested 
by the Laffer Curve construct66. It is easy therefore to conclude that VATs stimulate 
tax evasion and avoidance more intensely than do taxes that require lower rates, such 
as certain non-declaratory cumulative taxes. VAT models of taxation are becoming 
increasingly fraud-ridden, even in countries with high ethical standards, as most of 
the European countries.67 
As tax avoidance and evasion increase, new rounds of rate hikes and of 
bureaucratic controls become necessary. Therefore, it is not surprising that in 
countries where the VAT has been imposed, compliance and administrative costs 
have risen continually, leading to rate increases. Paraphrasing Henry Simons, the 
experience with VATs, especially in developing countries, is like “dipping deeply 
with a sieve”.68  
In Brazil, VATs were initially set at 12% and today are at 17% for most 
products; in some cases they reach 25 or even 30%. Therefore, because they require 
higher rates and because they stimulate tax avoidance, VATs show undesirable 
patterns of incidence. Some taxpayers are taxed in excess, whereas many others pay 
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too little, or less than they should. 
In Brazil, the tax system stimulates collusion against the public sector, sales 
without invoices, fake transactions, and “tax planning”. This system creates large-
scale allocative distortions, in which production costs and competitive capacity no 
longer define production efficiency. On the contrary, the competitive capacity of 
businesses depends to a great extent on the administrator’s skill in practicing crafty 
tax avoidance schemes more effectively than his competitors. This stimulates 
survival of the most cunning and domination by the corrupt. Market selectivity no 
longer rewards the most efficient. It is not perchance that in economies with high tax 
avoidance rates, the tax burden falls disproportionately on those who are least 
equipped to avoid taxes, such as wage earners. In Brazil, payroll income accounts for 
52% of the tax burden, but labor income represents only 27% of national income. 
Enforcement and compliance costs are becoming crucial elements in appraising 
the efficiency of tax systems. “The significance of compliance costs and enforcement 
difficulties warrants rethinking basic questions of tax design; perhaps tax rules or 
even tax systems that are desirable in principle should be redesigned in practice, 
sacrificing the original equity and efficiency goals to some extent for the sake of 
improving tax administration”.69 
Differential incidence 
Cumulative taxes may certainly cause typical distortions. They introduce 
changes in relative prices, although such negative effects are greatly eased by their 
low marginal rates. They are less transparent because they are embedded in 
production and in input prices, and they become invisible to the consumer. In the 
case of exports, cumulative taxes require more complex mechanisms for zero-rating, 
although this is a manageable technical problem if detailed inter-industry relations 
matrices are available.  
Another alleged distortion in evaluating bank transactions taxes stems from the 
assumption that being collected cumulatively at each stage of the production process 
they imply high tax burdens on products with “long” production chains. This is a 
mistake. Production chains should never be described as “short” or “long” – they are 
always infinite in their number of transaction links. Production of any good or 
service involves contributions from all other sectors of the economy. It is a circular 
process that necessarily uses inputs from several other sectors which, for their part, 
also need inputs from other sectors, and so on. Therefore, production chains are 
always infinite, never ending. 
What truly determines the tax burden of a cumulative tax is the relationship 
between the value of inputs and the value-added at each stage of the production 
process. For example, if a given production sector buys inputs at a certain price and 
adds an equal amount of value, the cumulativeness carried by the prior production 
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phases is totally imbedded in the price of the acquired inputs. The value-added at this 
step of production does not carry any cumulative effect, and only in the following 
stage of production, when the final product of this stage becomes an input, it begins 
to carry the cumulativeness of previous stages of taxation.  
TABLE 3 reflects this fact, assuming a value-added of 100% of the value of 
acquired inputs. In the example, we assume that the product’s final value is R$ 100, 
and the bank transaction tax has a rate of 1% on each bank credit and debit 
transaction. The data shows that the turnover effects dissipate rapidly when we 
analyze the tax carried over from previous production stages, following a decreasing 
geometric progression. In this example, the total value of tax accumulated into the 
product’s final price is R$ 3.8646; that is, the tax burden on final price is 3.8646%. 
TABLE 3 
Impact of cumulative 
taxation at each stage of the production chain 
 Final Price (R$) Tax at Each Stage (R$) VA (R$) Input (R$) 
T 100.0000 1.97039506 49.0148025 49.01480247 
T-1 49.01480247 0.96578525 24.0245086 24.02450861 
T-2 24.02450861 0.47337773 1.7755654 11.77556544 
T-3 11.77556544 0.23202516 5.7717701 5.77177014 
T-4 5.77177014 0.11372667 2.8290217 2.82902173 
T-5 2.82902173 0.05574290 1.3866394 1.38663941 
T-6 1.38663941 0.02732227 0.6796586 0.67965857 
T-7 0.67965857 0.01339196 0.3331333 0.33313331 
T-8 0.33313331 0.00656404 0.1632846 0.16328463 
T-9 0.16328463 0.00321735 0.0800336 0.08003364 
T-10 0.08003364 0.00157698 0.0392283 0.03922833 
T-11 0.03922833 0.00077295 0.0192277 0.01922769 
T-12 0.01922769 0.00037886 0.0094244 0.00942441 
T-13 0.00942441 0.00018570 0.0046194 0.00461936 
T-14 0.00461936 0.00009102 0.0022642 0.00226417 
T-15 0.00226417 0.00004461 0.0011098 0.00110978 
T-16 0.00110978 0.00002187 0.0005440 0.00054396 
T-17 0.00054396 0.00001072 0.0002666 0.00026662 
T-18 0.00026662 0.00000525 0.0001307 0.00013068 
T-19 0.00013068 0.00000257 0.0000641 0.00006405 
 
One will notice that under the conditions specified in the example, 
cumulativeness carried along the production chain quickly dissipates, reaching a 
value of merely five cents of a real (R$ 0.05), in phase T-5, and quickly moving to 
near-zero values as we move backward in the chain. It can thus be seen that the 
accumulation of taxes occurs with a much less alarming intensity than critics of bank 
transaction taxes would have one believe. In phase T-3 the value of the accumulated 
tax is little more than 5% of the total tax burden on final price, as can be seen in 
ILLUSTRATION 3. 
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ILLUSTRATION 3 
Tax generated per stage of the production chain (VA = 100%) 
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Taking an extreme example, in which the value-added in each step is only 10% 
of the value of acquired inputs, the tax burden contained in the final price reaches 
18.1066%. Notice that even in this case the tax carried over from the previous phase 
of the production chain also drops quickly to near-zero values as we move 
backwards in time. In phase T-6 the value of the tax is only 5% of the total tax 
burden (ILLUSTRATION 4). 
 
ILLUSTRATION 4 
Tax generated per stage of the production chain (VA = 10%) 
y = 2,211e-0,1152x
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ILLUSTRATION 5 shows the impact of cumulativeness on the production 
chain for several levels of value-added. 
Critics claim that the CPMF goes against all modern principles of tax theory and 
contradicts everything other countries are doing. The first part of this comment is 
false, and the second, irrelevant, and deserves no response. 
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ILLUSTRATION 5 
Tax burden in the production chain 
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The myth about the inevitable evils of cumulativeness must be placed in proper 
perspective. No tax is neutral, whether cumulative or on valued added. All taxes 
have advantages and disadvantages, as is widely acknowledged both by critics and 
supporters of bank transaction taxes. And comparing advantages to disadvantages, 
cumulative taxes such as the CPMF show a clearly positive balance. There is no 
evidence, either in Brazil or in other countries, that bank transaction taxes are more 
distortionary than other available alternatives.70 They do not discriminate against 
wages, they have rates that are structurally lower than those of the VATs and, 
therefore, discourage tax evasion and corruption. Furthermore, they have extremely 
low operational costs, almost zero in the case of electronic bank debit taxes such as 
the CPMF. 
CUMULATIVENESS AND THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 
Since the Single Tax proposal was first presented in the early nineties, it has 
been known that transaction taxes impact interest rates in direct proportion to the rate 
of turnover of market financial transactions. This could imply losses to investors and 
would require a corresponding increase in interest rates to offset this effect. 
Furthermore, extending the investment term in order to neutralize the turnover effect 
would imply an unjustified discrimination against short-term investments, although 
proponents of the Tobin Tax see this as a necessary instrument to slow down the 
flow of speculative money around the world. 
I have insistently demonstrated that, because of its cumulative nature, borrowers 
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would have to bear increased costs. For this reason I proposed a specific 
methodology for applying the Single Tax on financial transactions, on the capital 
markets, and on the stock exchange.  
Financial transactions should be considered as rental payments on capital. Thus, 
just as the value of a good being rented in the real market is not taxed by a 
transaction tax (only the value of the flow of services is taxed), the principal in a 
financial transaction should also not be reached by such a tax (only the interest 
payments should).  In a residential rental, the transaction tax is imposed solely on the 
value of the rental flow, and not on the stock value of the real estate being rented out. 
Likewise, in financial transactions only the interest earnings should be taxed, and not 
the capital that produced the earnings. If this were not the case, shorter transaction 
periods would bear higher impact of this tax. This would make short-term 
transactions in the stock market, such as day-trade, too expensive, even 
impracticable. 
According to our proposal, financial transactions would take place only through 
special bank accounts, similar to savings accounts. These special accounts, unlike 
regular checking accounts, would only be allowed to have credits or debits from 
other special accounts, or from the accountholder’s own checking account. Credits in 
the special accounts would be exempt from the tax. Whenever funds are debited 
from a special account and credited to a checking account of the same account 
holder, that portion of the transferred value that represents real returns earned during 
the period in which the funds were held in the special accounts would be 
automatically taxed. Once those funds are released for other uses from the checking 
account they will be taxed like any other transaction. It is worth noticing, that in 
order to improve the application of the CPMF in Brazil, the Central Bank adopted 
similar procedures in 2005. 
Some people fear that applying a transaction tax without those special 
precautions could drastically reduce the already modest returns of short-term funds 
(which are rolled over daily), causing a massive exodus to cash deposits, where they 
would be less taxed. The monetary base could suffer a contraction as the result of the 
increase in the compulsory deposits of the banking system in the Central Bank since 
the rate of compulsory deposits for cash accounts are approximately 50% higher than 
those required from short term investment funds. This would also cause a reduction 
in the financial system’s supply of loan able funds, causing economic contraction. 
As mentioned before, the initial implementation of the CPMF did not avoid 
these inevitable distortions. The correct operational system contained in the Single 
Tax proposal would exempt financial transactions insofar as they occur strictly 
within the scope of the financial or capital markets. Taxation would only occur upon 
transfer of real returns to the investor’s own checking accounts, when they become 
available for other uses. Thus, short-term transactions would not be discriminated, 
borrowers from banks would not be punished, the fear of possible migration to 
foreign stock market funds would be reduced and trade would not flee abroad in 
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order to escape the CPMF. 
Unfortunately the CPMF was introduced in Brazil nos as a Single Tax, but as an 
additional tax in a confusing and inefficient system. And despite the growing 
evidence that it had negative impact on financial markets, the government took too 
long to correct such distortions.  
RATES, REVENUE, AND EVASION  
The Single Tax has countless advantages, such as enormous simplification and 
reduction of tax collection costs. This latter advantage is not restricted to a reduction 
in the size of the governmental apparatus, but also includes lower compliance costs 
to businesses, that currently use about 10% of their administrative staff to meet the 
requirements of tax reporting. Altogether, such costs now amount to as much as 20% 
of the country’s gross tax revenue, which presently amounts to 37% of GDP. This 
means that the impact of the Single Tax proposal in terms of releasing real resources 
to be put to other uses would be on the order of 7.4% of GDP. This amount is more 
than double the net capital earnings transfers to foreign income recipients – 
payments of interest, profits, and dividends. These are resources that could be 
channeled to productive investments and would be capable of leveraging economic 
growth, instead of being absorbed in government consumption activities and private 
administrative costs. 
The Single Tax, if we take the experience of the bank debit transaction tax 
(CPMF) as an example, could lead to the virtual elimination of tax evasion and fiscal 
corruption, and to a reduction of the underground economy, at practically no cost to 
the public sector. Tax collection would take place automatically upon each debit or 
credit transaction within the banking system. Each credit and each debit account 
would be charged a fixed percentage of the value of the transaction. Thus, every time 
a check or other payment method is cleared, the system would automatically transfer 
the proceeds of the tax to the federal, state, and municipal treasuries, pursuant to 
predefined criteria. To make tax evasion practically disappear it would suffice to 
monitor the bank clearing systems. 
Practical administrative and operational aspects of taxation are usually ignored, 
or simply assumed away as non-existent, by economists. Only recently have 
economists turned their attention to such issues. Public policy towards evasion 
reflects complex issues involving efficiency, equity and growing compliance and 
administrative costs, and generally need much more attention from economists than 
has happened in the past. “Tax evasion clearly complicates measures of the 
distortionary effect of taxation; given a fixed revenue requirement, evasion means 
that higher and more distortionary taxes on reported income may be needed, while 
unreported income largely escapes taxation and its distortionary effects”71 
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 [ANDREONI et alii, 1998] p.818. 
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Skinner and Slemrod say that “the cost of tax evasion  include violations of 
horizontal equity, vertical equity, and efficiency…Increased enforcement will 
generate more revenue, but often at a substantial resource cost….The advantage of 
tax simplification is that it will generally reduce the loopholes that are breeding 
grounds for tax evasion schemes. Finally, reduced marginal tax rates have been 
associated with a significant decline in tax evasion.”72 Thus, the Single tax proposal 
stands on a superior level relative to conventional declaratory taxes such as the 
VATs, which are notoriously prone to corruption, high operational costs and growing 
complexity.  
The most significant element of the Single Tax proposal is that, being evasion 
proof, the tax rate could be low. Using the statutory regulations that apply to the 
bank debit transaction tax (CPMF), the Single Tax revenue can be estimated by 
simple linear projection. Despite all existing constitutional immunities and even in 
the absence of adequate government auditing of bank payment systems,73 revenue 
from the CPMF was significant and indicates that a 3% rate on each side of each 
transaction is capable of generating around 40% of GNP in revenue. This amount is 
larger than the combined tax revenue from all federal, state, municipal, and social 
security taxes and contributions. 
However, the initial Single Tax revenue forecasts assumed a universal tax base, 
which is significantly broader than the present tax base of the CPMF.74 Furthermore, 
precarious auditing of banking institutions is responsible for a significant part of the 
difference between the revenue estimates done in early studies of the Single Tax and 
actual revenue collected through the present system. The data available at the time of 
the first revenue estimates were done in the early nineties implied that, with a 1% 
rate, annual revenue from the Single Tax would be between US$ 69 billion and US$ 
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 [SKINNER AND SLEMROD, 1985], pp-345-353.   
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 Former Secretary of Federal Revenue, Everardo Maciel, responding to a question presented by the 
author in a seminar that took place at the Federation of Brazilian Industries, in Brasília, on August 7, 
2001, discussed the precariousness of the auditing system for the CPMF.  Such deficiencies were 
made evident in various newspaper articles printed during April 2002, according to which the Central 
Bank uncovered the existence of mechanisms, which banks offered to their largest clients that avoided 
collection of the CPMF. Such schemes resulted in heavy fines imposed by the federal revenue service 
against banks and their clients. The frauds became possible through the use of exemptions in colleting 
the CPMF allowed for flows of payments involving reserves among bank’s own checking accounts 
(or belonging to their respective financial agencies), in association with the permission to endorse 
checks. See Carta Capital, May 15, 2002, Valor Econômico Apr.24, 2002 and May 09, 2002. The 
Federal Single Tax bill under discussion in National Congress includes simple provisions that 
practically make such frauds all but impossible. 
74
 [CINTRA, 1994(b)], pp.235-239, where the author analyzes and compares various revenue 
estimates for the Single Tax: a first estimate based on data from a sampling of eight commercial 
banks, gathered by Febraban, the Brazilian Federation of Banks; a second estimate, made by the 
author based on data obtained directly from the accounting records of a large commercial Brazilian 
bank; a third one, made by the MCM Consultores, a consulting firm, and a fourth estimate carried out 
by KPMG, Peat Marwick Consultants. 
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89 billion.75 At the then current exchange rate, these revenue levels accounted for 
between 19.6 and 25.3% of GDP. TABLE 4 reproduces the main results obtained by 
different research groups in their projections. 
During the period immediately following the announcement of the Single Tax 
proposal, and following the publication of a study which contained the initial 
revenue estimates, a large banking institution began to provide the author with 
monthly volumes of debit and credit transactions related to its clients’ checking 
accounts. That banking institution’s accounting was the basis for transactions 
estimates, and made possible to obtain data equivalent to a significant sample of 
Brazil’s total banking system. These data were reported to the author monthly 
between June 1990 and May 1996. The reported values at December 2000 prices can 
be found in ANNEX I-B. 
TABLE 4  
Transaction volume and Single Tax revenue estimates 
(R$ 000,000,000/year) 
Type of transaction KPMG MCM Author (Febraban) 
Checks 7,200.0 5,932.8 10,368.0 
Cash 2,558.4 2,275.2 2,592.0 
Financial transactions 3,600.0 4,003.2 5,068.8* 
Other 2,5940 4,519.2 5,011.2 
Total value of transactions 15,952.8 16,732.8 23,040.0 
Projected revenue 177.6 165.6 213.6 
Revenue/GDP (%) 21.0 19.6 25.3 
Total value of 
transactions/GDP 18,9 19,8 27,2 
   Source:  [CINTRA, 1994(b)], pp.235-239. 
   *Values may be inflated due to overnight operations. 
 
TABLE 5 shows the annual banking transaction data for that institution and, 
based on the estimates of its share of the national banking system, it was possible to 
estimate projected revenue of the Single Tax, at rates of 1% for debit and 1% for 
credit bank transactions. 
The conclusion to be drawn from these projections is that, considering the low 
marginal rate for the Single Tax needed to replace current tax revenue, the incentive 
for tax evasion would virtually disappear. Tax evasion would become impossible 
except in cash or barter transactions. In these two cases the cost of evading taxes 
(transaction costs) would most likely exceed the benefit from tax evasion, thus 
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 These estimates adopted operational procedures proposed in the Single Tax bill, that is, 1-) tax 
overcharges on withdrawals and deposits, 2-) immunity on operations in the financial and capital 
markets, 3-) non-declaratory taxation of 25% on real returns of financial investments, and 4-) 
elimination of present constitutional tax immunities. 
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removing the stimulus for attempting to circumvent the tax system. Furthermore, the 
regulations for the Single Tax should provide that transactions above a certain value 
must be processed through the banking system, under penalty of legal nullification if 
processed otherwise. 
TABLE 5 
Transaction volume and revenue estimates for the Single Tax 
Source of data: a financial institution’s monthly accounting 
(R$ 000,000/year) 
(Dec/2000) 
Year GDP Credit transactions Debit transactions 
1990 836,518.56 12,932,577.95 12,938,219.66 
1991 845,134.70 10,826,442.70 8,991,287.59 
1992 840,540.72 12,865,062.34 12,811,422.97 
1993 883,144.34 9,780,748.42 9,899,884.84 
1994 934,833.65 10,443,753.19 11,099,530.00 
1995 974,319.10 13,008,261.04 12,918,568.13 
1996 1,000,222.24 13,087,289.24 13,012,175.79 
 
Year 
Share of 
banking system 
(%) 
Projected Revenue 
(tax rate = 1%) 
Revenue/ 
GDP (%) 
Transactions/ 
GDP 
1990 4.0 258,707.98 31 15.46 
1991 4.0 198,177.30 23 11.72 
1992 4.0 256,764.85 31 15.28 
1993 4.5 196,806.33 22 11.14 
1994 4.5 215,431.83 23 11.52 
1995 4.5 259,268.29 27 13.31 
1996 5.0 260,994.65 26 13.05 
                 Source: The author and Central Bank Economic Indicators 
 
It is important to remember that under the Single Tax model any withdrawal or 
deposit of cash into or from the banking system would be charged an overtax at a 
rate that is equivalent to the revenue raised considering the number and value of 
transactions carried out with that cash amount until its return to the banking system. 
This operational procedure would deter the use of cash transactions as a means of tax 
evasion.  
Such a taxation system would eliminate (or compensate for) tax evasion – the 
value of which is presently estimated to be between 30 and 40% of public revenue. 
There would be a noticeable reduction of production costs and prices, a fall in the 
costs of the public apparatus, and, potentially, a significant reduction in the tax 
burden. Certainly some of these gains would be once and for all, but would be 
sufficient to allow a significant fiscal adjustment and a noticeable recovery of the 
country’s investment capacity. 
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STRENGTHENING THE REVENUE-RAISING FUNCTION OF TAXES 
Romantic visions see taxation as an expression of the civic spirit of citizens, 
conscious of their rights and duties. Humanitarians have come to believe that the 
only way to redistribute wealth and income is through compensatory (or punitive) 
taxation of the more efficient and wealthier. Economists and political leaders seek 
through taxes, or through exemption from taxes, the pathway to stimulate economic 
growth. Ecologists and conservationists use the tax system as a form of 
environmental protection and of punishment of those who break preservationist 
rules. Urban and regional planners use taxes as inducement mechanisms to reach 
desirable social objectives. Farmers want to achieve land reform through taxation of 
large landowners. In a nutshell, everyone seeks in the tax system the solutions to 
their problems. As Everardo Maciel said, “this merely serves to demonstrate that the 
debate over taxation can take unpredictable turns, dictated by fortuitous reasons or 
impenetrable motives.” 76 
Given these multiple objectives and the inevitable indetermination that stems 
from the existence of more objectives than instrumental variables to achieve them, 
the tax system has lost effectiveness in performing its essential function, that of 
raising public revenue. 
We know that some taxes, to a greater or lesser degree, may perform regulatory 
functions. Some taxes were created with essentially non-revenue objectives, as is the 
case with import taxes, which exist fundamentally as instruments of industrial policy 
and for protection of domestic production. Revenue from these taxes is strictly a 
secondary objective. Others, such as the IPI (a federal value-added tax on industrial 
production) on tobacco and alcoholic beverages, combine revenue goals with social 
objectives of public health and safety. 
Unfortunately, this non-fiscal perspective has influenced so intensely the 
Brazilian fiscal policy that its tax system has become unintelligible and has 
performed poorly in its primary revenue-raising function. The multiplicity of 
objectives to be met by the tax system has turned it into a highly complex, 
bureaucratic, expensive, inefficient, and highly corrupt system, and has become a 
strong inducement to a wide variety of non-compliance and evasion tactics.  
“This problem has been recently highlighted by a Report to the President of the 
United States on tax reform, ´Simple, Fair and Pro-Growth: Proposals to fix 
America´s Tax System´ prepared by the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax 
                                                 
76
 Federal Revenue Service Secretary, Everardo Maciel, in his introduction to the text [SECRETARIA 
DA RECEITA FEDERAL, 2001(b)] says:  “tax reform seems at times to be a pool into which 
converge demands for tax simplification, inter federative conflicts, bills to transpose solutions applied 
in other countries, calls for more effective distributive justice, tax experimentation exercises, 
expressions of indignation over the asymmetry that exists between tax payments and public spending, 
complaints against the size of the tax burden, hidden attempts at tax evasion and avoidance, sincere 
proposals to correct regional inequalities, to stimulate exports, to strengthen the competitiveness of 
the economy etc.”. 
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Reform (November 2005). The Report suggests that legislators have lost sight of the 
fact that the fundamental purpose of the tax system is to finance public spending. 
Other goals have distracted the system from its fundamental purpose”.77 
From a fiscal standpoint, it is essential to collect revenue as efficiently, 
economically, and simply as possible. For this very same reason the Single Tax 
proposal gains significance as a basis for Brazil’s tax reform. 
Theoretical formalism, which is much appreciated by staff economists who seek 
to identify and measure the allocative and distributive impacts of taxes with 
meticulous precision, is proving itself increasingly misleading as a script for tax 
reform, given that economic reality does not always adjust itself to the ideal 
economic models designed in the realm of high abstraction. In the words of 
Mangabeira Unger, the academic perspective unfolds in the midst of “edifying and 
tranquilizing illusions”. But “the world is wild and obscure”.78 The world of perfect 
competition does not exist. 
Along this same line of reasoning, Delfim Netto states that economic science 
creates the impression of being “…a body of progressive knowledge, a ‘hard 
science’.” He further says, “What all this sophistication has forgotten is that its 
conclusions depend upon two implicit postulates: 1) that tax evasion does not exist; 
in other words, that each citizen is a prisoner of rigid social rules that cast the tax 
evader into opprobrium, and 2) that collection of these taxes has no costs; that is, 
they flow naturally and smoothly to the coffers of the treasury… When one considers 
the falseness of these two postulates, one begins to doubt the quality of suggested 
recommendations and to have greater intellectual respect for ‘non-declaratory tax’ 
proposals…” 79 
The rescue of the concept of revenue as the fundamental and primary goal of 
any tax system is supported by two articles published in Folha de São Paulo, by 
Prof. Roberto Mangabeira Unger. 
In “Taxes and Paradoxes”80 the author confirms the need to rescue the revenue 
function of taxes, when he states that indirect taxes, even cumulative ones, can 
“generate a lot of money with little economic disruption”, whereas direct and 
progressive taxes, so dear to staff economists, “such as individual income tax, do not 
produce the expected revenue. Neither can it do so, for the time being, without 
engendering disincentives, capital flight, and devastating tax avoidance.” Unger 
goes further and says that the essential objective of a good tax is to generate “money 
for the State to invest in social issues.” 
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 [TANZI, 2006], p.14. For a seminal approach to taxation and collective choice, stressing the 
endogenous nature of tax complexity in democratic societies see [HETTICH and WINER, 1999].  
78
 [UNGER, 1998(b)]. 
79
 [DELFIM NETTO, 1992]. 
80
 [UNGER, 1998(b)]. 
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In another article by Roberto Mangabeira Unger, titled “Tax Reform (1)”,81 the 
author confirms the theory espoused by supporters of the Single Tax, that 
redistribution of income “is done more efficiently from the expenditures side of the 
budget than from the revenues side supported by a progressive tax model”, thus 
demystifying the academic theory that progressive taxes are a necessary condition 
for good tax reform. 
Mangabeira Unger’s conclusions and proposals on tax reform, different from the 
Single Tax, feed into a system made up of consumption, inheritance, and financial 
gains taxes. But the fundamental point is that the premises that restore the focus of 
taxes on revenue, displacing its non-fiscal effects, are the same that support the 
defense both of the Single Tax and of Mangabeira Unger’s proposals. 
“Governments will rediscover that the objective of taxation is to provide 
revenue for the state to meet its obligation and not to engage in social engineering 
through the tax system”. 82 
THE VIRTUES OF BANK TRANSACTION TAXES 
A bank transaction tax is a good tax if it is used as a single tax; but is a bad tax 
if added onto many others. The CPMF was created as one more tax to be added to 
Brazil’s fiscal paraphernalia.  
The Government disfigured the proposal of the Single Tax on bank transactions. 
Conceived to be the basic tax for the entire fiscal system, it was ultimately reduced 
to a dishonorable role as one appendix in the nation’s confusing tax structure. The 
Government acted as a rapist who, in its brutality, sees nothing but the immediate 
object of its appetite. It completely ignored the virtues of the Single Tax – such as 
reducing bureaucracy, instilling morality, and promoting development. Instead, it 
adopted the tax solely for its high capacity to raise revenue. 
However, even if spurious, the CPMF produced a worthy result, in that it allows 
an accurate evaluation of the efficiency of the bank transactions tax, which is the 
foundation for the Single Tax construct. 
Described by adversaries as a hated cascading tax, the CPMF is called by every 
offensive name that can be given to an innocent tax: dumb, unfair, anti-production, 
anti-savings, and harmful to exports. Several political analysts, financial reporters, 
and especially collectors and other tax professionals criticize cumulative taxes, while 
heaping praise on value-added taxes, such as the ICMS. They support VATs as if 
they were the eighth wonder of the world. They consider them to be fair, neutral, and 
efficient. 
Reading the literature on the tax reform debate, a rookie economist who believes 
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everything said by adversaries of turnover taxes, cannot avoid the impression that the 
simple elimination of turnover taxes would redress all that is wrong with it, and that 
with a simple flick of the wand Brazil’s tax system would become rational, fair, 
modern, and efficient. 
There is nothing more mediocre than to accept, without rigorous critical 
evaluation, the prejudices and clichés contained in these opinions. The CPMF and its 
experience in Brazil brought to light many positive aspects of this tax. 
It is not necessary to overemphasize its virtues. All one needs to do is consider 
that with rates of merely 0.38% (0.30% from June 2000 to March 2001) and with 
practically no costs to the government or to the taxpayer, the CPMF raised R$ 14.4 
billion in 2000, approximately R$ 17.1 billion in 2001, and R$ 36.2 billion in 2007. 
Taxes that are highly complex and carry high administrative costs, such as the IPI (a 
federal value-added tax on industrial products) and the corporate income tax, 
generated revenue of only R$ 18.8 billion and R$ 17.6 billion in 2000, respectively; 
R$ 19.4 billion and R$ 17 billion in 2001 and R$ 32.9 billion and R$ 70 billion in 
2007. 
The CPMF is universal, evasion-proof, and it grasps all economic agents, 
eliminating the inequity of self-assessed, paper-driven taxes that impose high tax 
burdens on some taxpayers while favoring tax evaders and expert tax planners who 
enjoy markedly lower individual burdens. The CPMF is able to eliminate the greatest 
anomaly present in the current tax system, which is artificial production cost 
differences and consequently unfair competition caused by widespread tax evasion. 
Tax avoidance and evasion distort desirable patterns of distribution of the tax burden, 
and this distortion is more serious and disrupting than the alleged distortions in 
relative prices that a turnover tax, such as the CPMF, might be causing to Brazil’s 
economy. 
Concerning this issue, Everardo Maciel says, “The literature of public finance is 
full of examples of economic distortions caused by taxes. What is not stressed, 
however, is that the comparisons presume a context in which tax evasion is non-
existent or of little relevance. This, however, is not the reality in emerging countries. 
In these countries, to parody a well-known aphorism, one might say, create a tax, 
create evasion.” He continues, “ultimately, what we intend to assert is that tax 
evasion in emerging countries is the greatest economic distortion caused by taxes, 
far superior to any other.” 83 
Notwithstanding, IPEA (a Brazilian government-sponsored think tank) states the 
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 Everardo Maciel reinforces his argument, by asking:  “is there any better way to send Brazilian 
industry to ruin than to submit it to competition that uses under-invoicing or false import papers?  
Tax evasion, some would say, should be dealt with through auditing and punitive measures.  In 
emerging countries, this is a partial truth.  Inspection and punitive measures are insufficient.  It is 
indispensable that the concept of a tax itself prevent evasion as much as possible.  Complex taxes are 
fertile ground for tax evasion, not to mention avoidance.  Tax evasion, in these cases, requires 
prevention rather than cure or punishment.”[SECRETARIA DA RECEITA FEDERAL, 2001(b)]. 
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following: “The injurious elements of cumulative taxation can be classified into two 
groups: it harms the allocation of resources and the competitiveness of domestic 
goods. These distortions are due to the fact that this type of tax unintentionally and 
uncontrollably alters the economy’s relative prices.” 84 
To respond to this assertion, we should invert the argument and ask its authors if 
the changes in relative prices introduced by value-added taxes are intentional and 
controllable in an environment with widespread tax evasion and avoidance, as 
happens in Brazil An inevitable conclusion is that taxes that are easily evaded, such 
as VAT-style self-assessed taxes, certainly create even more unintentional and 
uncontrollable changes in relative prices, because nothing is as unpredictable or 
uncontrollable as tax evasion. 
The Brazilian economic environment has greatly changed in the present 
computerized and globalized world. Thus, one should not imagine that conventional 
taxes, created during the time when information technology was based on paper, on 
accounting ledgers, on physical transportation, on economic isolationism and on 
political fragmentation, such as prevailed during most of the 20th century, will be 
able to avoid widespread tax evasion and its dramatic consequences. Conservative 
tax policies will only deepen such inadequacies in the future.  
In a country like Brazil, that suffers from all sorts of administrative deficiencies, 
from a slow and inefficient judicial system, from a weak and discredited tax auditing 
apparatus, and from a deeply rooted culture of tax evasion, it is easy to understand 
the reason for so much criticism aimed at the CPMF. It corrects such anomalies. 
After all, for rent seekers, it is preferable to “pay” taxes on profits and on value-
added, since they can be easily manipulated by delinquent taxpayers, than to have a 
tax system that eliminates privileges, prevents avoidance, and turns universal the set 
of taxpayers in the country. 
The CPMF has been used successfully to achieve extremely important 
objectives, such as fiscal balance and currency stability. Still, there is generalized 
rejection against it although, if it did not exist, conventional taxes, which are always 
more inefficient and inequitable, would require even higher rates than they do at the 
moment.85 Therefore, the criticisms about cumulativeness need to be more deeply 
analyzed, and cannot be uncritically accepted. 
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 Another common criticism of the CPMF states that its automatic collection mechanism disregards 
the principle of contributive capacity.  However, critics forget that this principle is not upheld in 
conventional taxes such as the IPTU, ISS, IPVA, or ITR, and not even in value-added taxes such as 
the IPI or ICMS, because these are due irrespective of the profit earned.  Those who deny the notion 
that taxes can only be collected when contributive capacity is assessed respond by stating that, 
according to the benefit principle of taxation, even in a loss, companies benefit from the country’s 
infrastructure and, therefore, should pay taxes. 
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INCIDENCE AND EQUITY OF BANK TRANSACTION TAXES  
One of the most frequently raised questions about a bank transaction tax has to 
do with its progressiveness. Critics claim it is regressive. 
Actually, because it is a cumulative (turnover) tax, products that involve a 
greater number of transactions along the productive chain – with more roundabout 
production methods – and those that add less value at each stage, will be more 
heavily taxed. Thus, the Single Tax system should have a natural degree of 
progressiveness given that wage goods – staple products that make up the demand 
bundle for lower income families– would tend to have a lower tax burden than that 
of relatively more sophisticated products. Wage goods usually have less roundabout 
production chains, with less processing and a high rate of added value relative to the 
value of inputs at each production stage.  
Another interesting feature of the Single Tax proposal is that income and 
production become no longer the main components of the tax base, as happens in 
conventional tax systems. The tax base would shift to financial transactions. Thus, 
productive activities become less taxed, and those that involve mere asset transfers, 
that currently are notoriously under-taxed, such as estate and personal property 
transactions, would be more heavily taxed. 
The Single Tax proposal has, therefore, some essential characteristics that must 
be stressed: it ensures tax collection; it eliminates tax evasion and fiscal corruption; it 
increases efficiency of tax collection; it frees up significant resources in the private 
and public sectors; it is a comprehensive system; and it exhibits natural 
progressiveness. 
Maria da Conceição Tavares evaluated the alleged regressiveness of bank 
transaction taxes, considering their incidence by income brackets. In her article 
“Imposto sobre circulação financeira”86 (a Tax on Financial Circulation) the author 
says, “The argument that the tax would basically penalize the middle class is 
unjustified. This is a tax that primarily penalizes individuals who turn the financial 
circulation of their savings into an extra and often considerable source of income.” 
She further states, “because they are one of the dynamic vectors in the economic 
restructuring and globalizing process, bank transactions constitute one of the few 
potential bases for future taxation in which it is possible to anchor public revenue 
increases without punishing the productive sectors and the needier social segments”.  
Because of the difficulties in simulating transactions for businesses and 
financial institutions, the results presented in her article refer to a partial revenue 
base, restricted to individuals, on whom a tax similar to the CPMF would be levied at 
a rate of 0.25%. The conclusions of the exercise rebut arguments that a bank 
transactions tax is unfair because it is regressive. Her conclusions (although they 
may have lost some validity given the increasing use of bank transactions by all 
income groups) are reproduced here, in full: 
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“1 - The lower-income groups, with average monthly income equal to 1 to 3 
minimum wages and half of the group with average monthly income equal to 4 
minimum wages – which together account for 70.6% of the reference population 
(income receiving individuals older than 10 years of age that are economically 
active) – are presumed not to use the banking system and therefore would not be 
directly affected by the tax. 
2 - Of the remaining 29.4% that operate through the banking system, the tax 
burden falls predominantly on the higher-income groups (those with average 
monthly incomes that fall between 20 and 38.7 minimum wages). 
This latter segment, which accounts for a scant 3.4% of the reference 
population and less than 12% of individuals with bank accounts, holds 29.2% of 
total income and would account for 63.5% of the IPMF revenue paid by individuals. 
The group that has lower incomes (between 7.2 and 14.2 minimum wages 
per month), which represents 62% of the taxed universe and 18.2% of the reference 
population, accounts for 31.1% of revenue, whereas this group’s share of income is 
38.6%. 
Even the upper-middle segment, with average income of 14.2 minimum 
wages accounts for a smaller share of tax revenue than it should, given its total 
income. In other words, the argument that the tax would unfairly penalize the middle 
class is not supported. This is a tax that burdens those individuals who make bank 
transactions an extra and considerable source of income. 
3 - The average effective rates on members of each group are also progressive, 
varying from 0.25% (affecting only that lowest-income portion of the group, which is 
taxed only once at the time of salary withdrawal), up to 0.70% levied on the group 
whose average monthly income is equal to 38.7 minimum wages. 
Rate progressiveness is determined by values attributed to coefficients of 
financial circulation. The underlying theory is that greater savings coefficients 
correspond to higher income levels, and that the lion’s share of those savings goes 
into financial investments. 
The portion of income that is earmarked for this purpose is expressed by the 
financial investments coefficient. This coefficient, in turn, is associated with a 
greater number and volume of transactions; in other words, a higher turnover rate 
of financial credits and debits. The relationship between the volume of transactions 
performed during the year and income determines the magnitude of the financial 
circulation coefficient. 
4 - Finally, the index of progressiveness, presented in the simulation (which 
expresses the relationship among differentials of taxation and of average income 
among various taxable groups), shows absolute values that are increasing and 
greater than unit. 
This indicates that higher-income sectors not only pay relatively more taxes, 
but they also pay at proportions that are much higher than the differences between 
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their average income and that of other groups.” 
Conceição Tavares’s simulation truly demonstrates that an electronic 
transactions tax is proportional, or slightly progressive. It burdens more intensely 
those who have greater resources. 
From the standpoint of corporations (which were not included in the exercise), 
the author says that, the greater the volume of bank cash withdrawals, that is, the 
greater the circulation coefficient and the turnover rate of financial capital, the 
greater will be the participation of the tax on the volume of income invested in the 
financial system. 
Concerning the impact of the tax on prices, Tavares concludes that it should not 
be significant and it would not trigger (as it has not triggered) financial 
disintermediation. 
Summarizing, Conceição Tavares says that an electronic tax is desirable, given 
that it does not create distortions in the productive structure and is levied 
proportionally on taxpayers. Furthermore, it reaches the informal sector and 
minimizes tax evasion. In other words, bank transaction taxes are shown to be 
reasonably progressive taxes in their patterns of incidence, directly contradicting 
those who accuse them of being regressive. The tax falls more heavily on rentiers, 
whether “formal” or “informal”. Maria da Conceição Tavares concludes by stating, 
“Financial circulation is the tax base of the future, given that, in addition to its 
continual expansion, it allows for electronic controls and, therefore, should allow for 
less tax evasion than is allowed by current taxes.” 
As a direct tax, the bank transaction tax – in its formal expression – is neither 
progressive nor regressive; it is proportional, as long as it has a single rate. This 
means that for each individual transaction, the single rate would guarantee incidence 
that is proportional to the value of the transaction. Indirectly, as it becomes an item 
in production costs, it is alleged to be regressive. 
Zockun M. H. estimated that the CPMF accounted for 2.2% of family income 
for the lowest income bracket (two monthly minimum salaries), and only 1% for 
families in the highest bracket (thirty or more monthly minimum salaries).87  
Such results were not confirmed by other estimates, such as those of Paes and 
Bugarin showing a virtual proportionality in the CPMF incidence by income classes, 
varying from 1.31% and 1.33% of family income.88 Using family budget research by 
IBGE I estimated that the tax burden of the CPMF on total expenses were the 
following: 1.64% for families with 1.2 minimum salary of monthly earnings, 1.58% 
for the 3.20 minimum salaries bracket, 1.51% for the 6.5 minimum salaries bracket, 
and 1.41% for the 23 minimum salaries bracket. According to estimates by the 
Ministry of the Economy made public in Congressional hearings in 2007 the CPMF 
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is a “redistributive” tax, both by income classes and by regions of the country. 
According to the presentation 72% of the CPMF is collected by companies, and only 
28% by individuals; of the revenue collected from individuals 17% are collected 
from the richest 10% of the population, and only 2% of revenue comes from the 
poorest 50% of the population. Actually it is very closely a proportional tax if we 
take account of possible measurement and estimation errors. 
However, what really interests economists is the evaluation of tax incidence 
from the perspective of the complete set of transactions performed by individuals in 
the market. In this sense, the bank transaction tax can have a natural progressiveness, 
inherent to the different patterns of expenditures of the various income brackets of 
Brazil’s population, as shown by Tavares.89 
Furthermore, a more equitable distribution of national income must not be 
sought solely through progressiveness in taxation, but rather through the final impact 
of the fiscal process, which is comprised not only of the pattern of taxation, but more 
importantly by the composition of public expenditures, which can be progressive or 
regressive. The Ministry of the Economy showed that the poor northern and 
northeastern regions of the country collect only 24% of the CPMF revenue, but 
receive 42% of the CPMF collected by the federal government. Thus, the CPMF is 
not as regressive as claimed. 
The concept of tax progressiveness has been strongly attacked by several 
scholars. Indeed, “progressive taxation appears to have lost much of its political 
appeal…people became increasingly convinced that the economic costs of 
progressiveness were too high to make it worthwhile”. Furthermore, “what can be 
done through the tax system to redistribute income … no matter how extreme such 
redistribution might be, is unlikely to have much effect on the overall distribution of 
income”.90 
Ives Gandra91 points to “the noticeable trend of European economies to begin, 
gradually replacing direct taxation, which has always been considered socially 
equitable, for indirect taxation, believed by economists to be regressive and anti-
social. And the most curious consequence of this trend is that countries that have 
begun to reduce direct taxation have shown an increase in investments; and 
increasing investment is socially fairer because it generates growth, jobs, and better 
social conditions, facilitating the exercise of labor rights. On the other hand, 
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progressive direct taxation (...) ultimately causes recession and inflation, with 
unemployment, lower wages, and less possibility for a proper dialogue on the claims 
of the labor class. Europe, well into the 1980s, decided openly to head toward 
abandonment of ideological social justice theories, which are inhibitors of 
development, and to begin to thread the pathways  of the practical theories of 
international competitiveness, the only [theories] that are truly equitable from a 
communitarian perspective. This is the reason for which the European Union is 
turning to two orders of taxes; that is, indirect taxes and social contributions, 
gradually reducing direct taxes, including income tax.” 92 
On this same issue, Roberto Campos93 addresses the question of equity in 
Brazil’s tax system. He says, “Our fiscal ethics have been practically destroyed. The 
great American judge, Oliver Wendell Holmes, said that to pay taxes is to purchase 
civilization. In Brazil, it means acquiring annoyance. The taxpayer has three 
perceptions: a) the Government does not return reasonable services, even minimally; 
b) the fiscal system is extremely complex, with high bureaucratic costs and three 
levels of corruption; c) the federal revenue agency is wholly inequitable because 
government-owned companies, which are notoriously noncompliant, and the entire 
informal economy escape the tax burden. Only one-third of the economy, represented 
by organized businesses in the private sector and by formally registered payroll 
wage earners actually pays taxes. The other two-thirds are delinquents. Thus, the 
estimated fiscal burden of 24% of GDP (in 1991), which would seem reasonable in 
worldwide terms, is abusive when it is levied solely against the formal private sector. 
Not to mention, of course, the inflation tax.” 
Roberto Campos continues criticizing the excessive progressiveness of taxes: “It 
is a socialist superstition. Everyone must pay proportionally to their income. To 
impose on successful persons burdens that are more than proportional to their 
income is simply a confiscation, only understandable if: a) the wealth is undeserved 
and to be punished and is not, as often occurs, the result of greater diligence and 
creativity; b) if the Government were inspired by Puritan ideals, with unquestionable 
priorities, and were not a squandering spender. The best fiscal system is that which 
does not punish the rich, but which preserves for each person the maximum of 
incentives for its productive capacity. ‘Fiscal justice’ is much better served from the 
expenditures side than from the revenue side of the budget.” Indeed, “any serious 
fiscal attempts at poverty alleviation must be undertaken primarily on the 
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expenditure side the budget.”94 
Mario Henrique Simonsen95 reaffirms the same concern about excessive 
progressiveness, saying, “Today, the merits of progressiveness are strongly 
contested. A good portion of developed countries has considerably reduced the 
number of progressive rates, as well as the maximum rate. And the trend seems to 
return to proportional taxation, with one single exception: the exemption limit below 
which the taxpayer is released from any tax. The fall of the myth of progressiveness 
is due to several factors. First, the distribution of wealth promoted by the 
Government is not a function merely of a single tax, but depends on a set of taxes, 
and most importantly on the composition of public spending. What good is there in 
having an income tax that is strongly progressive if other taxes live along side it that 
are strongly regressive? The best thing would be to merge them into a single 
proportional or averagely proportional tax. On the other hand, what good is a 
progressive tax system if public spending benefits the rich much more than the poor? 
It would be better, in that case, for the budget to shrink and for the market to handle 
the conflicts of interest of the rich. Truthfully, the great distributive task of the 
Government should be handled through the operations of public spending, offering 
education, health, and assistance to the most needy. By doing this, the enchantment 
of progressiveness would, at least to a great extent, be undone. 
“Secondly, excessive progressiveness simply makes the taxpayer more 
disinterested in working and in assuming risk, which explains the stagnation 
produced by the welfare state of England’s Labor Party, which was rightly 
dismantled by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Why work harder and run more 
risk if the Government takes 80% of the earnings, when these are positive? In the 
1970s we discovered the obvious: highly progressive taxes engender laziness. 
“Thirdly, progressiveness creates the incentive for transferring fictitious income 
from one taxpayer who has a higher marginal rate to another who has a lower 
marginal rate. Suppose one individual, X, whose marginal rate is 50%, is a customer 
of physician Y, who has a 30% marginal rate, and let us allow for medical 
deductions, as is usual, to be deducted from taxable income. One additional $1 in 
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medical receipts is worth 50 cents to the customer and costs only 30 cents to the 
physician. The natural incentive would be a fake receipt from the physician to the 
customer. The customer would give the physician a check, and the physician would 
return $1 in cash. This example of fictitious transfer of income is merely one among 
thousands in a progressive tax system – and there is no screen so finely meshed that 
it is capable of preventing it.” 
On this same issue, Prof. Roberto Mangabeira Unger goes further, asserting that, 
“in the short run, and under the conditions of most contemporary societies, the 
progressive structure of taxation is irrelevant, when not harmful.” 96 
Mangabeira Unger goes on, stating: “a comparative study of taxation and public 
spending reveals a shocking fact. There is an almost inverse relationship between the 
theoretical fairness of tax systems and the success each of them may actually have in 
funding social expenditures for investment and for income equalization. In places 
where there is, in fact, more redistribution, such as France, indirect and ‘unfair’ 
taxation of consumption serves as a major source of public revenue. In countries 
where inequalities are stronger and social spending is restricted, such as in the 
United States, homage to progressiveness in taxation prevails. (…) In the name of 
“fairness”, the first step must be to abolish the income tax for individuals and 
corporations, along with all other taxes that burden production and wages and 
torture the middle class. The paradox that delights the thinker bores the practical 
man. This is one of the reasons why the reformative actions of practical men 
regularly produce paradoxical effects. Both political life and the academic milieu 
are being exercised in the midst of edifying and tranquilizing illusions. The world is 
wild and obscure. To confront it one must be possessed by a passion that takes us 
outside of ourselves and places in our hands the trumpet Joshua blew before the 
walls of Jericho. Do you think, reader, that basic information such as this, about the 
inverse relationship between tax progressiveness in revenue and in spending, would 
occupy the center of the attention of scholars of public finance and tax law? You are 
wrong. Sheltered in their analytical apparatus, few allow themselves to be surprised 
by reality.” 
Ultimately, the question to be answered is whether bank transactions taxes are 
fair. The evidence presented in this text points to the unequivocal advantage of bank 
transactions taxes compared to conventional tax bases, which have been fast losing 
efficiency as revenue collectors and as income redistributors. Further, they tend to 
stimulate tax avoidance, in addition to carrying high operational and compliance 
costs. 
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SINGLE TAX: CRITICISM AND REPLIES 
In this section it will be shown that usual criticism of the Single Tax concept is 
mostly wrong, and often biased and unfair. Below, we summarize some of the most 
commonly heard allegations. 
Regressiveness 
The Single Tax’s structure is accused of not meeting the requirements for 
vertical equity. It was shown, though, that it is flexible enough to accommodate 
reasonable progressiveness, if so desired, by exempting operations that add to values 
below a given floor, during a given time period, or even by using progressive rate 
structures for different transaction value brackets. Though this possibility does not 
deserve our support, it could be easily implemented. 
The distribution of Brazil’s tax burden by income groups reveals the extremely 
regressive nature of our present tax system. The supposedly progressive income tax 
only reaches the income of middle-class wage-earners in the formal sector, and fails 
to reach other income recipients, showing therefore a limited potential for income 
redistribution.97 
The Single Tax, by using the filter of bank transactions, inexorably reaches all 
types of income. It is ultimately more equitable and more progressive than, for 
instance, Brazil’s tortuous income tax. As for indirect taxes embedded in prices, the 
Single Tax is not comparatively more regressive, and induces less allocative 
distortions than do conventional systems for taxing consumption, as shown in this 
text.  
Cumulativeness 
The Single Tax is indisputably a cumulative tax, incident on bank transactions at 
each successive stage of the economic process. But this in no way discredits it as a 
good tax. The non-cumulativeness requirement for good tax system is a mindless 
fetish. No tax is perfectly non-cumulative, except those found in theoretical 
constructs divorced from reality. 
Value-added taxes would be impracticable if they did not contemplate, as they 
actually do wherever they are practiced, the most diverse types of exceptions, 
exemptions and special regimes, which give them appreciable degrees of 
cumulativeness. 
Brazil has a plethora of cumulative taxes, of which, curiously, some are 
execrated, others tolerated, while others still are fully appreciated, such as the special 
tax regime for small firms. The Single Tax is not different from these on this aspect, 
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but it does exhibit the notable advantages described above – it’s simple, cheap, 
gentle… 
Furthermore, the well-known conclusions of the second-best theory, as well as 
those of modern optimal tax theory, demonstrate that one cannot state a priori that a 
cumulative tax is less efficient than non-cumulative taxes. It is most likely that, for a 
given amount of revenue, a cumulative tax, which requires a low rate, is preferable to 
a value-added tax with a high rate, as shown in this text. 
Incentive to excessive vertical integration 
The weight of the Single Tax in the composition of final prices is inversely 
proportional to the ratio of value-added relative to purchased value of inputs, at each 
stage of the production process. However, incentives to vertical integration resulting 
from this peculiarity may be less present in the Single Tax world than in the tax 
structure that exists today. Coeteris paribus, the incentive to vertically integrate is 
obviously present in a Single Tax system, but it is a marginal thrust compared to the 
heavy cumulative burden that exists nowadays. One need only see that the 
PIS/Cofins (a former turnover tax on gross sales) alone had a statutory rate of 3.65%, 
and an effective rate of 3.79%.98 
The incentive for vertical integration in production is intensified as the turnover 
rate increases. If we consider the Single Tax system’s low marginal rate, it is 
improbable that this integration process would go beyond what can be predicted by 
reasons strictly related to economies of scale and other types of externalities. 
Verticalization beyond what would be justified in a neutral economic environment 
implies costs, against which the tax savings would have to be compared. 
Furthermore, our simulations show that distortions in relative prices caused by 
the Single Tax are lower than those present in the current system, as was shown 
before.99 Actually, the decision to vertically integrate hinges preponderantly on 
technological reasons, such as gains of specialization and scale, compared to which 
the weight of the Single Tax should not be very significant. 
Discrimination against domestic production 
Imported products reach the final consumer after a few, one or two, intermediate 
domestic transactions. Thus, critics say, the Single Tax on imported products is 
significantly lighter than the tax load carried by locally produced goods. It could be 
argued that either for imports or for domestic production the tax load is relatively 
light compared to present levels of taxation. On the other hand, if necessary, such 
differences in tax regime can be compensated by customs duties, and by application 
of countervailing taxes on imports, as provided under international laws that govern 
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foreign trade.100 
Tax exporting 
It is true that it is easier to exempt taxes on exports under the value-added tax 
system than under the Single tax. But exempting exports it is also feasible under the 
Single Tax system, though it requires more elaborate procedures. Tax exonerations 
would have to be calculated by empirically monitoring production chains, or by 
using Leontief input-product matrices, and thereby offering exporters tax credits, 
rebates, returns, or equivalent subsidies – not too different than what is nowadays 
practiced elsewhere, as demonstrated in various empirical studies.101 
It is false that the Single Tax has an inherent anti-export bias. What hurts 
exports is not the existence of the tax, but rather carelessness in exempting it for 
exports. 
Cluttering tax harmony 
If most countries, including our trading partners (except, most noticeably, the 
United States) adopt the VAT model, and tend to avoid taxing exports or practice 
other types of discriminatory policy instruments, such as outright subsidies, it makes 
sense to search for tax formulas generally accepted in the context of foreign trade 
regulation. 
On the other hand, the supposition that the Single Tax would be so dissonant 
with tax practices around the world, when compared to our trading partners’ systems, 
as to hamper trade and political rapprochement within regional commercial blocks is 
unfounded. As we have seen, the Single Tax is similar to gross sales taxes found in 
many countries.  
The obsession with tax harmonization, seen as homogenization of tax systems, 
is something of a myth. In truth, the tax systems of different countries are profoundly 
heterogeneous for traditional, cultural, political, economic, and geographical reasons, 
and this has not hindered the accelerated growth of international trade. 
Stimulus for banking disintermediation 
At a reasonable level of taxation, the tax savings obtained by avoiding the 
banking system, and thereby having to carry out business transactions in cash or 
barter, does not compensate for the resulting additional transaction costs such as cash 
storage and transportation, the lack of safety, the risks of counterfeits, the illegality 
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of foreign currency transactions, etc. To this, we add measures such as surcharges for 
cash withdrawals and deposits and other dissuasive measures that have been 
mentioned throughout this text. 
Social injustice 
At least 30 million individuals in Brazil do not have bank accounts, despite 
being participants in the active labor force. They do not qualify for bank accounts – 
i.e., they are illiterate or lack stable income sources, permanent addresses, property, 
etc. In the Single Tax world, critics claim that these individuals would be harmed by 
surcharges or any other penalizing measure applied to cash transactions. 
We rebut this objection along two lines. First, it is possible to universalize 
access to the use of electronic money through the use of debit cards, even if the use 
of checking accounts is subject to restrictions.102 Second, such people already suffer 
from a regressive tax system, with heavy fiscal overcharge, that would decrease 
under the Single Tax system. Because they have a strong propensity to consume, 
they are victims, under the current system, of an extremely high indirect tax burden 
imbedded in prices. This burden would certainly be reduced as the Single Tax 
replaces current consumption taxes. 
Excessive indirect tax burden on consumer prices 
Under the current consumption tax system, which is subject to exuberant 
evasion, substantial portions of the price paid by consumers are taxes that, in fact, are 
not collected by the government. To a great extent, they are appropriated by the tax 
evaders themselves. By replacing current taxes with the Single Tax, tax evasion 
would be eliminated and the tax burden, built into prices, would be more lightly 
distributed. The anticipated effect would be a fall in prices, which would benefit, 
first and foremost, the neediest segments of the population, who spend all their 
income in consumption goods. 
Abandoning fiscal policy 
The proposed Single Tax system is accused of giving up the use of tax 
instruments for economic policy making. In general, however, the use of tax 
instruments to achieve redistributive or greater social equity purposes does not 
achieve the goals desired by society and by policy makers.103  
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The Single tax actually does away with the use of tax incentives, or 
disincentives, as instruments of economic policy. However, policies related to prices, 
income, as well as growth and anti-cyclical policies can still be carried out through 
the utilization of non-fiscal instruments such as monetary, credit, consumer relations 
regulations, and even direct subsidy policies and cash transfers. All of these 
instruments are more transparent and more subject to social controls than obscure tax 
benefits, which usually do not achieve the intended purposes of tax policy makers.  
The loss of tax instruments does not immobilize economic policy; it only makes 
it less tortuous. Policy makers must adapt to a new paradigm of economic policy, 
one that does not count with tax instruments for intervening in production, 
consumption, and investment, but which can be both more powerful and more 
efficient than tax incentives. 
It is not our intention to abolish tax instrument in customs policy and in 
regulating financial markets. In many countries taxes on foreign trade are 
administered as customs duties, and customs administration is usually separate from 
federal tax administration. Foreign trade duties would not be abolished. 
Single tax base benefits property and wealth 
The Single Tax unifies all income and consumption bases, but allows the 
property base to escape taxation. Critics say that property owners would escape 
taxation tax more easily than would those whose savings are concentrated in the 
financial market. They would also escape taxation by avoiding financial transactions 
through the use of barter trade. 
We respond that, first, barter, or “in kind” type of trade is hardly a realistic 
alternative in the modern world. Furthermore, this type of economic relationship can 
easily be avoided by proper regulation. Also, property and wealth taxation have been 
showing a declining trend relative to other taxes in the world. Brazil has a certain 
aversion for this type of taxation due to it being costly to administer and 
unproductive in terms of revenue collection. 
But surely the Single Tax model does not preclude its concomitant use, if 
desired. 
Weakening the federative principle 
Replacing municipal and state taxes with the Single Tax inevitably raises 
questions about weakening the Federation. The Single Tax could not work on sub 
national geographical bases because it would privilege areas that enjoy high 
concentration of banks. This excludes the possibility of transferring the Single Tax to 
state or municipal control. It can only be a federal tax, and the sharing of revenue 
must occur according to predominantly political criteria. 
Under our proposal’s approach of gradual adoption, the Single Tax would 
initially be implemented only at the federal level. Later, states and municipalities 
could also be included in the Single Tax model, thus postponing to a later time the 
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difficult question of revenue sharing among them. 
There are many models of federalism, with greater and lesser degrees of 
autonomy for decentralized political entities. From a strictly financial point of view, 
it seems that a constitutional guarantee of revenue sharing among the various 
federated entities, adhering to a negotiated proportionality system, would be 
sufficient to ensure federative autonomy. However, we cannot disregard that, 
according to a respectable current of jurists, the Brazilian federative model would be 
inseparable from the relative taxing autonomy of the federated entities, which means 
they must have their own taxing jurisdiction and authority, with the power to 
determine the variables that make up their own taxes and their respective 
administration. 
It is not convenient to ignore the legal/political institutionalism anchored in our 
historical tradition. This is the reason we, when in doubt, may prefer the gradual 
path, with the introduction of the Single Tax in phases, beginning exclusively in the 
federal sphere and postponing facing the problems associated with the federative 
issue to when states and municipalities join in this tax model at a later point in 
time.104 This alternative abstains from suppressing state and municipal tax 
jurisdictions. The constitutional provisions will remain intact. Governors and 
legislators, both regional and local, responding to the demands of their respective 
populations, will decide whether to make full use of their tax jurisdictions and 
authority, or whether they prefer to abstain from using them, adhering to the federal 
Single Tax model. 
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2 
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AND MEASUREMENT OF THE 
IMPACT OF THE SINGLE TAX105 
After more than fifteen years of controversy, the debate between those who 
defend and those who oppose the Single Tax model has produced important 
conclusions. 
As we have shown throughout this text, some of the criticisms have turned out 
to be mistaken, and others were broadly refuted by facts. Among them are the fears 
of remonetization of the economy, of flight of depositors from the banking system, 
of the excessive verticalization of the productive process, of the impossibility of tax 
exonerations especially for exports, and of worsening the income distribution. At the 
same time, some of the positive features of bank transaction taxes, such as its 
imperviousness to tax evasion and its low operational and compliance costs have 
been widely acknowledged even by the tax’s earlier detractors. 
Delfim Netto reflects on these conclusions in an article106 in which he evaluates 
the study conducted by the Federal Revenue in defense of the bank debit transactions 
tax (CPMF).107 Following a brief summary of what he called “the government’s 
fiscal/financial philosophy”, he expresses, “certain sympathy with this position, 
despite finding it nihilistic”. Yet, despite this concession, he immediately criticizes 
cumulative taxes such as the bank debit transactions tax (CPMF) on an issue which 
he considers to be the last one not yet properly rebutted by those who defend such 
taxes. “This discussion avoids the real question of defining what should be the role of 
fiscal policy in the process of economic development”, and continued, saying, “the 
productive efficiency of the market economy increases in direct proportion to the 
decrease in the distortions introduced into relative prices when compared to the free 
functioning of supply and demand. [...] it is known that cascading taxes introduce 
greater distortions than value-added taxes.” 
Therefore, it is important to evaluate the impact of alternative tax models 
(cumulative versus VATs) on relative prices. 
One of the most important issues in public finance is the normative evaluation 
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of allocative and distributive effects of different systems of taxation. One specific 
point of interest has to do with comparing the changes in relative-prices introduced 
by value-added taxes (VAT) to those introduced by turnover taxes, such as the bank 
transactions tax. 
Under highly restrictive conditions, a VAT introduces less relative-price 
changes than a cumulative tax. For this statement to be true, the following conditions 
must be met: (a) perfect competition; (b) absence of tax evasion; (c) universal tax 
base – that is, both taxes must apply to all goods and services transacted in the 
economy; and (d) a single and identical tax rate applied to both forms of taxation. 
The four conditions listed above are very strong assumptions, and none of them 
is satisfied in the Brazilian economy. The absence of perfect competition is 
notorious. Large-scale VAT evasion is practiced in a broad variety of forms. 
Generally, taxation is applied to tax bases that are segmented by sector, activity, or 
by income categories. And almost all taxes in Brazil have multiple rates.108 
As such, it is impossible to state, a priori, which form of taxation, VAT or 
turnover, causes fewer distortions in price determination. With multiple rates, 
patterns of tax incidence virtually randomized by tax evasion, and sectoral income 
influenced by varying competitive conditions prevailing in each sector, a definitive 
statement one way or the other becomes all but impossible.  
Thus, it becomes necessary to evaluate empirically the effects these two taxes 
have on price formation mechanisms. 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN INPUT-OUTPUT TABLE 
FOR 2006 
Input-output economics has proven to be a valuable instrument for investment 
and development planning. Nevertheless, it has seldom been used in simulating the 
impact of different tax models on prices.   
In this text, an input-output model will be developed to analyze the effects of 
alternative tax models. The objective is to draw normative conclusions, in terms of 
equity and allocative efficiency. The simulations will compare value-added to 
cumulative taxes, such as a bank transactions tax, and will attempt to draw 
conclusions about their relative advantages and disadvantages in an effort to throw 
further light in the debate on tax reform in developing countries.  
Physical input-output 
The system of equations below describes a closed economy with no 
government, one factor of production (labor), and “n” productive sectors: 
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rate defined in its statutory regulations. The tax load on prices of goods and services is identical to the 
nominal rate of a given tax only if the conditions listed above are satisfied. 
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 X1 = X11  +  X12  +  X13  + …+  X1n + D1   
 X2 = X21  +  X22  +  X23  + …+  X2n  + D2 
 X3 = X31  +  X32  +  X33  + …+  X3n + D3  
 
.                                                                      
 
 .          (1) 
 . 
 Xn = Xn1  +  Xn2  +  Xn3  + …+  Xnn + Dn  
 L   = L1   +  L2    +  L3    + ... +  Ln     
 
where 
 
 i, j =  production sectors (1...n) 
 Xi  = gross output of sector i,  
 Xij = amount of product i used as input by sector j 
 Di = final demand for product i,  
 L  = labor inputs in sectors 1…n. 
 
Let aij= Xij/Xj. They show the amount of input i necessary for the production of 
a unit of output j.  Thus, Xij=aijXj, and Xi= ∑aijXj+Di. Thus, in matrix notation, and 
defining  
 
 A= matrix of technical input-output coefficients, with typical elements given 
by aij= Xij/Xj 
 
it becomes possible to conclude that  
 
 X = AX + D                                                     
 D = (I-A) X 
 X = (I-A) -1 D                                                                        (1a) 
 X = [cij] D 
 
where (I-A) is called the matrix of Leontief Coefficients, and its inverse, (I-A)-1= [cij] 
is the matrix of direct and indirect requirements of input i for the production of a unit 
of output j. In order for a sector i to have a positive net production, it is necessary 
that Xi >Xii and Xi  - aii Xi > 0. Thus, aii <1.  
Model (1a) is widely used for output and investment planning, since it predicts 
the correct output combination necessary to produce a projected vector of final 
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demand goods. 
Value input-output 
The basic physical relationships given by (1) have a dual representation in value 
terms, where sums of columns and rows are equal: 
 
 Y1 = Y11  +  Y12  +  Y13  + …+  Y1n + D1P1   
 Y2 = Y21  +  Y22  +  Y23  + …+  Y2n  + D2P2 
 Y3 = Y31  +  Y32  +  Y33  + …+  Y3n + D3P3 
 
.                                                                      
 
 .         (2) 
 . 
 Yn = Yn1  +  Yn2  +  Yn3  + …+  Ynn + DnPn  
 W = W1   +  W2    +  W3    + ... +  Wn     
 
Let Yij = Xij Pi , and Yj = Xj Pj. where 
  
 Yij = value of sales of sector i to sector j 
 Pi,j  = price of  product i, j 
 Wi = total wage bill paid by sector i. 
 
The value of sales of sector i necessary to produce one unit value of output j is 
defined as 
 
  bij, = Yij/Yj = XijPi/XjPj = Piaij/Pj.                                                                  
 
Total wage bill paid by sector j is given by Wj =PL Lj  and wj = Wj/Yj = PLLj/PjXj  
= PLdj/Pj  where  
  
 PL  = price of labor 
 Lj = total labor input used by sector j 
 dj  = Lj/Xj = labor used in a unit production of output j (labor coefficient). 
 
These relationships imply that  
 
 Yi = ∑jYij +PiDi  = ∑jbijYj + PiDi 
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which in matrix notation can be expressed as 
 
 Y = BY +PD 
 PD = (I-B)Y        (2a) 
 Y = (I-B)-1 PD  
 
where 
 
 Y = value of gross output 
 B = matrix of input coefficients in value terms 
 P = vector of product prices 
 
and (I-B)-1 = [I- (Piaij/Pj)]-1 represents the direct and indirect value of product j 
necessary for the production of a unit value of final demand i.  
Model (2a) is also widely used for output and investment planning, and 
determines the value of production and investment targets, disaggregated by sectors, 
given a vector of final demand.   
Price input-output 
Since in value terms sums of rows and of equivalent columns are equal, a 
typical equation in the system is given by Yi = ∑ Yij + Wi . Thus, adding along 
columns of (2)  
 
 Y1 = Y11 + Y21 + Y31 +...+ Yn1 + W1 
 
Y2 = Y12 + Y22 + Y32 +...+ Yn2 + W2 
 . 
 . 
 . 
 Yn = Y1n + Y2n + Y3n +...+ Ynn + Wn 
  
Since Yi= XiPi and Wi= PLLi, and taking i=1 as a typical equation we get 
 
 X1P1 = X11P1 + X21P2 +...Xn1Pn + L1PL     (3) 
 
Dividing both sides by X1, 
 
 P1 = (X11/X1)P1 + (X21/X1)P2 +...+(Xn1/X1)Pn + L1PL/X1 
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and remembering that aij=Xij/Xj  and that dj  = Lj/Xj  we get the basic economic 
identity in production and price formation, without taxation,  
 
 P1 = a11P1 + a21P2 +...+an1Pn + d1PL 
 P2 = a12P1 + a22P2 +...+an2Pn + d2PL 
 
P3 = a13P1 + a23P2 +...+an3Pn + d3PL 
 . 
 .         (4) 
 . 
  Pn = a1nP1 + a2nP2 +...+annPn + dnPL 
 
In matrix notation, 
 
 P = A´ P + d PL   
 P = (I-A´)-1 d PL        (5) 
  
where 
  
 A´= transpose of A =[aij] 
 d  = [di] =vector of labor coefficients. 
 
Model (5), which is a variant of model (2a), allows the simulation of the impact 
of factor prices (wages in this simple model) on product prices. This is the basic 
relationship that will be used to analyze the impact of different tax models on 
product prices. 
THE SIMULATION MODEL AND THE STATISTICAL DATA BASE 
According to model (5), simulations will require data on the technical input-
output coefficients aij, as given by the intermediate consumption matrix A.  
Brazilian National Accounts are reported in value terms. Thus, it is possible to 
derive the bij coefficients which express the value of sales of sector i necessary to 
produce one unit value of output j, as expressed in matrix B. This will be the basis of 
our simulation models, and the equivalence of matrices A and B for our purposes 
will be shown below as we need to normalize the price vector to be equal to unity.  
In this section, the model to be used in our simulations will be constructed, 
considering the data availability as given by the official National Income Accounts. 
Brazilian National Accounts Tables report the profit margins in each sector. 
Thus, such information is incorporated in the model by making equation (3) equal to  
 - 82 - 
 X1P1 = (X11P1 + X21P2 +...Xn1Pn + L1PL) (1+ m1) 
 
where 
 
 m1 = mark-up coefficient on circulating capital. 
 
Since aij=Xij/Xj  and dj = Lj/Xj  we get 
  
 P1 = (a11P1 + a21P2 +...+an1Pn + d1PL) (1 + m1) 
 P2 = (a12P1 + a22P2 +...+an2Pn + d2PL) (1 + m2) 
 
P3 = (a13P1 + a23P2 +...+an3Pn + d3PL) (1 + m3) 
 .         (6) 
 .           
 . 
  Pn = (a1nP1 + a2nP2 +...+annPn + dnPL) (1 + mn) 
 
In matrix notation, 
 
 P = (F0 A´) P + F0d PL  , and  
 P = (I – F0A´) -1 F0 d PL         (7) 
 
where 
  
 A´= transpose of A =[aij] 
 F0 = diagonal matrix of mark-up coefficients [1+mi] 
 d  = [di] =vector of labor coefficients. 
 
Since, as seen before, aij = Xij/Xj and dj = Lj/Xj algebraic manipulation of a 
typical row ( such as i=1) of system of equations (6)  results  in 
 
 P1 = [(X11/X1)P1 + (X21/X1)P2 +...+(Xn1/X1)Pn + L1PL/X1] (1 + m1) 
 
Multiplying both sides by (X1/ X1P1) yields 
 
 1 = [(P1X11)/ X1P1 + (P2X21)/ X1P1 +...(PnXn1)/X1P1 +  
            + (PLL1)/ X1P1] (1 + m1) 
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Remembering that each element in the input-output table B is given by bij = 
(PiXij)/(PjXj), and that wj = (PL Lj)/(PjXj), by substitution we get the basic estimating 
data used in the simulations, whereby prices are normalised to be equal to one. Thus, 
 
 1 = (b11 + b21 + b31 + ...+ bn1 + w1) (1 + m1) 
 1 = (b12 + b22 + b32 + ...+ bn2 + w2) (1 + m2) 
 1 = (b13 + b23 + b33 + ...+ bn3 + w3) (1 + m3) 
 
. 
 
.
         
(8) 
 
. 
 1 = (b1n + b2n + b3n + ...+ bnn + wn) (1 + mn) 
 
An input-output table for 2006 constructed in the format of equation (8) is used 
in simulating the economic impacts of different taxes. Note that since it is built in a 
way that forces Pi =1 for all i, and since we know that bij, = Piaij/Pj, then bij must be 
equal to aij.. Thus, model (8) is equivalent to model (6). In other words, in building 
our simulation models it is irrelevant which one is actually employed. Thus, in 
describing the dynamics of the structure of industrial price formation we chose 
model (6), which is more intuitive as far as price formation and tax simulations are 
concerned.109  
The construction of the input-output table 
It is necessary to produce a matrix of input-output coefficients representing 
intermediate use of inputs in production. In terms of value, such information is 
contained in matrix B, as in model (8), or, in physical units, in its dual matrix A, as 
in model (6). 
Brazilian National Accounts statistics, which follow the guidelines set up by the 
1993 United Nations System of National Accounts (1993 SNA), allow the 
construction of the input-output matrix B for 2006, the latest available year up to the 
date of this publication.  
The starting point for the construction of an input-output table is the Supply and 
Use tables (SUTs) which are part of the National Accounts Statistics, as published by 
the IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics).110 
The Brazilian SUTs contain production and use (supply and demand) statistics 
for 110 products and 55 activities. The official Brazilian input-output table is made 
                                                 
109
 For a clearer understanding of the model it is interesting to note that  equation (6) represents an 
input-output model constructed “down the columns” of the Use Table of the Supply and Use Tables 
contained in the Brazilian National Income Accounts, while the model given by equation (2) 
represents its dual, constructed “along the rows”.  
110
 For the methodology used in constructing the Brazilian Input-Output Tables see [IBGE, 1997]. 
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up of 55 activities. However, as the SUTs contain production information for 110 
products, it is possible to construct a 110 entry input-output table organized in terms 
of products X products, instead of activities X activities. Doing so results in more 
disaggregated information, which is preferable as it allows more precise analysis of 
the impact of taxes on prices.  
This was done as follows. 
SUTs are products X activities matrices that have three parts: 
 
1. The resources table, (also called the “make” table); 
2. The intermediate uses table; and 
3. The final uses (or final demand) table. 
 
From the SUTs, and assuming that i=row, j= column, that a capital letter 
represents a matrix, and that a lowercase letter represents a column vector, the 
following tables can be derived: 
 
 
Domestic 
Product 
Activity 
Margins and 
Taxes 
Final 
Demand 
Value of 
Production 
Domestic Value  U M F q 
Activity V    g 
Imported Product     m 
 
where 
 
 V= matrix of value of production of each activity, by product, in basic prices; 
 U = matrix of total intermediate consumption (domestic and imported goods) 
of each product by activity, in market prices; 
 M= matrix of margins, taxes and imports, where columns represent 
respectively  a trade margin vector (tm), a transport margin vector (trm), a vector of 
import taxes (mt), an IPI tax vector (ipi), an ICMS tax vector (icms), and a vector of 
other taxes net of subsidies (ot); 
 F = matrix of final demand by type of final demand, where columns represent 
respectively the vectors of final consumption by families, government consumption, 
exports, capital formation, and inventory changes; such final demand vectors will be 
referred to as (Fj), and are all expressed in market prices; 
 m = vector of value of imported products   
 q= vector of gross value of production for each product; and 
 g= vector of gross value of production for each activity. 
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For illustrative purposes a reduced 12 sector National Account Table is 
reproduced in ANNEX I-C. 
In order to produce an input-output table from the SUTs it is necessary to make 
important adjustments for two basic reasons: a) because prices in the table of 
intermediate consumption (U) are reported in market (or consumers´) prices, whereas 
we wish to have an input-output table in basic (or producers´) prices, and b) because 
the intermediate consumption table does not differentiate between domestic and 
imported products, whereas we wish to have an input-output table of domestic 
production. 
The relationship between basic and market prices are given by  
 
 Basic Prices = Market Prices – Trade Margin – Transport Margin – (Taxes - 
Subsidies). 
 
Thus, the first task is to take margins, taxes, and imports out of the values 
reported in the intermediate use table, and transform them from total intermediate 
use tables at market prices to intermediate use of domestic products at basic prices. 
In other words, it is necessary to find dt such that  
   
 Unbp = Ump - dt  
 
where  
 
 Unbp = matrix of intermediate consumption of domestic goods of each 
product by activity, and  
 dt = matrix that registers the sum of the value of margins, taxes and imports 
to be subtracted from the corresponding entry in the U matrix in order to turn it from 
a market price total intermediate use table at market prices into a basic price table of 
intermediate consumption of domestic products, by each activity, and  
 bp = basic prices 
 mp = market prices. 
 
Since trade margins, transport margins, and taxes (which are columns of M), 
and the imports vector in the supply table of the SUT´s are column vectors by 
products, and therefore do not discriminate by activities, it becomes necessary to 
adopt a distribution criterion according to which total margins, taxes, and imports are 
distributed to the activities that produce such products. It should be noticed that even 
in the construction of a product X  product  input-output table the margins, taxes, and 
imports are first distributed among activities, and the resulting intermediate domestic 
consumption (now in market prices)  by activities  are allocated to the various 
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production processes and to their secondary production. This two-stage procedure is 
necessary since the SUTs tables are reported in the product X activities format. 
The transformation of market values into basic values, and of total intermediate 
consumption into domestic intermediate consumption, is obtained through the 
construction of two distribution matrices (P and P*) used to introduce a weighted 
average method of distribution of margins, taxes and imports among activities.  
Let P be the distribution matrix with a typical cell that represents the value of 
the intermediate consumption of a product (elements from the U matrix) divided by 
the value of total demand for the same product, all at market prices as published by 
the IBGE. Since by construction of the SUTs 
 
 q = U.i + F 
 
where 
 
  i = column vector where each element has value equal to unity,  
 
it follows that  
 
 P = U . <q>-1                                                                    
 
where  
 
 <a> is a diagonal matrix with elements given by vector a.   
 
A typical element of P is  
 
  [uij/ ∑j uij + ∑j Fj]  
 
showing the proportion of a product´s total demand used up as intermediate 
consumption in each of the activities that produce such a product.  
Matrix P can be used to distribute the values of a column vector (such as total 
trade margin, or total transport margin) used up by the production of a good or 
service (a product) proportionally to the fraction of the product value which is 
produced by each activity.  
Thus, the allocation of trade margins among the various activities is given by 
 
 Ptm = P´. <tm>        
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where 
 Ptm = matrix of products´ total trade margin distributed by activities that 
produce such product, and  
 
 P´= transpose of P 
   
The transpose of matrix Ptm, expressed as  
 
 P´tm = ( P´.<tm> )´       (9)                                      
 
 
has as each of its elements the portion of the of total trade margin to be subtracted 
from each respective entry in the U matrix.  
Similar procedure is used to calculate the matrix  
 
 Ptrm = P´. <trm> 
 
where 
 
 Ptrm = matrix of products´ total transport margin distributed by activities that 
produce such product.  
 
Similarly, we can derive 
 
 P´trm = ( P´.<trm> )´       (10) 
 
which has in each of its cells the portion of the of total transport margin to be 
subtracted from each respective entry in the U matrix. 
Following the same procedures, the distribution matrix for the IPI tax (ipi) and 
for Other Taxes Minus Subsidies (ot) are given by 
 
 P´ipi = ( P´.<ipi> )´        (11) 
 
 P´ot = ( P´.<ot> )´       (12) 
 
The need to construct two distribution matrices  (P and P*) is due to the fact that 
it is necessary to subtract the value of exports (a column of the F matrix) from total 
 - 88 - 
final demand when computing the distribution coefficient for some vectors of the 
final demand, such as Import Taxes, and the ICMS tax. This becomes necessary 
since none of such taxes are levied on exports, and therefore the value of exports 
should not influence the weights on the distribution of such taxes, which are levied 
entirely on domestically consumed products.  
Furthermore, since we wish to produce an input-output table for domestic 
production, it also becomes necessary to subtract the imported components from 
each element of the U matrix. Thus, 
 
 P*= U . <q*> -1     
 
where  
 
 q*= U.i + (F-Fx) 
 
and 
 
 Fx = vector of value of exports by product. 
 
The “net of exports” distribution matrix P* is used to calculate the value of 
imports, import taxes and the value of the ICMS tax to be subtracted from each 
element of the U matrix, following similar procedures as those used with trade and  
transport margins, and with IPI and Other Taxes. Thus, the required adjustment for 
the ICMS (icms), for Imports (m) and for Import Taxes (mt) are  given by  
 
 P*´icms = ( P*´.<icms> )´      (13) 
 
 P*´m = ( P*´.<m> )´       (14) 
 
 P*´mt = ( P*´.<mt> )´       (15) 
 
Finally, to transform the U matrix from a market price table into a basic price 
table, and also from a total intermediate use table into a domestic intermediate use 
table (and remembering that Unbp = Ump – dt ) it suffices to subtract each of the 
distributed margins, taxes, and imports from each cell in the U matrix, thus 
transforming it from a market price, total intermediate use table (Ump) into a basic 
price table of intermediate consumption of domestic products by activities (Unbp). 
Thus, the matrix dt is the the sum of the matrices given by equations (9), (10), 
(11), (12), (13), (14) and (15) where each equation gives the value of the margins, 
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taxes, and imports that should be subtracted from the respective entry in the U matrix 
in order to turn it from a market price (Ump) into a basic price table (Unbp). 
The resulting Un matrix, at basic prices, is the fundamental component in the 
development of the input-output models used hereafter. 
But before the basic input-output model is constructed a second methodological 
question must be tackled. 
The published official SUTs (more specifically the U matrix from which we 
derived the Un matrix) are rectangular matrices containing 110 products and 55 
activities. The IBGE also publishes a square input-output table with 55 entries by 
activities. However, as seen before, it is possible to construct a 110 entry input-
output table organized in terms of products X products, instead of activities X 
activities. 
To do so, we start with a few basic questions and relations. 
One question is how to transfer demand for 110 products to the 55 activities; 
alternatively, how to distribute the output of 55 activities into the 110 production 
processes. 
The second question is how to allocate the intermediate consumption of inputs 
to the 55 activities; or alternatively to the 110 production processes. 
The methodology to deal with the first question implies the construction of a 
Market Share Matrix D as follows: 
 
 D = V . <q>-1  
 
and  
 
 V = D . <q>        (16) 
 
The market share matrix D will be used to distribute demand from products to 
activities. 
To answer the second question, and to allocate the intermediate demand for 
domestic products to activities, we assume that inputs are proportional to value of 
production according to the Matrix of Domestic Technical Input-Output Coefficients 
at basic prices Bn given by 
   
 Bn = Unbp . <g>-1                                               (17) 
   
from where it follows that  
 
 Bn . <g> = Unbp                                                (18) 
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showing that each intermediate use of a product by an activity is divided by total 
value of production for that same activity.   
Finally, observing the Use Table of the SUTs , it can be seen that the vector 
representing the value of production by product is given, from the demand or use 
side, by 
 
 q = Unbp . i + Fn         (19) 
 
with a typical element in basic prices given by [qi = ∑j unij + Fni], or alternatively, 
from the supply or resource side of the SUTs, 
  
 q = V´. i   
 
where V´is the transpose of V, and with a typical element given by  
 
 [qi = ∑j v´ji]. 
  
Also, the value of production by activity is given by 
 
 g = V.i         (20) 
 
with a typical element equal to [gj = ∑i vij]. 
 
Total value of production, the sum of columns or of rows, is given by 
 
 ∑i qi = ∑j gj .  
 
Substituting equation (18) into equation (19) and eliminating Unbp yields 
 
 q = Bn <g>. i + Fn 
 q = Bn . g + Fn       (21)
 
  
Next, multiplying both sides of equation (16) by the column vector i , 
remembering equation  (20), and since <q>.i = q  
 
 g = D.q        (22) 
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and substituting (22) into (21) yields 
 
 q = Bn . D . q + Fn 
 q – Bn. D. q = Fn 
 q (I-Bn.D)-1= Fn 
 q = (I-Bn.D)-1 Fn        (23) 
 
Equation (23) is the basic product X product input-output model used in the 
simulations that follow. 
It is worth noticing that the activity X activity input-output model could be easily 
obtained by substituting (21) into (22), yielding 
 
 g = D.(Bn.g +Fn)  
 g – D.Bn.g = D.Fn 
 g.(I-D.Bn) = D.Fn 
 g = (I-D.Bn)-1 D.Fn       (24) 
 
Equations (23) and (24) are therefore the two possible representations of the 
input-output model given the SUTs tables reported for the Brazilian economy, and 
both are strictly compatible with equation (2a) above, which defines conceptually the 
input-output model as created by Wassily Leontief. Pre-multiplying the Bn matrix by 
D (D.Bn) yields the matrix of technical coefficients activity X  activity; post-
multiplying the Bn matrix by D (Bn.D) yields the matrix of technical coefficients 
product X product; D.Fn yields final demand vector by activity; and Fn is the final 
demand vector by product. 
After constructing matrix Bn.D, which is what interests us in our simulations, 
and remembering that prices of all products were constrained to be equal to unity, the 
matrix of technical coefficients Bn.D is complemented with the following rows: a 
Sum row, with sums of technical coefficients by column, an Imports row containing 
the sum by column of the technical coefficients of imported intermediate products, a 
Wages row, containing coefficients given by the division of the “wages paid” by the 
“gross value of production” both contained in the value-added part of the Use Table 
of the SUTs , and finally a residual Gross Profit Margin row, by activity. 
Of course, summing the column of intermediate use and adding the value-added 
components of the production process amounts to unity.  
Simulation models 
The SIM (0) model 
We now construct our simulation models, which will incorporate the basic 
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conceptual input-output model given by (6) together with the empirical matrix of 
domestic technical input-output coefficients at basic prices (BnD) contained in 
equation (23). 
Equation (6) incorporates information on profit margins through the use of 
mark-up coefficients applied on circulating capital. We adopt the hypothesis that 
advances on purchase of inputs and on payment of wages have to wait for a certain 
production period before it is recovered through sales to other sectors and to final 
demand. During this period the firms earn a “waiting fee” of mi % of the circulating 
capital used in purchasing inputs and in paying wages. Such mark-up margin may 
also include a competitive profit margin, or normal profits. This model is certainly 
more realistic than the zero-profit assumption implied by (4). Thus, remembering 
that equation (6) is equivalent to equation (8) (since, as seen before, aij = bij) a typical 
price accounting equation is given by  
 
 Pi = [ ∑j(bijPj) + wi ] (1 + mi ) 
 
where 
 
 Pi,j = price of product i, j , (1...n) 
 bij = value of input j per unit value of product i 
 wi = value of labor input per unit value of product i  
 mi = mark-up on circulating capital of product i. 
  
In matrix notation the model described above can be expressed as   
 
 P=[ F*K ] P + F*w  
 P- [F*K] P = F*w 
 [I – F*K] P = F*w 
 P= [I – F*K]-1 F*w       SIM (0) 
 
where 
 
 P =vector of final prices (n x 1) 
 I = identity matrix (n x n) 
 F* = diagonal matrix [(1 + mi)] (n x n) 
 K = the transpose of matrix B of technical coefficients bij    (n x n) 
 w = vector of wi , value of labor input per unit value of product i (n x 1). 
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This model, called SIM (0) is the benchmark with which all other simulations 
will be compared. It represents an economy without taxation, and in which all prices 
are normalised to equal unity. Note that, in terms of the statistical data available, 
matrix K above is the exact equivalent to the transpose of matrix (Bn.D) in equation 
(23). Thus, for strictly denominational purposes K= (BnD)´ in this and in all other 
variants of the simulation models, as  described below. 
The introduction of taxation will result in a different set of prices which, 
compared to unit prices implied by the SIM (0) model, will describe their percentage 
change resulting from the choice of taxes used by the government. Different taxes 
will be introduced, and the resulting prices will be compared to those given by the 
benchmark model (SIM 0) with no taxation. 
 
The SIM (1) model: 
This model introduces the bank transactions tax. It is charged on both debit and 
credit entries on clients´ bank accounts. It has a double incidence on each 
transaction, shared by purchaser and seller. As an example, suppose that the bank 
transaction tax with a 1% rate is applied on a $100 purchase of an input for 
production of a certain output. The purchaser’s bank account will be charged $101, 
and the sellers bank account will be credited $99. Thus, a $100 transaction will result 
in tax revenue of $2, shared between the two agents involved in the transaction. 
For each economic agent such as a producer, the cost accounting records will 
register a 1% tax cost on all outlays on inputs and on labor, and also another 1% tax 
on sales of final products. This can be expressed in terms of prices as   
 
 Pi = (1+t) {(1+t)[∑j(bijPj) + wi ] (1 + mi )} 
 
where 
 
 t = the bank transaction tax rate. 
 
In matrix notation,  
 
 P = F[KP + w] 
 P = [FK]P + Fw 
 P = [I – FK]-1[Fw]       SIM (1)  
 
where 
 F = diagonal matrix [(1+t)2 (1+mi)]   
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The SIM (1) model estimates the effect on sector prices of a bank transactions 
tax. The matrix F, is the product of two diagonal matrices: the first [(1+t)2] , 
represents the effect of the uniform rate of the bank transaction tax, and the second, 
[1+mi] reflects the impacts of the sector mark-up coefficients. Matrix F introduces 
the turnover effect into the system, iterating with the mark-up coefficients.  
The SIM (1) model implies that no other tax is imposed, and therefore it isolates 
the effect of the bank transactions tax on prices. If compared to the hypothetical “no 
tax” situation implied by the SIM (0) model, the total cumulative effect of a bank 
transactions tax on sector prices can be effectively evaluated. 
  
The SIM (2) model: 
This model introduces a value-added tax into the initial no-tax system SIM (0). 
As usual, tax payments included in the price of purchased inputs will be deducted 
from tax liabilities due by the seller of the final product. It is assumed that the final 
price for each sector comprises the VAT cost according to the following relation: 
 
 Pi = [total outlays plus profit margin]/(1-v) 
 
where  
 
 v = uniform VAT rate. 
  
Thus, the pricing model can be expressed as 
 
 Pi = (1/(1-v)){ [(∑j(bijPj) + wi ) (1 +mi)] - v∑j(bijPj)} 
 
or,  
 
  Pi = [((1+mi–v)/(1-v)) ∑j bijPj]  + ((1 +mi)/(1-v)) wi  
 
In matrix notation the model can be expressed as 
 
 P = [F1K]P + F2w 
 P = (I - F1K)-1  F2w       SIM (2) 
 
where 
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 F1 = diagonal matrix [(1+mi-v)/(1-v)]
  
 F2  = diagonal matrix [(1+mi)/(1-v)] 
Defining M as the mark-up diagonal matrix with elements [1+mi], A as the VAT 
diagonal matrix with elements [1/(1-v)], and C as the value-added credit diagonal 
matrix with elements [-v/(1-v)] it can be seen that F2 = MA and F1 = F2 + C. 
It is important to note that in this model the mark-up rate is levied on input 
prices with the VAT tax included, in the same way as with any other cost of 
production. Thus, it is assumed that VAT taxes included in input prices are paid as 
an advance to the government, and that there is a waiting time equivalent to an 
average production period before the tax advance is paid back to the producer in the 
form of a credit against his VAT tax liabilities due when final product is sold.  
This hypothesis implies that the VAT incidence on final prices is not uniform 
and cumulative, as opposed by standard theoretical analysis of the incidence of 
value-added taxation on final prices. VAT´s may have differential impacts on prices 
of different products, thereby distorting relative prices of intermediate goods in a 
way that is formally quite similar to cumulative taxes.  
It becomes clear, therefore, that the alleged neutrality of the VAT can only be 
guaranteed in the unlikely situation where all mi= 0, in addition to the seldom seen 
application of a single VAT tax rate for all products and services traded.  
Thus, the assumption that VATs have a neutral impact on relative prices is not 
warranted, and proves erroneous the assumption that they are less distortionary than 
turnover taxes as far as their effects on prices are concerned. 
 
The SIM (2´) model: 
In a mark-up model, a VAT will show the neutrality properties usually assumed 
in simplified textbook models, only if it meets an exceedingly strong assumption: 
that value-added tax credits are instantaneous. In other words, the pricing model 
becomes 
 
 Pi = (1/(1-v)){ [(∑j(bijPj) + wi ) - v∑j(bijPj) ] (1 +mi) } 
 Pi = (1/(1-v)){ [ (1-v) ∑j(bijPj) + wi ] (1 +mi) } 
 
and   
 
 Pi = (1 +mi) ∑j(bijPj) +  (1+mi)/(1-v) wi  
 
In matrix notation, 
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 P = MKP + F2w  
 P = (I-MK)-1 F2w       SIM(2´) 
 
where 
  
 M= the mark-up diagonal matrix with elements [1+mi] 
 F2  = diagonal matrix [(1+mi)/(1-v)] 
  
It should be pointed out that in this model the prices of intermediate inputs are 
multiplied by matrix M, composed solely of the mark-up coefficients. Thus, the 
value-added tax will not influence prices through their effect on prices of 
intermediate inputs, as happened in model SIM (2) when intermediate prices were 
multiplied by the F1 matrix, which includes both the mark-up coefficients mi and  the 
value-added tax rate v.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that even if mark-up rates equal zero in all 
sectors, the expected “neutrality” of value-added taxes (defined loosely here as a 
proportional increase in all prices of intermediate inputs), will only occur if there is a 
uniform VAT rate applied to all sectors. The multiplicity of value-added tax rates, as 
is the case in practical applications of such taxes throughout the world, does not 
guarantee its neutrality, as commonly claimed, even in the (unlikely) case of zero 
mark-up rates.  
On the other hand, the labor cost, which by definition is the same as the value-
added in production, is amplified by the mark-up margin and by the VAT rate v, 
present in the F2 matrix. The incidence of the VAT on the labor component in 
production does not allow for credits, since its total incidence falls completely on 
final prices, as expected by conventional value-added tax theory. Thus, its effects are 
similar to a tax on final sales, guaranteeing neutrality in intermediate prices, and 
therefore on production costs. Nevertheless, the assumptions of such model are 
extremely unrealistic, restricting severely the usefulness of its policy prescriptions. 
  
SIM(2)EXT: extensions of the SIM(2) model 
Given the exceedingly strong assumptions implied by the SIM (2´) model, the 
original SIM (2) structure will be used for comparing alternative tax systems.  
Such construct can easily incorporate other taxes in its analytical framework. 
Three other important taxes in current use in Brazil can be easily included into 
that same input-output framework, namely a turnover tax on services, the ISS, a 
value-added tax on industrial products (IPI, similar to a value-added excise) and the 
payroll social contribution to the INSS, the federal social security agency.  
The incidence of the ISS is upon the value of both intermediate and final gross 
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sales of services. It has an identical impact on prices as the mark-up rate, and thus it 
suffices to add the sectoral ISS rates to each corresponding mark-up rate, simply 
adding each si   (the ISS rate applicable to sector i ) to each mi. Identical procedure, 
mutatis mutantis, should be used to introduce the IPI in the model, adding its rate pi  
to the sectoral VAT rate vi.  
As far as the INSS is concerned, its impact on prices is equivalent to an 
additional labor cost corresponding to the INSS uniform rate µ. Thus, it suffices to 
replace each wi  for w´i, where w´í = (1+µ). Therefore, the simulation model used to 
represent the conventional Brazilian tax model made up of two value-added taxes, a 
turnover services tax, and a single social contribution rate on wages can be 
represented as 
 
 Pi = (1/(1-vi´)){ [(∑j(bijPj) + w´i ) (1 +mi +si)] -     
         - vi´∑j(bijPj)} 
 
where 
 
 si= the ISS rate for sector i 
 vi´= v + pi 
 pi  = the IPI rate for sector i 
 w´í = wi(1+µ)  
 µ = the social security rate on wages. 
 
As a result, in the extended SIM(2)EXT model 
 
 F1 = diagonal matrix [(1+mi+si –vi´)/(1-vi´)]
  
 F2  = diagonal matrix [(1+mi+si)/(1-vi´)] 
 w´ = vector of w´i , value of labor units per unit of product i , including social 
contributions. 
 
The simulations contained in this text, therefore, will use the SIM(0) model as 
the benchmark for a “no tax” situation, which theoretically represents the least 
distortionary situation, and against which the effects of alternative taxation systems 
will be compared. The effects of the bank transactions tax on prices will be measured 
by comparing SIM(1) results against SIM(0). And the SIM(2) model, and its 
extensions as in the SIM(2)EXT model, will be used to evaluate the current tax 
system applied in Brazil, as compared with the least distortionary situation implied 
by model SIM(0).  
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Evidently, the comparison of both the SIM (1) and the SIM (2) models with the 
benchmark SIM(0) model,  will imply a corresponding comparison of models 
SIM(1) and SIM(2), as far as their impact on prices are concerned. Thus, the debate 
between the supporters of a VAT tax and those in favor of a bank transactions’ tax 
will finally occur with a quantitative perspective in sight, as opposed to the 
predominantly loose and fragile conceptual framework in which it has been 
occurring in the last two decades. 
SETTING RATES FOR THE SINGLE TAX 
The electronic tax on bank transactions was introduced in Brazil in 1993 
through the enactment of Article 2 of Constitutional Amendment 3, which authorized 
a Complementary Law to create a Provisional Tax on Financial Transactions 
(IPMF). It should be effective until December 31, 1994, with a rate of 0.25% (a 
quarter of 1%) levied on the value of all current account bank debt entries.  
The use of the IPMF, which began to be collected in August 26, 1993, was 
suspended by a Judiciary order on September 15, 1993 (Adin 939-7/DF). It became 
effective again on January 1, 1994, and was in force until December 31 of the same 
year, collecting R$ 3.7 billion, which amounted to 5.17% of total federal revenue, 
and 1.06% of Brazilian GNP. 
Constitutional Amendment 12/96 reintroduced the financial transactions tax 
under the name of Provisional Contribution on Financial Transactions (CPMF), with 
a rate of 0.20%. Law 9311/96 authorized its use from January 23, 1997 until 
February 23, 1998.  
From this period onwards a series of time extensions of the CPMF were 
enacted. The rate was changed in certain short periods, but it remained at 0.38% 
from 2001 until its extinction in December 31, 2007. The rates of the CPMF were the 
following: 
• 0.20% between January 23, 1997 and January 22, 1999; 
• 0.38% between June 17, 1999 and June 16, 2000; 
• 0.30% between June17, 2000 and March 17, 2001; and 
• 0.38% between March 18, 2001 and December 31, 2007. 
TABLE 6 below shows the IPMF/CPMF revenue between 1994 and 2008. 
Revenue collected in 1995/1996 and 2008, when the financial transactions tax was 
not in effect, is attributed to residual revenue from taxable transactions which 
occurred in 1994 and 2007 respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
IPMF/CPMF Revenue, tax base, GNP, and Federal Revenue (1994/2008) 
TABLE 6 (CONTINUATION) 
IPMF/CPMF Revenue, tax base, GNP, and Federal Revenue (1994/2008) 
Year Tax Base/ GNP 
(IPMF/CPMF) 
Revenue/GNP 
(%) 
Total Federal 
Revenue 
(R$ 000,000) 
(IPMF/CPMF) 
Revenue/Total 
Federal Revenue 
(%) 
1994 4.23 1.06 71,456 5.17 
1995 - 0.02 129,321 0.12 
1996 - 0.00 150,708 0.00 
1997 3.87 0.74 171,082 4.04 
1998 4.14 0.83 186,561 4.35 
1999 3.39 0.75 215,568 3.69 
2000 3.59 1.22 248,004 5.80 
2001 3.66 1.32 281,300 6.10 
2002 3.62 1.38 326,362 6.23 
2003 3.56 1.35 364,321 6.32 
2004 3.58 1.36 432,192 6.11 
2005 3.58 1.36 498,535 5.85 
2006 3.56 1.35 550,788 5.82 
2007 3.68 1.40 632,674 5.74 
2008 - 0.04 726,579 0.16 
     Source: Central Bank, Federal Revenue Agency and the author. 
     1-It includes taxes, social security contributions, and other economic contributions. 
 
In the six years during which the full rate of 0.38% was applied, the financial 
transactions tax collected on average 1.37% of GNP, or 6% of total federal revenue. 
Its tax base amounted to 3.6 times the Brazilian GNP.   
 
Revenue 
(R$ 000,000) Average Tax Rate  
IPMF/CPMF Tax`Base 
(R$ 000,000)  
1994 3;692 0.25% 1,476,800,000 349,205 
1995 159 - - 705,641 
1996 1 - - 843,966 
1997 6,910 0.19% 3,636,842,105 939,147 
1998 8,113 0.20% 4,056,500,000 979,276 
1999 7,949 0.22% 3,613,181,818 1,065,000 
2000 14,395 0.34% 4,233,823,529 1,179,482 
2001 17,157 0.36% 4,765,833,333 1,302,136 
2002 20,336 0.38% 5,351,578,947 1,477,822 
2003 23,029 0.38% 6,060,263,158 1,699,948 
2004 26,399 0.38% 6,947,105,263 1,941,498 
2005 29,188 0.38% 7,681,052,632 2,147,239 
2006 32,058 0.38% 8,436,297,368 2,369,797 
2007 36,320 0.38% 9,557,894,737 2,597,611 
2008 1,148 - - 2,904,942 
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The Brazilian Tax Burden (2007/2008) 
Even without the CPMF, total tax burden in 2008 was 1.15 percentage point 
above that of the year before, maintaining the upward trend initiated in the early 
1990’s. Between 1995 and 2008 total tax burden, including federal, state, and 
municipal revenues, grew 7.5 percentage points, going from 28.4% to 35.9% of 
GNP. 
To compensate for the projected loss of revenue in 2008 resulting from the 
cancellation of the CPMF, the rate of the pre-existing tax on loans and credit (IOF) 
was raised by 0.38%, and that of the Social Contribution on Net Profits (CSLL) of 
the financial sector was raised from 9% to 15%. Such measures resulted in additional 
revenue of R$ 23.6 billion in 2008. 
TABLE 7 below shows federal and social security revenues for 2007 and 2008, 
as well as state and municipal fiscal revenues. 
TABLE 7 
Tax Revenues (2007-2008) 
Taxes and Contributions 
Revenue 
2007 
(R$ 000,000) 
% of 
GNP 
Revenue 
2008 
(R$ 000,000) 
% of 
GNP 
Change 
in pp 
International Trade  (Imports and Exports) 12,257 0.47 17,235 0.59 0.12 
Tax on Industrial Production (IPI)  – Total 32,867 1.27 39,466 1.36 0.09 
        IPI Tobacco 2,785 0.11 3,211 0.11 0.00 
        IPI Beverages 2,581 0.10 2,438 0.08 -0.02 
        IPI Vehicles 5,167 0.20 5;998 0.21 0.01 
        IPI on Imports 7,702 0.30 10,402 0.36 0.06 
        IPI Other products 14,632 0.56 17,417 0.60 0.04 
Income Tax  (IR)  – Total 160,315 6.17 191,754 6.60 0.43 
        IR – Individuals 13,655 0.53 14,986 0.52 -0.01 
        IR – Corporate 70,034 2.70 84,726 2.92 0.22 
        IR –withholdings on labour income 42,347 1.63 51,610 1.78 0.15 
        IR –withholdings no capital income 21,421 0.82 24,854 0.86 0.03 
        IR – withholdings on foreign residents income 7,801 0.30 9,562 0.33 0.03 
        IR – withholdings on other income 5,057 0.19 6,016 0.21 0.01 
Tax o n Loans and Credit  (IOF) 7,795 0.30 20,341 0.70 0.40 
Rural Land Tax  (ITR) 331 0.01 470 0.02 0.00 
Federal Service Fees 383 0.01 290 0.01 0.00 
Total Federal Fiscal  Revenue 213,948 8.24 269,556 9.28 1.04 
Financial Transactions Tax  (CPMF) 36,320 1.40 1,148 0.04 -1.36 
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TABLE 7 (CONTINUATION) 
Tax Revenues (2007-2008) 
Taxes and Contributions 
Revenue 
2007 
(R$ 000,000) 
% of 
GNP 
Revenue 
2008 
(R$ 000,000) 
% of 
GNP 
Change 
in pp 
Social Security Contribution on Firms Revenue 
(Cofins) 99,164 3.82 120,801 4.16 0.34 
Contribution for Workers’ Social Integration Fund 
(PIS/Pasep) 25,839 0.99 31,598 1.09 0.09 
Social Security Contribution on Net Profits (CSLL) 32,880 1.27 43,970 1.51 0.25 
Federal Govt. Workers Social Security Contribution  
(2) 15,216 0.59 19,463 0.67 0.08 
Social Security Contributions (3) 140,412 5.41 163,355 5.62 0.22 
Other Contributions  (2) 3,242 0.12 3,486 0.12 0.00 
Total Federal Social Security Revenues 353,073 13.59 383,821 13.21 -0.38 
Economic Contribution ( Cide – Fuels) 7,950 0.31 5,934 0.20 -0.10 
Economic Contribution (Cide – Foreign 
Remittances) 793 0.03 871 0.03 0.00 
Economic Contributions for Tax Auditing Fund 
(Fundaf) 307 0.01 252 0.01 0.00 
Workers Unmotivated Dismissal Compensation 
Fund ( FGTS) (4) 41,630 1.60 48,616 1.67 0.07 
Funds for Education  (INSS e FNDE) 7,156 0.28 8,814 0.30 0.03 
Funds for Workers Social Activities and Training ( 
"S" System) 6,674 0.26 7,553 0.26 0.00 
Other Economic Contributions (2) 1,143 0.04 1,162 0.04 0.00 
Total Federal Economic Contributions 65,653 2.53 73,202 2.52 -0.01 
State Value-added Tax  (ICMS)  (5) 187,625 7.22 219,909 7.57 0.35 
State Tax on Vehicles (IPVA) (5) 14,690 0.57 17,201 0.59 0.03 
State Tax on Inheritance and Donations (ITCD) (5) 1,207 0.05 1,92 0.05 0.00 
State Service Fees  (5) 4,436 0.17 6,416 0.22 0.05 
State Social Security (5) 19,052 0.73 21,206 0.73 0.00 
Other (5) 4,110 0.16 4,758 0.16 0.01 
Total State Revenues 231,120 8.90 270,982 9.33 0.43 
Municipal Tax on Gross Revenue of Service Firms 
(ISS) (2) 18,746 0.72 22,658 0.78 0.06 
Municipal Estate Property Tax (IPTU) (2) 11,388 0.44 12,782 0.44 0.00 
Municipal Tax on Estate Transactions (ITIBI) (2) 2,795 0.11 2,614 0.09 -0.02 
Municipal Service Fees (2) 2,925 0.11 3,776 0.13 0.02 
Municipal Social Contributions (2) 3,881 0.15 4,357 0.15 0.00 
Other (2) 133 0.01 175 0.01 0.00 
Total Municipal Revenues 39,868 1.53 46,362 1.60 0.06 
Total National Fiscal Revenue (Tax Burden) 903,662 34.79 1,043,923 35.94 1.15 
    Source: 1-Federal Revenue Agency - Estudos tributários nº 20 – Carga tributária no Brasil - 2007 – Análise por 
Tributos e Bases de Incidência – December/2008, and Análise da Arrecadação das Receitas Federais - 
December/2008. 
2-Author estimates for 2008 
3-Author estimates for 2008 based on cash flow of National Social Security Institute (INSS). 
4-Estimates by Federal Savings Bank for 2008 (CEF). 
5-Estimates by Fiscal Council for 2008 (Confaz) 
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In addition to the effects of higher tax rates on the IOF and on the CSLL for the 
financial sector, revenue from these taxes increased significantly due to higher 
volumes of credit transactions and also to higher corporate profits. In 2008, the IOF 
collected a larger share of GNP than in the previous year (+ 0.4 percentage point), 
while the CSLL showed a growth of 0.25 percentage point. 
Other federal taxes that showed significant revenue growth were the corporate 
income tax, the withheld income tax on labor income, the international trade tax, and 
the industrial tax on imports (IPI). Such performance was due to larger corporate 
profits, to growth in formal employment, and to larger value of imports. 
Social Security taxes showed a slight decrease due to the discontinuation of the 
CPMF, although the loss of revenue was almost completely compensated by the 
larger revenue raised by the Cofins, the CSLL, and by other social security 
contributions.  
The satisfactory performance of the Brazilian economy in recent years also 
contributed to the larger state and municipal revenues, such as the ICMS, the ISS and 
the IPVA. 
Single Tax: Estimating the Required Rate 
In 2002 the Brazilian tax burden reached 31.86% of GNP. The rate of the Single 
Tax on Financial Transactions necessary to raise the equivalent revenue was 
estimated at 5.3%, equally split between the value of banks’ debits and credits.  
According to a paper issued by the Federal Revenue Agency named “Brazilian 
Tax Burden- 2007”, the tax burden in 2007 reached 34.79% of GNP. Together with 
information issued by another of its various papers called “Analysis of Federal 
Revenue” published in 2008, and also with data from the “2007 Social Security 
Statistical Yearbook” we estimate that the rate necessary for the Single Tax to 
replace in 2007 the same revenue raised in 2002 would be 5.62%. While the tax 
burden increased 2.93 percentage points during those five years, the Single Tax rate 
would have to increase by 0.32 percentage point. Thus, for each percentage point 
increase in the tax burden, the single tax rate would have to be raised by 0.11 
percentage point. 
The estimates for the Single Tax rate necessary to replace the revenue raised by 
all predominantly fiscal taxes are shown in TABLE 8 below, and were based on the 
performance on the CPMF in 2007, the last year it was collected. We estimated an 
“enlarged” tax base, which in addition to the conventional CPMF tax base, includes 
the double taxation of the bank cash withdrawals and deposits, and the Single Tax 
levying on bank transactions done by the government and by privileged sectors and 
institutions, constitutionally exempt from the CPMF until 2007.  
TABLE 8 below shows the “enlarged” tax base for the Single Tax. The starting 
point for the estimates is the tax base of R$ 9.6 billion for the CPMF in 2007. 
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TABLE 8 
Single Tax Base 
Items of “enlarged” tax base R$ 000,000 (2007) 
Revenue for CPMF (0.38% rate) 36,320.0 
 CPMF Tax Base 9,557,894.7 
(+) Cash transactions equivalent (1) 1,939,402.7 
(+) Public Sector Bank Transactions (2) 903,709.0 
(+) Former Immunities and Exemptions (3) 83,123.6 
“Enlarged” Tax Base 12,484,130.0 
1-Obtained by multiplying the average stock of paper-money in circulations (R$ 63.8 billion) 
by the velocity of M1 (15.2). Cash transactions will be double taxed with a levy of 5.62% on the 
value of each cash withdrawal from the bank, and 5.62% on each cash deposit.  
2-Estimate based on the proportion of the public sector in GNP (34.7%).  
3-Estimate based on the proportion of the health and education sectors in GNP (3.2%) 
 
Total tax revenues to be replaced by the Single Tax collection amounted to 27% 
of GNP in 2007. Considering the CPMF tax base, federal taxes and contributions 
amounted to 17.9% of GNP, state revenues to 7.83%, and municipal taxes to another 
1.27% of GNP, as can be seen in TABLE 9 below. 
To replace all federal fiscal revenue the Single Tax rate would have to be 1.79% 
according to the CPMF base, and 1.37% according to the enlarged base. Including 
social security and economic contributions the rates would be respectively 4.87% 
and 3.72%. Adding the three state taxes and the three municipal taxes, the rate would 
have to be 7.34% according to the CPMF base, and 5.62% using the enlarged base. 
In the Single Tax model, all corporate social contributions to the INSS, to the 
various quasi-governmental agencies (Sistema “S”), and to the educational fund 
(FNDE) would be discontinued. Of the approximately 35% of payrolls paid out by 
firms for social security contributions, only 8% for the Workers Unmotivated 
Dismissal Compensation Fund (FGTS) would remain. 
It should be pointed out that the revenues of the “S”system would continue to be 
transferred to its administrators. The only change would be the way such revenue is 
raised. Instead of burdening firms’ payrolls with rates varying from 0.3% to 2.5%, as 
happened in 2007, it would be raised by the specific rate of 0.05% on bank 
transactions, which compose the estimated total Single Tax rate of 5.62%. The same 
would happen to the Education Fund (salário-educação), which instead of being 
financed by a 2.5% levy on payrolls, would be maintained by a specific rate of 
0.06% on bank transactions. 
The Single Tax system would imply a significant decrease in the tax load of the 
productive sector as a result of abolishing taxes on corporate income, on gross 
revenues, on sales and on profits. Furthermore, administrative costs would be 
significantly reduced as the costly declaratory taxes would no longer be collected.  
Individuals would benefit from an increase in purchasing power as a result of 
lower indirect taxes on prices, and from a dramatic reduction in individual taxes on 
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wages and on property. 
TABLE 9 
Taxes and Contributions to be replaced by the Single Tax Levy 
Estimates of Necessary Rates 
Taxes 
Revenue 
2007 
(R$ 000,000) 
Revenue 
2007/ GNP 
(%) 
Rate 
(CPMF base) 
(%) 
Rate 
(Enlarged 
base)  
(%) 
Federal Fiscal Revenue 
Personal Income Tax (IRPF ajuste) 4,981 0.19 0.05 0.04 
Corporate Income Tax (IRPJ) 70,034 2.70 0.73 0.56 
Real Profist System 50,364 1.94 0.53 0.40 
Imputed Profits System 10,677 0.41 0.11 0.09 
Others 8,993 0.35 0.09 0.07 
Income TaxWage Withdrawal (IRRF-Folha) 42,347 1.63 0.44 0.34 
Income Tax Foreign Resident Withdrawal 
(IRRF residente no exterior) 7,801 0.30 0.08 0.06 
Income Tax Other Withdrawals (IRRF - 
outros rendimentos) 5,057 0.19 0.05 0.04 
Income Tax Total 130,220 5.01 1.36 1.04 
Tax on Industrial Goods (IPI) 32,867 1.27 0.34 0.26 
Tax on Credit and Loans (IOF) 7,795 0.30 0.08 0.06 
Total Federal Tax Revenue 170,882 6.58 1.79 1.37 
Social Security 
Corporate Social Security Contributions 
(INSS – empresas) 42,759 1.65 0.45 0.34 
Insurance for Urban Work Accidents 6,447 0.25 0.07 0.05 
Rural Social Security Contributions (INSS 
produção rural) 2,403 0.09 0.03 0.02 
Small Firms Simplified System  (Simples) 8,997 0.35 0.09 0.07 
Philanthropic Social Security Contributions 
(INSS filantrópicas) 1,198 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Sports Events Social Security Contributions 
(INSS espetáculos esportivos) 36 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Social Security Contribution Withdrawals 
(INSS retenção de 11% sobre nota fiscal) 10,510 0.40 0.11 0.08 
Federal Govt. Social Security Contributions 
(Parcela governo) 8,264 0.32 0.09 0.07 
State Govt. Social Security Contributions 
(Parcela governo) 12,291 0.47 0.13 0.10 
Municipal Govt. Social Security 
Contributions  (Parcela governo) 2,504 0.10 0.03 0.02 
Social Security Contribution on Firms 
Revenue (Cofins) 99,164 3.82 1.04 0.79 
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TABLE 9 (CONTINUATION) 
Taxes and Contributions to be replaced by the Single Tax Levy 
Estimates of Necessary Rates 
Taxes 
Revenue 
2007 
(R$ 000,000) 
Revenue 
2007/ 
GNP 
(%) 
Rate 
(CPMF base) 
(%) 
Rate 
(Enlarged base)  
(%) 
Contribution on Financial Transactions 
(CPMF) 36,320 1.40 0.38 0.29 
Social Contribution on Net Profits 
(CSLL) 32,880 1.27 0.34 0.26 
Social Integration Fund  (PIS sobre 
folha de pagamentos) 373 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Social Fund for Govt. Employees 
(Pasep) 4,037 0.16 0.04 0.03 
Lotteries and other  social contributions 1,938 0.07 0.02 0.02 
Total Social Security Revenue 270,121 10.40 2.83 2.16 
Economic  Contributions 
Funds for Workers Social Activities and 
Training (Sistema "S") (1) 6,674 0.26 0.07 0.05 
Funds for Education  (INSS e FNDE) 7,156 0.28 0.07 0.06 
Economic Contribution ( Fuels) (Cide – 
combustíveis) 7,950 0.31 0.08 0.06 
Economic Contribution (Foreign 
Remittances) (Cide – remessas) 793 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Other Economic Contributions 
(AFRMM e Condecine) 1,143 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Economic Contributions for Tax 
Auditing Fund (Fundaf) 307 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Total Economic Contributions 24,023 0.92 0.25 0.19 
        
  
Total Federal Revenue 465,026 17.90 4.87 3.72 
State Fiscal Revenue 
State Value-added Tax  (ICMS) 187,625 7.22 1.96 1.50 
State Tax on Vehicles (IPVA) 14,690 0.57 0.15 0.12 
State Tax on Inheritance and Donations 
(ITCD) 1,207 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Total State Revenue 203,522 7.83 2.13 1.63 
Municipal Fiscal Revenue 
Municipal Tax on Gross Revenue of 
Service Firms (ISS) 18,746 0.72 0.20 0.15 
Municipal Estate Property Tax (IPTU) 11,388 0.44 0.12 0.09 
Municipal Tax on Estate Transactions 
(ITBI) 2,795 0.11 0.03 0.02 
Total Municipal Revenue 32,929 1.27 0.34 0.26 
          
Grand Total 701,477 27.00 7.34 5.62 
   Sources: Federal Revenue Agency and Social Security Institute (INSS) 
   (1).Includes revenues from Senar, Senai, Sesi, Senac, Sesc, Incra, SDR/MAARA, Sest, Senat, SEFA/Fundo 
Aeroviário, DPC/FDEP – Marítimo, Sebrae and others. 
 
 - 106 - 
When the IPMF was introduced in 1993, following the polemical proposal in 
1990 for the creation of a Single Tax on Financial Transactions, certain technical 
requirements for the proper use of a bank transactions tax were ignored by the 
government. Among them is the inadequacy of its application on transactions in the 
financial and capital markets. Taxation should not occur as the value of the principal 
in a capital or financial transaction is registered as credit or debit in a bank account. 
Taxation should occur only as the flow of real returns of such financial transactions 
goes through the banking system. Such characteristic of the bank transaction tax was 
thoroughly discussed elsewhere in this text. 
In October 2004 the “investment current account”, linked to its respective bank 
“current account”counterpart, was created by the Brazilian Central Bank to redress 
this technical imperfection. The intention was to avoid taxing the value of the stock 
of financial capital as it flows within the banking system. Taxation of bank debits 
and deposits would occur only once as the value of the financial investment was 
transferred to the “investment account”, from where it could circulate, free of 
taxation, to and from other “investment accounts” to carry out typical financial 
dealings, such as purchasing and selling of bills, stocks, or any other financial asset.  
It was a significant improvement, although in the pure Single Tax model the 
first transfer of investment funds, as well as all the other subsequent transfers, would 
be free of taxation as long as it remained within the realm of “investment accounts”. 
In fact, taxation of transactions in the financial and capital markets would remain 
very similar to the current income tax on financial returns. 
TABLE 10 below shows the income tax revenue on financial profits in 2007, 
amounting to 1.15% of GNP. 
TABLE 10 
Income Tax on Financial and Capital markets in Brazil 
Income Tax  withholdings on financial returns  in 2007 
 
R$ 000,000 % GNP 
“Fixed Income” Investment Funds  (Fundos de Renda Fixa) 8,364 0.32 
Swaps 736 0.03 
Interest on Capital Equity (Juros s/capital próprio) 2,714 0.10 
“Fixed income” investments (Aplicação de renda fixa) 7,487 0.29 
Other 2,121 0.08 
Total 21,422 0.82 
 
  
Income Tax  due when filing returns 
 
R$ 000,000 % GNP 
Capital Gains (Alienação bens / Dep. Judiciais) 4,141 0.16 
Stock Market Profits 1,389 0.05 
Other 3,143 0.12 
Total 8,673 0.33 
              Source: Federal Revenue Agency. 
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In the Single Tax model various existing taxes would remain in place, as they 
are considered to have preponderantly non-fiscal characteristics and are used mainly 
as instruments in public policy. Such is the case, for instance with the international 
trade taxes, which are instruments of industrial policy; the rural land tax (ITR), an 
instrument of land reform policy; and service fees, which are retributions to services 
rendered to individuals, devoid of  the essential characteristics of public goods.  
Other levies which would continue to be charged are those that may be 
considered as negotiated gains for workers, such as compulsory savings or 
compensatory payments in their favor, such as the Social Integration Fund (PIS), the 
Compensatory Fund for Unmotivated Dismissals (FGTS), and the own social 
security contributions of employees. 
TABLE 11 below lists taxes, contributions, tax debt payments, fines and 
compulsory savings collected in 2007 and that would continue to exist even if the 
Single Tax Model were fully applied. 
TABLE 11 
Current taxes, contributions and other compulsory charges that would remain in place within 
the Single Tax Structure (2007) 
Federal Government (Fiscal Charges) Revenue R$ 000,000 % GNP 
International Trade  (Imports and Exports) 12,186 0.47 
Rural Land Tax  (ITR) 331 0.01 
Federal Service Fees 383 0.01 
Total 12,900 0.50 
   
Social Security Revenue R$ 000,000 % GNP 
Turnover Contribution for Workers’ Social Integration Fund (PIS cumulativo) 6,024 0.23 
Value-added Contribution for Workers’ Social Integration Fund (PIS não 
cumulativo) 14,901 0.57 
Federal Govt. Workers Social Security Contribution  (Parcela do servidor) 6,953 0.27 
Workers Social Security Contributions (INSS segurados) 27,791 1.07 
Individual Social Security Contributions (INSS individual) 3,422 0.13 
Optional Social Security Contributions (INSS facultativo) 646 0.02 
Domestic Help Social Sec. Contributions .(INSS domésticos) 1,626 0.06 
Special Social Security Contributions (INSS especial) 5 0.00 
Negotiated Tax Debt Payments (Regime parcelamento débito) 2,775 0.11 
Government Bills (FIES e FNS) 690 0.03 
Judiciary Deposits (Depósito Judicial) 1,486 0.06 
Fiscal Recuperation Program (Programa Recuperação Fiscal) 2,550 0.10 
Labour demands (Reclamatória trabalhista) 1,555 0.06 
Contributions for Military Pensions (Pensões Militares) 1,304 0.05 
Other Contributions 12,643 0.49 
Total 84,371 3.25 
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TABLE 11 (CONTINUATION) 
Current taxes, contributions and other compulsory charges that would remain in place within 
the Single Tax Structure (2007) 
Economic Contributions Revenue R$ 000,000 % GNP 
Workers Unmotivated Dismissal Compensation Fund ( FGTS) 41,630 1.60 
Total 41,630 1.60 
   
Fiscal and Social Security Revenues for States and Municipalities Revenue R$ 000,000 % GNP 
State Service Fees (Taxas estaduais) 4,436 0.17 
Other (States) 4,110 0.16 
Municipal Service Fees (Taxas municipais) 2,925 0.11 
Fiscal and Social Security Revenues for States and Municipalities Revenue R$ 000,000 % GNP 
Other (Municipalities) 133 0.01 
State Social Security  ( Parcela servidor) 6,760 0.26 
Municipal Social Security (Parcela servidor) 1,377 0.05 
Total 19,741 0.76 
   
Grand Total 158,642 6.11 
     Source: Federal Revenue Agency and Social Security Institute (INSS). 
SIMULATION RESULTS 
The effect of types of different types of taxes on relative-prices can be evaluated 
using inter-industrial relations (input-output) models described above. We intend to 
compare the price effects of the Bank Transactions Single-Tax model to those of a 
VAT using Brazil’s inter-industrial structure drawn from technical coefficients of 
production contained in a 110 sector input-output table for 2006, constructed from 
data published by the IBGE [Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics].  
Model SIM(1), described above, simulates sector prices by applying a single-
rate turnover transactions tax, as estimated in the section above. In this model, all 
sectors have an infinite number of links in their production chains (which contradicts 
the general belief in the existence of “shorter” or “longer” production chains). The 
effect of a turnover tax on prices is inversely related to the proportion of value-added 
relative to the value of inputs from other sectors in each link of the production 
process. Clearly, the tax effect on final prices resulting from the use of such taxes is 
as smaller as the greater is the distance that separates a certain production process 
from the final step where it reaches the final consumer. In the simulations, we use a 
“mark-up model” to determine profit margins, as found by IBGE’s input-output 
matrix. 
In the simulations, Model SIM(1) was used to evaluate the effect on final prices 
of the bank transaction tax as the single tax [Single Transaction Tax]. 
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Model SIM(2) was used to evaluate the effect of the pure VAT. To define profit 
margins, we chose a variation of the “mark-up model” which seems more realistic in 
the sense of applying the mark-up multiplier to circulating capital as well as to cost 
of inputs. It is worth stating that no financial costs were imputed to the time spent 
“waiting” for the use of the tax credits, thus reducing the impact of a VAT on final 
prices. 
It is important to note that we chose not to use Model SIM(2’) as the basis for 
our simulations, although it is the model that incorporates the conventional 
assumptions incorporated in the orthodox framework of value-added tax doctrine. 
The reason, as stated above, is the absurdly unrealistic assumptions that they assume, 
particularly with respect to developing countries such as Brazil. 
Finally, in order to incorporate into the simulation models the other taxes 
composing the Brazilian tax structure (INSS, IPI, and the ISS) the SIM(2)EXT 
model was used, as shown above. 
In the earliest papers on the Single Tax111 we sought to evaluate the impact of 
cumulative taxes on price formation in the economy. Simulations using the IBGE 
input-output matrices of inter-industrial flows and their updates led to the conclusion 
that because bank transaction taxes require nominal tax rates that are significantly 
lower than VAT rates for a given revenue target, and since they, consequently, 
discourage tax evasion, the bank transaction tax would have less of an impact on 
relative prices taking an ideal tax-free market equilibrium as a benchmark.  
The statistical data and the assumptions implied in the construction of the input-
output model used in the simulations are summarized in ANNEX I. 
Cumulativeness, or the cascading effect, has caused critics to erroneously 
believe that more roundabout methods of production could drive tax costs upward. 
Simulations proved that those assertions were mistaken. For example, studies on the 
Alternative Proposal112 demonstrated that the effect of a 2.7% rate bank transaction 
tax on sector prices ranged from 4.1% to 11.1% price hikes. Greater impact on 
production costs would be caused by a VAT, such as the ICMS, with 17% rate, 
bringing the tax burden to between 18.4% and 31.4% of the final price of 
products.113 Other studies that have been mentioned earlier used the same 
methodology and arrived at similar conclusions. 
But, despite the absolute impact of a bank transaction tax on prices being 
weaker than those caused by VATs (assuming a given a revenue target), there 
remains doubt about the impact on relative prices, as Delfim Netto suspects. 
Before trying to measure the impacts of different tax systems on relative prices, 
                                                 
111
 See [CINTRA, 1994(b)]. 
112
 See  [CINTRA, 1999]  
113
 See APPENDIX to ANNEX III. 
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it is worth noticing that there are theoretical reasons to believe that bank transaction 
taxes will be less distortionary than value-added taxes.  
Yitzhaki has suggested that “in the extreme case where all commodities are 
taxed, they can all be taxed at the same rate, so that relative prices do not change 
and we end up with a zero deadweight loss.”114 Thus, a tax system with lower rates, 
and more widespread universal incidence across all commodities should imply a 
smaller impact on relative prices, and therefore, have smaller substitution effects and 
cause less allocative distortions on the economy.  
There are two reasons for expecting that bank transaction taxes conform more 
closely to these requirements of absolute generality stated by Yitzhaki. First, bank 
transaction taxes have a single uniform rate, universally applied to all commodities. 
VATs, on the other hand, usually have multiple rates. Second, rates of bank 
transaction taxes are lower than those required from VATs to achieve a given 
revenue target: the tax base is broader, and evasion potential is more limited. Thus, it 
is expected that bank transaction taxes imply lower and more homogeneous tax 
burdens on commodity prices than VATs, thus being closer to a situation of relative 
price neutrality, as stated by Yitzhaki.  
The simulations results described below confirm these effects. 
No doubt, all taxes distort relative prices. However, it is believed that the 
cumulative effect of a bank transactions tax would cause even more intense 
distortions. It is believed that the VATs would be less distortionary because the tax 
burden on final prices could theoretically be determined entirely by economic 
policymakers and tax legislators as they set nominal tax rates.  
The conclusion about the superiority of VATs in commodity production, as 
against cumulative taxes, would be partially true if two conditions were met: first, 
absence of tax evasion, and second, the existence of uniform rates for all sectors and 
products. Given that neither of these conditions is satisfied in real life, the conclusion 
that VATs necessarily introduce fewer distortions than a bank transactions tax cannot 
be reached a priori.  
The efficiency advantages of VAT´s are highly questionable. The use of 
multiple rates, proliferation of exemptions, administrative and operational costs, sub 
national competence to apply value-added taxation and many other empirical 
shortcomings in the application of the VAT make its practical results fall 
significantly short of what is expected from its theoretical conclusions. 115 Such 
problems are especially serious when the VAT is under sub national administration 
                                                 
114
 [YITZHAKI, 1979], pp-475-480. 
115
 For a comprehensive analysis of the operational difficulties found in practical use of VAT´s across 
the world see [ITD, 2005]. 
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in federative countries116 
Furthermore, impacts on relative prices are not a result of the type of tax alone, 
but also of the intensity of the tax’s use, or of the value of its respective rates. Given 
that, for a specific amount of revenue, the bank transactions tax require rates that are 
significantly lower than what VATs require, we can immediately notice the fragility 
of assertions that cumulative taxes must necessarily introduce stronger distortions in 
relative prices. 
The use of multiple rates and the existence of significantly more tax evasion in 
VATs make its impacts on relative prices be just as uncontrollable, random, and 
unintentional as they can be for bank transactions taxes. 
It is possible that VAT-driven distortions could be even stronger than those 
generated by a bank transactions tax, given that tax evasion is a highly volatile, 
mutable, unpredictable, and camouflaged practice. In bank transactions taxes the 
variability of impacts on sector production costs over time are the result of changes 
in the production functions, which only occur over the medium and long terms. This 
means that bank transactions taxes, even with unintentional and uncontrollable 
patterns of incidence due to its cumulative effect, seem to be more stable than VATs. 
Tax evasion is generally most unstable even in the very short run, making the 
allocative effects of VATs a random event, with effects on relative prices even more 
unpredictable than those caused by a bank transactions tax. 
The simulations below will attempt to show that: 
1. Even assuming away the existing differences in potential tax evasion, a 
bank transactions tax introduces less allocative distortions than VATs 
because it requires lower nominal tax rates for a given revenue target; 
2. With the possibility of tax evasion being greater for VATs, the effect of 
these taxes on price becomes strongly distortionary, far exceeding the 
distortions in relative prices caused by bank transactions taxes. 
This is an exercise in comparative statics, in which the tax models of the 
cumulative bank transaction tax and the non-cumulative VAT will both be compared 
to a heuristic situation of absence of taxation, which supposedly would be the 
optimal competitive equilibrium. Therefore, the farther the sector prices cum taxes 
distance themselves from prices that are free of taxes (which in the model below 
were set to equal to one, to unit), the greater the distortionary effect that they may 
have caused on prices, and therefore on tax burden.  
The assumptions implied in each of the simulations are detailed in ANNEX I-A.   
Next, for each simulated situation, a matrix of relative prices shall be 
constructed (each element being a relative price for a pair of sectors), and the 
distance of each relative price from the unit value will measure the distortion caused 
                                                 
116
 For the inconveniences of VATs when applied by sub national entities, see [PIFFANO, 2003]. The 
author points out to the fact that few federal countries allow for sub national VATs, noticeably Brazil 
and Canada, and the only case of success seems to occur in the Province of Quebec in Canada. 
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by the respective tax model on the relative prices of that specific pair of sectors. The 
extent of overall distortion is given by the standard deviation of relative prices of the 
matrix, relative to the unit relative prices. 
Simulation 1 in TABLE 12 compares the impact a bank transaction tax as a 
Single Tax would have on relative prices, compared to a conventional tax model. 
The simulation only includes indirect taxes, and does not include the foregone 
revenue raised by taxes on property (IPTU, IPVA, ITR, etc.), on personal and 
corporate income (IRPJ, IRPF), on foreign trade, and on other taxes that have extra-
fiscal or regulatory characteristics. Therefore, the simulation is strongly biased 
against cumulative taxes, because the tax rate applied to the bank transaction tax, of 
2.81%, will raise more revenue (27% of GDP) than the conventional indirect taxes 
(ICMS, IPI, INSS, ISS) included in the simulation (10.9% of GDP).117 
One can see that relative price deviation for the bank transaction tax (Single 
Tax) was 2.38%, whereas, in the conventional model, it was 5.67%. This proves 
false the statement that cumulative taxes necessarily create greater distortions in 
relative prices. It should be noted that although in this particular case the result 
shows that a turnover tax was less distortionary than conventional taxes (mostly 
VATs), one cannot assert a priori that this always occurs, or that it never occurs. 
However, we can assert that under the circumstances of Brazil’s economy, this 
criticism to cumulative taxation did not prove true, as far as its effect on relative 
prices is concerned.118 
Simulation 2, in TABLE 13, introduces corrections to make the comparison 
more rigorous. The bank transaction tax rate was reduced to 1.13%, in order to force 
the revenue raised to be equal to that raised by the conventional taxes included in the 
simulation (10.9% of GDP). The conventional taxes, as in the previous simulation, 
are the ICMS, IPI, and ISS, and the employer contributions to social security (INSS). 
The effect of reducing the bank transaction tax rate from 2.81% to 1.13% caused the 
relative price deviations to drop from 2.38% to 1.13%, whereas the conventional 
model’s deviation remained at 5.67%. Deviations in relative prices caused by 
application of a cumulative tax were less than half the deviations observed in the 
conventional model, thus proving that the assertions to the contrary, made a priori, 
are erroneous. 
Another interesting variation in the simulations addresses the oft-remembered 
alternative of eliminating the cumulative social contributions (the CPMF, a bank 
transactions tax, the Cofins, the PIS and the ISS, which are both corporate gross sales 
contributions), while maintaining intact all other components of the current Brazilian 
                                                 
117
 Ideally in this type of simulation one would use general equilibrium models, since the dynamic 
effects of tax changes would be better captured.  About the use of computable general equilibrium 
models, see [DOMINGUES and HADDAD, 2003] where the model is used for regional simulations 
in the state of São Paulo.  It is fertile ground for future research. 
118
 For similar conclusions, see [LEVY, 2007]. 
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tax model, including tax revenue.119 The results can be seen in TABLE 14. 
TABLE 12 
Simulation 1: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of a 
traditional tax system (unadjusted rates) 
 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 2.81% ICMS+IPI+INSS+ISS 
1 Rice 16.26 31.20 
2 Corn 15.21 32.46 
3 Wheat and others cereals 16.59 33.89 
4 Sugar Cane 16.97 34.51 
5 Soybean 16.49 34.04 
6 Other agricultural products 14.57 32.07 
7 Manioc 15.07 32.66 
8 Tobacco 16.86 52.01 
9 Cotton 16.10 33.65 
10 Citric fruits 16.65 34.20 
11 Coffee 16.74 31.66 
12 Forest products 14.87 32.01 
13 Cattle and other live animals 17.68 34.04 
14 Cow milk 17.76 28.69 
15 Live pigs 17.98 34.33 
16 Live poultry 17.86 34.12 
17 Chicken eggs 15.05 29.22 
18 Fish 17.63 28.53 
19 Oil and natural gas 15.11 30.22 
20 Iron ore 18.23 35.98 
21 Coal 16.87 32.24 
22 Non-ferrous metallic minerals 16.49 33.91 
23 Non-metallic minerals 15.96 33.81 
24 Meat processing 17.38 31.73 
25 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen pork 17.98 32.91 
26 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen poultry 17.07 31.51 
27 Processed fish meat 18.11 32.36 
28 Canned fruit, legumes and other vegetables 18.72 33.40 
29 Non-refined soybean oil and by-products 19.61 33.94 
30 Vegetables except corn and animal oils 18.61 32.86 
31 Processed soybean oil 17.67 30.75 
32 Refrigerated, sterilized and pasteurized milk 17.83 32.09 
33 Dairy products and ice-cream 16.95 32.02 
34 Processed rice and by-products 15.84 29.13 
35 Wheat flour 19.16 33.47 
36 Manioc flour 16.05 30.09 
37 Corn oil and corn products 17.40 31.64 
                                                 
119
 [VARSANO et alii, 2001]. 
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TABLE 12 (CONTINUATION) 
Simulation 1: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of a 
traditional tax system (unadjusted rates) 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix – Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 2.81% ICMS+IPI+INSS+ISS 
38 Sugar products 18.95 33.33 
39 Ground coffee 17.13 30.30 
40 Instant coffee 18.62 32.91 
41 Other food products 17.05 31.28 
42 Beverages 18.38 54.82 
43 Tobacco products 18.89 58.49 
44 Processed cotton 16.13 35.20 
45 Textiles 15.27 34.25 
46 Other textiles products 15.66 34.75 
47 Clothing 14.38 35.06 
48 Leather products except shoes 16.17 40.37 
49 Shoes 15.91 36.10 
50 Wood products except furniture 16.60 39.44 
51 Cellulose and other paper inputs 16.97 34.39 
52 Paper cardboard and packaging 15.58 37.93 
53 Newspapers, magazines and sound recordings 13.84 26.25 
54 Liquefied oil gas 17.28 30.31 
55 Gasoline 20.35 35.12 
56 Gasalcohol 16.87 30.99 
57 Heating oil 18.83 31.92 
58 Diesel oil 17.49 29.23 
59 Other oil products 17.10 29.71 
60 Alcohol 18.07 33.27 
61 Inorganic chemical products 14.95 30.36 
62 Organic chemical products 14.13 27.75 
63 Resin and elastomer 14.25 29.67 
64 Pharmaceutical products 12.29 31.35 
65 Pesticides 15.78 32.81 
66 Perfumery, soaps and cleaning products 15.76 47.95 
67 Paints, vanish, enamels and lacquers 15.71 34.35 
68 Other chemical products 14.83 38.50 
69 Rubber products 15.79 37.21 
70 Plastic products 15.39 34.11 
71 Cement 16.86 34.33 
72 Other non-metallic mineral products 16.37 34.82 
73 Pig iron 17.80 38.77 
74 Semi-finished rolled steel and steel tubes 16.53 36.49 
75 Non-ferrous metallic products 16.65 32.28 
76 Cast steel 18.32 35.85 
77 Metal products - except machinery and equipment 15.83 37.38 
78 Machinery and equipment 15.59 31.96 
79 Home appliances 16.13 38.15 
80 Office and computer equipment 15.09 35.90 
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TABLE 12 (CONTINUATION) 
Simulation 1: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of a 
traditional tax system (unadjusted rates) 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 2.81% ICMS+IPI+INSS+ISS 
81 Electric machines and equipment 15.36 35.92 
82 Electronics and communication equipment 13.20 34.01 
83 Medical and hospital equipment 12.93 40.94 
84 Automobiles, vans and pick-ups 17.90 35.72 
85 Buses and trucks 17.13 38.22 
86 Auto industry parts and equipments 15.21 31.72 
87 Other transport equipment 16.00 34.39 
88 Furniture 13.70 36.08 
89 Recycled scrap 17.65 39.11 
90 Electricity, gas, water, sewer and urban sanitation 13.76 34.08 
91 Construction 15.20 30.35 
92 Trade 12.17 32.58 
93 Freight 15.72 31.32 
94 Passenger transportation 14.15 30.59 
95 Mail 14.98 27.61 
96 Information services 12.46 24.20 
97 Insurance and finance 11.90 23.31 
98 Real estate rental 9.87 21.07 
99 Imputed rental values 18.42 27.97 
100 Maintenance and repair 12.53 26.23 
101 Lodge and food 14.53 37.73 
102 Services to firms 11.57 22.21 
103 Private education 11.87 23.53 
104 Private health services 18.15 30.31 
105 Services to families 12.70 26.94 
106 Community services 14.15 26.19 
107 Domestic services 18.62 30.89 
108 Public education 18.42 29.48 
109 Public health care 17.49 28.01 
110 Government and social security 17.53 26.24 
Maximum 20.35 58.49 
Minimum 9.87 21.07 
Deviation 2.38% 5.67% 
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TABLE 13  
Simulation 2: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of the 
traditional tax system (Single Tax rate adjusted to produce equivalent revenue)  
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 1.13% ICMS+IPI+INSS+ISS 
1 Rice 6.74 31.20 
2 Corn 6.26 32.46 
3 Wheat and others cereals 6.88 33.89 
4 Sugar Cane 7.06 34.51 
5 Soybean 6.84 34.04 
6 Other agricultural products 5.99 32.07 
7 Manioc 6.21 32.66 
8 Tobacco 7.01 52.01 
9 Cotton 6.67 33.65 
10 Citric fruits 6.91 34.20 
11 Coffee 6.95 31.66 
12 Forest products 6.12 32.01 
13 Cattle and other live animals 7.36 34.04 
14 Cow milk 7.40 28.69 
15 Live pigs 7.50 34.33 
16 Live poultry 7.44 34.12 
17 Chicken eggs 6.19 29.22 
18 Fish 7.34 28.53 
19 Oil and natural gas 6.25 30.22 
20 Iron ore 7.64 35.98 
21 Coal 7.02 32.24 
22 Non-ferrous metallic minerals 6.84 33.91 
23 Non-metallic minerals 6.61 33.81 
24 Meat processing 7.22 31.73 
25 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen pork 7.49 32.91 
26 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen poultry 7.08 31.51 
27 Processed fish meat 7.55 32.36 
28 Canned fruit, legumes and other vegetables 7.83 33.40 
29 Non-refined soybean oil and by-products 8.25 33.94 
30 Vegetables except corn and animal oils 7.78 32.86 
31 Processed soybean oil 7.35 30.75 
32 Refrigerated, sterilized and pasteurized milk 7.42 32.09 
33 Dairy products and ice-cream 7.03 32.02 
34 Processed rice and by-products 6.53 29.13 
35 Wheat flour 8.03 33.47 
36 Manioc flour 6.63 30.09 
37 Corn oil and corn products 7.23 31.64 
38 Sugar products 7.94 33.33 
39 Ground coffee 7.11 30.30 
40 Instant coffee 7.78 32.91 
41 Other food products 7.07 31.28 
42 Beverages 7.68 54.82 
43 Tobacco products 7.93 58.49 
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  TABLE 13 (CONTINUATION)  
Simulation 2: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of the 
traditional tax system (Single Tax rate adjusted to produce equivalent revenue) 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 1.13% ICMS+IPI+INSS+ISS 
44 Processed cotton 6.69 35.20 
45 Textiles 6.31 34.25 
46 Other textiles products 6.48 34.75 
47 Clothing 5.91 35.06 
48 Leather products except shoes 6.69 40.37 
49 Shoes 6.58 36.10 
50 Wood products except furniture 6.89 39.44 
51 Cellulose and other paper inputs 7.06 34.39 
52 Paper cardboard and packaging 6.44 37.93 
53 Newspapers, magazines and sound recordings 5.69 26.25 
54 Liquefied oil gas 7.20 30.31 
55 Gasoline 8.62 35.12 
56 Gasalcohol 7.01 30.99 
57 Heating oil 7.91 31.92 
58 Diesel oil 7.29 29.23 
59 Other oil products 7.12 29.71 
60 Alcohol 7.54 33.27 
61 Inorganic chemical products 6.16 30.36 
62 Organic chemical products 5.80 27.75 
63 Resin and elastomer 5.87 29.67 
64 Pharmaceutical products 5.03 31.35 
65 Pesticides 6.53 32.81 
66 Perfumery, soaps and cleaning products 6.52 47.95 
67 Paints, vanish, enamels and lacquers 6.50 34.35 
68 Other chemical products 6.12 38.50 
69 Rubber products 6.54 37.21 
70 Plastic products 6.37 34.11 
71 Cement 7.01 34.33 
72 Other non-metallic mineral products 6.79 34.82 
73 Pig iron 7.43 38.77 
74 Semi-finished rolled steel and steel tubes 6.86 36.49 
75 Non-ferrous metallic products 6.92 32.28 
76 Cast steel 7.68 35.85 
77 Metal products - except machinery and equipment 6.55 37.38 
78 Machinery and equipment 6.44 31.96 
79 Home appliances 6.69 38.15 
80 Office and computer equipment 6.25 35.90 
81 Electric machines and equipment 6.34 35.92 
82 Electronics and communication equipment 5.41 34.01 
83 Medical and hospital equipment 5.29 40.94 
84 Automobiles, vans and pick-ups 7.49 35.72 
85 Buses and trucks 7.14 38.22 
86 Auto industry parts and equipments 6.27 31.72 
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TABLE 13 (CONTINUATION) 
Simulation 2: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of the 
traditional tax system (Single Tax rate adjusted to produce equivalent revenue) 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 1.13% ICMS+IPI+INSS+ISS 
87 Other transport equipment 6.62 34.39 
88 Furniture 5.61 36.08 
89 Recycled scrap 7.37 39.11 
90 Electricity, gas, water, sewer and urban sanitation 5.66 34.08 
91 Construction 6.27 30.35 
92 Trade 4.98 32.58 
93 Freight 6.50 31.32 
94 Passenger transportation 5.81 30.59 
95 Mail 6.17 27.61 
96 Information services 5.12 24.20 
97 Insurance and finance 4.88 23.31 
98 Real estate rental 4.01 21.07 
99 Imputed rental values 7.75 27.97 
100 Maintenance and repair 5.12 26.23 
101 Lodge and food 5.95 37.73 
102 Services to firms 4.73 22.21 
103 Private education 4.85 23.53 
104 Private health services 7.63 30.31 
105 Services to families 5.20 26.94 
106 Community services 5.82 26.19 
107 Domestic services 7.84 30.89 
108 Public education 7.75 29.48 
109 Public health care 7.34 28.01 
110 Government and social security 7.37 26.24 
Maximum 8.62 58.49 
Minimum 4.01 21.07 
Deviation 1.13% 5.67% 
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TABLE 14 
Simulation 3: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of traditional 
taxes (traditional taxes with rates adjusted to raise equivalent revenue after elimination of social 
contributions) 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 2.81% ICMS+IPI+INSS 
1 Rice 16.26 39.32 
2 Corn 15.21 40.93 
3 Wheat and others cereals 16.59 42.62 
4 Sugar Cane 16.97 43.33 
5 Soybean 16.49 42.77 
6 Other agricultural products 14.57 40.43 
7 Manioc 15.07 41.13 
8 Tobacco 16.86 65.62 
9 Cotton 16.10 42.31 
10 Citric fruits 16.65 42.95 
11 Coffee 16.74 39.87 
12 Forest products 14.87 40.40 
13 Cattle and other live animals 17.68 42.89 
14 Cow milk 17.76 36.46 
15 Live pigs 17.98 43.23 
16 Live poultry 17.86 42.99 
17 Chicken eggs 15.05 37.03 
18 Fish 17.63 36.28 
19 Oil and natural gas 15.11 37.69 
20 Iron ore 18.23 45.01 
21 Coal 16.87 40.71 
22 Non-ferrous metallic minerals 16.49 42.83 
23 Non-metallic minerals 15.96 42.72 
24 Meat processing 17.38 40.44 
25 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen pork 17.98 41.86 
26 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen poultry 17.07 40.17 
27 Processed fish meat 18.11 41.25 
28 Canned fruit, legumes and other vegetables 18.72 42.49 
29 Non-refined soybean oil and by-products 19.61 43.19 
30 Vegetables except corn and animal oils 18.61 41.88 
31 Processed soybean oil 17.67 39.31 
32 Refrigerated, sterilized and pasteurized milk 17.83 40.91 
33 Dairy products and ice-cream 16.95 40.78 
34 Processed rice and by-products 15.84 37.25 
35 Wheat flour 19.16 42.61 
36 Manioc flour 16.05 38.32 
37 Corn oil and corn products 17.40 40.35 
38 Sugar products 18.95 42.43 
39 Ground coffee 17.13 38.74 
40 Instant coffee 18.62 41.93 
41 Other food products 17.05 39.90 
42 Beverages 18.38 78.64 
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TABLE 14 (CONTINUATION) 
Simulation 3: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of traditional 
taxes (traditional taxes with rates adjusted to raise equivalent revenue after elimination of social 
contributions) 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 2.81% ICMS+IPI+INSS 
43 Tobacco products 18.89 75.44 
44 Processed cotton 16.13 44.22 
45 Textiles 15.27 43.09 
46 Other textiles products 15.66 43.68 
47 Clothing 14.38 44.09 
48 Leather products except shoes 16.17 51.15 
49 Shoes 15.91 45.71 
50 Wood products except furniture 16.60 49.65 
51 Cellulose and other paper inputs 16.97 43.34 
52 Paper cardboard and packaging 15.58 48.03 
53 Newspapers, magazines and sound recordings 13.84 33.17 
54 Liquefied oil gas 17.28 37.88 
55 Gasoline 20.35 44.08 
56 Gasalcohol 16.87 38.85 
57 Heating oil 18.83 39.98 
58 Diesel oil 17.49 36.69 
59 Other oil products 17.10 37.38 
60 Alcohol 18.07 41.92 
61 Inorganic chemical products 14.95 38.43 
62 Organic chemical products 14.13 35.37 
63 Resin and elastomer 14.25 37.83 
64 Pharmaceutical products 12.29 39.29 
65 Pesticides 15.78 41.32 
66 Perfumery, soaps and cleaning products 15.76 63.25 
67 Paints, vanish, enamels and lacquers 15.71 43.30 
68 Other chemical products 14.83 49.26 
69 Rubber products 15.79 47.24 
70 Plastic products 15.39 43.20 
71 Cement 16.86 43.04 
72 Other non-metallic mineral products 16.37 43.76 
73 Pig iron 17.80 48.57 
74 Semi-finished rolled steel and steel tubes 16.53 45.97 
75 Non-ferrous metallic products 16.65 40.91 
76 Cast steel 18.32 45.20 
77 Metal products - except machinery and equipment 15.83 47.21 
78 Machinery and equipment 15.59 40.49 
79 Home appliances 16.13 48.09 
80 Office and computer equipment 15.09 45.65 
81 Electric machines and equipment 15.36 45.63 
82 Electronics and communication equipment 13.20 43.78 
83 Medical and hospital equipment 12.93 51.90 
84 Automobiles, vans and pick-ups 17.90 45.11 
85 Buses and trucks 17.13 48.23 
 - 121 - 
TABLE 14 (CONTINUATION) 
Simulation 3: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of traditional 
taxes (traditional taxes with rates adjusted to raise equivalent revenue after elimination of social 
contributions) 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 2.81% ICMS+IPI+INSS 
86 Auto industry parts and equipments 15.21 40.28 
87 Other transport equipment 16.00 43.47 
88 Furniture 13.70 45.59 
89 Recycled scrap 17.65 49.12 
90 Electricity, gas, water, sewer and urban sanitation 13.76 42.63 
91 Construction 15.20 35.89 
92 Trade 12.17 40.62 
93 Freight 15.72 39.09 
94 Passenger transportation 14.15 37.01 
95 Mail 14.98 31.67 
96 Information services 12.46 25.15 
97 Insurance and finance 11.90 24.21 
98 Real estate rental 9.87 24.20 
99 Imputed rental values 18.42 33.08 
100 Maintenance and repair 12.53 31.11 
101 Lodge and food 14.53 57.19 
102 Services to firms 11.57 23.24 
103 Private education 11.87 27.62 
104 Private health services 18.15 37.32 
105 Services to families 12.70 31.61 
106 Community services 14.15 33.59 
107 Domestic services 18.62 39.32 
108 Public education 18.42 35.73 
109 Public health care 17.49 34.73 
110 Government and social security 17.53 30.78 
Maximum 20.35 78.64 
Minimum 9.87 23.24 
Deviation 2.38% 7.84% 
 
Revenue from the cumulative taxes which are to be eliminated (including the 
municipal ISS turnover tax on services) amounted to R$ 88,337 bi. The total revenue 
of the conventional taxes added to R$ 263,251 bi. Thus, for the simulation in 
TABLE 14 the rates applicable to the conventional taxes were increased by 33.56% 
in order to maintain total tax revenue constant, thus avoiding that public revenue 
suffers from a drastic decline caused by the elimination of the cumulative taxes.  
This, by itself, makes this raise unreasonable since the intensity of this tax hike 
would be a strong stimulus for greater tax avoidance. But, supposing this increase in 
tax avoidance were not to happen, which is highly unlikely, deviations in relative 
prices would rise from the 5.67%, estimated in Simulation 1, to 7.84%, further 
aggravating strong distortions in relative prices. The deviation in relative prices 
caused by the bank transaction tax would remain the same, 2.38%; that is, 69% lower 
 - 122 - 
than if social contributions were eliminated. This shows that, unless significant 
budget cuts are possible, the proposal to eliminate the cumulative social 
contributions needs to be analyzed with greater care before being fully adopted. 
TABLE 15 
Simulation 4: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of the 
traditional tax system (with rates of traditional tax system adjusted to compensate for loss of 
revenue due to estimated evasion rates) 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix – Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 2.81% ICMS+IPI+INSS+ISS 
1 Rice 16.26 38.08 
2 Corn 15.21 41.72 
3 Wheat and others cereals 16.59 43.23 
4 Sugar Cane 16.97 43.88 
5 Soybean 16.49 43.37 
6 Other agricultural products 14.57 44.21 
7 Manioc 15.07 41.85 
8 Tobacco 16.86 82.70 
9 Cotton 16.10 42.95 
10 Citric fruits 16.65 43.54 
11 Coffee 16.74 38.60 
12 Forest products 14.87 41.19 
13 Cattle and other live animals 17.68 43.76 
14 Cow milk 17.76 33.60 
15 Live pigs 17.98 44.09 
16 Live poultry 17.86 43.88 
17 Chicken eggs 15.05 36.23 
18 Fish 17.63 33.56 
19 Oil and natural gas 15.11 32.43 
20 Iron ore 18.23 39.01 
21 Coal 16.87 34.80 
22 Non-ferrous metallic minerals 16.49 36.51 
23 Non-metallic minerals 15.96 36.41 
24 Meat processing 17.38 37.35 
25 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen pork 17.98 38.57 
26 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen poultry 17.07 37.02 
27 Processed fish meat 18.11 38.22 
28 Canned fruit, legumes and other vegetables 18.72 39.32 
29 Non-refined soybean oil and by-products 19.61 40.21 
30 Vegetables except corn and animal oils 18.61 38.89 
31 Processed soybean oil 17.67 36.54 
32 Refrigerated, sterilized and pasteurized milk 17.83 37.80 
33 Dairy products and ice-cream 16.95 37.37 
34 Processed rice and by-products 15.84 34.33 
35 Wheat flour 19.16 39.62 
36 Manioc flour 16.05 34.99 
37 Corn oil and corn products 17.40 37.29 
38 Sugar products 18.95 39.31 
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TABLE 15 (CONTINUATION) 
Simulation 4: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of the 
traditional tax system (with rates of traditional tax system adjusted to compensate for loss of 
revenue due to estimated evasion rates) 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 2.81% ICMS+IPI+INSS+ISS 
39 Ground coffee 17.13 35.94 
40 Instant coffee 18.62 38.91 
41 Other food products 17.05 36.86 
42 Beverages 18.38 60.81 
43 Tobacco products 18.89 80.70 
44 Processed cotton 16.13 38.15 
45 Textiles 15.27 37.09 
46 Other textiles products 15.66 37.64 
47 Clothing 14.38 40.76 
48 Leather products except shoes 16.17 43.60 
49 Shoes 15.91 39.35 
50 Wood products except furniture 16.60 43.76 
51 Cellulose and other paper inputs 16.97 38.77 
52 Paper cardboard and packaging 15.58 42.28 
53 Newspapers, magazines and sound recordings 13.84 29.00 
54 Liquefied oil gas 17.28 32.62 
55 Gasoline 20.35 37.46 
56 Gasalcohol 16.87 33.11 
57 Heating oil 18.83 34.23 
58 Diesel oil 17.49 31.48 
59 Other oil products 17.10 31.81 
60 Alcohol 18.07 40.02 
61 Inorganic chemical products 14.95 32.12 
62 Organic chemical products 14.13 29.37 
63 Resin and elastomer 14.25 31.11 
64 Pharmaceutical products 12.29 33.47 
65 Pesticides 15.78 35.31 
66 Perfumery, soaps and cleaning products 15.76 50.49 
67 Paints, vanish, enamels and lacquers 15.71 36.51 
68 Other chemical products 14.83 40.53 
69 Rubber products 15.79 38.88 
70 Plastic products 15.39 35.90 
71 Cement 16.86 37.02 
72 Other non-metallic mineral products 16.37 37.37 
73 Pig iron 17.80 41.02 
74 Semi-finished rolled steel and steel tubes 16.53 39.59 
75 Non-ferrous metallic products 16.65 34.30 
76 Cast steel 18.32 38.61 
77 Metal products - except machinery and equipment 15.83 40.51 
78 Machinery and equipment 15.59 34.06 
79 Home appliances 16.13 40.18 
80 Office and computer equipment 15.09 37.46 
81 Electric machines and equipment 15.36 37.63 
 - 124 - 
TABLE 15 (CONTINUATION) 
Simulation 4: Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of the Single Tax and of the 
traditional tax system (with rates of traditional tax system adjusted to compensate for loss of 
revenue due to estimated evasion rates) 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
Single tax Traditional system 
nº Products 2.81% ICMS+IPI+INSS+ISS 
82 Electronics and communication equipment 13.20 35.36 
83 Medical and hospital equipment 12.93 42.50 
84 Automobiles, vans and pick-ups 17.90 37.74 
85 Buses and trucks 17.13 40.01 
86 Auto industry parts and equipments 15.21 33.66 
87 Other transport equipment 16.00 36.27 
88 Furniture 13.70 40.27 
89 Recycled scrap 17.65 42.27 
90 Electricity, gas, water, sewer and urban sanitation 13.76 35.72 
91 Construction 15.20 33.27 
92 Trade 12.17 37.20 
93 Freight 15.72 35.27 
94 Passenger transportation 14.15 34.67 
95 Mail 14.98 29.92 
96 Information services 12.46 26.21 
97 Insurance and finance 11.90 25.42 
98 Real estate rental 9.87 24.47 
99 Imputed rental values 18.42 30.96 
100 Maintenance and repair 12.53 29.00 
101 Lodge and food 14.53 44.50 
102 Services to firms 11.57 25.35 
103 Private education 11.87 25.87 
104 Private health services 18.15 33.33 
105 Services to families 12.70 30.96 
106 Community services 14.15 29.05 
107 Domestic services 18.62 34.26 
108 Public education 18.42 32.53 
109 Public health care 17.49 31.17 
110 Government and social security 17.53 29.09 
Maximum 20.35 82.70 
Minimum 9.87 24.47 
Deviation 2.38% 7.72% 
 
The explicit introduction of tax evasion into the simulation model, and its 
impact on distortions in relative prices, is another interesting topic for future 
research. The hypothesis assumed in this text is that tax evasion introduces strong 
elements of instability, volatility, and randomness in relative prices. Simulation 4, in 
TABLE 15, applies the same parameters as in Simulation 1, but introduces tax 
evasion into the model.  
To this end, the same tax rates used in Simulation 1 were used again, but 
adjusted for estimates of the weight of the formal sector on the total Value of 
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Production for each sector, as calculated by the BNDES.120  In other words, we 
estimate effective tax rates on the formal economy by adjusting the statutory rates to 
the proportion of informality in each respective sector. 
For example, whereas in the sugar industry 100% of the sector is formal, in 
agriculture 93.1% is not a part of the formal economy. Applying corresponding 
information for the 110 products used in the simulations, we made equivalent 
adjustments to each sector’s tax rates, except for the rate of the bank transaction tax 
(Single Tax) because it is evasion-free even for those economic agents operating in 
the informal economy. The expectation is that the deviation of relative prices in the 
Single Tax model will remain constant, because the rate had not changed. But we 
expect, for the reasons mentioned above, that deviations in relative prices in the 
conventional model would be higher than the 5.67% found in Simulation 1. 
The tax adjustment was done as follows. To the extent that we admit that 
evasion exists, stimulated by the high rates of conventional taxes, the drop in 
effective rates will imply a loss of revenue. To correct this, nominal rates of 
conventional taxes are raised by a proportion derived from the ratio of the sum of 
nominal rates to the sum of effective rates. The expectation is that in making this 
correction the higher nominal rates will offset the effects of evasion on tax revenue. 
This is, in fact, what happens. The more tax evasion increases, the more the 
government increases nominal tax rates to offset the loss of revenue. This means that 
although rates and tax incidence patterns are altered, revenue is kept constant by 
raising statutory tax rates. In other words, this mechanism makes good taxpayers pay 
for bad ones. 
After such adjustments were made, our hypothesis was confirmed by the 
simulation. Tax evasion had a strong distortionary effect on relative prices. The 
dispersion index jumped from 5.67% in simulation 1 (which assumed no tax evasion) 
to 7.72% in simulation 4, which incorporated tax evasion in the model. 
These results strongly suggest the inadequacy of the peremptory and 
unconditional assertions, made by several scholars and critics of cumulativeness, 
concerning the distortionary effects of turnover taxes on relative prices, as compared 
to value-added taxes. 
With these observations we hope to be marching ahead in understanding the last 
pending issue in the Single Tax controversy: that one cannot state a priori whether 
cumulative or value-added taxes introduce greater distortions in relative prices in the 
economy. But we can state unequivocally that in the empirical case of the Brazilian 
economy, bank transaction taxes such as the CPMF are less distortionary than the 
conventional tax structure made up mostly of value-added taxes. 
                                                 
120
 Mentioned in [PEREIRA and IKEDA, 2001]. 
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3 
TAXATION IN BRAZIL 
INTRODUCTION 
A first-time analyst of the literature on tax reform in Brazil would come to a 
curious conclusion: that the bulk of the controversy surrounding the subject, which 
dates back to the mid-1990s, focuses almost exclusively on doing away with 
cascading, or turnover taxes.121 
In fact, in August 2001, representatives of Brazil’s major business associations 
published a manifesto demanding an urgent tax reform.122 A close look at the 
document, however, shows that the true goal of business leaders was neither to 
discuss the tax issue as a whole – its malfunction and dysfunction – nor to seek 
comprehensive and definitive solutions to the problem. Rather, it was a severe 
criticism of cumulativeness present in some of the taxes in use in the country. Those 
entrepreneurial groups convinced important public opinion leaders that the top 
priority in tax reform should be nothing more that the elimination of turnover, 
cascading taxes. 
One indicator of their mistake can be gauged in the results of a survey taken by 
                                                 
121
 A tax is considered cumulative if applied on a same tax base in two or more stages during the 
production and exchange process, as when the amount collected in the earlier stages of production, or 
exchange, are not allowed to be deducted from the tax due on the next stage. Examples of such taxes 
in Brazil are the ISS (a municipal tax on services), the CPMF [Provisional Contribution on Bank 
Transactions], and partially the Cofins [Contribution for Funding Social Security], and the PIS [Social 
Integration Program]. A tax is not cumulative whenever the tax amount paid in one stage of 
circulation is deducted from the amount due on the following stage. Examples of non-cumulative 
taxes in Brazil are the IPI [Tax on Industrialized Products] and the ICMS [Tax on the Circulation of 
Goods, Transportation, and Communication Services]. Everardo Maciel (a former head of the Federal 
Revenue Service in Brazil) defines cumulativeness as typical of “tax systems the incidence of which 
have no repercussions either forward or backward... The value-added tax system...considers 
backward and forward data; it has a system of debits and credits. Which of these is best? Both have 
virtues and shortcomings. In cumulative systems, rates are lower. In value-added systems, rates are 
higher. Cumulative systems are simple. Value-added systems are more complex and lend themselves 
to tax avoidance and fraud... Value-added systems provide better accounting practices than 
cumulative systems. The mistake is to be partisan to one or the other. Each situation has an 
appropriate solution. Generalization is a huge mistake. Therefore, the cumulativeness of a system 
does not constitute an error in principle.” [MACIEL, 2001]  
122
 Available in Portuguese at www.marcoscintra.org/singletax 
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the National Confederation of Industry, in which 88% of business leaders surveyed 
pointed to Brazil’s excessive tax burden as the least desirable feature of the current 
tax system, and not to the presence of turnover taxes. Thus, it is surprising that 
business leaders have aimed their anger at cumulativeness, instead of arguing for a 
reduced tax burden and for lower tax rates. 
The manifesto contained no demands for fighting tax evasion and corruption. 
Nor did it call for actions to decrease the high compliance costs related to accessory 
tax obligations imposed on taxpayers. It did not even complain about bureaucracy or 
about the inequities of Brazil’s current tax system.123 The manifesto complained 
almost exclusively of cumulativeness, despite the fact that what truly suffocates 
competitiveness in Brazil is not the manner in which taxes are collected 
(cumulatively or on value-added), but rather the disproportionate weight of Brazil’s 
tax burden, in excess of 34.8% of GDP in 2007. They were discussing form, and 
forgot the essence of their problem.124  
No heed was given to basic problems, such those raised by Everardo Maciel, 
former Secretary of Federal Revenue who foresaw that “without a doubt, the speed 
and depth of changes facing the world will affect (or even exhaust) the tax models in 
use today. Which taxes, then, will continue to exist, or which new ones will be 
created, are still questions that have no answer.”125 
Tax evasion, not the CPMF, is the tumor that must be rooted out from the 
national tax system, and no other system, apart from the bank transaction tax, can do 
just that. As a matter of fact, the CPMF and bank transaction taxes are not problems 
in Brazil’s tax system; rather, as assumed by the Federal Revenue Service,” Brazil 
can prove that the use of bank transaction taxes…can be the solution for taxation in 
an increasingly globalized and electronically dependent world”.126 
This text discusses Brazil’s tax system, including its cumulativeness. We 
demonstrate that a priori rejection of cumulative taxes is the result of prejudice and 
of poorly digested theoretical concepts. We will also show that it is important to 
overcome this erroneous and incomplete interpretation of Brazilian tax problems. 
This is the first step to begin building a more efficient tax model, capable of being 
                                                 
123
 According to research by SEBRAE/SP (Brazilian System for the Development of Small 
Enterprises) bureaucracy bears down heavily on micro business owners who spend 40% of their time 
complying to the bureaucratic demands of federal revenue agencies. According to estimates, small 
businesses in Brazil spend approximately 3% of GDP (US$ 15 billion) in bureaucratic red tape related 
to taxes  
124
 Discussion of tax reform is ambiguous in Brazil. When we speak of simplification through the 
unification of ICMS state legislation, for example, “people oppose it because, in fact, this that is 
supposedly desired, which modernizes, which furthers progress, in truth is not desired. That is, we are 
discussing a false agenda, a hidden agenda… All of the discussions are not truthfully those that are 
being discussed.” [MACIEL, 2001].  
125
 [SECRETARIA DA RECEITA FEDERAL, 2001(b)]  
126
 [SECRETARIA DA RECEITA FEDERAL, 2002(c)] p.38.  
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more equitable, less costly, and more consentaneous with Brazilian economic and 
social structures. Such tax model, as will be demonstrated, is the Single Tax 
system.127 
BRAZIL NEEDS A NEW TAX SYSTEM 
Brazilian society shows signs of deep dissatisfaction with its tax system128. It is 
one of the most complexes in the world, having reached an advanced stage of 
deterioration, irrationality, inefficiency, and inequity.129 
In mid-2001, Brazil’s tax legislation consisted of 55,767 articles, 33,374 
paragraphs, 23,497 sub-paragraphs, and 9,956 headings. This tax law miscellany is 
housed in 18,589 pages of texts, decrees, codes, and notices.130 These figures, 
however, need to be updated each day. Every year nearly 300 new laws are drafted 
on the subject – roughly 1.23 alterations per business day. 
In less than three years, between May 1995 and December 1998, legislation 
related to two federal taxes (the Income Tax (IR) and the Industrialized Products Tax 
(IPI)), one state tax (Circulation Tax on Goods and Services (ICMS)), and two Social 
Contributions (Social Integration Program (PIS) and Social Security Contribution 
(Cofins)) increased in the following manner: 
• On the IR: 24 laws, 76 provisional measures, 14 decrees, 46 notices, and 149 
rulings; 
• On the IPI: 8 laws, 41 provisional measures, 20 decrees, 67 notices, and 87 
rulings; 
• On the ICMS: 24 laws, 165 notices, 314 resolutions and conventions; 
• On the PIS: 1 Constitutional Amendment, 7 laws, 122 provisional measures, 
1 decree, 3 resolutions, 8 rulings, 3 notices, 1 court order, and 1 legal 
opinion; 
• On the Cofins: 2 supplemental laws, 3 laws, 30 provisional measures, 1 
                                                 
127
 On the Single Tax and on the controversy that surrounds it, with arguments for and against that 
proposal, see [CINTRA, 1994(a)]. For an explanation of the proposal, see, especially [CINTRA, 1994 
(c)] pp.85-89 and [CINTRA, 1994(b)] pp.203-245. 
128
 For a concise description of the main institutional characteristics of the Brazilian tax system see 
[SECRETARIA DA RECEITA FEDERAL, 2002(b)]. 
129
 Instead of the famous maxim: “a good tax is an old tax”, Everardo Maciel suggests that  “a good 
tax is a simple tax”. [MACIEL, 2001] . 
130
 The Congressional Investigative Commission on Tax Evasion stated that in Brazil “there is an 
excessive number of taxes, which are imposed through legislation that is extremely complex, 
unconstitutional, inconsistent, inadequate, of dubious interpretation and application, subject to 
constant modifications… to the extent that in 1990 1,062 fiscal rulings were issued, an average of 4.6 
per business day. This legislation requires 33 accounting books, 24 tax forms, in addition to 25 basic 
labor and social security obligations.” See [CONGRESSO NACIONAL, 1994]. 
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decree, 1 notice, 1 court order, and 1 ruling.131  
A recent study done by the Instituto Brasileiro de Planejamento Tributário 
(Brazilian Institute for Tax Planning) estimated that between October 1988, when the 
new Brazilian Constitution was promulgated, and October 2008, over 240,000 pieces 
of tax regulation and legislative acts were issued, which amounts to 34 pieces of 
legislation issued each day since 1988, including week ends and holidays.132  
Such complexity, typical of declaratory taxes is not unique to Brazil. In the 
United States heated debate has been waging over changes in that country’s main 
source of revenue, the income tax. Current US federal tax law is contained in no less 
than 45,662 pages, a number which has grown by 74% since 1984. Between 1990 
and 2000, the number of tax forms increased by 23%%. The eight largest tax-
consulting firms experienced sales increases of 112% between 1996 and 2001. The 
American “tax industry” currently employs over 1 million people, more than the 
entire automotive industry. US taxpayers spend US$ 183 billion annually in 
compliance costs alone (filling out forms and returns).133 
In Brazil, the excessive number of taxes has directly contributed to record 
increases in revenue, year after year. TABLE 16 shows the growth of the tax burden 
in Brazil. 
Some argue that the tax burden, as a percentage of Brazil’s GDP, could 
increase, considering that in several developed countries they are still higher. 
However, such an opinion is nonsensical if taken as an isolated statement. A 
country’s tax burden can only be appraised considering, comparatively, its per capita 
income levels and its stage of development. 
                                                 
131
 [REZENDE].  
132
 [AMARAL et alii ]. 
133
 [EDWARDS, 2001]. 
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TABLE 16 
Total and per capita tax burdens 
Brazil (1993–2008) 
Year GDP per capita  
 (R$) 
Per capita tax burden 
 (R$) 
Tax burden 
(% GDP) 
1993 91.55 23.16 25.3 
1994 2,232.32 622.82 27.9 
1995 4,441.49 1,261.38 28.4 
1996 5,231.52 1,496.22 28.6 
1997 5,734.20 1,639.98 28.6 
1998 5,890.31 1,725.86 29.3 
1999 6,310.98 1,962.71 31.1 
2000 6,886.28 2,093.43 30.4 
2001 7,491.21 2,389.69 31.9 
2002 8,378.10 2,706.13 32.3 
2003 9,497.70 3,029.76 31.9 
2004 10,691.89 3,506.94 32.8 
2005 11,658.10 3,882.15 33.3 
2006 12,688.28 4,250.57 33.5 
2007 13,719.65 4,772.70 34.8 
2008 15,155.15 5,446.17 35.9 
    Sources: Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) and Federal Revenue Agency. 
 
TABLE 17 shows the tax burden in selected countries. Brazil carries a tax 
burden that is incompatible with the per capita income level of the population. All 
countries bearing a tax burden near or higher than 30% of GDP have per capita 
annual income of US$ 40,000 or more. It is worth noting that countries with per 
capita income of less than US$ 10,000 per year have tax burdens of less than 25% of 
GDP. Brazil (and Uruguay in this sample of countries) is a clear example of 
extravagant over taxation.  
Brazilian consumers bear high indirect taxes built into prices of products and 
services. According to ABIA [Brazilian Food Industry Association], taxes account 
for up to 34.7% of the final price of food. Internationally, the average is 7%. TABLE 
18 illustrates the abusive taxation of consumer goods in Brazil, which results in low 
purchasing power of wages and in loss of competitiveness of Brazilian products in 
foreign markets. Most taxes on domestic production are not exonerated at the time of 
export, making exported goods and services carry heavy tax loads built into their 
prices (tax export). 
In order to defend themselves from such an abusive tax burden, taxpayers 
practice evasion as a dodge necessary for survival. Tax avoidance has become a 
behavioral rule for Brazilian taxpayers, to the point of being called a “national 
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religion”.134 
TABLE 17 
Tax burden and per capita income in selected countries 
Countries 
Income  per capita 
(US$/year) 
2007 (1) 
Tax burden 
(% GDP) 
Norway 76,450 43.7 
Denmark 54,110 50.3 
Sweden 46,060 50.7 
United States 46,040 27.3 
United Kingdom 42,740 36.5 
Germany 38,860 34.8 
France 38,500 44.1 
Japan 37,670 27.4 
Italy 33,540 41.0 
South Korea 19,960 25.5 
Chile 8,350 19.2 
Mexico 8,340 19.9 
Russia 7,560 16.9 
Venezuela 7,320 15.9 
Uruguay 6,380 30.3 
Argentina 6,050 24.0 
Brazil 5,910 34.8 
Peru 3,450 14.3 
China 2,360 16.7 
India 950 16.0 
                                   Source: (1) World Bank 
 
In 1999, the Secretary of the Federal Revenue, Everardo Maciel, testified before 
the CPI [Parliamentary Investigative Commission] on the Financial System. His 
statement caused a strong impact on public opinion. The country was officially 
informed that large-scale tax evasion, tax avoidance, and other forms of tax hiding 
were common practices. According to his testimony, R$ 825 billion, almost one year 
of Brazil’s GDP, slipped through the fingers of the Federal Revenue without a cent 
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of it being collected, except for a small amount of revenue collected by the CPMF (a 
turnover bank transactions contribution). He stated, furthermore, that half of Brazil’s 
530 largest corporations had not been paying income tax, and 42% of the 66 largest 
banks had accomplished the same feat. 
Tax evasion is a deadly tumor to be extirpated from the nation’s tax system. The 
prevalence of this anomaly is responsible for deep tax injustices. According to the 
proceedings of the CPI [Parliamentary Investigative Commission] on Tax Evasion, 
“tax evasion is entrenched in the population, in taxpayers, due to an educational and 
moral problem.”135 
The Federal Revenue has been cross-referencing bank transaction data with 
filed income tax returns. The data reveal that billions of reais circulate free from the 
reach of the income tax. 
TABLE 18 
Percent of taxes on consumer prices 
Product 
Current tax as a percentage of 
consumer price 
(%) 
Kilogram of meat 47 
Dozen eggs 29 
Bread 43 
Soft drink 37 
Tea 50 
Automobile 46 
Tennis shoes 47 
Pair of shoes 47 
Television 49 
Gasoline 53 
Soybean oil 25 
Tires 37 
Men’s pants 25 
Refrigerator 49 
                                   Source: Trevisan e Associados, Sindicom and ACSP. 
 
In 1999, cross-referenced data uncovered taxpayers who claimed to be exempt 
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or economically inactive, and firms registered under the Simple [simplified tax 
procedures for micro and small firms], but whose bank transactions, surprisingly, 
amounted to approximately half of Brazil’s GDP, as shown in TABLE 19. It is worth 
noting that 559,161 individuals and firms transacted a total amount of R$ 116.9 
billion, a monthly average of R$ 9.74 billion, while “claiming” to be exempt from 
income tax (of those, 424,435 individuals and firms that transacted R$ 77,736 billion 
were suspected of evasion, as seen in TABLE 19). 
The data also revealed that 254 individuals and firms transacted the 
overwhelming amount of R$ 164.1 billion without paying income tax. On average, 
each one transacted R$ 54 million per month, but claimed to be exempt, inactive, 
registered under the Simple [simplified method of tax calculation used for small and 
micro firms], or were outright omissive. The analysis concluded that in 1999, 
512,117 individuals and companies transacted R$ 465.5 billion, or R$ 38.8 billion 
per month, without reporting such payments to tax authorities. Implicitly, such 
transactions represented evaded earnings estimated at R$ 339.2 billion, or R$ 28.3 
billion per month. In other words, transactions equivalent to approximately 32% of 
GDP evaded Brazil’s income tax.  
Tax avoidance makes the current pattern of tax incidence on production so 
chaotic, unpredictable, and devastating that it can bankrupt an efficient taxpaying 
company. On the other hand, it can enable an inefficient tax-evading producer to 
survive, by looting its competitors in the marketplace.  
TABLE 19 
Taxpayers that are exempt, inactive, non-registered, and micro or small firms: 
Value of bank transactions cross-referenced with income tax returns 
Estimate tax evasion 
Annual Bank 
Transactions 
(R$ 000) 
Number of 
individuals and 
firms audited by 
the Internal 
Revenue 
Number of 
individuals and 
firms suspected 
of tax evasion* 
Non reported 
annual bank 
transactions 
(R$ 000,000,000) 
Annual non-
reported taxable 
income 
(R$ 000,000,000)** 
Up to 100 29,402,435 - - - 
> 100 to 500 559,161 424,435 44.7 30.7 
> 500 to 1,000 51,065 51,065 34.7 13.9 
> 1,000 to 10,000 33,991 33,991 100.9 50.4 
> 10,000 to 100,000 2,372 2,372 88.1 80.1 
> 100,000 254 254 164.1 164.1 
Total 30,049,385 512,117 465.5 339.2 
   Source: Data from the Federal Revenue Agency (1999). 
(*) Annual bank transactions greater than R$ 100,000 for individuals and firms, and greater than R$ 1 million 
for micro and small firms. 
(**) Calculated as the average bank transaction figures for each category divided by the ratio of bank 
transactions/income, as indicated below: 
Up to 10,000 = 10; from 10,000 to 100,000 = 5; from 100,000 to 500,000 = 3; from 500,000 to 1 million = 2.5; 
from 1 million to 10 million = 2; from 10 million to 100 million = 1.5; and + than 100 million = 1. 
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According to surveys, 40% of Brazil’s income are not reported to tax authorities 
due to evasion or to escaping into the underground economy. This figure implies that 
the current tax burden of 38% of GDP is borne by 60% of potential taxpayers; in 
other words, those that pay bear a tax burden of almost 65% of their taxable income, 
while evaders contribute little to society, or much less than they should.136 
Furthermore, tax evasion has an inevitable consequence: corruption. In Brazil, 
tax avoidance and evasion are accepted as normal facts of life, and are often praised 
as signs of courage and boldness in market behavior. Collusion between tax evaders 
and corrupt tax officials has been a cause of severe deterioration of ethical and moral 
standards of Brazilian society. 
But it is on labor income that Brazilian tax burden sets a dreary record. 
The combination of widespread tax evasion and the need for increased public 
revenue has turned payroll employees into one of the most heavily burdened subjects 
of taxation. Because of greater difficulties in practicing evasion or avoidance, 
regularly hired payroll employees are easy prey to escalating taxation. Additionally, 
the government has overburdened employers with extremely high fiscal and social 
security obligations. 
Labor income in Brazil, which accounts for only 26.8% of domestic income, 
bears the burden – directly and indirectly – of approximately 53.5% of the country’s 
tax revenue. This provides clear indication that, in order to compensate for revenue 
lost to evasion, the government transfers the tax burden to those for whom tax 
evasion is all but impossible, namely, payroll employees. Data from both the US 
Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Revenue show that in the United States the 
individual income tax rate increases from 15% to 19% as taxable wage income 
reaches R$ 119,200 annually. In Brazil, the same rate increase is triggered when 
taxable income reaches R$ 15,200 per year. 
This fact contributes significantly to current high unemployment rates. 
Furthermore, the high cost of hiring and maintaining payroll employees is one of the 
key causes of the growth of the informal economy. Half of Brazil’s workers are not 
formal payroll employees.  
Another characteristic of the Brazilian tax system is its regressiveness. In fact, 
ex post the system taxes more heavily those with lower income, although statutory 
taxes are usually progressive in their formal mechanisms of tax collection. For 
example, the income tax is progressive ex ante, but becomes regressive ex post after 
evasion and all deductions and allowances are duly accounted for. On the whole, the 
Brazilian tax system is regressive, as found in a recent study that showed that the tax 
burden for families earning up to two monthly minimum salaries is 48.8%, while it 
falls consistently across higher income brackets until it reaches a tax burden of 
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26.3% for families earning more than thirty monthly minimum salaries.137 
These facts demonstrate the urgent need for tax reform in Brazil. This is a debt 
contracted by government and by politicians with regard to Brazilian society during 
the last decade of the 20th century, and still left unpaid. Despite various attempts, tax 
reform never happened. The debate was intense; at times, even passionate. But it was 
never carried out. 
It is no simple task to accommodate the specific interests of the vast number of 
social groups involved in a tax reform. These groups include workers, business men, 
and government agents, which are further divided by sectors and geographical areas, 
often with conflicting interests. Each group envisions in tax reform an opportunity to 
broaden its own economic space. Such conflicting interests cannot be resolved by 
conventional tax reform, as past experience has shown. 
The Single Tax proposal for a tax reform, as will be shown ahead, by allowing 
gains to all parties involved – the public sector, payroll employees, and business 
owners – creates favorable conditions for a productive discussion. For the public 
sector, the Single Tax allows for reduced costs, for dismantling of unnecessary 
bureaucracy, for administrative modernization, for recovering evaded revenue, and 
for a lower public deficit; for workers, it allows for wage increases through the 
transfer to personal earnings of part of the social security contributions and payroll 
withholdings. For business owners, it allows for reduced costs, for larger markets, 
and for higher profits and investments. 
Antonio Ermírio de Moraes, head of the largest industrial group in Brazil, stated 
in a published interview that he had engaged his entire legal and tax departments to 
analyze the Single Tax and the bank transaction tax, concluding that it is evasion-
proof.138 With a Single Tax, only tax evaders and the underground economy stand to 
lose, but this would be a welcome act of Justice, long overdue. 
ROBERTO CAMPOS: THE CHOICE BETWEEN “INNOVATIVE 
INSOLENCE” AND “PERFECTING THE OBSOLETE” 
Roberto Campos was an enthusiastic supporter of new ideas, of innovative 
insolence, and of the Single Tax. Such posture surprised those who claimed that 
“Bob Fields” was a starch conservative (“Bob Fields” is the literal translation of his 
name, as he was jokingly known because of his support for economic liberalism, and 
for his fierce defense of free market ideals). They were wrong. He was always 
original, an iconoclast, a creator of new paradigms. 
Between 1964 and 1967 he was responsible for implementing the last tax reform 
in Brazil. He introduced changes that cleared the way for what was called the 
“Brazilian miracle” of the 1970s, a period of outstandingly high economic growth. 
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During the 1980s he became a respected politician and a critic of the government. He 
claimed that the state apparatus had become deformed, grossly deviating from its 
original objectives. He pointed to several problems that required urgent solution if 
the country were to build a modern and prosperous economy. On one occasion he 
said, “We remain too far removed from achievable wealth, and too close to 
correctable poverty.” 
During the last ten years of his life, one of his major criticisms was directed at 
taxation in Brazil. 
He showed that value-added taxes, VATs, which are widely acclaimed as fair 
and efficient, actually hid another far less attractive reality. The deformities hidden 
in that invisible reality are amplified in countries with federative systems of 
government: bureaucratic exacerbation, rampant corruption, exasperating 
complexity, prohibitive operational costs, irresistible tax avoidance, and ever-
seductive evasion. He claimed that a VAT tax is a monster of the declaratory genus, 
of the bureaucracy-bribery species, beloved only by busybody private and 
governmental bureaucrats. 
In “Reform or Revolution”139 Roberto Campos stated that Brazil’s fiscal ethics 
had been destroyed. He insisted that to pay taxes was to purchase harassment and 
irritation, and that only firms in the formal economy and registered payroll 
employees actually pay direct taxes. The remaining taxpayers, estimated by him to 
account for two thirds of the total, were tax evaders, which he referred to as 
delinquents. 
In tax matters, between reformist simplifications and revolutionary innovations 
Roberto Campos preferred the latter. He supported the proposal of a Single Tax, 
which he considered a seminal idea. He wrote that “On fiscal matters the country has 
the chance to introduce a pioneering experience with the Single Tax. This is so 
because of the coincidence of circumstances inexistent elsewhere: a) both fiscal 
ethics and the tax structure have begun to collapse; b) the economy became non-
monetized (free of paper currency) – paper currency in the hands of the public 
amounts to less than 1% of GDP; c) the banking system is surprisingly modern and 
electronically equipped for a third world country.” Campos concluded by stating: 
“As I see it, the (desired) features of a fiscal revolution would be: 1) a tax base 
sufficiently broad and simple to turn innocuous the frontiers between taxpayers and 
criminals; 2) rates sufficiently low to make unprofitable tax-engineering attempts at 
finding evasion schemes; 3) automated tax collection that would make dispensable 
the three levels of federal revenue bureaucracies (municipal, state and federal); and 
4) instantaneous transfer of tax proceeds to their beneficiaries, avoiding the 
complications of tax indexing. All of these conditions are met by Professor Marcos 
Cintra’s proposal (the Single Tax), and by none of the reformist proposals.” 
Roberto Campos became a Single Tax warrior. He emphasized the need to 
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implement this system exactly as it had been idealized; in other words, as a tax that 
would replace all fiscal taxes (those primarily purposed to raise revenue). 
Meanwhile, in 1992, the government, seized by a tax collecting fury, made an 
opportunistic use of the basic pillar of the Single Tax, the bank transaction tax, and 
created the IPMF (Provisional Bank Transaction Tax), which later became the 
CPMF (Provisional Bank Transaction Contribution). But they were used as 
additional taxes, in a regrettable violation of the original intent to have a single 
hegemonic tax. 
The creation of the IPMF/CPMF provided Single Tax critics with a valuable 
opportunity to demonize the bank transaction tax. A myth was painstakingly 
constructed, which stated that, because of its cumulativeness, the tax was necessarily 
inefficient, of low quality, and therefore should be fiercely rejected. 
Tax evasion – the foremost anomaly of the Brazilian tax system and which the 
Single Tax proposal emphatically addressed – was relegated to a secondary level of 
interest in the subsequent debates on tax reform, thus allowing the sprouting of a 
perverse competitive advantage: continuing and unabated tax evasion allows 
inefficient firms to survive, as long as they continue practicing it, while more 
efficient, but evasion-shy firms, succumb to tax fraud and to unfair competition. 
Sarcastically, Roberto Campos made a distinction between two kinds of cascade 
in taxation: one, malign and the other, benign. Malign cascading taxes are those such 
as PIS and Cofins (taxes on gross income of firms), which are notoriously less prone 
to evasion. Benign cascading taxes, on the other hand, are those that reduce fiscal 
obligations to taxpayers, such as the Simple (simplified tax system also called the 
Single Tax for micro and small businesses), or the corporate income tax option for 
assessment based on “presumed profits”, a fixed proportion of gross income of 
firms.140  
Not surprisingly, criticism is always directed at the first group of taxes. 
Whenever the cascade involves obstacles and restrictions on evasion, and therefore a 
higher tax burden, it is swiftly seen as diabolical, and therefore as malignant. But 
whenever a tax model, even if grossly cumulative, reduces the tax bill, the cascade is 
considered benign, even by hard line critics of cumulativeness. Such bias can be 
clearly seen in the crusade against the CPMF, the only tax in Brazil that has been 
proven impossible to evade. 
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Roberto Campos argued in favor of “reformatting the State”, and gave special 
emphasis to the Single Tax proposal. Throughout his brilliant career, his privileged 
mind was always capable of seeing far beyond. He demonstrated clearly and 
unequivocally that tax reform is a fundamental demand for approximating 
“achievable wealth” and for combating “correctable poverty”. But unfortunately, 
discussions about tax reform in 1999 resulted in a report issued by the Special 
Commission on Tax Reform of the lower house of Brazilian Parliament that Roberto 
Campos qualified as a futile attempt “to perfect the obsolete”.141 
Among his many memorable articles there are some that deserve extensive 
reproduction. 
In “The Funeral of the Invoice”142  and in “How to Get Out of the Madhouse”143 
Campos describes, in his usual masterful style, the dichotomy of current tax debate, 
as reflected in the bloody duels between those who support conventional tax models 
and those who seek new bases on which to build a modern tax system.  
In the first article, Robert Campos says, “two concerns afflict analysts of 
‘Brazil’s sovereign risk’ in both the medium and long terms. The first is our “fiscal 
madhouse” (costly tax collection and multiple forms of evasion), which creates a 
sinister dilemma: whether to increase tax rates, thereby weakening taxpayers, or to 
sacrifice essential investments. Fiscal disorder is acutely seen in the Executive 
branch, moderately in the Legislative, lightly in the state and municipal 
governments, whereas the Judiciary continues to be fertile at granting injunctions to 
protect ‘acquired rights, or abuses’. The second concern is the insolvency of the 
‘pay-as-you-go’ social security system, which is structurally deficit-ridden.…In 
fiscal matters, we are achieving a primary budget surplus thanks to emergency (once 
and for all) revenue that only further complicates the tax structure. Any effective 
reform must take into consideration three facts: 1) hired labor is taxed excessively, 
leading to informal jobs or unemployment. Furthermore, taxes and union dues are 
shrinking worker’s ‘take-home pay’ (net wages); 2) declaratory taxes that require 
abundant paper work – IR [Income Tax], ICMS [Circulating Sales Tax on Goods 
and Services], IPI [Industrial Sales Tax], ISS [Tax on Services], etc. – and involve 
three levels of  bureaucracy: tax compliance, auditing by the Federal Revenue, and 
often the litigation process; 3) Brazilian cultural tradition is prone to fiscal 
rebellion, due to the anemic supply of government services, the system’s complexity, 
and corruption among tax officials. This makes unproductive those taxes that rely on 
declaratory paper returns from taxpayers. 
“Taxes must be automatic, collected electronically at the root of the economic 
process. There are bills in Congress, such as those sponsored by Congressmen 
Marcos Cintra and Luís Roberto Ponte, in which the bank transaction tax, and 
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special excises (called selective taxes) on essential inputs – electricity, fuel, vehicles, 
and telecommunications (in addition to cigarettes and alcoholic beverages) – would 
replace all other declaratory taxes based on paper tax returns. Collection would be 
done electronically, dramatically reducing costs and the gymnastics of tax 
avoidance. 
“The Government’s proposal to replace current taxes with a federal VAT has 
obvious merits, such as simplification, but it merely improves the obsolete, since 
taxes would continue to be paper-driven and to be assessed by a highly bureaucratic 
procedure.  
“Classical tax structure, to which we hold so firmly, is a curious handicraft 
relic in the electronic age. An alternative is the bank transaction tax embedded in a 
Single Tax model, which nevertheless, faces some spurious objections. One of the 
objections is its alleged ‘cascade’ effect, which in reality is a benign form of 
‘progressiveness’, because it affects more than proportionally the rich, who make 
comparatively more bank transactions and purchase more products with long 
productive chains. The other objection has to do with the tax federalism and the 
autonomy of states and municipalities. But this autonomy is more adequately 
preserved when state and local government are granted guarantees of automated 
collection of revenue and availability of funds for spending, than the illusory power 
to create evasion-ridden taxes that require costly fiscal bureaucracy to raise 
revenue. States and municipalities would be given their revenue shares without any 
bureaucratic or political intermediation.144 
“Partisans of electronic taxation now have a powerful ally in the search for new 
fiscal technology: internet e-commerce, which is growing at an annual rate of 70% 
in the United States. This explosive growth, which weakens the effectiveness of the 
sales taxes, will have as an inevitable consequence at least: 1) a unification of state 
and local tax rates and classifications; and 2) a mechanism to centralize tax 
collection. Last February, the United States Governors Association issued a 
manifesto that favors the creation of a ‘21st Century sales tax applicable to the Net’. 
Everything points to the Internet as the funeral for tax invoices, in the same way the 
fax was the tomb of the telex and airplane, the exterminator of air-balloons.” 
In the second article, Roberto Campos says that “for some time now I have 
considered the deconstruction of our fiscal madhouse to be extremely urgent, in 
order to correct two major evils: tax evasion, which divides the country into 
‘taxpayers’ and ‘free riders’, and the high cost of labor, which causes informal work 
relations or unemployment.” 
“Today, there is a third reason, because globalization and digitalization 
represent a ‘paradigm shift’. The productivity of classical taxes on production, 
circulation, and services has been greatly diminished; these are homespun relics in 
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the electronic society. There are many reform proposals, all affiliated with one of 
two lines of thought: that of the ‘papyrophiles” who limit themselves to simplifying 
the paper and document-driven system, and that of the ‘eletronicphiles’ who wish to 
abolish classical paper-driven declaratory taxes that presuppose that taxpayers will 
correctly and dutifully fill out tax returns for income, sales, and services…(which) on 
one hand increases compliance costs, and  on the other, facilitates tax evasion. 
“The major proposal now in Congress is the preliminary report written by 
Congressman Mussa Demes, of the Special Commission on Tax Reform. It is an 
effort to ‘perfect the obsolete’, because it would replace the ICMS, the IPI, and the 
ISS with a new ICMS (a value-added tax) under federal legislation and shared with 
the states. Being a tax under responsibility of both federal and state governments, it 
would have double auditing and collecting operational jurisdiction. Furthermore, if 
the new ICMS were to incorporate the social contributions – PIS, Cofins, and CSLL 
[Social Contribution on Profits] – the current 17% rate would have to be increased 
in order to substitute for their lost revenues, further stimulating evasion. 
“The other approach to tax reform adopted by the ‘electronicphiles’, was the 
object of a bill presented by Congressman Luís Roberto Ponte, already approved by 
the Special Commission on Tax Reform . However, it was never brought up for a 
vote on the floor of the House due to the opposition from the Government, which 
prefers topical micro-adjustments in the tax system to radical changes. Fortunately, 
Congressman Marcos Cintra has just introduced in the lower chamber an 
‘alternative proposal’ which smoothes out the original idea of a ‘Single Tax’ on 
bank transactions, and attempts to reconcile the two opposing  lines of fiscal 
thought. 
“There would be few taxes; almost all non-declaratory. Current property taxes 
(IPVA [Motor Vehicle Tax], IPTU [Urban Land and Property Tax], and ITR [Rural 
Land Tax]) would be preserved, as would regulatory taxes on foreign trade and on 
credit (IOF [Tax on Financial Transactions]). Due to the insistence of state capital 
cities, which extract approximately 25% of their revenue from the service tax (ISS), it 
would remain in force, as opposed to the Demes proposal of a new retail sales tax 
for municipalities, which is costly to collect and easy to evade.. One significant 
advance is to replace the panoply of social contributions – Cofins, PIS/Pasep, CSLL, 
and the employers’ payroll contribution – with a global tax on bank transactions, 
purged of the imperfections of the CPMF. The income tax, which at its heart is a 
socialist rascality because it punishes those who are most diligent and creative, 
would be compacted. Individuals earning up to 20 monthly minimum salaries would 
be exempt. The corporate income tax would be abolished. 
“It is a tenacious illusion to think that firms are the ultimate taxpayers. Taxes 
always fall upon individuals, whether stockholders, through losses in earnings, 
workers, through paycheck withholdings, or consumers, through higher prices of 
goods. To stimulate reinvestment, in the Cintra bill, profits would only be taxed if 
distributed to individuals. 
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“Abolition of the employer’s contribution to the INSS [National Social Security 
Tax] would encourage employability in the formal sector. If we want deep and 
lasting fiscal reform, we must take into consideration the effects of globalization and 
digitalization. Today, a transnational corporation can choose to account its profits 
or purchase its components in whatever country has the most benign and least 
bureaucratic fiscal system. Then again, how should labor regulations treat a 
“telecommuter” who works for companies located in another country? 
“The fairest tax is not the one that best redistributes income (because social 
justice is best handled on the spending side of the budget), but rather the one that is 
most evasion-proof and inexpensive to collect. 
“The bank transaction tax, replacing the CPMF, would be the most appropriate 
system in a digital economy such as Brazil, but unfortunately it has been 
demoralized by its ‘cascade effect’. Nevertheless, it should be seen as one of those 
benign cascades since revenue collection is free of bureaucracy and almost evasion-
proof, as opposed to the malignant cascades implicit in the Cofins and PIS/Pasep 
(declaratory gross revenue taxes totally dependent on reported sales). The bank 
transaction tax will seem much friendlier if acknowledged as a ‘progressive tax’, 
since it is levied mostly on the wealthy, who conduct larger transactions and 
purchase sophisticated products that have extensive production processes. Only two 
of the objections to the cascade are relevant. 
“The first is the negative effect on high-speed transactions in the stock market. 
This has led Congressman Marcos Cintra to propose that taxation only be applied to 
realized earnings, and not to transactions within the capital markets. 
“The other has to do with the alleged impossibility of allowing tax credits on 
exports. The solution lies not in tax credits but on ‘rebate’ procedures allowed by the 
WTO. That is, restitution to exporters of amounts equivalent to the average tax 
burden extracted from embarked products, calculated according to Leontief’s input-
product tables which are now routinely available from the IBGE (Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and Statistics). This is preferable to the current and highly conflicting 
procedure of compensating the exporting States for the hypothetical loss of revenue 
due to exemption of ICMS in foreign trade. Replacing the ICMS with an excise tax 
on electricity, fuel, telecommunications, vehicles, alcoholic beverages and tobacco, 
collected electronically as they leave their production loci usually concentrated in a 
few large plants, would have several advantages: no evasion, less bureaucracy, 
automatic partition and delivery of revenue, electronic tax collection, and full 
compatibility with the digital age.” 
Roberto Campos concludes by saying, “It surprises me that Congressman 
Cintra’s ‘alternative proposal’, which is more modernizing and simplifying than the 
Government proposals found in the Demes report, has been discussed so little in 
Congress and by the press. It would be melancholic if, in the electronic age, we were 
to remain subject to the papyrophilia of classical taxes’.” 
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In the article “The Fiscal Madhouse”145, Roberto Campos illustrates with great 
precision the tax atmosphere in Brazil during the 1990s. He says that “one of the 
myths that have hindered tax reform has been the belief that an essential requirement 
of federative autonomy is to preserve the three separate tax revenue machines at the 
three levels of government. Some federations, such as Germany, have centralized tax 
collection. The true autonomy and independence of states and municipalities rest in 
their freedom to spend according to their own priorities. The method of tax 
collection should be the simplest and cheapest possible, and funds should be 
partitioned and delivered automatically and instantaneously. 
“Among conventional declaratory taxes – income, consumption, and services 
taxes – the progressive income tax, considered to be the most equitable by 
neoconservative leftists, is precisely the most inadvisable in developing countries. 
There are three possible principles of equity: a) the benefit principle, taxing 
individuals according to the benefits they draw from public services; b) the liberal 
principle, according to which individuals should be taxed proportionally to their 
consumption, that is, to the use they make of society’s production; c) the socialist 
principle, according to which individuals should be taxed progressively, according 
to their ability to pay, which reflects the contribution they make to society through 
their productive efforts.  
“The socialist principle is anti-development. It creates disincentive to savings 
and investment – precisely the opposite of what is advisable for a developing 
country. In the extreme case, defended by foolish leftists, in addition to the tax on 
current income, accumulated income should be taxed again (wealth tax on large 
fortunes), with the resulting effect that capital accumulation would take place 
elsewhere, and not within our Tropic of Capricorn. 
The insufficiency of internal savings is driving even industrialized and rich 
countries such as the United States to consider replacing progressive income taxes 
with a Flat Tax, that is, a single rate applicable both to businesses and individuals, 
levied only on consumed income and not on produced income (of course, with 
generous exemption for the poor).” 
Roberto Campos continues, in “Jatene’s Revenge”146 : “my position on the 
subject has always been clear. I consider, in theory, that the Bank Transaction Tax is 
the most modern and efficient tax collection instrument. Its use only became viable 
on a large scale with the advent of electronic banking payment systems. Essentially, 
it is a creature of the electronic age. Instead of taxing subsets – such as income, 
services, and merchandise circulation – we would tax a synthesis of them all – the 
bank transaction – which in modern economies is a faithful reflection of all 
economic transactions and payments. I opposed the IPMF (a temporary bank debit 
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tax introduced in 1992-3) because it was just one more tax, in addition to the 
existing ones. It simplified nothing. It adopted the ‘methodology’ of a single tax, 
eliminating fiscal bureaucracy, but it violated the philosophy of the single tax, which 
is the ultimate simplification of the system as a whole. In 1996, I accepted the CPMF 
(the former bank debit tax was turned into a contribution), albeit with discomfort, 
surrendering to Jatene’s argument [Dr. Adib Jatene, former Health Minister] that the 
public health network was facing imminent collapse, with no available fiscal 
alternatives. Spending cuts and reformulation of the corrupt health system would 
only produce results over the medium and long term. 
“I do not have the least respect for the conventional wisdom that enthrones 
classical taxes as indispensable, such as income tax and value-added taxes on sales 
of goods and services. Both are intolerably obsolete. They lead to the creation of 
parasites, social classes such as tax officials and tax professionals, who do not profit 
from productive activities, but rather from ‘exploiting complexity’. All declaratory 
taxes, which require paper returns (income, consumption, or services taxes), involve 
two bureaucracies: the taxpayers’ and the auditors’. The more complicated the tax 
is, the greater the profits of the parasites. In Brazil we achieve the maximum waste 
with five tax collecting machines: municipal, state, federal, labor, and social 
security. 
“A good tax is neither an ‘old tax’ nor a ‘classical tax’. A good tax is one that is 
evasion-proof and is automatically collected. Any tax that can be evaded is socially 
unfair. And if collection depends on tax reporting paperwork, it becomes a waste. 
The features of a tax that is automatic and evasion-proof are precisely the features of 
the Single Tax on bank transactions, which have not found support from the 
Government or even from Congress. 
Roberto Campos concludes: “unfortunately, the simplifying methodology of the 
bank transaction tax has been demoralized by the fact that the Government has twice 
– with the IPMF (1993) and with the CPMF (1996) – used the tax’s automatic 
‘methodology’ without paying heed to its simplifying ‘ideology’. An otherwise 
sophisticated instrument has been ruined through misuse, like a fencing foil being 
used for cutting sugar cane…”147  
The most curious element of this debate, the flavor of which Roberto Campos 
captured so charmingly in his newspaper articles, is that representatives of the 
entrepreneurial classes do not understand their own reality and do not tend to their 
own interests when they oppose the bank transaction tax solely on the basis of its 
cumulativeness. Over 90% of Brazilian firms voluntarily subject to cumulative taxes 
through tax methods and systems that are widely accepted and openly praised by the 
business community, although only applicable to micro and small firms. These 
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methods are widely adopted not by imposition of tax agencies, but by free choice of 
those same people who, exhibiting a contradictory stand, advocate the immediate 
elimination of turnover cascading taxes in exchange for declaratory value-added 
taxes (VATs). 
THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE CENTRAL BANK AND THE 
FEDERAL REVENUE ON THE CPMF 
The Brazilian Central Bank issued two reports analyzing the economic impact 
of the CPMF.148 It took a clear position against levying the CPMF on transactions 
performed in the financial and capital markets.  
It should be remembered that just before the announcement of the timid tax 
reform of 2001 the president of the Central Bank, Armínio Fraga, stated that the 
government had at last decided to exempt such transactions from the incidence of the 
CPMF. The exemption was not immediately granted, as the Central Bank had 
expected, and this may have motivated publication of the two papers as a means of 
putting pressure on economic authorities to allow the planned exemption,149 which 
was finally enacted only in 2004. 
In general, the allegations of the Central Bank pointed in two directions. First, 
the drop in transactions performed in the Brazilian stock market was attributed to the 
effects of the CPMF. Secondly, it was stressed that the turnover tax was having 
strong effects on interest rates, thus explaining their high levels. 
Actually, since the very beginning of the debate over the Single Tax on Bank 
Transactions, attention had been drawn to the inadequacy of applying such tax on the 
financial and capital markets. A financial investment is strictly an operation that 
involves renting money, or capital. Thus for the same reason that the CPMF is not 
imposed on the value of real property each time a lease contract is renewed (it is 
imposed only on the flow of rents, and not on the stock of real estate capital), it must 
also not be levied on the value of the principal in a financial transaction each time a 
contract is due, or an investment is reissued, or rolled over.150  
When the Government introduced the Provisional Tax on Bank Transactions 
(IPMF) in 1993-1994, which was followed by the CPMF in 1997, it did not exempt 
transactions in the financial and capital markets, although it was full aware that the 
cumulativeness of the IPMF/CPMF impacted these markets, especially the structure 
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of interest rates. 
Albuquerque, the author of one of the Central Bank’s papers, lists various 
reasons for criticizing the bank debit tax. He addresses the CPMF as a bad tax, which 
shows “significant deficiencies as a revenue instrument”, among them its impact on 
interest rates “in a manner disproportional to other taxes” and which, as a 
consequence, increased government expenditures in servicing the public debt. In 
addition, he mentions other criticisms to the bank transaction tax, like the 
disincentive to using banking services, the illiquidity in the financial markets, which 
diminishes the incentives for increased use of credit, and its high dead-weight losses. 
Notwithstanding the imprecision of some of these claims, the paper presents an 
incomplete and biased analysis of the problem, in addition to having methodological 
weaknesses, as pointed out in a paper by the Federal Revenue.151 
According to it, the validity of the conclusions of the Central Bank’s paper 
depends on some unlikely and unrealistic assumptions, such as the existence of 
perfect competition and of a completely specified production function. Furthermore, 
there are flaws in the specifications of the econometric model (such as not including 
relevant variables) and the possibility of a strong correlation in the residues of the 
selected variables, which might indicate a problem of spurious relations. 
Technicalities aside, the Central Bank paper attempts to demonstrate that 
imposing the CPMF on financial markets leads to serious problems, whereas the 
Federal Revenue’s rebuttal has largely minimized the impact of such alleged effects. 
Arguments such as the inducement to excessive verticalization in the production 
process,152 the risk of bank disintermediation, and the lack of progressiveness and 
selectiveness of the CPMF, are issues which have already been thoroughly discussed 
during the 1990s, and which could be safely discarded as being devoid of practical 
interest. None of these risks has been empirically observed during the life of the 
CPMF.  
Therefore, we shall concentrate on evaluating the validity of two more relevant 
criticisms, which are: the impact of the CPMF on interest rates, and the possible 
erosion of its base of incidence as nominal rate increases. 
The claim that the CPMF has caused a significant increase in real interest rates 
can be rebutted quite easily, even though, coeteris paribus the CPMF does 
effectively lead to a higher cost of money. In other words, the criticism may be 
qualitatively true, but a quantitative evaluation demonstrates that this is a problem of 
minor importance. 
The Central Bank model presupposes, without plausible justification, a totally 
inelastic demand for credit, which obviously magnifies the CPMF’s impact on 
interest rates. Based on that, the Central Bank paper asserts that the CPMF 
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“contributes to the increase in the public deficit”. In other words, what it implies is 
that revenue from the CPMF is less than the increase in the public debt service that it 
may have caused. With CPMF revenue estimated at approximately R$ 19 billion in 
2001, and accepting the exaggerated assumption that 40% of net public debt 
(approximately R$ 240 billion) is indexed to the Selic rate (rate of interest paid on 
government bills), the paper leads to the conclusion that the CPMF must have caused 
an increase of at least eight percentage points in nominal interest rates. 
This is a gross exaggeration, as the Central Bank itself claims that the CPMF 
has had a 2.7% impact on Selic rates, 3.3% on consumer credit, and 5.9% on the 
interest rate charged on overdrawn bank account balances. Actually, the greatest 
impact on interest rates in Brazil does not stem from the CPMF, but rather from the 
banking spreads.  
Several of the Central Bank’s papers claim that the influence of taxes on 
banking spreads is very modest, and that more important than taxes are the rates of 
interest demanded by savers, the operational costs of banks, and their profit margins. 
Even if we grant that interest rates demanded by savers are influenced by the CPMF, 
it cannot be denied that high interest rates in Brazil are more likely explained by the 
microeconomics of the Brazilian banking system, with its notorious concentration, 
its cartel-style organized trade associations, its high operational costs, and its high 
profit rates. 
According to the Federal Revenue paper, to claim that the CPMF is responsible 
for Brazil’s high interest rates “is to jump to conclusions. The CPMF impacts interest 
rates in the same way as other taxes long imposed on bank transactions (such as the 
IOF, a tax on credit), countless fees charged on transactions and many other cost 
and profit items related to financial intermediation activities. Before reaching a 
conclusion... one must determine the true components of the banking spread (30.4 
percentage points in January 2009), of which more than half is accounted for as 
banks’ gross profits, net of indirect taxes). However, it is well known that these 
factors are not the most relevant in determining Brazil’s interest rates. Interest rates 
represent, in synthesis, the market’s overall assessment of Brazil’s 
creditworthiness...” Thus, it can be seen that blaming the CPMF for the high costs of 
capital in Brazil is more likely a good excuse for justifying the banking sector’s high 
profitability. 
Furthermore, an impartial analysis of an eventual increase in interest rates 
caused by the CPMF should consider the countervailing effect the CPMF may have 
had in reducing banking costs by replacing traditional paper-driven declaratory taxes, 
which are known to have much higher compliance and administrative costs. 
In spite of the fact that the author of the Central Bank paper has not based his 
conclusions on reliable empirical data, and that he may be reaching conclusions that 
are highly speculative in their quantitative results, the fact is that a bank transaction 
tax does indeed tend to raise interest rates. And though this effect may not be very 
significant, and therefore should not be held responsible for the budgetary problems 
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faced by Brazil’s public sector, the CPMF should not be imposed on the financial 
and capital markets, as I have been insistently pointing out since the earliest 
discussions about the Single Tax proposal, in the beginning of the 1990s. 
This recommendation is not based on the CPMF’s quantitative impact on 
interest rates, but rather on a conceptual necessity. In this regard, the Central Bank 
paper’s arguments are well-founded, although for the wrong reasons. Nevertheless, it 
lays solid ground for not imposing the CPMF on the financial and capital markets. 
It must be noticed, however, that the Single Tax proposal,153 which provides for 
the non-incidence of the CPMF on financial and capital markets, does not create any 
privilege whatsoever for them. Such transactions are taxed, albeit with a special 
procedure. In other words, we advocate the non-incidence of the turnover tax on such 
transactions, but, in exchange, we call for a non-cumulative procedure that taxes net 
earnings of financial investment portfolios, regardless of the number of intermediary 
transactions carried out, at rates equal to the average rate of the current tax system. 
Thus, if a Single Tax with a turnover rate of 3% raises revenue equal to 25% of 
GDP, the rate applicable to financial portfolio earnings should be the same 25%. 
It is important to underscore this characteristic of the Single Tax, because the 
Federal Revenue, in its paper on the CPMF, strongly criticizes those who support 
exempting the financial markets, believing the exemption would be granted 
unaccompanied by specific taxation of that sector. This is obvious disinformation by 
the paper’s author, who states that such an exemption would “privilege a class of 
individuals, precisely the most fortunate, to the detriment of the remainder of the 
population subject to the CPMF.” 
As for the fear of the Federal Revenue that the taxation method for financial 
investments proposed by Single Tax supporters “would demand extremely complex 
and costly operational control”, it is a surprising statement in view of the 
conclusions drawn by the critics themselves who, in another section of the paper, 
demonstrate convincingly that the electronic age and the progress in digital 
technology are capable of supporting a tax system that is based on electronic 
impulses, simply, cheaply, and efficiently. In other words, it would not be 
recommendable to give in on a correct conceptual principle merely because of 
presumed operational difficulties.154 
The second aspect of the CPMF strongly criticized by the Central Bank has to 
do with the allegation that as its nominal rate increases, its base of incidence is 
gradually eroded. 
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Initially, it is important to admit that any tax suffers from this effect. The higher 
the tax’s nominal rate, the greater is the stimulus to evade it. It is also expected that 
the strength of this effect tends to accelerate as the nominal tax rate increases. 
Concerning this aspect, cumulative taxes such as the CPMF have some clear 
advantages. Tax base erosion occurs mainly as a function of marginal tax rates. In 
the case of value-added taxes, which are imposed on a smaller tax base (value-added 
at each production phase), the rates required to reach a given level of revenue are 
higher than those required by a cumulative tax, which is imposed on a broader base 
(gross value of sales). Furthermore, VATs have equal average and marginal rates, 
whereas in cumulative taxes the average rate is always higher than the marginal rate. 
Having said this, it is easy to conclude that the impact of self-erosion on the tax base 
may be stronger in VATs than in turnover taxes. 
In the case of the CPMF, a measure of the tax base erosion that the Central Bank 
claims to have taken place in Brazil must be searched in the growth of bank 
disintermediation, in the drop in bank deposits, and in the concomitant expansion of 
the use of paper currency, to the detriment of fiduciary and other forms of currency 
such as checks, credit cards, electronic transfers etc. In other words, for the Central 
Bank’s allegation to be true, the public must have reduced its use of banking 
institutions, making increasing use of paper currency. 
The data, however, do not support this statement. TABLE 20 shows that, 
following the fast drop in inflation after the Real Plan in 1994, and with the 
introduction of bank transaction taxes (which supposedly would have strongly 
increased preference for paper currency), indicators of preference for paper currency 
showed significant differences compared to earlier levels, albeit remaining at levels 
significantly lower than seen in other countries. Cash deposits in the banking system 
have been increasing in proportion to GDP, and the public’s preference for paper 
currency has remained practically constant vis-à-vis bank deposits. 
Lastly, the evidence used by the Central Bank to argue against the CPMF, based 
on international experience, is not theoretically comparable to Brazil’s experience. 
The conditions for a well-functioning bank transaction tax do not exist in any other 
economy. Only Brazil satisfies the basic prerequisites conducive to the correct 
application of a bank transaction tax, as shown in other sections of this text. Thus, 
other countries’ experience with bank transaction tax are weak indicators of what 
could happen in Brazil, and which, from a conceptual point of view, turns any 
comparison into a totally speculative exercise. In other words, the coeteris paribus 
conditions for a correct comparison of operational efficiency across countries are not 
present. 155 
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TABLE 20 
Paper currency in circulation, cash deposits and public preference 
Brazil (1992-2008) 
Year Paper currency in 
circulation (% GDP) 
Cash deposits 
(% GDP) 
Public preference 
for paper currency 
Public preference 
for cash deposits 
1994 2.2 3.7 0.37 0.63 
1995 1.6 2.2 0.43 0.57 
1996 1.7 1.7 0.50 0.50 
1997 1.9 3.0 0.38 0.62 
1998 2.1 2.9 0.42 0.58 
1999 2.2 3.3 0.40 0.60 
2000 2.3 3.7 0.38 0.62 
2001 2.4 3.7 0.39 0.61 
2002 2.7 4.2 0.39 0.61 
2003 2.4 3.7 0.40 0.60 
2004 2.6 3.9 0.40 0.60 
2005 2.7 4.0 0.40 0.60 
2006 2.8 4.2 0.40 0.60 
2007 3.1 5.1 0.38 0.62 
2008 3.1 5.0 0.41 0.59 
       Source: Central Bank 
       (*) Based on average daily balances 
 
Concerning the alleged ill-effects the CPMF might have caused in Brazil’s stock 
markets, the Federal Revenue paper satisfactorily demonstrated the lack of a causal 
nexus between the CPMF and the drop in domestic trade volume. In fact, the 
creation of ADRs (American Depositary Receipts), which are surrogates for 
Brazilian stocks used in American stock trading, bears primary responsibility for the 
migration of such transactions to the U.S. market. The same occurred, as that paper 
demonstrated, in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, whose domestic stock trade virtually 
disappeared (in Mexico, it dropped from US$ 300 million per day to less than 
US$ 30 million per day), even though there was no cumulative tax on stock market 
transactions in any of those countries. Actually, capital seeks greater liquidity such 
as found in US markets. For foreign investors, the use of ADRs reduces the risk 
associated with fluctuations in the rate of exchange. Thus, in Brazil, there is a clear 
causal relationship between stock trade migration abroad and the creation of ADRs, 
but not between migration and the CPMF. However, the Central Bank’s model of 
analysis ignores this causal nexus. 
Summing up, the Central Bank’s paper is superficial, it mistakenly specifies the 
econometric models, and it omits variables and causal relationships that could 
significantly change its findings. Furthermore, it points solely to the costs and 
disadvantages of the CPMF, such as raising interest rates and its negative impact on 
the financial markets, but completely ignores its virtues, such as the elimination of 
tax evasion, the lowering of administrative costs to the public sector, and the 
reduction in corruption that goes hand in hand with non-declaratory, electronic taxes. 
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The other paper by the Central Bank156 also shows surprising conceptual and 
statistical weaknesses. It reveals the clear intention to demonstrate, by means of an 
illusorily methodological sophistication, something which cannot be easily proven, 
namely that the CPMF has caused significant financial disintermediation in Brazil. 
The previously mentioned paper authored by the Federal Revenue states that, 
“the criticism linked to financial disintermediation can easily be refuted, since 
agents did not stop performing financial transactions as a result of the CPMF and 
the Brazilian banking system continues to operate normally.” 
The Central Bank paper intends to demonstrate the undesirable impacts of the 
CPMF on financial markets. Thus, it claims that the CPMF erodes its own tax base 
and that it has been responsible for the reduction in the number of checks used in the 
economy (remonetarizing the economy); that the CPMF displaced savings deposits 
in favor of investment funds, and that it increased the banking spread. 
The CPMF should not, indeed, be levied on the financial, credit, and capital 
markets. If the Government had correctly implemented the original Single Tax 
proposal, it would not have imposed the CPMF on such markets. Nevertheless, it is 
imperative that we point out the imprecision and technical weaknesses contained in 
the Central Bank studies, as they attempt to impute faults and distortions to the 
CPMF without solid empirical foundation. Rather than being scientific, the paper 
reflects misconceptions and prejudices.  
To impute to the CPMF the decline in the number of checks issued is, at best, a 
gross mistake. Rather, such decline is part of an ongoing trend that occurred even 
during periods when the CPMF rates remained constant.  
According to the Federal Revenue, the paper is misleading “because the model 
fails to consider the true variables that cause the reduction in the use of checks.” It 
states that “even the Brazilian System of Payments (an innovative and path breaking 
real-time and on-line system of transfers of bank reserves) will further stimulate 
real-time digital transactions, which means that the Central Bank’s policy will also 
seek to discourage the use of checks as a means of payment, since they are obviously 
not adapted to the digital economy.” Likewise, banks discourage the use of paper 
checks, either through charging high service fees, such as for use of checks, or 
through emphasizing the greater safety and reduced operational costs of electronic 
transactions. Therefore, the assertion that the CPMF is responsible for the drop in the 
use of checks is totally unfounded. 
Furthermore, the Central Bank’s argument states that the CPMF, by taxing bank 
transactions, could stimulate the use of paper currency and the re-monetization of the 
economy. In addition to the fact that this hypothesis has not been confirmed, as we 
have seen above, this phenomenon is not accurately measured by the number of 
checks issued, as done in the Central Bank paper, but rather by the value of the 
checks issued. Because the use of checks carries an increasing per unit service 
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charge, a more rational use of this payment instrument would imply that the average 
value of cleared checks would have increased. Even with a smaller number of 
checks, the value of transactions may have increased. In fact, as seen in TABLE 21, 
the value of checks cleared has only begun to drop significantly since 2003, with the 
development of internet banking and the growth of debit cards, showing no relation 
with the introduction of the CPMF in 1997. 
TABLE 21 
Number and value of checks cleared 
Brazil (1997-2007) 
Year Number of checks cleared (000,000) 
Value of checks cleared 
(R$ 000,000,000) 
Value of checks cleared/GDP 
(%) 
1997 2,943.9 1,860.4 198 
1998 2,751.5 1,797.4 184 
1999 2,612.1 1,741.0 163 
2000 2,637.5 1,805.8 153 
2001 2,600.4 1,884.9 145 
2002 2,397.3 1,675.2 113 
2003 2,246.4 1,092.4 64 
2004 2,106.5 1,085.9 56 
2005 1,940.3 1,024.2 48 
2006 1,709.4 984.4 42 
2007 1,533.4 989.8 39 
   Source: Central Bank 
 
But the Central Bank’s attempts to criticize the CPMF are mistaken not only on 
conceptual grounds, but also on the econometric models and premises adopted. In 
addition to the misleading specification of the models (using the number rather than 
value of checks as the dependent variable in the regressions), the results are not 
strongly significant. Most of the estimated coefficients are not significantly different 
from zero. The same problems are found in the remainder of the paper in question: 
coefficients with no statistical significance and questionable conceptual models. Not 
to mention a contradiction found in one paper relative to the results reported in the 
other. 
The Central Bank’s Discussion Paper No. 21157 states that the base of the CPMF 
shows high elasticity with respect to the tax rate applied. This would explain, 
according to its author, the high dead-weight losses associated with it. On the other 
hand, in Discussion Paper No. 23158 the claim is made that “the revenue base of the 
CPMF is inelastic relative to variations in its rate…” Surprisingly however, and 
though contradictory in the causal relationships claimed to be found, both studies 
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were unanimous in criticizing the CPMF! 
The inconsistencies found in these papers go so far as to claim that the growth 
of money supply as measured by M1, which in Brazil is basically the balance of cash 
deposits, increased because “checking account withdrawals and deposits for 
investment in extremely short-term funds are penalized by the introduction of this 
tax”. The truth lies elsewhere. It is the newly conquered monetary stability that 
makes unnecessary the high turnover of funds that marked Brazil’s hyperinflationary 
period. Furthermore, the paper calls irrational the behavior of an investor that 
accumulates cash deposits in order to avoid the 0.38% of the CPMF, but accepts the 
loss of monthly yield of more than 1% by leaving his funds idle in bank accounts. 
The Central Bank ignores the opportunity cost of cash deposit balances. 
The same analytic superficiality and statistical weakness can be found in other 
correlations presented by the Central Bank. To say that “the CPMF might be 
inducing migration of savings account deposits to short term investment funds” is a 
claim completely devoid of causal nexus. The migration of funds that follows a 
transition from hyperinflation to stability is an obvious truism, and has little to do 
with the CPMF. 
As the Federal Revenue states “the fact that two variables tend to show 
opposing tendencies does not necessarily mean that a direct or indirect relationship 
exists between them. Both can be influenced by other variables that explain the 
strong mathematical relationship indicated by the correlation coefficient.” The paper 
also states that “the main advantage of financial investment funds in relation to 
savings deposits is due to the following factors: greater  individual access to the 
capital market; greater yield; better alternative for the small saver; and a reduction 
in risk exposure.” Thus, contrary to the Central Bank results, the inverse relationship 
between the use of the CPMF and diminishing balances in savings accounts is clearly 
a spurious correlation. 
Finally, the Central Bank’s Discussion Paper No. 23159 states that the CPMF 
significantly affects banking spreads. “It worsens the situation of borrowers, savers, 
and banks, because it increases the cost of loans to borrowers, reduces gains for 
savers, and decreases bank spreads”. The surprising aspect of this assertion is that it 
suggests the existence of a better tax alternative to the CPMF, which does not burden 
taxpayers, directly or indirectly. If such a tax does exist, the Central Bank should 
immediately make it public, as supporters of the Single Tax would certainly adopt 
this new and miraculous type of tax. 
The authors demonstrate lack of knowledge of banking microeconomics. It is an 
oligopsony, with few credit suppliers and a large number of borrowers. Under these 
conditions it is fanciful to believe in the veracity of their conclusions as when they 
claim that “the borrower tends to demand a lower rate of interest in view of the need 
to pay not only the interest charged, but also the tax burden. On the other hand, the 
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saver will demand, in addition to the usual return, an additional amount necessary to 
pay the tax.” Analysis of the elasticity of supply and demand in oligopsonic markets 
quickly shows how fanciful these assertions can be, since they imply an environment 
in which banks would be sandwiched between ambitious savers and powerful 
borrowers! 
The Federal Revenue concludes its analysis of the Central Bank papers with a 
strong, though not surprising, statement. “Opposition to the CPMF in the financial 
markets is due to, in our opinion, the possibility that, through data generated by 
withholding the tax, the privacy of banking investors may be violated… the Federal 
Revenue agency will gain knowledge of all monetary transactions related to tax 
evasion schemes (unreported sales, drug dealing, bribes,  corruption, etc.).” 
Before concluding, it is important to address another controversial issue having 
to do with a bank transaction tax: its revenue productivity. 
The studies published by the Central Bank mention the concept of the Laffer 
Curve, according to which tax rate increases lead to declining marginal tax revenue. 
They even suggest the possibility that tax revenue reaches a peak, after which, 
raising nominal tax rates imply negative marginal tax revenue, causing a decline in 
total revenue. 
Within the limits in which the CPMF has been applied in Brazil, no evidence 
has yet turned up concerning the alleged drop in its marginal revenue. To the 
contrary, according to the International Monetary Fund,160 bank transaction taxes are 
recommended in situations of institutional weakness or erosion of the conventional 
tax systems, as can be seen in the following statement: “these new bank debit taxes 
have been imposed because the transactions on which they fall were viewed as a 
convenient and effective tax handle, against a background of weak tax 
administration and, typically, in the face of a difficult fiscal/revenue situation.” Thus, 
even if marginal revenue declines with higher rates, the CPMF is appropriate. Its 
notorious revenue raising potential is clearly above that obtained through worn down 
conventional self-assessed declaratory taxes. 
According to the Federal Revenue, “the presence of a tax on bank debits in a 
stable tax system implies the existence of a highly productive tax, the minimization of 
total administrative costs (and, therefore, a higher net revenue [author’s insertion]), 
the guarantee that the underground economy is being taxed, and the adaptation of 
the tax system to the new reality of trade and electronic transactions.” 
The Federal Revenue goes on to say that the CPMF is a “highly productive tax, 
with a high ratio of revenue per unit rate”. It quotes the IMF paper that says, “in the 
case of Brazil, in particular, a high revenue yield has been sustained over several 
years”. According to the IMF paper, Brazil’s CPMF productivity, measured by the 
proportional relationship of revenue/GDP relative to unit rates, remained practically 
stable during the period it was applied, having reached values of 4.14 in 1998. From 
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then until 2007 the ration varied within narrow limits of 3.39 in 1999 and 3.68 in 
2007. It has maintained high and sustained productivity over the years it has been in 
force.  
This explains the growing interest other countries have shown in Brazil’s 
experience with a bank transaction tax, where it has been used in large scale over an 
extended period of time. In October 1999 the Parliamentarians for Global Action 
(PGA), with support and sponsorship of the United Nations, held a debate in New 
York at the UN headquarters, to discuss Brazil’s experience with bank transaction 
taxes. The meeting was attended by representatives of more than 40 countries. At 
that time I presented the paper transcribed in ANNEX III, which attempts to 
demonstrate the viability of this new type of tax, especially in economies that are still 
attempting to develop strong tax institutions and an ethical approach to taxation, as is 
the case in Brazil. 
SETTING RATES FOR BANK TRANSACTION TAXES 
Although the productivity of Brazil’s CPMF has remained robust and stable as 
its rate grew from its initial level of 0.20% to its final level of 0.38%, its adversaries 
insist on saying that it has reached its maximum tolerable level, warning that any 
increase will inevitably lead to stronger tax avoidance and evasion (even if difficult), 
and that, therefore, its base would shrink significantly.161 
The above-mentioned paper written by the Federal Revenue admits that, “the 
Laffer curve effect exists not only for the CPMF, but for any tax: it is natural to 
expect that, for each percentage point of increase in the tax rate, marginal tax 
revenue will fall.  Therein lies the art of fine tuning in tax policy, and from what we 
can see, the Brazilian experience has been successful…” 
Actually, the rate capable of maximizing CPMF revenue is still far above 
0.38%. This fact, if proven, would imply a significant support for the idea of 
imposing a tax such as the Single Tax on bank transactions. 
Determining the point beyond which a rate increase would cause declining (or 
even negative) marginal revenue depends critically on the advantages and benefits 
that the modern banking system offers its clients. The only way to avoid tax 
incidence on bank transactions would be to cease using banks for clearing financial 
transactions. In other words, the incidence base of the CPMF will only suffer a 
decline if people stop using the banking system to make payments, and begin to 
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 Concerning the rate and the potential revenue of the Single Tax, see [CINTRA, 1994(i)]. In this 
paper, the author points to the strong revenue potential of a bank transactions tax if it is used as a 
single tax as opposed to its use as one tax among others; he also shows the operational differences 
between the IPMF (and more recently, the CPMF) and the Single Tax, with emphasis on the effect of 
the constitutional immunities given by these taxes, and the issue of a drop in revenue due to the 
“whistleblower effect”. By using the bank transaction tax as a control mechanism for the compliance 
of other taxes, the tax evader is led to also defraud the tax on transactions, even when the implicit 
costs of evasion are higher than the tax savings obtained. 
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replace bank fiduciary currency for outmoded paper currency. This would mean a 
remonetization of the economy. 
The occurrence of this phenomenon will depend critically on the cost-benefit 
relationship between the tax savings derived from using paper currency (which is the 
same as the tax’s nominal rate) and the added transactional cost of doing away with 
bank services. 
It is easy to verify that in integrated and globalized societies, remonetization of 
the economy is only a theoretical possibility. It would be inconceivable that in 
contemporary economies, where purchases and sales are made globally and with 
ever-increasing frequency, electronically, there would be even a remote possibility of 
receding to a system of person-to-person payments in paper currency. The costs 
would be astronomical and would mean the virtual destruction of the modern 
economy. 
Likewise, how can anyone imagine that payments for all purchases and sales 
made in all the markets of the world could ever be made in cash? Would it make 
financial sense to anyone to make payments to suppliers and services at the cashier’s 
windows of the various commercial establishments, just to save a CPMF of 0.38% 
charged on the transaction? What would be the additional transaction cost of 
choosing to pay in cash? 
Security, physical displacement, transportation, opportunity cost for time spent 
in manual payment, and many other reasons would imply a significantly higher 
marginal transactions cost compared to the tax saving. Such a choice would mean the 
rejection of all present-day progress and a return to economic pre-history. Therefore, 
it is difficult to imagine that this scenario would occur because of a reasonable 
CPMF rate increase. 
But there still remains the matter of knowing what the tolerable rate ceiling 
would be for a bank transaction tax. 
The theoretical answer would dictate that the ceiling rate would be the 
difference between the transactional cost of using paper currency and the 
corresponding costs of making payments through the banking system. That is, the 
rate would have to be equal to or greater than the maximum amount bank clients 
would be willing to pay in order to reduce the transactional costs if they use the 
banking system to make payments. As a mere theoretical exercise, one could assert 
that in a perfectly competitive economy, in which the price of a service equals its 
marginal benefit, the ceiling for the CPMF rate would be equal to the banking 
system’s participation in National Income. 
In Brazil, during the inflationary period, the banking system reached 13% of 
GDP. More recently, it has decreased to about 6% of GDP. Thus, one can say that 
the rate at which the CPMF’s marginal revenue becomes zero, and then negative, is 
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around 6%.162 
As evidence that the current CPMF rate is far removed from critical values for 
maintaining its current level of productivity, two important facts should be stressed. 
First, is the growing importance of digital money and of electronic payments. 
According to an article published in Information Week “in the United States, e-
mail payment systems now send money not only to friends and family, but also to 
online merchants, purchasers, and sellers, in a global environment.” In this system, 
clients send e-mails, as if they were checks from their electronic checkbooks.163 
Most surprising, is the cost of these services. As can be verified on the website of 
one of these companies, PayPal (http://www.paypal.com), the service is free for 
remitters. For recipients, there is a fixed fee of 30 cents, plus 2.2% of the amount 
received. In the case of corporate market payments, the cost can be as high as 2.9% 
of the transaction amount. In some cases, the cost can be as much as 3.5%.164 Even 
with current fees “PayPal adds 50,000 new users to its customer base, every two 
days”. This is unequivocal evidence of the high value customers place on 
computerized banking services in the modern economies. It also shows convincingly 
the wide space for increasing CPMF rates and its enormous potential to become the 
basis of a tax model in the framework of the Single Tax. 
Further evidence of the same phenomenon can be found in Brazil’s banking 
system. Fees charged by banks provide an assessment of the marginal utility of the 
services they supply. 
A paper by ANEFAC (Associação Nacional dos Executivos de Finanças, 
Administração e Contabilidade [National Association of Finance, Management, and 
Accounting Executives] evaluates banking service costs in Brazil between March 
and May 2000. They are several times higher than the CPMF, in terms of an 
equivalent tax on bank transactions. TABLE 22 demonstrates that, in the case of 
corporations, banking services can cost as much as 1.43% of monthly invoiced sales. 
Because this concept can be considered equivalent to bank transactions (we are 
assuming that the velocity of bank circulation of corporate invoiced sales is equal to 
one; that is, corporation’s invoiced sales are deposited and withdrawn from the 
banking system only once), it is clear that no bank flight occurs, even if bank 
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 It is worth repeating that this is a theoretical analysis which requires, to be supported, strong 
assumptions about the competitive conditions under which modern economies function. In this regard, 
the Federal Revenue Service quotes, as a warning, economics Nobel prize-winner George Stiglitz, 
who says: “there is the assumption implicit in our earlier discussion that a competitive equilibrium is 
attained...this may be problematical, and much of macroeconomic policy is directed at disequilibrium 
in factor markets, in the balance of payments etc.”. 
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 Many companies are dedicating time and effort to this fast expanding field in the USA; it is a 
market niche for which major US banks are hotly competing.  Citibank is developing a new product in 
this market, through its partnerships with MSN and AOL, and Bank of America plans to offer a 
similar system by email, based on WebPay, by CheckFree. 
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 [THE ECONOMIST, 2004(a)] 
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transactions are charged up to 1.43% merely to cover bank service fees. 
For individuals, the evidence is equally convincing. TABLE 23 shows the 
equivalent monthly income needed to bring customer banking fees into equivalence 
with the CPMF, charged at 0.38%. As can be seen, the lower limit for monthly 
income must be R$ 17,116.00 and the upper limit, R$ 40,706.00. Because these 
income levels are higher than the 97th percentile of income distribution in Brazil, it is 
evident that wide space exists for raising CPMF rates before these would result in 
declining marginal revenue. 
TABLE 22 
Cost of banking services in Brazil, as a percentage of companies’ gross revenues 
Corporations – monthly gross revenues 
(R$) Banks 
100,000 500,000 1,000,000 5,000,000 
Public 0.91% 0.46% 0.33% 0.16% 
Foreign 1.23% 0.59% 0.42% 0.19% 
Domestic 1.43% 0.62% 0.45% 0.20% 
Source: National Association of Finance, Management and Accounting Executives (Anefac). March/May 
2000. 
 
It is clear, therefore, that there is compelling evidence that CPMF rates can be 
raised significantly without causing bank disintermediation or a remonetization of 
the economy. The evidence supports the belief that the Single Tax, based on a bank 
transaction tax, is totally viable, especially considering that rate increases in the 
transaction tax will occur concomitantly with the elimination of conventional taxes. 
Therefore, the tax burden would not increase. To this end, we should note that 
taxpayers see this as an acceptable option. Everardo Maciel said, “If we ask any 
Brazilian taxpayer whether he prefers a 30% value-added tax regime, or a 2% 
cascading regime, I have no doubt what the answer would be.”165 
 
TABLE 23 
Annual income needed to generate CPMF revenue 
equivalent to bank service fees 
Bank service fees 
(R$) Number of banks 
Annual income equivalent 
to CPMF payment 
% of economically 
active population 
65.04 to 69.14 5 17,116.00 to 18,195.00 3,0 
74.35 to 98.48 5 19,566.00 to 25,915.00 2.8 
100.47 to 128.30 6 26,440.00 to 33,763.00 2,0 
130.30 to 154.68 4 34,290.00 to 40,706.00 1,0 
   Source: National Association of Finance, Management and Accounting Executives (Anefac). March/May 
2000. 
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On the other hand, considering, as the Federal Revenue does, that this tax would 
not require fiscal bureaucracy (such as invoices, papers return forms, and other 
information usually required by traditional declaratory taxes), the cost-benefit 
relationship of this new tax model would be very favorable. “Collection of this tax 
occurs practically without any operational cost to the tax administration and to the 
taxpayer,” and would thus permit us to forecast the downsizing of the public 
bureaucracy as a result of reducing the tax burden to be extracted from the private 
sector. 
THE IMPURITY OF VALUE-ADDED TAXES IN BRAZIL 
Roberto Campos made extensive reference to the intriguing distinction drawn 
by Brazil’s business community between two types of cascade, as seen before. One, 
considered malignant, includes the hated CPMF, PIS, and Cofins. All criticism, 
whether fair or not, is leveled against them. The other, applauded unanimously by 
the business community, includes taxes that are considered laudable contributions 
made by Brazil to world tax practice: these are the Simple [simplified tax system for 
micro and small firms] and the presumed profits option for calculating corporate 
income tax. It is worth noting that the adoption of these two systems is entirely 
voluntary, and that, by making this choice, firms reduce their tax obligations and the 
bureaucracy involved in tax assessment. As such, these two modalities deserve 
extensive praise from business leaders, even though from a strictly technical 
standpoint the Simple and the presumed profits modalities are no less cumulative 
than are the CPMF or the Cofins. 
It is worth noting that 93% of Brazilian companies have opted to use either the 
presumed profits or Simple modalities for calculating income tax.166 Companies that 
adopt these simplified tax collection procedures do not necessarily do so aiming 
exclusively at reducing their tax liabilities. Many prefer to pay more taxes, but to 
reduce compliance costs. 
The presumed profits modality implies the acceptance of taxable margins that 
vary from 8% of sales to as much as 32%. Implicit taxable profit margins for the 
Simple modality can reach as much as 8.21 % of sales for micro businesses, and up 
to 17.42 % for small businesses. The implied profit margins are very high, compared 
to those reported by companies taxed under the real profit modality. What makes 
them choose an assessment procedure that implies cascading incidence, and often 
higher tax liabilities, is the much lower compliance costs implicit in these simplified 
systems. 
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 See [SECRETARIA DA RECEITA FEDERAL, 2001(b)]. In 1999, 1,988,733 of the 2,826,733 
companies that paid the IRPJ tax opted for the Simple corporate tax structure, whereas 626,226 opted 
for the presumed profits structure, and only 208,729 were taxed on real profits.  However, this latter 
category was responsible for 83.5% of all tax revenue.  Most surprising is that only 228 companies are 
responsible for 50% of all IRPJ revenue in Brazil. 
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Furthermore, the case for non-cumulativeness is weakened by the fact that even 
non-cumulative taxes have several forms of cumulative incidence. 
A tax comes closer to being totally non-cumulative if legislation allows for 
generalized clearing of tax credits. In this case, the tax amount levied on all inputs 
(including permanent assets and usable/consumable inputs) can be claimed to 
compensate for tax liabilities. However, the ICMS, for instance, allows for tax 
credits on permanent assets, but does not allow tax credits on ‘consumed’ inputs, 
such as stationery or office telephone bills. 
Furthermore, there are cases in which a firm’s administrative staff is not 
adequately trained, or equipped, to claim tax credits, thus turning a value-added tax 
into an effective turnover tax. This happens, for example, when small farmers 
purchase equipment, seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides, all taxed by the ICMS. 
Because they usually do not keep records of their sales and purchases, they are 
unable to claim credit for those transactions. Some States allow farmers to claim 
presumed credits based on their sales volume, but usually these compensations fall 
short of the their true value. 
There are instances in which taxes are only partially non-cumulative because 
they only allow for physical credits. In this case, claims are limited to the amount of 
tax levied on acquisitions of inputs for production and sale, or alternatively, only for 
sale. In other words, tax credit is allowed only for inputs that enter and exit the 
production process, but not for permanent assets, such as machines and equipment. 
This is the case with the IPI (tax on industrial products). 
Even the ICMS, considered to be a modern tax because of its value-added and 
therefore non-cumulative characteristics, can be heavily cumulative in its day-to-day 
operation. Every time the debit-credit chain is broken, it becomes cumulative. 
Nevertheless, in Brazil this seems to pass unnoticed. For example, the agricultural 
sector usually does not claim tax credits for the ICMS for lack of accounting 
procedures. Service sectors, not registered as contributors of the ICMS, are also 
liable for cumulative taxation since they cannot claim credits accumulated in 
purchases of taxed industrial inputs. The ISS (a municipal tax on services) is 
cumulative, as also would be the new IVV [Retail Sales Tax] on lodging and food 
which business community representatives want to include in the tax reform bill. 
Even more amazing is that, in order to improve compliance, ICMS legislation 
has been undergoing changes that are totally cumulative. One example is the 
authorization for the food and restaurant sector in São Paulo to collect the value-
added tax as a percentage of gross sales, with no credits allowed. This turns it into a 
turnover tax. Due to high evasion and in the name of simplification, the government 
is adopting the same procedures in other sectors and for other value-added taxes, 
such as the non-cumulative PIS/Cofins; estimates of average value-added in each 
sector are imputed as bases for charging such taxes, which are collected as final 
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payments with no credit being allowed in the other links of the production chain.167 
Thus, Brazilian value-added taxes for operational reasons are becoming increasingly 
cumulative. 
It is easy to see the ambiguity surrounding the debate on cascading taxes, if even 
the largest value-added tax in Brazil, the ICMS, is becoming ever more 
cumulative.168 In these cases, even hard line critics of cumulativeness ignore its 
cascading effect, provided it reduces the tax burden. However, anytime the cascade 
prevents evasion and implies a higher tax burden it is seen as highly distortionary. 
The obvious conclusion is that criticism of cumulativeness is, in truth, an outcry 
of revolt against the high tax burden. It is a shame that this is not expressed clearly, 
which would bring greater transparency and rationality to the debate on tax reform. 
Due to the regrettable involution of Brazilian tax system, the creation of a bank 
transaction tax was an innovation in which rests high hopes for greater tax 
efficiency. The CPMF/IPMF has become a very productive tax that is highly 
effective in preventing evasion. Nevertheless, the Brazilian tax system remains 
predominantly dependent on classical tax bases: income, circulation, property, 
payroll, and foreign trade. Thus, it remains dependent on declaratory taxes, which 
require extensive paper work. Taxpayers continue to self-assess and self-collect taxes 
using their own respective fiscal accounting procedures. Tax evasion lives on. The 
quality of the tax collection system remains poor. All a delinquent taxpayer must do 
to enjoy generous financial returns is not to comply with tax legislation, or else, to 
fiddle with his accounting procedures, knowing that his crimes have a low 
probability of being uncovered. Thus, corruption and growth of the underground 
economy continue to thrive in Brazil. 
                                                 
167
 As of 2008 such procedures became applicable for the ICMS in São Paulo for the personal 
hygiene, cosmetics, medicines and imported beverages sectors; in the state of Rio de Janeiro various 
important sectors such as beverages, pharmaceuticals, textiles, electronics and many others follow the 
same rules for the ICMS. Similar procedures are used by the federal government in collecting 
PIS/Cofins of alcohol production, and in some cases such “value-added” tax is charged on a  ad rem 
basis, or in other words, as lump sum value excise per unit of physical production.  
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 Critics of cumulativeness are quick to point out the damage caused by the cascade effect of the 
PIS/Cofins and CPMF taxes, calling them disastrous to the efficiency and competitiveness of 
domestic production.  However, they do not levy charges against the effects of cumulativeness 
implicit in the Simple and IRPJ-presumed profits tax systems (which together encompass 93% of 
Brazilian companies), in the ISS, the partial cumulativeness of the IPVA and IPTU, nor even in the 
increasing cumulativeness of the ICMS and IPI.  When they admit that this cumulativeness is present 
in the Brazilian economy, they say it occurs only in “miniscule doses that do not impose significant 
losses on production”, as in [VARSANO et alii, 2001]. These authors should explain, for example, 
how they can call the cumulative effects of important taxes such as the ICMS and IPI “miniscule”, 
which, when collected from sectors that do not pay those taxes, such as the primary and tertiary 
sectors (which account for more than 50% of Brazil’s GDP) create totally cascade incidence 
proportional to their purchases of industrial inputs. For an eloquent newspaper article written by a 
former deputy and author of a polemical tax reform proposal, showing that the concept of 
cumulativeness is nothing but a stereotyped cliché, see [PONTE, 2000]. See also [CINTRA, 2004]; 
[MARTINS, 2002]; and [MACIEL, 2007].  
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All in all, rejection of the bank transactions tax remains significant, even if it is 
capable of eliminating many of these distortions.  
I recently received an e-mail from a friend who, indignant with the CPMF (the 
bank debit tax), said, “I pay taxes when I send money to my daughter who studies in 
another city, and she pays taxes again whenever she withdraws the money from the 
bank in order to use it. That makes no sense.” 
The CPMF is a tax on the circulation of money. The existence of such a tax 
could be conceptually justified as being the payment for the supply of public services 
and for the public cost of making possible the circulation of money without physical 
handling. It is a tax on a social service that creates value, reduces transaction costs, 
and which society makes available through the banking services. Such a service 
would not be possible without institutions that guarantee its safety and reliability. 
Taxing the circulation of money is a cumulative process, but must not be confused 
with double taxation, which means multiple tax incidences on a single tax base. 
But let us return to my friend’s line of questioning: he asks whether the CPMF – 
and, consequently, the Single Tax – are fair taxes. 
An adequate response requires a meticulous cost-benefit analysis. At issue is not 
the fairness of a 0.38% tax on each bank transaction, but rather the possibility of its 
alternative being even more unfair to current tax payers, namely the resulting 
necessity of, for instance, increasing the current 27.5% income tax rate. Certainly, 
greater unfairness results from evasion made possible by declaratory taxes such as 
the income tax or the ICMS. Greater inequity lies in allowing multinational 
corporations to use transfer prices to remit their profits to foreign tax havens, thus 
avoiding collecting them in Brazil even though Brazilian public services are required 
in order to generate the very same profits that are sent abroad. It is not fair that tax 
rates have to be increased every passing year to compensate for tax revenue lost to 
increasingly sophisticated evasion mechanisms. For these reasons, in a proper cost-
benefit analysis, my friend should prefer to pay 0.38% – or even 3% if necessary – 
on his money orders to his daughter, to the alternative of collecting 27.5% out of his 
total wages or of paying 30% indirect tax on his grocery cart at the supermarket. 
If there were a single tax, a single CPMF of, say, 3% or 4% on all bank 
transactions, almost all other taxes could be eliminated. There would be no tax 
avoidance, and this would certainly be fairer than the current system. 
Unfortunately, political pressure coming from powerful lobbies commanded by 
the tax bureaucracy and by major tax evaders have managed to portray the CPMF as 
unfair, and the Single Tax as utopian and inefficient. But the truth lies elsewhere. 
Those who reject the Single Tax are those who will lose by not being able to practice 
tax evasion, or by not keeping control of the bureaucratic power with which the 
current declaratory system endows them.  
If an oft-repeated lie eventually becomes the truth, then it is high time to 
question some of the allegations that have been made about the CPMF before they 
become universally accepted as true. 
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TAX COMPLIANCE COSTS: A NEW FIELD FOR RESEARCH  
Conventional tax analysis has ignored an important criterion for evaluating the 
quality of tax collection models used around the world. Taxation studies begin with 
theoretical assumptions which are usually unsupported by economic reality, such as 
the presence of perfect competition, economic rationality, the absence of evasion, 
and negligible tax compliance costs. At the same time, analysts largely ignore the 
economic, cultural, ethical, moral, and operational environments in which tax 
collection takes place. An inevitable consequence is a conflict between intentions 
and results.169 Theoretical models are essential components in the construction of 
sound tax models. However, a disturbing fact is the failure of economists to realize 
that there is an abyss between their logical constructs and the reality of applied 
economics. Economists become prisoners to pure science, and the more innocent 
believe they can extend their “monoparadigmatic” prescriptions to reality170. 
“The broadly based neutral VAT found in textbooks is quite different from the 
VAT prevailing in most developing countries, and this difference results largely from 
administrative constraints: in developing countries tax administration is tax policy. 
Multiple VAT rates, zero-rating with refunds and numerous exemptions of specified 
goods can be accommodated only at high administrative and compliance costs”.171 
A recent study conducted in Brazil by Aldo V. Bertolucci172  fills a significant 
gap in the study of taxation, and inaugurated in Brazil a new area of study and 
research– the analysis of tax compliance costs – which is also relatively new in the 
world. One of its most important mentors is Professor Cedric Sandford of the 
University of Bath, England. This field of tax study first appeared in 1988 at the 
International Fiscal Association Conference in Rio de Janeiro, followed by two 
congresses on the Cost of Compliance at Oxford (1994) and Sydney (2000). 
According to Professor Cedric Sandford,173  politicians, tax administrators, and 
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 Vito Tanzi, a former Director of the IMF Fiscal Department once expressed his surprise at noticing 
that many tax experts study tax models and theory, but very few dedicate their efforts to tax 
administration, implicitly assuming it to be a trivial problem. Such mistake, according to him, may 
turn a good tax model into a harmful system if in practice its application produces different results 
than were originally intended. See [BIRD and JANTSCHER, 1992].  
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 A Brazilian economist, Antonio Maria da Silveira referred to this phenomenon as “Senior’s 
indeterminacy”. To construct theoretical models and try to apply them without due consideration to 
the complete environmental determinants of where they are to be applied is to incur in a “ricardian 
vice”, a term, according to him, coined by Joseph Schumpeter to describe the “habit of piling up a 
heavy load of practical conclusions over a fragile foundation…seemingly simple, attractive and also 
convincing”. See [COUTINHO, 2007] pp.169-184; [SILVEIRA, 1991, 1993]. 
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 [SHOUP, 1990], p.xiv; [JANTSCHER, 1990] p.178; and [SANDFORD and GODWIN, 1990]. 
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 [BERTOLUCCI, 2001, 2005]. 
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 [SANDFORD et alii, 1989], quoted by [BERTOLUCCI, 2001], p.30. On page 54, Bertolucci refers 
to Vito Tanzi’s opinion of the IMF, who “manifests surprise concerning the imbalance between the 
economists’ interest, on the one hand, for taxes and their repercussions on the economy, and on the 
other, their concern over the tax administration: many books have been written on the first subject, 
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economists have neglected the administrative and operational costs of taxation. 
These costs should be taken into consideration in tax policy analysis, in addition to 
the usual considerations regarding equity, neutrality, and simplicity. In retrospect, 
Professor Sandford stated, “following Adam Smith, no one else referred to 
compliance costs (with the honored exception of McCulloch in his Treatise on 
Taxation, published in 1845), until 1935, when the first attempt was made to 
measure them. However, the author stated that it was not until the end of the 20th 
Century that the topic was given importance, at the Rio de Janeiro conference in 
1988.”174  
At the Oxford Congress in 1994, Professor Cedric Sandford listed reasons for 
the growing interest in tax costs:175  
1. Compliance and administrative costs are high and they reduce international 
competitiveness; 
2. Compliance costs have undesirable redistributive effects, are highly 
regressive, and severely burden small businesses; 
3. High compliance costs create resentment and stimulate tax avoidance; 
4. The high costs generated by the creation of VATs in several countries have 
led to protests and dissatisfaction on the part of small business; 
5. The importance of deregulation in order to unburden small business; 
6. The need to begin considering the taxpayer as a client and treating taxpayers 
in a friendlier manner; 
7. In the early 1980s, some governments reduced their administrative costs, 
shifting them onto the taxpayer and increasing compliance costs; they soon 
discovered that the social tax cost had increased in their economy as a 
whole. 
Certainly, research in this area will open new horizons in tax studies, 
broadening the list of critical variants used in evaluating, reforming, and planning tax 
systems throughout the world. These fields of study and research will at once enrich 
the debate and partially divert the focus of economic policymakers’ attention from 
where it is today, biased by the formalistic approach of economists, toward a position 
of greater equilibrium between theoretical-conceptual considerations and practical-
operational experience. Economists must talk to tax administrators, and vice-versa.  
Aldo Bertolucci has surveyed stock companies in Brazil, and gathered valuable 
information on their compliance costs.  
Bertolucci says, that “compliance costs of taxation correspond to the resources 
                                                                                                                                          
but almost nothing has been written about how to administer the receipt and control of revenue and of 
taxpayers”. 
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 [BERTOLUCCI, 2001] 
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spent by a taxpayer to comply with tax legislation. Tax statements and reports 
required by federal, state, and municipal governments, filling of forms for federal 
revenue agencies, inclusions and exclusions defined by tax law, meeting auditing 
requirements and changes in legislation, lawsuits, as well as administrative and 
judicial processes…” represent a small portion of the total costs of taxation, because 
these are merely the monetary costs borne by companies in meeting their tax 
obligations. Other costs must be added to these, such as public operational and 
administrative costs borne by the three levels of government (federal, state, and 
municipal) and by their three branches (executive, legislative, and judiciary). One 
must also add the opportunity cost of time as well as the psychological costs imposed 
on the taxpayer, in addition to the imputed costs implied by economic distortions and 
by the loss of allocative and distributive efficiency introduced by taxes, as 
ILLUSTRATION 6 indicates. 
 
ILLUSTRATION 6 
Costs of Taxation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: [BERTOLUCCI, 2001], p.18. 
 
Bertolucci’s findings are dramatic. The average total value of compliance costs 
to Brazilian stock companies accounts for 0.32 % of their gross income. In smaller 
companies, with annual sales of up to R$ 100 million, the cost is 1.66 % of their 
gross income. For all stock companies this cost reaches the equivalent of 0.75 % of 
GDP. Taking as reference the compliance costs of smaller stock companies alone, 
they represent 5.82 % of GDP, as can be seen in the TABLE 24. 
Cost of taxation 
Taxes Distortionary costs Operational Costs 
 
Compliance Cost: 
persons and firms 
 
 
Administrative Cost: 
Executive, 
Legislative and 
Judiciary branches 
 
Direct Monetary Time Costs Psychological Costs 
Temporary Costs Permanent Costs 
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This study was based on compliance costs for publicly held stock companies 
that are members of the Brazilian Association of Publicly Held Companies 
(Abrasca). The breakdown of their compliance costs, according to Bertolucci’s 
research, is found in ANNEX II. Such publicly held companies are usually large 
firms and, therefore, Aldo Bertolucci’s findings surely underestimate the overall 
compliance costs for all of Brazilian companies, given that tax costs are highly 
regressive in relation to sales volume.  
 
TABLE 24 
Compliance Costs for Publicly Held Companies in Brazil 
Gross Income (R$ 000,000) 
Description Up to 100 From 100 to 1.000 
From 1,000  to 
5.000 
From 5,000 to 
15.000 
All 
companies 
Total gross income 154,194 3,736,199 19,631,366 24,610,181 48,131,840 
Federal compliance costs 2,025 19,606 76,514 25,325 123,470 
External compliance 
costs 
533 5,669 18,349 8,337 32,888 
Total compliance costs 2,558 25,275 94,863 33,662 156,358 
Projected cost savings in 
case of stable Legislation 
2.74% 9.27% 14.72% 27.28% 16.35% 
Value-added  (FIBGE) 14,240,294 54,215,096 70,918,307 80,764,772 147,362,174 
Production Value 
(FIBGE ) 49,964,749 150,951,175 183,381,330 141,571,928 341,787,174 
Description Up to 100 
From 100 to 
1.000 
From 1,000  to 
5.000 
From 5,000 to 
15.000 
All 
companies 
Ratio of production 
value/ 
Value-added 
3.51 2.78 2.59 1.75 2.32 
Compliance costs as 
percentage of gross 
income 
1.66% 0.68% 0.48% 0.14% 0.32% 
Compliance costs as 
Percentage of GDP 
5.82% 1.88% 1.25% 0.24% 0.75% 
Source: [BERTOLUCCI, 2001] p.157. 
 
The size classification used in the survey considered as “small businesses” those 
companies with annual sales up to R$ 100 million. According to the Federal 
Revenue, 72% of firms that pay the PIS (a kind of social security contribution), are 
registered under the Simple method of tax calculation (requiring, therefore, 
maximum annual sales of R$ 1.2 million), and 21% chose to report profits under the 
“presumed profits” option (with maximum annual sales of R$ 24 million). These 
data indicate that the publicly held stock companies surveyed are large firms, at the 
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top of the pyramid, and they certainly represent less than 1% of Brazilian 
companies.176 
It can thus be concluded that the overwhelming majority of Brazilian companies 
incur compliance costs that are higher than the corresponding 5.82 % borne by 
smaller Brazilian stock companies. 
To calculate the overall cost of Brazil’s tax system, the administrative costs of 
tax collection to the government must be added to compliance costs borne by private 
firms and families. In centralized countries, which usually have simpler 
administrative structures, the ratio between public administrative costs and private 
compliance costs ranges from 1:2 to 1:4. Brazil is a federative republic, and has, 
therefore, an administrative structure that is more complex, with more decentralized 
taxation. Thus, the ratio can be conservatively estimated to be 1:3. It is easy to 
conclude that overall operational tax costs in Brazil are at least 7% of GDP. 
Nevertheless, these estimates should be interpreted cautiously due to the lack of 
detailed empirical studies on the subject. 
It is worth noting that international research indicates a strongly regressive 
relationship between corporate gross sales and operational tax costs. The Annals of 
the International Fiscal Association Congress held in Rio de Janeiro in 1988, point to 
this phenomenon as one of the most significant conclusions of research done in 
Canada and the United Kingdom. This is a source of great competitive disadvantage 
for smaller companies.177  
Thus, despite that fact that operational tax costs in relation to average gross 
sales of domestic companies should be at levels between 1 and 2% of GDP, for most 
micro, small, and medium businesses – which account for 97% of Brazilian 
companies – operational tax costs and obligations take a hefty slice of production 
costs, over 7% of their value-added. 
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 See testimony of Federal Revenue Service Secretary Everardo Maciel before the Special 
Committee on Cumulative Taxation on April 2, 2002.  In that same public hearing, the secretary 
stated that the top five hundred Brazilian corporations account for 60% of all federal tax revenue, and 
that the top 2,500 corporations account for 80% of all federal tax revenue.  Thus, it is clearly 
demonstrated that publicly held companies in Brazil represent a small portion at the highest percentile 
of gross revenue among Brazilian companies. 
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 See [BERTOLUCCI, 2001] p.29.  In Canada, the costs borne by small employers in collecting 
withheld income tax and social security taxes are 3.36% of gross income, whereas the costs for large 
employers represent 0.064%.  In the United Kingdom, VAT collection costs are 0.78% of taxable 
income for small companies, compared to 0.003% for large companies. [HALL and RABUSHKA, 
1995] mention that in the US during the 1993 fiscal year, income tax revenue reached US$ 625 
billion, while compliance and administrative costs to raise that revenue reached US$ 385 billion, or 
61% of that value.  
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ARGENTINA’S USE OF THE BANK TRANSACTION TAX (1984-1992) 
One often-heard criticism of bank transaction taxes has to do with its application 
in Argentina in 1984. The allegation is that the use of a bank debit tax in Argentina 
was an absolute failure. It is claimed that such experience left a mark in popular 
imagination with stories about intense banking disintermediation, which have 
become folklore in the diatribe against cumulativeness. 
The truth is that Argentina’s unsuccessful experience in the 1980s had nothing 
to do with banking disintermediation, but rather with misguided economic policies 
adopted during that period.178 
Argentina’s bank debit tax went through several phases. Initially, it was a low-
revenue provisional tax. But it became an important component of the fiscal 
adjustment performed in that economy until its extinction in July 1992. Minister 
Cavallo, who raised the tax’s rate to 1.2%, attributed to the tax a fundamentally 
important role in his economic stabilization policy. The bank transactions tax raised 
US$ 1.8 billion, or 1.27% of GDP. It exceeded all other taxes charged in Argentina, 
except for the value-added tax (US$ 7.2 billion) and the fuel tax (US$ 2.7 billion). 
The bank transactions tax was extinguished exclusively because of its 
incompatibility with the traditional tax model that was later implemented in that 
country. In fact, the transaction tax does not fit in with traditional tax structures. As 
Robert Campos says, “use of the bank transaction tax would only be revolutionary if 
it were the only tax and not an additional one.” 179 In the 1980’s, the priority of the 
Argentine government was focused on implementing the value-added tax (VAT). 
Argentina made rapid advances towards it, albeit with immense bureaucratic costs 
and a repressive atmosphere that bordered on fiscal fascism.180 
Critics of the transaction tax claim that Argentina’s tax on bank debits was the 
cause of heavy bank disintermediation. The increase in its rates apparently motivated 
a significant fall in bank transactions and, consequently, increased cash transactions 
(in dollars or in local currency). It also allegedly motivated higher transaction costs 
and losses of competitiveness by banks and economic agents in general. Thus, the 
critics hold, eliminating that tax was an imposition of good sense, and Argentina’s 
experience would recommend against implementing it in Brazil.  
Such a chain of events, however, is spurious for the reasons that follow. 
Brazil possesses structural conditions that are more favorable to the use of 
transaction taxes than Argentina’s. Even in its initial phase, when the transactions tax 
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 In 1993 a group made up of Deputies Roberto Campos, Luís Roberto Ponte, and Flávio Rocha, and 
the economists Daniel Dantas, Pedro Bodin, Luiz Zottman, and I, visited Argentina to meet with 
economists, bankers, business leaders, Minister Domingo Cavallo and with his federal revenue 
secretary. This group found out that the facts differ greatly from what is usually reported. 
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 [CAMPOS, 1991] 
180
 See PEC nº 46/95, in discussion at the Chamber of Deputies. 
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rate was 0.1% or 0.2% and, therefore, no attempt was made to avoid the tax, the ratio 
bank transactions/GDP was around 2.5. In Brazil this ratio is much higher, 
approximately 4, according to CPMF revenue data.181 In other words, banks in Brazil 
are used much more intensively than in Argentina. In fact, checks were little used 
there. They still are not used by individuals or by commerce. The banking system 
was minimally computerized and there was no national clearinghouse, as there is in 
Brazil. Transaction costs are high and checks carry little credibility as a form of 
payment. 
Furthermore, imperfect regulation of Argentina’s tax on bank debits allowed for 
the corrosion of its base of incidence. Only checks were taxed, while other types of 
bank payments were exempt, such as collection accounts (cuentas de recaudación), 
transfers among accounts, term deposits, and third-party checks. There were 
differentiated rates and a large number of exemptions and waivers. These deviations 
were gradually eliminated, but tax avoidance was heavy during most of the life of the 
tax, drawing bank transactions/GDP ratio down to about 1.2 in 1991. 
It is worth mentioning that this drop was primarily due to factors other than 
those related to the tax itself. From 1988 through 1991, Argentina suffered enormous 
economic instability and two hyperinflationary surges. In this period, cash deposits 
yielded highly negative returns, especially since interest rates were fixed by the 
government, and caused savings deposits (not taxed) to migrate to informal and 
unregulated overnight markets. 
These illegal markets were managed in ways similar to black-market lotteries, 
known in Brazil as “jogo do bicho”, which function on strict confidence. Individuals 
also converted their earnings into dollars, with up to 4% discount, a clear 
demonstration of the loss of competitiveness of bank savings accounts relative to 
those informal deposits. Under these circumstances, there is no way to rightfully 
attribute bank avoidance to the tax on bank debits. 
TABLE 25 
Tax on bank debits in Argentina 
Rate (%) Period in force Revenue (*) 
0.1 Jan. 84 to Jun. 85 37.30 
0.2 Jul. 85 to Dec. 87 67.73 
0.7 Jan. 88 to Dec. 89 121.74 
0.3 Jan. 90 to Jan. 91 50.44 
1.2 Feb. 91 to Feb. 92 167.59 
0.3 Mar. 92 to Jul. 92 65.77 
                   * Monthly average in 000,000 of pesos (Feb. 93). 
 
Argentina’s experience teaches us a three-part lesson. First, a bank transactions 
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tax requires competent regulation to work properly. Secondly, Brazil has the 
structural conditions that allow us to predict that a bank transactions tax can be a 
successful experiment, as indeed it has turned out to be. Thirdly, it is a streamlined 
tax with low costs (as acknowledged by Argentina’s bankers themselves) that did not 
cause a negative reaction among economic agents.182 
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 A proof of the fact that the bank transactions tax in Argentina was not a failure, as critics suggest, 
is that a similar tax, with rates of 1% on bank debits and 1% on bank credits has been in us since 
2001, and is nowadays the most important provincial tax in the country, with a rate of 1.2% levied on 
the value of each bank transaction. 
 - 170 - 
4 
“FEDERAL SINGLE TAX”: A PLAUSIBLE FORMULA FOR 
TAX REFORM: ADOPTING BANK TRANSACTIONS AS THE 
PREDOMINANT BASE FOR FEDERAL TAXES183 
OBJECT AND METHOD 
The issue of bank transaction taxes still rarely appears in specialized literature. 
Brazil currently enjoys primacy in this area, seasoned by the richest, most 
comprehensive, and most successful field experimentation ever undertaken in this 
unique taxation technique. 
We cannot turn anywhere for help on this subject, in English, French, German, 
Japanese, or Italian. This time, the only reference we have is our own experience, 
which also serves as the fundamental benchmark for research by foreign scholars.184 
The pioneering theoretical work of Professor Marcos Cintra, on the “Single 
Tax” on bank transactions, has resulted in fruitful political engagement that has 
ripened into a succession of specific propositions, the culmination of which is the 
legislative proposal that bears the name of Federal Single Tax. A Special Committee 
in the Chamber of Deputies was formed to analyze this constitutional amendment 
bill. 
Alongside this proposal, a bank transaction tax became a reality, though it 
escaped the control of its sponsor. This tax took the form of the IPMF [Provisional 
Tax on Bank Transactions], which was later resurrected as the CPMF [Provisional 
Contribution on Bank Transactions].185 This tax provides an excellent laboratory 
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 This chapter was written by Paulo Euclides Rangel.  
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 Although Brazil is the country with the longest track record in the use of a bank transaction tax, a 
recent study [DELOITTE, 2006] states that what could be labeled as the “Brazilian tax model”, whose 
main characteristics  are strong income taxation, strong taxation on production and on consumption, 
complemented with gross revenue and bank transaction turnover taxation is now applied  in 
approximately 35% of the countries researched, and that a bank transaction tax is no longer a 
Brazilian, or Latin American peculiarity, having been found in 15% of the countries studied. 
185
 For a brief history of the IPMF/CPMF taxes see [CINTRA, 2008(a)] pp. 705-726. There, the 
author briefly discusses the question of cumulativeness, its economic and legal implications, and 
describes the results of statistical simulations that modeled its impact in the economy, including 
changes in relative prices and in sectoral tax burdens.      
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experience, repeatedly proving groundless most preconceived notions that oppose it. 
It also defined an administrative doctrine within Brazil’s Federal Revenue that has 
been surprisingly favorable to the merits of this tax.186 
This text presents some modest preliminary comments that might be useful to 
better understand the proposal. These comments are not a substitute for the benefits 
to be gained by reading the generous and seductive “justification” attached to the text 
of PEC No. 474/01 [Constitutional Amendment], nor to the writings of the eminent 
Professor and Deputy Marcos Cintra. 
The specific legislative task is the redefinition of some of the constitutional 
guidelines on tax policy. The core issue is the adoption of non-financial bank 
transactions as the predominant federal tax base – as a solution to the impasse in tax 
reform. 
This text is not a package of regulatory suggestions, which would require the 
cooperation of the executive branch. Neither is it a compendium of numerical 
simulations or a scholarly evaluation about presumed macro and microeconomic 
effects of a bank transactions tax, which a few university dissertations already 
address. 
These are pragmatic considerations, qualitative and multi-focused reflections 
that seek to engage debate on the various and complex dimensions of the issue, 
which include reflections on the less common perspectives of social psychology, 
financial sociology, institutional administrative analysis and, of course, legislative 
technique. 
TAX REFORM AT A DEADLOCK 
Changes within Brazil’s society and economy since the last celebrated tax 
reform, in 1965, have created an accumulation of distortions within our tax system. 
Several attempts at reform have ended in failure, including the “Sayad Commission” 
in 1986, followed by the “Ary Oswaldo Commission” (both were commissions of the 
executive branch), and the constitutional revision convention of 1993/1994 (a 
frustrated attempt by the legislative branch). 
Official tax policy during the last presidential terms, pressed by the demands of 
economic stabilization and by the limitations imposed by external constraints, has 
emphasized revenue productivity and reliability, to the detriment of rationality within 
the tax system. Preference has been given to investing in easily collectable taxes, 
which overburden a given set of taxpayers and postpone the solution to ever-
increasing distortions and inequities in the tax system. 
The Union’s cumulative contributions, because they are not shared with other 
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entities of the federation [states and municipalities], have grown during this period. 
Income tax has shrunk in order to meet expectations of foreign investors and large 
taxpayers, resulting in overwhelming taxation, almost exclusively, of the upper strata 
of the working middle class. 
During the last fifteen years, when several attempts at reforming the tax system 
were tried, it was tacitly agreed that demands for tax reform were to be centered on 
consumption taxes. The government invested in a unified value-added tax program 
without conviction. Even the Secretary of the Federal Revenue has admitted, years 
later, that he does not consider this tax to be practicable in the foreseeable future. 
A perception that had been blurred in the past now became clear: that our 
peculiar federal system cannot handle a VAT. It also became clear that, although the 
VAT may satisfy large industry and trade, it harms the service sector and huge 
numbers of small entrepreneurs. 
PEC No. 175/95 (one of the government’s many tax reform proposals), after 
producing a lot of heat and little light, is now buried.187 By 2001/2, the only thing it 
accomplished was to give birth to a modest by-product: a non-cumulative, restricted, 
experimental, and time-scaled bill for the PIS/PASEP, which was in the interest of 
large taxpayers and export business owners. 
In the meantime, tax burden grew by 4 percentage points, between 1994 and 
2001, and the tax revenue administered by the Federal Revenue showed a real 
growth of 54%. Most significantly, inequity in tax incidence increased, which should 
make tax reform a priority in terms of public discussion. 
The most crucial challenges to Brazil’s public administration are: a) the 
necessary reduction of the overall tax burden (which, however, as a precondition, 
must redistribute tax costs more equitably across a much broader taxpaying 
universe), and b) a more rational fiscal policy in order to exonerate labor and 
production costs, and to stimulate economic growth. 
According to an academic study undertaken at the University of São Paulo 
(FIPE/USP) for the Industrial Federation of the State of São Paulo (Fiesp), the focus 
on consumption taxes as a priority in tax reform is misguided. In order to correct tax 
imbalances, the predominance of consumption taxes in Brazil should be inverted in 
favor of income and property taxes, bringing our system into harmony with models 
used throughout most of the developed world, that is, a model which taxes 
consumption lightly, with income tax providing the bulk of public revenue. It is 
likely that Brazilian industry and exporters would more easily accept taxing 
consumption if it were more lightly applied, and if income and property taxes were 
predominant, as it is in the United States, England, Japan, the Scandinavian 
countries, and others. 
Other analysts, such as the staff of BNDES [National Economic and Social 
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Development Bank] and IPEA [Institute for Applied Economics Research], 
understand that a developing country, with its significant income and wealth 
inequalities – as is the case in Brazil – can only rely on indirect taxation, while at the 
same time seeking to apply it in the least distortionary possible manner. 
Concerning this last suggestion (but contrary to the IPEA’s theoretical 
postulations that favor value-added taxation), the Federal Revenue has published a 
series of empirical studies on its website. These studies suggest that the effect of 
cumulative taxes, such as the CPMF and the PIS/Cofins, are not regressive, as had 
been thought, but rather seem uniformly proportional at all levels of purchasing 
power, closely approximating the effect expected by an ideal VAT, scoring better 
than the ICMS [Tax on the Circulation of Goods and Transportation and 
Communication Services] or IPI [Tax on Industrialized Products] with their 
selectivity and their value-added technique. 
It is suggested that taxes that are apparently unsophisticated and insensitive to 
individual differences, such as taxes on gross income and bank transactions – which 
are simple, moderate, and less prone to evasion – ultimately engender economic 
effects that are less distortionary than those of sophisticated net income or value-
added taxes with high rates, which are very complicated, heterogeneous, and easy to 
evade.188  
Recent studies done by Federal Revenue on the experience with the CPMF (a 
bank transactions tax), confirm the theoretical simulations and observations on which 
Professor Marcos Cintra has been insisting for some time, claiming that 
regressiveness of such cumulative taxes is illusory. 
So many years of failures and hugely disappointed efforts attest to the 
exhaustion of our traditional tax reform paradigms. 
It does not seem that unifying consumption taxes into an all inclusive value-
added tax would be practicable over the medium term, given the conflicts within our 
federal structure and the dependence of Brazilian states on the current ICMS. Nor 
can the federal government, risk losing part of the revenue it collects with its gross 
income taxes.  
The challenges that remain are finding ways to ease tax pressure through more 
equitable tax incidence, preventing tax avoidance, and including the informal 
economy, without seeking an unrealistic solution that would result in significant 
growth of the tax collection and auditing apparatus. 
In view of these difficulties, taxation of bank transactions appears to be a 
plausible pathway to tax reform. Bank transactions, as a tax base, would differ little 
from consumption and gross income, which are Brazil’s current predominant tax 
bases. A bank transaction tax would offer advantages in that it costs little, is simple, 
light, has universal scope, and is difficult to evade. 
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TAX POLICY ISSUES 
There is no perfect tax. The choice of a tax system, considering the clashing 
interests of groups and sectors that comprise a complex society, should seek to cause 
the least harm to the majority, given that it will be incapable of completely satisfying 
everyone. 
The failure of tax reform is not due merely to a lack of government 
determination as many have claimed. The apparent indecision and disorientation of 
the government, which is wrongly interpreted as lack of effort, reflects 
disagreements within society, with no immediate prospect of solution. 
The problem is that the tax systems we envy in more developed countries 
where, contrary to Brazil’s situation, income is taxed more heavily and consumption 
and property, more moderately, rest on the sociological presupposition of solid 
democracies, of high per capita income, of vast middle classes that are educated, 
politically aware, and capable of exerting broad social control over the actions of 
well-equipped fiscal administrations. 
Still valid today is the diagnosis put forth by Cambridge scholar Nicholas 
Kaldor (Colloque International sur la Fiscalité et le Dévellopement, Paris, 1982). He 
wrote that Latin American tax reforms would continue to be cosmetic arrangements 
condemned to failure, so long as the dominant elite in that part of the world remained 
unwilling to adopt a more patriotic posture, keeping their fortunes within their own 
countries and participating more substantively in the taxpaying effort, as has 
occurred in Western Europe in the past half-century. 
But it is unrealistic to expect the dominant elite in societies that are profoundly 
unequal to renounce their power to manipulate the tax system to their own benefit, 
and to become spontaneously willing to make tax sacrifices. Patriotism of the sort Sir 
Kaldor alludes to is increasingly becoming a forgotten value within the context of 
today’s globalized economy. 
Mass society will no longer acquiesce to a tax, the payment of which was once a 
conscious act of ritual compliance with the Social Contract. Today, preference for 
“anesthetic taxes” prevails. Common sense, therefore, recommends construction of 
indirect and automatic formulae that tax everyone proportionally, without exception, 
preferably without appeal to values and to ethical conscience. Bank transactions are a 
tax base capable of facing this challenge. 
Direct taxes, charged against income and personal wealth, are in theory both 
fairer and more sensitive to the diversity of individual circumstances. But this 
theoretical advantage becomes lost in practical problems. Brazil’s experience with 
personal income tax highlights distortions that are both acute and nearly 
insurmountable. The late Professor Henry Tilbery, an exceptional tax attorney, 
expressed his opposition to implementation of a tax on wealth in Brazil, explaining 
that, though he favored the fair theoretical configuration of the tax, he believed 
execution would be inequitable; that, with preference given to ease, tax pressure 
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would increase on reliable taxpayers, but would still fail to reach habitual tax 
avoiders. 
The tax base provided by bank transactions is more democratic than income and 
personal wealth tax bases. It has more effectiveness, and on a broader scale. 
Professor Maria da Conceição Tavares well understood this feature and did not 
mince words in acknowledging this fact. 
During the first half of the 1990s, Professor Marcos Cintra’s theoretical findings 
resulted in the Single Tax Bill, which became a plank in the platform of Flávio 
Rocha’s presidential campaign. It gained support, in some constitutional revision 
proposals, to anchor the tax system on a bank transactions tax, particularly the 
proposals by Deputies Roberto Campos and Luis Roberto Ponte. 
Since then, while the congressional forum has argued in vain for several years 
over the impracticable implementation of a unified VAT for our federated republic, 
Deputy Marcos Cintra has further developed several formulas for harnessing a bank 
transactions tax. 
The first formula, amendment No. 47/99 to PEC No. 175/95, proposed a gradual 
elimination of federal taxes, which would be phased out over three years. These 
would be offset, during the phase-out period, with a bank transaction tax levied on 
bank accountholders. This formula would bring new taxpayers into the fiscal 
universe, making way for rates of other taxes to be reduced or, ultimately, eliminated 
altogether. 
This was a prudent mechanism that would have permitted a risk-free evaluation 
of the new tax’s effectiveness. This approach even allowed for the possibility of 
using the bank transaction tax as advances on behalf of the traditional system, which 
might ultimately remain in place. This would have been an inexpensive technique, 
able to close traditional tax loopholes, making the traditional taxes more efficient in 
reaching the informal economy, tax avoiders, and tax evaders. 
The second formula, PEC No. 183/99, called the Alternative Proposal, provided 
for a multiple system, with special emphasis on the bank transaction tax, and which 
would carry an additional function, that of funding social security along with excise 
taxes on alcohol, cigarettes, automobiles, telecommunications, energy, and fuel, in 
addition to a marginal income tax on windfall profits and financial market gains. 
This plan would abolish corporate income tax. 
The third formula, PEC No. 256/00 suggested that a tax on bank transactions be 
adopted as a “social tax” that would replace all corporate social contributions 
earmarked for funding social security. The aim of this proposal would have been to 
remove from businesses the burden of social security payments, thus stimulating job 
creation. 
The fourth formula boldly calls for all federal taxes and almost all federal 
contributions to be replaced immediately by a tax that, though not exclusively, would 
predominantly be levied on bank transactions. 
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The operational simplicity of this tax, its legal and administrative lightness, its 
low cost, and its evasion-proof characteristics, would make it a fiscal instrument of 
exceptional ease and flexibility. It would offer tax policymakers a vast menu of 
alternative applications, such as those illustrated in the formulae above. 
On one hand, these features make the bank transaction tax incomparably better – 
relatively to any other tax – as an instrument for the attainment of the essential fiscal 
function of taxes, that is, to be an effective mechanism for collecting revenue. On the 
other hand, these same features leave empty-handed those who have interventionist 
leanings, and who insist on exploring the non-fiscal functions of taxes. 
It is clear that, if fiscal interventionism prevails, the bank transaction tax could 
be adopted as a tax revenue instrument that is ancillary to other traditional taxes, 
eventually being offset against them. This would be a choice for continuity of a tax 
system that is complicated, cumbersome, and chaotic, with the only gain being it’s 
broader scope and a reduction in tax avoidance. 
It is important to draw attention to something that has been overlooked by those 
who are well versed in the bank transaction tax as a tool for advance collection of 
other taxes. What they overlook is this: additional revenue entering from one side, 
coming mostly from the informal economy, can run out through the other side, via 
offsets and shrewd stratagems to be applied to the other taxes, as these would still 
provide loopholes that lend themselves to the same distortionary features decried in 
the current system.  
If the bank transaction tax is selected just to be one additional tax, as happened 
with the IPMF/CPMF since 1992, this would be disappointing, because the 
distortions of traditional taxes remain, keeping a new scenario from flourishing, and 
preventing the qualities of the new tax from supplanting the shortcomings of 
traditional taxes. 
Optimal use of the bank transaction tax, in the liberal vision of its formulator, 
Prof. Marcos Cintra, would effectively bolster the tax’s financial function because of 
its pure instrumentality as a collection mechanism. This would free the fiscal system 
of its confusing and inefficient non-fiscal responsibilities (except in foreign trade). 
These responsibilities would be transferred – with increased effectiveness and 
transparency – to the public expenditure side of the budget. 
Along with the disappearance of current taxes, fiscal waivers and their obscure 
schemes of privileges and exemptions would also disappear. This would redeem the 
function of taxes as revenue collectors for the public budget. Only through this 
approach can the bank transaction tax fulfill its pledge to entrepreneurs and the entire 
population, a pledge to decompress fiscal obligations and controls, to greatly reduce 
fiscal costs, worries, and risks, freeing up resources for better use. 
THE MYTH OF A SINGLE TAX 
The history of economic thought provides at least two approaches to single tax 
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theory. One, superseded by production modes themselves, was the Physiocratic idea 
of a single tax on land. 
Another approach, which was never discussed seriously, was the single tax on 
capital. The brilliant French economist Maurice Allais, winner of the 1987 Nobel 
Prize in Economics, formulated this idea during the post-war period. Later, however, 
Monsieur Allais himself, without renouncing his tax on capital, expressly 
recommends that the European Union use a fiscal tripod that would also include 
moderate income and consumption taxes using value-added criteria, therefore 
abandoning the myth of the single tax. 
Single tax utopias would perhaps contain a regressive psychological trait – the 
desire to escape the complexities of social life and return to the simplicity of pastoral 
living, a dream life without the entanglements of fiscal constraints. Opposing this 
utopian wish is the patriarchal, repressive dogma that demands complex tax systems, 
capable of dismembering all possible forms of economic wealth. 
According to one perspective of tax psychology, the magnetic force of the single 
tax idea does not reside exclusively in its attractiveness as a single solution, which 
seduces a small number of intellectual speculators fascinated by unified theories, 
absolute systems, and closed architectures. Although this seduction takes root 
naturally in the human spirit, the truth is that the post-modern age has celebrated the 
triumph of the multiple, the diverse, the fragmentary, the open, and the relative. 
Complexity, diversification, and fragmentation of modern tax systems only mirror 
identical features within modern societies. 
Rather, the magnetic force of the single tax idea stems primarily from libertarian 
pulsations deeply rooted in the hearts of mankind, a disposition toward anarchy, an 
aversion to oppression, all of which are consistent with the extreme individualism 
that typifies our times. 
There is a heightened sense of discomfort over the State’s power of fiscal 
intervention in the lives of private citizens. The growing complexity of fiscal systems 
only multiplies the instances of control. Information networks squeeze more tightly. 
The rituals of civic exercise proliferate, draining increasing amounts of time and 
energy from taxpaying citizens, suffocating them and fueling (beyond mere aversion 
to taxes) rancor against the bureaucratic enforcement apparatus. This fiscal malaise 
stems from the powerlessness individuals feel when facing the coercive power of the 
State. Fiscal stress is aggravated by fiscal obligations that keep multiplying and fiscal 
regimes that keep diversifying. This in turn leads to increasing competition among 
economic agents, who search for situations that offer the greatest fiscal advantage. 
The individual feels caught in a trap, forced to run a fiscal gauntlet of permits and 
prohibitions. From one side they are pressed by enforcement agents and, from the 
other, by the need to survive and not lose ground to competitors. 
This loss of taxpayer’s energy, which happens against their will as they tend to 
petty activities that only partly service the fiscal apparatus, is wasted on piles of 
paper, documents, proofs, checking and re-checking, deadlines, tricks, calculations, 
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planning, and meeting with advisers, accountants, lawyers, and consultants. This 
creates significant discomfort to the taxpayer, and keeps him or her on the brink of 
fiscal non-compliance, tax evasion, delinquency, disobedience, and fiscal revolt. 
The idea of a single tax has always harkened from afar, with the promise of 
significant relief of this discomfort, because of its simplicity and homogeneity. The 
other side of the coin, however, is that those who have achieved positions of obscure 
privilege and advantage – working within chaotic tax systems – namely, those who 
are most savvy at fiscal competition, the unseen partners of fiscal chaos, tend to 
resist such transparency, which is at the very heart of the single tax. 
The simplicity and transparency of a single tax are weapons in the hands of 
citizens, to be used against antisocial types who, forever on a quest for fiscal 
privileges, are parasites and looters of the community for selfish ends. Chaotic fiscal 
systems are incubators of parasitic behavior. 
If it is true that mankind cannot coexist without abiding by a “Social Contract”, 
then each of us should genuinely desire that any necessary contribution to the 
Common Good be as painless as possible, that it require of us little or no effort, that 
it not incite competition with our peers, and that it protect us from the anxieties 
associated with investigative and prosecutorial actions of the State. Thus, one can see 
clearly that the call for a light tax system that is simple, automatic, universal, 
paperless, non-declaratory, moderate, equitable, difficult to defraud, rests on solid 
foundations of tax psychology. These are the good foundations of the tax’s 
legitimacy, which ensure consent, a subjective presupposition that is indispensable to 
effective fiscal institutions. 
To complete the list of requirements, tax scholars often identify in a “good tax” 
two others characteristics that remain to be discussed: progressiveness and allocative 
neutrality. Both are worthy of closer examination. 
“SINGLE” TAX IS NOT A SINGLE LEVY 
The term “single tax” is merely a nickname; the legal term is “tax on movement 
or transmission of values, of credits and rights of a financial nature.” 
The legal term is complicated. It is for use by experts. For common use, of the 
terms “tax on checks”, “transaction tax”, “tax on bank debits”, or “tax on financial 
transactions”, the latter is the least imprecise. But it too is an abstract and 
uncommon concept, unlikely to become part of our everyday language. Even the 
term “single federal tax”, despite its imprecision, is easily recognizable and has the 
advantage of denoting the turn of events occurring at this moment with the PEC No. 
474/01. This PEC is one phase of the single tax movement, a movement that burst 
open during the 1990s – an idea that already enjoys name recognition among the 
people. Use of the term “single federal tax”, instead of a less precise but perhaps less 
decipherable “tax on financial movements”, has undeniable communicative power, 
marketing and electoral appeal, and there is no reason to ever stop using it. 
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Nevertheless, Professor Marcos Cintra never intended – not in his earliest 
writings, even less so in his more recent proposals – that what he has successively 
called a “single tax”, “single tax on transactions”, and “single federal tax” would 
ever become an absolutely exclusive tax, nor even effectively single. 
There is no intention to implement a destructive policy against Brazil’s tax 
system – far from it. PEC No. 474/01 acknowledges and respects the excellence of 
the current constitutional framework of Brazilian tax law. Rather, this constitutional 
amendment bill intends that the proposed tax revolution be molded – skillfully and 
with minimal alterations – in conformity with the current framework of tax law, 
which has been developed meticulously and has been highly celebrated by our tax 
scholars. 
The bank transaction tax that is being proposed – which is both a tax and a 
contribution – is not a single tax. It seeks to become the predominant tax, responsible 
for the most substantial portion of State revenue, in healthy coexistence with other 
regulatory taxes. 
It is also not a single tax, because it will coexist with service fees and police 
fees, contributions, user fees, and special contributions that can be sub-divided into 
social, corporate, and regulatory contributions. It will also coexist with compulsory 
loans and, ultimately, all other taxes contained in our Constitution. The section on 
general principles of the national tax system is preserved in its entirety, as set forth in 
articles 145 through 149, in which are merged the results of decades of taxation in 
Brazil. 
It is not a single tax. It merely seeks to be quantitatively hegemonic, without 
damaging its qualitative solidarity with the variety of constructs found in current law, 
which cannot be renounced because they establish the boundaries for the taxpaying 
citizenry, within a democratic environment. 
Without questioning the conquests in which Brazil’s Tax Law takes pride, the 
proposed amendment merely seeks to find a single formula that is simple, automatic, 
transparent, universal, difficult to circumvent, and that fulfills the fundamental 
financial mission of taxes, which is the collection of revenue necessary for financing 
the current activities of the State. 
The proposed amendment aims to accomplish this without damaging taxes 
assigned to non-fiscal functions (that have little monetary significance), such as 
foreign trade taxes, or to any other specific and defined purpose, such as corporate 
and regulatory fees and contributions. 
This wealth of instruments is desirable and does not need to be demolished. This 
diversity of levies does not affect most taxpayers on a day-to-day basis, but 
sporadically affects those agents involved in mutual relationships that seek specific 
government services. These are levies that have little financial impact, that do not 
even cast a shadow on the “single” tax. 
For example, it is perfectly reasonable that someone traveling abroad should 
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pay, once every five years, a nominal fee for the issuance and control of his or her 
passport. There is no excuse for someone who throws a fit because the supposedly 
single tax does not seek to abolish a passport tax, an obviously naïve illusion.  
Passports represent a specific activity of the State on behalf of a limited number of 
taxpayers. Therefore, it makes no sense to require that all taxpayers fund passports 
through the single tax. The single tax is a generic tax earmarked for funding the 
collective activities of the State, on everyone’s behalf. 
The generic activities of the federal State – which are significant in financial 
terms – and social security activities under an entitlement regime, which is also 
financially sizeable, would be funded by a single tax on bank transactions. PEC 
474/01 is scrupulously concerned with introducing a new financial tax paradigm, a 
revolution in the basic financing of the State, a hegemonic tax collection formula – 
all without in any way damaging our good tax law architecture in those dimensions 
of the law that do not strictly address generic public funding. 
Obviously, it would not be realistic to attempt to abolish, in the name of the 
single tax myth, the legal diversity and sophistication that are the result of much 
work and lengthy sedimentation through our history. Likewise, it would not make 
sense to discredit these proposed changes, under the unfair claim that it is timid 
because it does not destroy the elaborate and differentiated current legal apparatus. 
The simplicity we seek must not be mistaken for simplism. The great simplicity of 
this tax as the predominant mechanism for federal revenue collection is closely 
linked to highly sophisticated technology and law. The proposed tax simplification 
does not presuppose antagonism toward current tax law. Simplified tax collection 
does not imply a regression to an unrefined legal framework. In fact, this proposal 
does not address, neither should it, the naïve demand for extinction of all 
constitutional tax constructs other than the “single” tax. 
It is remarkable to notice how this ambitious proposed tax revolution shines in 
its effort to avoid damaging current constitutional tax law, and how it accommodates 
constitutional tax paradigms without disturbing them. 
This proposal calls for far fewer changes to constitutional rules than does PEC 
No. 175/95, the official “tax reform” proposal, despite the fact that this latter 
proposal’s modest ambition is merely to merge the consumption taxes into a single 
value-added tax. 
PEC 474/01 states its purpose as the search for a balanced source of public 
finance. It is cloaked in prudent legal procedure. It is impregnated with a rational 
concept that challenges deeply rooted preconceived notions. It is founded on 
empirical evidence gathered during almost two decades the IPMF/CPMF tax has 
been in effect, and it echoes a recognized social demand. 
PRUDENCE, PRECONCEPTIONS, AND RATIONAL PURPOSE 
The golden rule of tax reform theory is to prevent premature burnout of 
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promising ideas by imprudence in their implementation. But such fear should not 
lead to inertia, apathy, complacence, and capitulation to prejudice. The pathway to 
good tax reform is a delicate razor’s edge, between defensive paralysis and careless 
impulsiveness; between rigid legal formalism and technocratic recklessness; between 
prejudicial distrust and unreflective compliance; between the general idealized 
interest and concrete articulated interests. 
What ultimately drives reform is social demand. So long as that demand is not 
monolithic, it is incumbent on the reformer to pursue a balanced result that reflects 
its multifaceted composition. 
At the beginning of the 1990s the proposal for the adoption of a retail sales tax, 
collected at the point of sale to the final consumer was well received by the industrial 
sector. It was a demand that would have done away with a value-added tax on 
consumption. Obviously unbalanced, this proposal would have relieved the industrial 
sector of its taxes, but would have overburdened the commercial and services 
sectors. Inspired by the United States’ model, the demand omitted other features of 
that model, none of which exist in Brazil, namely, a powerful, feared, and 
omnipresent tax enforcement apparatus; a predominant individual income tax; a huge 
middle class; and a property tax that in the U.S., can be as high as 12 % of total tax 
revenue, whereas in Brazil it is only 3%. 
Once that solution was discarded, years were spent pondering the demand for a 
VAT. It too is unbalanced. This means that, in addition to conflicting with our 
federal system, it favors the organized industrial sector, large business, and 
exporters. But it harms the services sector and the great number of entrepreneurs 
whose accounting practices are rudimentary. 
Meanwhile, the CPMF experiment flourished far beyond expectations, 
disarming alarmist predictions of banking disintermediation, market disruption, etc. 
Its discontinuation in 2008 reflects the result of a vicious political battle between the 
government and the opposition, rather than a negative evaluation by the Brazilian 
people. 
During these years of tax reform discussion, we have seen a procession of 
misleading flavor-of-the-week jingoisms, employed as seen fit by various interested 
parties, such as “a good tax is an old tax,” “single tax, inequitable tax”, “a good tax 
is any tax you can collect”, and even this strangely passive expression that depicts 
low self-esteem: “a new tax, if it were good, would already exist in more advanced 
countries”.189  
Conditions are now ripe for a more audacious reform, which goes beyond 
imported models that, even in their own countries of origin, are criticized as being 
obsolete. What we need is a reform that is tailored to our situation, to our 
technological position, to our social profile, and to our administrative experience. It 
                                                 
189
 For a refutation of this latter fallacy, see other sections in this text, particularly as it relates to the 
bank transaction tax. 
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is fitting that we, at this point, question some paralyzing prejudices. We should 
examine with clear eyes some sample situations, and invite representatives of the 
various sectors of society, industry, commerce, services, agriculture, mining, 
banking, non-governmental organizations, public finance and social security 
administration, the scientific community, jurists, accountants, auditors, and 
professionals of information technology to spell out their perceptions on a tax system 
whose hegemonic base would come to rest on bank transactions. 
GLOBALIZATION AND TAX HARMONIZATION 
One of the more technically persuasive variants of the complacent fallacy that 
claims, “a new tax, if it were viable, would already exist in more advanced 
countries”, is the mistaken supposition that a bank transactions tax is incompatible 
with tax harmonization. 
It is alleged that globalization is engendering a trend toward increased 
harmonization of tax systems, particularly as it pertains to taxation of factors that 
have greater mobility, such as intangible capital and highly qualified labor. Double 
taxation agreements are multiplying, allowing for a reciprocal deduction of 
analogous taxes different countries levy against the same legally taxable event. The 
context of the allegation is that, because bank transaction taxes do not exist in most 
of our partner countries, except for five Latin American nations (Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina), its existence in Brazil would constitute a roadblock 
to harmonization. 
However, a logical impasse stands out at the core of this strange rationale, 
which its enunciators are not noticing and that should be explained. 
This rationale unwittingly suggests that, finding themselves caught off-guard by 
globalization, national tax systems must become petrified and renounce all 
innovation; as if any tax measure to be adopted should be subjugated by the 
supposed priority status of international harmonization. A bank transaction tax, 
welcomed by many tax experts as the tax of the future, would be unable to gain that 
future, because implementation of such a tax would not become available 
immediately and simultaneously to all countries. 
Such an argument calls for discrediting the historical, cultural, and endogenous 
roots of national tax systems. It suggests that transcendental paradigms should take 
precedence over local tax decisions that address each nation’s particular social, 
economic, and political circumstances. This argument would have each country 
eventually eliminate dissonant taxes. This raises the sensitive political issue of 
deciding which hegemonic tax profile to apply, and which benchmark of uniformity 
to use in order to abolish diversity, and to decide what should be considered an 
undesirable divergence. 
The fanciful exaggeration of this line of reasoning is obvious. Of course, vectors 
of globalization and tax harmonization exist. We acknowledge them. But these 
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vectors do not impose a veto nor do they make anathema those tax features that a 
sovereign nation deems appropriate for its own situation. 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
The objection discussed above takes on a more serious dimension than one 
might reasonably foresee. For example, the American Chamber of Commerce of São 
Paulo, though admitting that the simplifying perspectives of a bank transaction tax 
are exciting, decided to take a stand against adopting the single federal tax because, 
in its view (which appeared on its website), it would constitute a “disaster to foreign 
investment” in Brazil. 
This judgment is based on the allegation that the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development] and the United Nations do not 
acknowledge that the bank transaction tax is comparable to the traditional tax bases 
which allow reciprocal compensation under international double taxation 
agreements. To date, Brazil has not entered into a double taxation agreement with the 
United States. They, not we, are the ones who lack interest. Stemming from this, 
earnings, profits, and gains remitted to the United States are subject to Brazilian 
income tax. But U.S. law allows for compensations of the tax paid in Brazil with a 
similar tax payable in the United States, normally levied at a higher rate. 
The argument is that US investors, accustomed to this treatment, would become 
upset if they could no longer enjoy this deduction from their U.S. taxes, and that they 
would have to pay the bank transaction tax, for which U.S. law allows no deduction, 
as it does not have a similar tax. 
It is possible that this condemnation is the result of a hasty conclusion based on 
erroneous analysis. But it is a good example of how innovation, by abolishing deeply 
rooted habits, engenders resistance not always based on good reasoning. 
Let us look at the example of distribution of profits and dividends. Since 1996, 
these have not been taxed in Brazil, the justification being that these would already 
have been taxed as corporate profits, through the IRPJ [Corporate Income Tax]. If 
remitted to the United States, these profits and dividends would be subject to full 
local taxation, with nothing to deduct. 
If the Federal Single Tax were adopted, as proposed, the remittance would be 
taxed as a bank transaction at, say, a 2% rate. But, we must note that the remittance 
would be larger, because the tax and the contribution on profits, which are taxed at a 
34% rate, would have been abolished! It makes absolutely no sense to turn down a 
2% tax, following relief of a 34% tax! Where is the disaster in that? 
Secondly, the burden is on the remitter. The accountholder in Brazil is the one 
who pays the bank transaction tax, not the beneficiary overseas. In other words, the 
foreign investor will benefit from a substantial increase, not a reduction, in his net 
return, making groundless the analysis that backs the claim above. 
If remittances of other kinds of earnings are made (for example, payment for 
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technical assistance services), the income tax withheld in Brazil is a 15% tax. Often 
the remitter in Brazil agrees contractually to adjust the basis of the calculation so that 
the foreign payment received by the foreign beneficiary would remain the same. But 
the burden would be lifted off the remitter in Brazil. Again, we fail to see where lies 
the disaster. In these cases we again believe the analysis seems groundless. 
Even if this were not the case, it is beneficiary receives full payment, net of 
taxes, subject to taxation in his own country. In this case, the abolition of income tax, 
and adoption of the Federal Single Tax would have no effect on the appropriate to 
point out that ultimately the intrinsic mission of the tax system, far from being one of 
granting deductions foreign investors can claim on their own country’s tax returns is, 
first and foremost, the mission of collecting the resources necessary for basic 
operation of the home State. Any eventual stimulus for foreign investment is mostly 
a function of monetary policy, not only of tax policy. 
ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVENESS OF THE TAX BASE 
More than one jurist has expressed the opinion that it would be impossible to tax 
bank transactions, because doing so does not correspond to any concrete economic 
fact and consequently, it could not constitute a legitimate tax base. This sophism 
spread during the early phases of implementation of the former IPMF [Provisional 
Bank Transactions Tax], but it did not prosper in the courts of law. 
This argument impresses laymen, when in truth this is the argument that lacks 
concrete logical substance. This reasoning is more mythological than scientific, and 
disregards the historical foundations of tax theory. 
The history of concrete tax practices shows that no country has ever exclusively 
taxed true economic substantiveness. The essence of taxation has always been, and 
still is, to tax indicators of taxpaying capacity, not to be confused with economic 
values. The old “rights of passage” were convenient methods, though unrefined, for 
capturing the presumed taxpaying capacity of a vehicle or load. The window tax, or 
façade tax, to which the architecture of Amsterdam owes its long houses with narrow 
fronts and tiny windows, was a practicable formula, albeit imprecise, for taxing 
wealth presumed to exist by the ostentatious use of spaces and windows on urban 
landscapes. 
Some modern tax systems use complex assessment mechanisms in attempts to 
assess something approximating net income, net profits, or value-added, which are 
considered to represent substantial economic assets, or goods eminently susceptible 
to taxation. These would be the ideal tax bases because they would be the most 
faithful expression of purchasing power. But it is impracticable to build a tax system 
exclusively on these bases, because of the complexities of individualized assessment. 
No country in the world taxes, exclusively, net profits, net income, and added 
value. Exact accounting of these values is only accessible to a small number of large 
taxpayers. Assessment of these values is always imperfect, and depends on a series 
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of accounting conventions and legislative simplifications that are, themselves, 
approximations. Complete verification of these values, without sampling, is 
impracticable for any federal revenue agency in the world, no matter how well 
equipped it might be. 
Thus, all tax systems in the world seek, to a greater or lesser degree, techniques 
for estimation, presumption, and forfeit, based on indicators. The result is that the 
correlation between taxes and true taxpaying capacity is always unsatisfactory. 
In Brazil, only 15% of companies assess real profits, and only 3% of the 
population assesses its net taxable income using the full income tax form. 
Assessment based on presumed profits, the Simple [simplified method for taxing 
small firms], sales, or gross income, which are the predominant tax bases, also 
contains little economic substance. These are only approximations of taxpaying 
capacity that can be as misleading, if not more so, as bank transactions.  
Many of the criticisms to the bank transaction tax simply disregard this fact. We 
should make it clear that such criticisms are groundless because they are 
impregnated with a mythological vision of taxation of net income and value-added, 
which does not exist in pure form anywhere. 
CONTENT OF BANK TRANSACTIONS  
Anyone who claims that bank transactions hold no correlation with taxpaying 
capacity (and therefore contain no economic substance) commits an impropriety. 
Such a person does not perceive, or obscures the fact, that he or she is reasoning 
based on an income paradigm, or more precisely, a paradigm of net earnings or 
increased net worth. 
We must underscore this elementary mistake. Though increased net income 
could be chosen as an ideal tax base, it would be abusive to consider it the exclusive 
indicator of taxpaying capacity. On the other hand, though bank transactions may not 
always represent income or increased net worth (albeit this is often the case), this 
does not mean that bank transactions do not indicate taxpaying capacity. 
A good example is a loan. Accounting shows that funds leaving the lender’s net 
worth to enter the borrower’s net worth only to once again return to the lender do not 
trigger a definitive change in the respective net worths of lender and borrower. On 
the other hand, payment for the loan (interest) decreases the net worth of the 
borrower, and materially increases the net worth of the lender. So it is fair that 
income tax should not be levied against the value of the loan, but rather only against 
the net income from interest, earned by the lender. The borrower, who pays the 
interest, would be permitted to deduct the interest as a cost or expense. 
Now, this logical routine, which is valid within the mental universe of income 
tax, cannot exclude other dimensions of the phenomenon. 
Obviously, the loan has economic substance; it is a manifestation of credit, a 
quantifiable economic asset. It also indicates the taxpaying capacity of its holder. 
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This asset, the foundation of financial leverage, can be used, spent, invested, made 
profitable, multiplied, renewed, “rolled”, and exploited economically. It is not 
income, so it would be absurd to tax it at high income tax rates, of between 15 and 
27.5. But it constitutes a bank transaction, utilization of capital, which is indisputably 
an economic act. In fact, it is already subject to Brazil’s IOF tax [Tax on Financial 
Transactions], with a low rate, and until 2007 to the CPMF [Provisional Contribution 
on Financial Transactions], both of which would be replaced by the proposed bank 
transaction tax.  
Now let us take the common case of a middle class wage earner whose only 
income is his monthly salary deposited into a bank account. Under normal 
conditions, this citizen will not play around with his money, needlessly withdrawing 
it and re-depositing it into the same bank account, over and over again, knowing he 
would be charged the tax repeatedly and pointlessly. If he makes a loan, the funds 
will leave the account and return to it, just once. Normally funds will be withdrawn 
only once, for consumption, leisure, charity, equipment, maintenance or increased 
productive capacity, or for savings and investments. 
Funds withdrawn for financial investment will not be subject to the proposed 
tax, as the comments in the section below will make clear. Under the current system, 
the remainder, after allowed deductions and on amounts exceeding the exemption 
limits, would be subject to income tax, at rates of between 15 and 27.5%, and until 
2007 to the CPMF – in addition to other indirect taxes included in the prices of 
products and services consumed. 
Under the proposed Federal Single Tax system, the funds would be subject to 
the bank transaction tax, the rate for which would be nearly 10 times less than the 
income tax rate, in addition to indirect taxes included in the prices of goods and 
services consumed, which presumably would be less than what they are today. 
Currently, half or more of taxes included in the prices of products and services are 
pocketed by sellers, and not passed on to the Treasury. These become illegitimate 
income appropriated by criminal businessmen and disloyal competitors. 
Because it is intended, in principle, to keep the tax burden unchanged, and since 
that revenue does not rain down from the sky, but does curtail the economy’s 
disposable income, clearly there is no magic. Any tax that ceases to flow from one 
place will have to emerge from other sources. And since tax avoidance is very high 
in Brazil, we should expect that the universally applied bank transaction tax would 
produce a healthy redistribution of tax incidence, and a subsequent easing of fiscal 
pressure. Reduction of taxes included in product prices will tend to occur as soon as 
business owners cease to act as tax depositories and as soon as tax evaders, now 
subjected to the inescapable bank transaction tax, are included in the taxpayer 
universe. 
The case of a self-employed professional, whose earnings takes the form of 
numerous checks in small denominations, part of which will be used to pay 
suppliers, will differ little, if at all, from the case of the wage earner. In both cases, 
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the taxpayer will feel unjustly taxed on that portion of his gross earnings that are paid 
out as costs, such as checks paid to third party suppliers. Those taxpayers whose 
business structure involves large bank transaction volumes that do not represent 
earnings will be hurt; namely, those enterprises, whether individual or corporate, that 
manipulate third-party funds, involving high costs and minimal margins. These 
enterprises would suffer – and perhaps even become impracticable – under this type 
of tax. 
It might be fair, albeit not simple, to avoid this effect. On the other hand, this 
effect would not necessarily be a bad thing, insofar as it would discourage a whole 
range of speculative businesses that are devoid of true economic usefulness, since 
they involve using assets in order to seek profits in the intermediation game. 
Adoption of the tax base comprised of bank transactions is perfectly compatible 
with building adjustment mechanisms capable of making the tax’s incidence fairer 
and better tailored to the diversity of individual circumstances. But, we should make 
clear that any adjustment or individualization of the tax presupposes that paper tax 
returns and interfacing with the federal revenue agency will survive. In other words, 
they would exclude the primary advantages of the tax, which are simplicity and low 
compliance cost. 
Perhaps it is preferable to be taxed in a less sophisticated manner, thus avoiding 
auditing procedures of fiscal obligations, than to be taxed in a fine-tuned system 
while having to accept a lasting and costly relationship of dependency with the 
federal revenue agencies. The authors of the Federal Single Tax amendment place 
their bets that preference will be given to simplicity, low operational costs, abolition 
of the paper-ridden declaratory system, and elimination of all subjectivity in taxation 
procedures. 
DEFERRED TAXATION OF FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS 
A tax should not interfere in the market cost of money. Neither should it drive a 
wedge into the returns of financial assets. The proposed tax (Federal Single Tax) 
postulates financial neutrality. 
In previous versions of his tax model, Professor Cintra had envisioned a system 
of mirror bank accounts directly tied to checking accounts. Funds used for 
investment in the financial or capital markets would move through these mirror bank 
accounts without being taxed, except upon returning to their respective checking 
accounts. Business done in the financial and capital markets would be protected as if 
encapsulated, beyond the reach of any tax. Upon return to the bank checking 
account, net earnings from the investment would be taxed at a special rate, which in 
practice would represent a tax on earnings and capital gains. This would be the sole 
surviving remnant of the income tax. 
In the current Federal Single Tax version, income tax disappears completely, 
taking advantage of the protective capsule, which translates into the principle of tax 
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deferment, a necessity in a parallel accounting system. And the tax’s universality 
requirement would be preserved. In other words, funds withdrawn for further 
financial investment would not be taxed, but funds withdrawn for consumption 
would be taxed, regardless of their origin. If the funds withdrawn for consumption 
originated from financial investment, the amount of net returns withdrawn for 
consumption (and only that amount) would be taxed. Adventures and misadventures 
with financial papers would be emptied of any tax dimension. Bank transactions not 
earmarked for investment would be taxed. Taxation would be uniform, generalized, 
and proportional, regardless of the origin of funds. 
The proposed model is not incompatible with a differentiated financial earnings 
and capital gains tax, but this would mean systematic control and assessment of net 
gains, which is contrary to the simplicity of the model. Therefore, we have a tax base 
that does not discriminate against its content – transacted funds – based on the legal 
or economic condition of their origin. But it does discriminate against the manner the 
funds are used, protecting savings and financial investment. The proposed tax base 
would be strictly limited to bank transactions not earmarked for debt, equity or 
securities. 
CONSUMED INCOME 
With the preceding observations in mind, it becomes crystal clear that for 
individuals the single bank transaction tax acts as a light tax on gross income, 
preserving financial investments. That is, it is applicable to gross income that is not 
invested (consumed income). The bank transaction tax could be conceived as a 
practicable formula for approximating the Kaldor tax. 
The expenditure tax, or consumed income tax, developed by Nicholas Kaldor in 
1955 and later picked up by James Meade, the British economist and 1977 Nobel 
Laureate, has excited the imaginations of tax reformers, though it constantly runs 
into serious implementation roadblocks. To choose as a tax base those bank 
transactions that take place outside of financial and capital markets, which is the 
nucleus of the proposal now being examined, means opting for a simplified variant 
of the expenditure tax. 
The tax system that would stem from this, once its functionality is proven, could 
potentially be apt to evolve into a progressive personal consumption income tax, 
which is the dream of modern tax reformers. All that would be needed in the future, 
as long as organized and mature demand exists for such, would be to make some 
concessions to supplemental complexities, in exchange for refinement of the tax’s 
equity feature. 
VICES, LUXURIES, THE ENVIRONMENT, INTERVENTIONIST 
TAXATION 
The study of comparative tax systems highlights the tendency to overtax 
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consumer items that could be classified as luxuries, vices, legally restricted 
consumption such as pornography and weapons, pollutants, non-renewable fuels, 
jewels, art objects, and durable goods. The list goes on to include cigarettes, 
alcoholic beverages, perfumes, drugs, controlled substances, items of conspicuous 
consumption, automobiles, pleasure boats, and sophisticated electronics. Once the 
single federal tax were adopted, with the corresponding proposed extinction of the 
IPI, possibly followed in the future by the extinction of the ICMS (a state value-
added tax), prices of that list of goods would become cheaper, which could be 
considered, under the circumstances, undesirable. These are situations that public 
policymakers might regret, and may be used to illustrate the ineptitude of the bank 
transaction tax as a regulatory instrument of intervention. 
It is appropriate here to again underscore the rich potential of the current tax law 
system, defined in Article 149 of the Federal Constitution, which proponents of the 
federal single tax have made efforts to preserve. 
The CIDE tax, an “interventionist contribution on economic domain”, which 
functions under highly flexible parameters, including its ability to avail itself of 
bases identical to those of other taxes, both current and extinct, is the perfect solution 
for filling these loopholes. It is an underused and recently rediscovered tax. We now 
have the fully functioning precedent of a CIDE on fuels.  
A similar CIDE on cigarettes, for instance, would be appropriate. It is obvious 
that removing taxes on cigarettes would be disastrous for public health policy and a 
significant loss of public revenue. Current statistics show a deficit between tax 
revenue from cigarettes and public expenditures incurred in treatment of cigarette-
related diseases. The CIDE could easily be calibrated to cover this deficit. It has the 
advantage of being an earmarked tax linked to specific behaviors, which gives it an 
interventionist effectiveness which is much more precise than that of taxes on 
production and consumption.  
The CIDE would be the appropriate instrument to replace, even overcome, the 
regretful absence of the selective IPI, the abolition of which is being proposed. The 
major advantage is that the CIDE does not have an exclusive revenue-raising 
purpose and can be fine-tuned to achieve well-defined intervention goals. It is also 
the appropriate instrument, within our constitutional framework, for incorporating 
the environmental taxes promoted by the OECD, which are now springing up all 
over the world. 
A new CIDE, which would be crucial to the systemic equilibrium of the 
proposed model, would be the CET (tax equalization contribution), which then-
Deputy Marcos Cintra introduced as a supplemental bill, aiming to add a levy on 
prices of imported products and services, equivalent to the cumulative effect of the 
single federal tax on national production. This cumulative effect would be estimated 
by using the matrix of inter-industrial flows developed and published by the IBGE 
[Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics]. 
The use of a tax rebate as a means of exonerating exports, applied at the time of 
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shipment abroad, and the CET, which is applied on imports, are basic requirements 
for the bank transaction tax to be practicable. But this is a regulatory issue, the 
generic guidelines for which could be established through supplemental legislation. 
Extinction of the IOF, the financial operations tax, would not be indispensable 
to the model, since it is inherently a regulatory tax, whereas the bank transaction tax 
is expected to replace all revenue-raising taxes. The proposal satisfies the intuitive 
yearning for simplicity, even taking into consideration that the tax base of the IOF 
broadly intersects with the bank transaction tax. Should it not be preserved, and its 
extinction cause uneasiness to the monetary authority, which eventually would desire 
a tax instrument to regulate financial markets, it would be perfectly in order to get 
hold (also in this sector) of the CIDE. 
PROPERTY TAXATION 
Under the proposed model, extinction of the ITR [rural land tax] would not be 
indispensable, because the ITR serves as a predominantly regulatory tax, producing 
only nominal revenue. Again, in this case the proposed bank transaction tax would 
fulfill a simplifying function, considering the historical ineptitude of this complicated 
tax instrument in Brazil. It could be justifiably eliminated altogether, consistent with 
the paperless aspect of the proposed model. 
Truthfully, the ITR has been auctioned off by the Union, either to states or 
municipalities, during its most recent attempts at tax reform. The reason for this is 
found in the difficulties faced in implementing the tax against the interests of a 
politically influential segment of rural landowners. But it would be unusual, within 
the context of comparative tax systems, if Brazil were to devote itself to taxing urban 
real estate and omit taxation of rural properties, even if only to repress speculation in 
which land is amassed as a reserve of value. The elimination of any land tax 
instrument in Brazil could appear detrimental to the international image of a country 
that has already been negatively distinguished as a leader in inequality of income and 
wealth, and in insufficient use of its agricultural potential, with serious turmoil in its 
rural areas. The ITR could be preserved. However, should its elimination seem 
appropriate, nothing prevents the CIDE from replacing it, with revenue earmarked 
for administration of land reform. 
One weakness acknowledged by scholars who have carefully studied consumed-
income tax models is that landowners find themselves in a privileged position, 
compared to those who do not own land. These privileges include being able to avail 
themselves of loopholes in order to circumvent taxation. The proposed federal single 
tax is aimed at discouraging the acquisition and transfer of non-financial assets. 
Funds used for real estate acquisition, and for its sale, would be taxed whenever non-
financial assets are again mobilized. 
To a certain extent, the model can be accused of favoring asset freezing, since it 
favors directing saved income toward investment in equity and securities. 
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Because the model is initially to be circumscribed to the federal sector, state and 
municipal rural land taxes would remain in existence, as would the tax on transfer of 
assets among the living or following death. It is worth noting that globalization tends 
to promote resumption of non-financial asset taxation precisely because of its 
inaptitude for cross-border mobility. 
Doctrine points to taxation of personal wealth as the antidote against the above-
mentioned asset immobilization. It is also with this in mind that Maurice Allais 
recommended taxation of capital. Taxes on wealth have this peculiarity, that they tax 
the fruition of wealth, encouraging it to be mobilized and to produce profits, 
penalizing immobilization. In other words, they do the opposite of what the proposed 
federal single tax would do. One could counterbalance the other. 
Thus, a tax on wealth, which is being suppressed in Brazil without ever having 
come into force, could perhaps be preserved, despite its declaratory characteristic, for 
which the authors of the proposed federal single tax have little appreciation. But it 
should be pointed out that the wealth tax would affect a small number of individuals 
who own far greater assets than average, perhaps 100,000 individuals. As such, it 
would serve as a social and progressive counterweight to the proposed model, with 
no great ambition as a revenue producer. 
REGRESSIVENESS, PROGRESSIVENESS, PROPORTIONALITY, AND 
NEUTRALITY 
The often praised redistributive effect of tax systems has turned out to be 
somewhat disappointing in most countries. It would seem to make more sense to 
admit that when there is political will to redistribute, the most effective instrument is 
budgetary allocations, not the tax system. 
The most repeated criticism of the federal single tax is that it would be 
regressive. This, however, is not the right argument to engage in, but rather whether 
this regressiveness might not also be much smaller and less harmful than the 
regressiveness of the taxes it proposes to replace. 
The simulations Professor Marcos Cintra has published support this opinion, 
and recent studies published by the Federal Revenue and by other experts 
corroborate it. Furthermore, it has been empirically verified that, contrary to what 
had been thought, cumulative taxes on gross sales (the PIS/PASEP/Cofins taxes) 
demonstrated almost uniform and proportionally distributed incidence in all income 
brackets, whereas, the IPI, a selective value-added tax, rich with exemptions and 
differentiated rates, reveals an almost imperceptible progressiveness, as does the 
ICMS [a value-added state tax on circulation of goods]. 
The paper, “Progressiveness in consumption”, published by the Federal 
Revenue, after revealing evidence that cumulative taxes behave quite like an ideal 
VAT, from the perspective of their impact on consumers, states that the irregularities 
of the ICMS and the IPI, both in their legislative profile and in their practical 
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application, fall short of being the ideal VAT. The report concludes by suggesting 
that VAT supporters should increase their caution.190 
This reinforces the thesis that moderate cumulative taxes that are simple, 
uniform, and easily audited are less distortionary than value-added taxes usually with 
higher rates, full of exemptions, and always subject to heavy tax avoidance. 
For its part, Brazil’s income tax is falsely progressive. Its base is highly 
restricted and irregular, and the progressiveness of the tax rates by income brackets 
is heavily mitigated, and does not extend to capital income. Informal markets and tax 
avoidance predominate. Rent earners, entrepreneurs, and self-employed 
professionals are clearly favored when compared to wage earners. The theoretically 
fairest tax in Brazil is actually extremely inequitable. As we have stated earlier, it is 
actually a tax that is overwhelmingly levied on one restricted segment, middle class 
wage earners. 
The choice of a comprehensive, regular, uniform base that is difficult to evade – 
by itself – reduces the regressiveness of the system. Replacement of the income tax 
with the proposed federal single tax would mean an immediate broadening of the 
taxpaying universe, from the fourteen who pay the personal income tax to the 27 
who pay the CPMF. 
By incorporating into the taxpaying population this vast segment of tax avoiders 
and those involved in the informal market not usually reached by the traditional tax 
systems, the pressure on actual taxpayers would both spread and be eased, providing 
a fairer profile to the fiscal system. 
The remaining 180 million people, who do not have the possibility of making 
bank transactions, will not experience any direct effect of the proposed tax on their 
gross income. This, undeniably, is enough to make it clear that the system has some 
degree of progressiveness. 
The nature of the system within which the federal single tax functions is 
compatible with policy measures that could be used to give the system an even 
stronger progressiveness. Even the authors of the proposal stress the ease of applying 
progressive rates as a function of transaction volume by a single accountholder 
within a given period of time. Another possibility would be for employers to assume 
the onus of the tax on paid wages, up to a given amount. 
Lastly, we must address the objection concerning the possible allocative impact 
of the bank transaction tax on production chains. There is no way to avoid such an 
impact without sacrificing the proposed tax’s simplicity, which is its fundamental 
feature. The impact of the CPMF at the rate of 0.38% seems negligible, but it would 
become much more noticeable if the rate were ten times higher. 
Professor Marcos Cintra’s studies aim to demonstrate that the resulting 
                                                 
190[SECRETARIA DA RECEITA FEDERAL, 2002(a)] p.17. 
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distortions would be less than those that stem from adoption of value-added taxes 
(ICMS + IPI + PIS/Cofins) with rates that add to 34% or more, as will be 
demonstrated ahead. It is almost intuitive that it would be practically impossible to 
avoid widespread evasion of a consumption tax of that magnitude. We hope that 
future empirical studies will be able to better illumine this aspect of the problem. 
WHO BENEFICITS? 
The most obvious beneficiaries of the proposed federal single tax system are the 
habitual victims of our current non-comprehensive income tax. Middle and upper 
class wage earners in the formal economy would experience significant increases in 
disposable income. 
A corollary would be that a vast segment of economic agents would be included 
in the taxpayer pool. As it is now, these agents manage to circumvent income tax, 
either because they are exempt or immune to them, or because they are in the 
informal economy, or even because they are tax avoiders or evaders. A Federal 
Revenue study using 1998 data reveals 16.9 million people exempt from income tax; 
and 11.7 million non-registered economic agents – all of which would be included in 
the pool of bank transaction taxpayers.  
The bank transaction tax would decrease the current under-taxation of financial 
investments income and of capital gains. Profits and dividends would begin to be 
taxed upon distribution, but the personal income tax (IRPJ) would be abolished, 
resulting in a significant net gain for anyone who presently pays it and a loss for 
those who circumvented it, or who made use of irregular methods of profit 
distribution. Beneficiaries of income tax waivers, special regimes, and localized 
deductions would lose. For example, the tax advantage that loan capital has over own 
capital would disappear, with the dissolution of tax benefits for indebtedness. 
The cost of labor would decrease significantly, with the discontinuation of 
employer social contributions and income tax withholding of wage earners. This 
effect will greatly enhance employability, as well as business operations, especially 
in labor-intensive industries. Business tax planning would be simplified and tax 
administration costs, whether personal or outsourced, would greatly decrease. 
In addition to these general issues, the breakdown of the distribution of gains 
and losses is the most challenging issue to be discussed on tax reform, and deserves 
further research and analysis by all sectors involved. 
QUANTITATIVE LEAP AND QUALITATIVE PROBLEMS 
If the Federal Single Tax is approved, it is not the bank transaction tax itself that 
may cause apprehension, but rather the level of the rate to be applied. Because the 
quantitative leap would be sizeable, up to ten times the present rate, it is likely that 
the qualitative dimensions of this tax could undergo significant changes. 
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The CPMF experience, since 1992, has already caused a strong impact, 
throwing aside traditional arguments that express hesitancy and aversion concerning 
a bank transaction tax. Its discontinuation, as of 2008, was caused primarily for 
political reasons, rather than for solid economic arguments. 
Andréa Lemgruber and others have conducted research on the impact of the 
CPMF which, since 2001 have been published on the Federal Revenue’s website. 
These studies effectively disprove those arguments born of incredulity and antipathy, 
which stained a great amount of paper during the past decade. 
Experience confirms, and the paper published by the IMF No. 01/67 
acknowledged, that the tax, at least with moderate rates, as has been the case in 
Brazil, has been successful. It did not cause bank disintermediation, did not increase 
the preference for use of paper currency, did not cause a fall in the use of bank 
checks or debit cards, did not inflate prices, did not raise the cost of money, did not 
hurt investments, did not trigger dramatic restructuring of productive cycles, nor did 
it increase the regressiveness of the tax system. And it had little influence on the 
competitiveness of Brazil’s products abroad. 
But it must be remarked that the proposed bank transaction tax’s hike to a new 
level is not equivalent to a higher CPMF, merely adding new tax obligations to those 
already in place. Rather, it means something wholly different. It means having a 
bank transaction tax that replaces almost all other federal taxes and contributions 
currently in effect. It would imply a beneficial replacement of the present tax burden 
for another with a distribution profile that is purposefully more widespread. As such, 
it is presumably more balanced and milder. 
What we want to foresee is the public’s reaction, not to an increase in the 
current tax burden, but rather to its restructuring, with a new profile that will 
ultimately take a friendlier shape. A ten-time multiplication of the CPMF tax rate, 
that would be necessary for implementing the Federal Single Tax, would obviously 
be intolerable if it were merely an add-on to current taxes. That would effectively 
double the federal tax burden – completely out of question. 
This is an ambitious target. Its implementation may require (at the time this text 
was written) a tax rate of approximately 3.5% (1.75% on bank account debits, 1.75% 
on credits), to be applied to each bank transaction. This estimation is the result of a 
somewhat simple extrapolation based on the current pattern of bank transactions and 
on current productivity of the CPMF which applies a 0.38% rate, with predicted 
revenue of 20 billion reais annually.  
It is likely that the profile of bank transactions might undergo some changes in 
response to a rate that is ten times higher. But it is also possible that the tax’s 
productivity will increase, in response to more severe fraud deterrent regulation. 
Fraud already detected and eliminated by the Central Bank and the Federal Revenue 
allow for estimated revenue that is potentially 10 to 20% higher than current 
estimated revenue of the CPMF. 
This basic calculation should also be adjusted to the proposed extinction of all 
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exemptions and immunities, except for reciprocal immunities among political 
entities of the Federation. Such increased revenue would probably compensate for 
the drop in revenue caused by the suggested system of taxation for the financial and 
capital markets. 
In view of these generic parameters, it is clear that, for the time being, the 
search for more precise estimates would be a useless exercise. The only way to 
perform a conclusive empirical test of the model is to follow its implementation. 
This reveals the proposed tax’s flank most exposed to criticism, albeit subordinated 
to highly hypothetical reasoning. 
The most skeptical critics will continue to place their bets on the assumption 
that it will be impossible to tax bank transactions at rates higher than 0.5%, or at 
most 1%, and they predict society will mobilize on a large scale to find ways to 
evade taxation of bank transactions. 
The most optimistic critics will say that such figures are superstitious, and that 
everything will run smoothly, as it did with the 0.38% rate, because potential forms 
of evasion had already been exhausted or overcome. 
A realistic posture must acknowledge that efforts to avoid taxation are normal, 
and predictably will increase since, as the rate increases, so do the rewards for 
avoidance. Tax avoidance measures that are not attractive at the current 0.38 rate 
could become much more attractive if the rate is multiplied ten times. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to ponder the viability of implanting effective deterrent measures, and to 
consider ways to prevent attempts to dodge the tax. 
The measures considered within the legislative bill of the proposed tax, such as 
prohibiting endorsement of checks to third parties, demanding premiums to those 
who write bearer checks, punishing of those who write them, discouraging the use of 
cash, and others that may be proposed, are all infra-constitutional and regulatory 
measures in the commercial, banking, criminal, and administrative areas, and 
therefore extend beyond the bounds of a constitutional amendment. 
It would be inappropriate to dwell into the details of these measures at this time, 
neither should they detract us from the focus of the discussion which addresses, not a 
complete fiscal package, but rather a political choice among taxation models in a 
democratic discussion within the Legislative. 
Nevertheless, along with the proposal’s economic and political dimensions, 
discussion of the requirements for institutional analysis is also indispensable. 
TAX REVENUE: AN ESSENTIAL FUNCTION OF THE STATE. THE 
PERMANENT INSTITUTION SURVIVES ANY CIRCUMSTANCIAL 
SPECIALIZATION 
The saying that “taxes are, first and foremost, administration” still holds true. A 
clear-thinking tax analyst should always give priority to the conditions for 
implementation of a given tax, relative to the eventual qualities of its theoretical 
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profile. For example, Brazil’s income tax is sharply disassociated from its theoretical 
paradigm and from its explicit principles, as contained in the Constitution. This is 
true because of the fragility of the administrative apparatus in charge of its 
execution. 
A necessary and indispensable assumption of any realistic tax reform is the 
existence, current or potential, of an institutional apparatus that is empowered to 
enact the adopted legislative framework. This means that prior analysis of the 
institutions is fundamental. Without a solid fiscal apparatus there can be no State. A 
federal revenue agency is a basic component in the nuclear structure of the State, an 
indispensable requirement for good governance. 
Tax policies vary, fiscal experiences come and go, but a federal revenue 
apparatus must be the filter that collects the product of this historical alchemy. It 
would be imprudent to weaken the federal revenue agency. The wisdom of tax 
scholars has never ceased to stress that a good tax depends, first and foremost, on 
administration. The federal revenue agency must be preserved and cultivated as a 
permanent institution. 
Occasional specializations, which depend on whatever tax policy is in place at a 
given time, should never exclude a bureaucratic structure that is well founded, solid, 
diversified, continuous, capable of accumulating knowledge, history, techniques, and 
values. It must be capable of critical observation, researching, monitoring world 
events, evaluating, adapting, forecasting, and thinking in the long term. The 
triggering of a given specialization by a circumstantial fiscal experience is no 
justification for dismantling other components of the taxing apparatus. 
Of course, it would be unrealistic to think that implementation of an hegemonic 
tax, however simple its administration might be at the operational level, would lead 
to extinction of the federal revenue agency. It would be unwise to feed this illusion 
born of romantic liberalism uncommitted to the responsibilities of public 
administration. It would be unrealistic to suppose that a transaction tax (or any other 
tax) would signal the end of fiscal administration and the apocalypse of bureaucracy. 
Technical analysis of the proposed tax should take care to undo any artificial 
amalgams between this interesting tax administration experience (the federal single 
tax) and any eventual leanings of its sympathizers towards the “minimum State” and 
similar ideologies. The bank transaction tax does not mean, a priori, any necessary 
ties with ultraliberal, anti-bureaucratic, anti-Statist, or anarchical postures. Nor is it 
in any way incompatible with the social-democracy worldview or with the realities 
of the “techno bureaucratic production mode”. Tax agencies are an essential public 
duty that must reach beyond circumstantial fiscal policy, just as diplomatic 
bureaucracy surpasses occasional choices in foreign policy. 
NO TAX IS IMUNE TO EVASION 
The Federal Revenue has prosecuted a number of large banks for practicing 
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premeditated fraudulent procedures that lend themselves to evasion of the CPMF, in 
amounts of approximately 5 billion reais, though this figure is expected to reach 8 
billion reais. 
The banks claim that they were exercising a legal form of tax avoidance. They 
were doing so to benefit large clients, probably in exchange for some reciprocal 
benefit. These banks used their legal authorization to endorse checks issued by large 
clients and to transfer large values to the bank’s bond and securities distributors. 
These distributors, in turn, credited the accounts of the vendor’s of those clients, 
without paying the CPMF, thus bypassing a bank transaction in the client’s checking 
accounts which, otherwise, would have been charged the tax. 
This is a typical maneuver that makes no economic sense, showing patent 
irregularity on the part of the securities distributors whose business objective does 
not include making payments to vendors of the bank’s clients and their associates. 
The sole purpose of the maneuver was to evade the tax. This ploy, which of course 
reduces tax revenue, also distorts the distributive impact of the tax and aggravates its 
regressiveness, since it favors large clients to the detriment of others.  
The maneuver was relatively elementary and predictable, as is the 
transformation of bearer checks into quasi-money and other formulas – fraudulent or 
not – for avoiding the tax. Banks fear the loss of a formidable flow of funds, and feel 
a strong temptation to take advantage of this situation, if not outright appropriation 
of some residual sums for their own benefit. 
The only way to prevent or repress the natural propensity to evade the tax is to 
have a well-equipped federal revenue agency that acts persistently, even fiercely, to 
deter it. The truth is that there is not, there has never been, and there will never be a 
completely fraud-proof tax system. It is an illusion to imagine that any tax system 
could do away with a tough auditing structure. 
A simplified tax system might require a more light-duty federal revenue 
apparatus that is more specialized and targeted. The hegemonic bank transaction tax 
would certainly relieve the general citizenry of any worries with the federal revenue 
agency, which would direct its efforts to auditing banks. This might explain bank 
reticence about this tax. 
Thus, it is impertinent to view the struggle for a bank transaction tax as a sort of 
vendetta against the alleged oppression of a voracious federal revenue agency. This 
feeling would only fit that limited segment of the population that is subjected to 
localized tax surcharges, but it would not be a shared sentiment among the 
population as a whole, which is invisible to the federal revenue agency. The federal 
revenue bureaucracy, first of all, does not have a genetic predisposition against a 
bank transaction tax. Secondly, it would not be disposable, even in the ideal scenario 
of a single tax on bank transactions. 
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THE BANKING SYSTEM: DOMAIN OF THE TREASURY´S AGENTS 
Most developed countries depend on traditional tax collection systems for 
public revenue. Therefore, due to respect for traditions, cultural preferences, 
collective resistance by agents of the public treasury, or strategic posturing, those 
countries view Brazil’s bank transaction tax experience with reticence. It is highly 
unlikely that, over the medium term, the population of these countries would agree to 
turn over to private banks the function of public tax collection. They prefer to 
tolerate the costs of heavy federal revenue bureaucracy – perhaps antiquated, but 
reliable, under oath, and imbued with the spirit of public service – than to turn this 
traditionally public function over to what many see as organizations of mercenary 
money merchants.191 
The fallacious claim that “if the bank transaction tax were good, it would 
already have been adopted in developed countries,” errs precisely because it ignores 
one tiny detail, to wit, that the bank transaction tax can only be economically viable, 
and can only be competitive as a tax revenue instrument, in a country that enjoys 
advanced and well-distributed banking information technology. Furthermore, that 
country must also consent to delegate the collection of public revenue to the banking 
system. It is this very requirement, which Brazil fully meets, that prevents other 
developed countries – despite their growing curiosity about the bank transaction tax 
– from adopting this technique. 
Whether they, or we, are correct depends on historical, social, administrative, 
institutional, and political factors that would be too lengthy to explore here. But it is 
important to understand that mere economic analysis is insufficient for deciding on 
tax reform. Institutional analysis is also important, and often decisive. 
Any sensible observer would agree that the State, which embodies the public 
interest, and particularly the public treasury, cannot be subjected to being brought to 
its knees by the unpredictable capriciousness of banking operators or by the 
extremely self-oriented interests of the finance barons. 
This reservation, does not exclude, however, acknowledgement of the lengthy 
experience Brazil has had using the banking system for tax collection. No serious 
setbacks have been recorded in three decades of experience. It is possible to believe 
that the Central Bank and the Federal Revenue can satisfactorily control the banking 
system. But this should not prevent concerns over what could happen in a scenario of 
an eventually weak government and lax institutions. 
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 To illustrate, in France, a country smaller than Brazil, the Direction de la Comptabilité Publique is 
the agency responsible for the public treasury, for collection and control of public revenue. The 
agency has approximately 50,000 agents, another nearly 80,000 agents in charge of federal taxes 
(Direction des Impôts), and nearly 50,000 customs agents (Direction de la Douane). These statistics 
illustrate that Brazil’s federal bureaucracy is comparatively lightweight, and could not function 
without the help of the banking system.  
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If the banking system were to assimilate the functions of the public treasury, it 
would give banks enormous bargaining power. At the same time, it would subject 
them to the discomforts of government investigation and control. This is the reason 
bank directors still maintain a reticent and ambiguous posture concerning their 
playing this role. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Since the end of the authoritarian regime in the mid-1980, Congress has had a 
difficult time overcoming its timidity about exercising its prerogative to evaluate and 
influence tax policymaking in Brazil. It is a verifiable fact that even today nearly 
90% of all tax legislation derives from the executive branch. 
Executive branches of government are growing by gargantuan proportions, 
while legislative branches are shrinking. This is a common phenomenon throughout 
the world. Therefore, of course, no one is thinking of competing with the formidable 
machine of the executive branch in the complexities of tax execution. It would not be 
reasonable to expect the legislative branch to build complete fiscal systems. But the 
definition of more generic guidelines for tax policy falls fully within the scope of the 
legislative branch, in response to social demands. 
The proposal for the “federal single tax” has merit in that it constitutes a 
formulation entirely and genuinely consummated within the environs of the 
legislative branch. Of course, notwithstanding the exceptional scientific 
qualifications of its major proponent, it cannot pretend to embody an exhaustive 
fiscal system. But it does outline the generic makeup of a complete tax model, which 
is offered as a viable alternative to the obvious impasse in the tax reform proposed in 
PEC No. 175/95, and others that came after it. 
In order for the proposed model to be appreciated, it is not necessary that it be 
propped up with exhaustive regulatory detail and exact numerical forecasts. This, of 
course, is not possible without the cooperation of the executive branch. 
The proposal of a VAT, for its part, despite originating in the executive branch, 
cannot guarantee its results. Every time tax policy guidelines have been approved, 
approval has come with the unspoken understanding that the taxes adopted would 
lead to heavy tax avoidance, the repression of which would be incumbent on fiscal 
agencies. Public policy choices cannot rely on advance guarantees of full execution. 
They need reasonable indicators of viability. 
The 1965 tax reform, which is still Brazil’s major tax benchmark, was adopted 
even prior to the formation of institutional agencies capable of implementing it. 
These were formed slowly over subsequent years, which meant that the tax reform 
did not enjoy immediate and automatic effectiveness. Guidelines were defined first. 
Conditions for implementation came later. 
The institutional scenario is different now, much more sophisticated, capable of 
speedy approval of the new proposed model, without apprehension about continuity, 
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even if only because the current economic situation would not tolerate gaps in 
providing public revenues. Finally, this is about appreciating an innovative option for 
tax policy, based predominately on bank transactions that do not represent savings, 
offered as a viable solution to the impasse in tax reform. 
What is left to decide is whether it meets society’s demand for a tax system that 
is broader and whose incidence is more equitably distributed, that is simpler, smooth, 
universal, cheap, effective, and difficult to evade. 192 
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 The Constitutional Amendment Bill, PEC 474/2001 was unanimously accepted by the two 
Committees in the Chamber of Deputies responsible for appreciating it, the Judiciary Committee and 
the Special Tax Reform Committee. It is also under appreciation in the Brazilian Senate under an 
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5 
FURTHER ISSUES ON TAX REFORM IN BRAZIL 
INTRODUCTION 
After publication of the article entitled “For a tax revolution”, in the Folha de 
São Paulo, in January 1990, the Single Tax proposal contained in that article gave 
rise to a controversy that deeply involved public opinion, and brought fresh air to the 
technical debate on the subject. 193 
The article held that the Brazilian economic situation demanded a sweeping tax 
reform. This is still true nowadays. It called attention to a wrong turn taken by the 
debate. Tax reform was being treated in a restricted manner, merely as a program for 
guaranteeing tax revenue. Measures such as fighting tax evasion, reducing tax 
incentives and subsidies, and tax expenditure planning were frequently seen not as 
objectives in themselves, but merely as means to increase government revenue and, 
therefore, to balance the public deficit and to reduce inflationary pressures resulting 
from constant budget disequilibrium. 
Issues related to the efficiency of tax mechanisms, their equity, costs, incidence 
patterns, and other important questions were given secondary attention. Taxation was 
assumed to be a necessary evil, affording few options for improvement and 
innovation. Further, the simplifying and highly stylized postulates of neoclassical 
economic theory were uncritically accepted, producing theoretically efficient models 
from a distributive and allocative perspective but devoid of sound judgment about 
the realism of their assumptions. 
The complexity of Brazil’s tax structure had already been a subject of 
discussion for decades. The countless forms of taxation (such as income taxes, value-
added taxes, estate taxes, not to mention taxes on services, quasi-fiscal contributions, 
compulsory loans, fee surcharges, etc.) made it absolutely impossible to arrive at any 
trustworthy conclusion about the characteristics of Brazil’s tax system, such as its 
alleged regressiveness, its efficiency, etc. 
The text on the Single Tax contained a forceful demand for a broad tax reform 
that would encompass all of these issues, but in a context in which the formulators of 
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 For a comprehensive discussion on the main controversies involved in tax reform in the world see 
[OWENS, 2005]; concerning the Single Tax bill, and the controversies that were raised in Brazil, with 
arguments for and against the bill, see [CINTRA, 1994(a), 1994(b), 1994(c)].  
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economic policy would not be constrained to existing fiscal and operational 
procedures. 
The idea of a Single Tax polarized the debate on tax reform and triggered two 
major reactions. On the one hand, were those who supported a bureaucracy-free 
system using the Single Tax as an important foundation in the debate. On the other, 
were the supporters of the orthodox paper-driven declaratory tax structure, who 
unleashed a violent criticism against the single-taxers. 
In 1992, Roberto Campos published an article in the O Estado de S. Paulo titled, 
“Exógenos e papirófilos”,194 in which he explained in his inimitable style the 
important points that clearly differentiate the two currents that emerged as the debate 
intensified. In order to synthesize the issue, he labeled the two groups as the 
“exogenous” and the “papyrophyles” distinguishing the first, who argue for a simple, 
evasion-free structure, from the second group, that calls for maintaining, albeit with 
improvements, the current complex and bureaucracy-laden system. 
The first group rejects paper-driven declaratory taxes. Such classical taxes force 
the taxpayer to submit tax returns and the revenue agency to assess and audit 
taxpayers. The compliance and auditing costs are enormous and assessment involves 
subjectivity, making the temptation to evade almost irresistible. 
Roberto Campos states, “The papyrophyles, who have forgotten that they live in 
the electronic age, love the bureaucracy of documentation. These include income 
and property tax returns, production or consumption invoices, receipts for services, 
and payroll taxes. There is a bureaucratic ‘delirium tremens’. In 1990 alone 1,062 
fiscal instruments were handed down by the Government, including laws, decrees, 
executive orders, and regulatory statements. That is 4.6 new regulations per business 
day! Over 33 accounting books are required, eight accounting ledgers, six corporate 
ledgers, nine fiscal books, six labor volumes, and 24 different tax declarations. There 
are 25 basic labor and social security obligations!” 
It is fair to suspect that today, almost twenty years later, the bureaucratic 
complexity is probably even more intense than it was then. 
Campos estimates that “in 1990, the cost of tax collection for the four revenue 
agency levels – federal, state, municipal, and social security –amounted to US$3 
billion. That is, 3% of GDP. For corporations, the cost of compliance was even 
higher. At least one third of administrative costs, or approximately 5% of GDP, 
represented bureaucratic and legal expenditures involved in paying taxes.” 
The group that argues for the paperless non-declaratory system, called 
“exogenous”, according to Roberto Campos “proposes that different tax bases – 
income, consumption, production, and labor use – be replaced by a single bank 
transaction tax collected through the banking system. This tax would be exogenous, 
automatic, and evasion-proof. It would be exogenous because it would not depend on 
returns filled out by the taxpayer. It would be automatic in that it would be a simple 
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charge against use of banking services. It would be evasion-proof, because in a 
modern economy banks are indispensable, financial supermarkets that offer diverse 
services. This is especially true in Brazil, where there is minimal use of paper 
currency to prevent robbery.”  
According to Roberto Campos, “there are differences in thinking among both 
the ‘exogenous’ and the ‘papyrophyles’. The ‘radical exogenous’ want the bank 
transaction tax as the only revenue tax (only economic regulation taxes would 
survive, such as the import tax). Moderates would allow for six taxes on specific 
products (excises), in addition to the bank transaction tax. Those products are 
energy, fuels, communications, vehicles, alcohol, and tobacco. These taxes are 
collected at the production unit of a limited number of producing agents, exempting 
tax collection at the subsequent stages of trade and consumption, and would not 
require taxpayers (consumers) to fill out returns. 
“There are also the ‘dietetics’ among the papyrophyles. These want to trim 
taxes down, from 15 to five (the Ives Gandra proposal). There are also the fatty, (as 
in the proposal by the Executive Committee on Tax Reform), who would create - 
´horresco referens´ – two new taxes: a tax on corporate assets and a selective tax on 
specific products. The common weakness of all proposals by the ‘papyrophyles’ is 
that they preserve, to greater or lesser degree, the corrupt bureaucracies of revenue 
agencies and the documentation hell faced by the taxpayer.” 
Roberto Campos believed that the only fiscal model worth its salt is the one that 
can claim to possess four desirable features and to avoid five unwelcome effects. The 
desirable features are: 
1. A tax base that is comprehensive enough to circumvent the barrier between 
the informal economy (which pays no taxes), the state economy (which pays 
little), and the fiscal “victims” (payroll employees and formal sector 
companies); 
2. Low tax rates in order to convert tax evasion from an act of cunning into an 
act of outright deceit (in the single bank transactions tax the threshold seems 
to be 2% to 3% on each side of a bank transaction – debtor and creditor); 
3. Automatic, not primitive mechanisms for tax collection; 
4. Instant pass-through of shared revenue to beneficiaries – the Union, the 
states, the municipalities, and social security. 
The five effects to be avoided are: 
1. The underground economy effect – non-registered payments (for example, 
fiscal blackmail and tax evasion ); 
2. The government corruption effect – corruption in intermediation of public 
funds; 
3. The “Tanzi” effect – inflationary corrosion of revenue between time of 
collection and actual availability of funds; 
4. The “papyrus” effect – the proliferation of documents and tax books; 
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5. The “toga” effect – when tax cases logjam the judiciary branch. 
TAX REFORM: THE DISADVANTAGES OF BEING CONSERVATIVE  
The Special Committee on Tax Reform of the Chamber of Deputies began 
working in 1995. At the time, Deputy Mussa Demes presented four versions of the 
Committee’s report. Three of those were not even read for lack of parliamentary 
support. The last version, dated November 1999, was voted and approved by 35 
votes in favor, and one against, that was my solitary vote. This majority approval, 
however, did not mean that a technical or political consensus had been reached.195 
The bill that was approved in the Committee incorporated an orthodox vision of 
tax reform, with three basic characteristics: a) the unification of circulation taxes 
(ICMS, IPI, and ISS); b) the elimination of cumulative social contributions; and c) 
the creation of a comprehensive VAT that would merge all those eliminated taxes 
and contributions. The Committee assumed one commitment, that of maintaining 
government revenue constant. 
Such proposal ignored two fundamental aspects of a good tax reform in Brazil. 
It also made one fatal error. The omissions were: a) it excluded the personal and 
corporate income tax from the reform, and b) it did not exonerate the heavy labor 
social contributions paid by company payrolls. The technical error was that the rate 
of the new, comprehensive VAT had to be excessively high to keep constant the 
present levels of revenue, and this, strongly stimulates evasion.196 
A tax reform must find solutions to several fundamental problems. It must be 
able to guarantee adequate revenue collection – so the government can meet the 
demand for public services; it must be neutral and seek allocative efficiency to 
minimize tax-related distortions in the decisions of economic agents; it must be 
simple and inexpensive in order to minimize tax compliance and administrative 
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 [CINTRA, 2000]; the separate vote by Deputy Marcos Cintra, contrary to the opinion by Deputy 
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 There are some fundamental issues to be resolved in building a Tax Reform bill. Two problems in 
particular need urgent solution:  1) the incorporation of the services sector in the tax base of the new 
ICMS or in the federal VAT implies a significant increase in tax burden on service producers (since 
the ISS is replaced by the ICMS/VAT), creating undesirable asymmetry in the impact of tax reform 
on different sectors in Brazil’s economy; and 2) from the standpoint of a set of taxpayers which 
includes individuals, small and medium sized business owners, and the informal sector, the tax reform 
that is underway is unlikely to benefit them directly; its impact will be diffuse, invisible to the large 
mass of Brazilian population, and incapable of creating enthusiasm, as would be desirable.  One 
eloquent example of the lack of consensus emerging from the official tax reform bill comes from the 
Ação Empresarial (Entrepreneurial Action), a group led by the National Confederation of Industry. 
An article signed by Antonio Oliveira Santos, president of the National Confederation of Commerce, 
published in Correio Braziliense on March 1, 2000, states that: “these observations lead us to suspect 
the validity and the timeliness of this supposed tax reform, which after all, by all indications, will not 
reduce the tax burden, will not simplify the system, nor provide the desired competitive equality Ação 
Empresarial dreams of.” 
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costs; and it must be fair, respecting current standards of social equity. 
Additionally, as Everardo Maciel, former Secretary of the Federal Revenue, 
recalled in his speech on August 7, 2001 at the headquarters of the Federação das 
Indústrias de Brasília, “there is no tax system that is good and adequate for every 
country in the world. In modeling the tax system, one must not fail to consider the 
political situation, the cultural tradition, and the stage of economic and social 
development of a given country. There is no model that can simply be transported 
from one country to another.”197 
The various bills presented before in the Special Committee on Tax Reform 
sought to meet those criteria. Each bill under discussion has its advantages and 
disadvantages; each makes advances in some areas and back steps in others. 
However, there are two preliminary problems that, if not addressed properly, will 
make any tax reform become a mere attempt at “perfecting of the obsolete”, to 
paraphrase Roberto Campos. 
The first is to improve the pattern of tax incidence in Brazil. It is well-known 
that the average tax burden has greatly increased, from 23% during the 1970s and 
1980s to 35% today, in tandem with the narrowing of the tax base. The rise in 
evasion, avoidance, and flight to the informal economy was stimulated, and resulted 
in a tax system that overburdens the formal economy, asphyxiates organized 
businesses, and hurts the registered wage-earner. As Mário Henrique Simonsen 
taught us: “A fair tax is one you can collect”. Contrario sensu, the worst tax is one 
that can be evaded. 
The second is the high cost of the current tax system. Society bears a heavy tax 
load in order to meet several fiscal demands such as maintaining the Union’s 
gigantic tax collection machine, maintaining the expensive social security program 
and financing the operating costs of the legislative and judiciary branches whose 
responsibility include legislating and judging millions of tax-related cases that clog 
Brazil’s courts. We must also add the administrative and compliance costs of 
individuals and of corporations that are related to the system’s bureaucratic demands. 
The Special Committee on Tax Reform set the stage for discussions about two 
opposing concepts concerning the construction of a new tax model for Brazil. 
On one hand stands the orthodox view espoused in the text of the Tax Reform 
Committee’s reporter, Deputy Mussa Demes. On the other hand, inspired by the 
Single Tax proposal, is the Alternative Proposal, inspired by the Single Tax, a daring 
and innovative concept of which I am the author,(198) and which assembles the 
contributions of several deputies and ex-deputies, such as Luís Roberto Ponte, 
Francisco Horta, Alberto Mourão, Edinho Araújo, and Ronaldo Vasconcellos. This 
proposal stresses the rôle of paperless non-declaratory taxes, the principal feature of 
which is that they can be collected automatically using information technology and 
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thus eliminating tax avoidance and evasion. Collection of these taxes has low-cost 
and is free of bureaucracy and, therefore, immune to corruption. 
The final report produced by the Special Committee on Tax Reform proposed a 
conventional tax structure, though important advances were made on items such as 
taxpayer advocacy, ending the fiscal war, and simplifying the complex ICMS 
legislation. On the other hand, it totally rejected the contributions that non-
declaratory taxes could make to enhancing Brazil’s tax system. In fact, the 
Alternative Proposal served as a counterpoint to the reporter’s text, insofar as it 
introduced two important paperless taxes (the Bank transaction tax, and an excise 
called Selective Tax), as substitutes for several other taxes. 
Both the Mussa Demes proposal and the Alternative Proposal advanced very 
similar diagnostics about the state of taxation in Brazil, and both sought to eliminate 
social contributions based on company’s gross income (PIS, Cofins,) on profits 
(CSLL), bank transactions tax (CPMF)), and to end the multiple taxes on circulation 
of goods and services (IPI, ICMS, and ISS). The big difference between the 
proposals, however, is that Deputy Mussa Demes encumbered a national VAT to be 
the hegemonic tax of the Brazilian system, whereas in the Alternative Proposal that 
function would befall on two paperless taxes: the Bank transaction tax and the 
Selective taxes. 
The Alternative Proposal has the following characteristics: 
1. Tax asepsis: it eliminates the IPI, the ICMS, and corporate income tax, 
which have high bureaucratic complexity, high evasion rates, and high 
operating costs. It also eliminates several social contributions that heavily 
pollute the current tax system – i.e., PIS, Cofins, CSLL, and the bank debit 
transaction tax (CPMF); 
2. Personal Income tax to be levied only on high income recipients: the 
personal income tax will exempt incomes up to 20 minimum wages 
monthly, which will exclude over 90% of Brazil’s population from paying 
income tax; 
3. Exoneration of production – by eliminating the corporate income tax (IRPJ), 
corporate profits, if reinvested, will not be taxed, which will stimulate 
production and employment. Distributed profits, however, will be taxed as 
individual income on the personal income tax of shareholders. Withholding 
income tax will be applied to all financial and capital earnings; 
4. Paperless taxes: declaratory taxes eliminated by the Alternative Proposal 
will be replaced by non-declaratory taxes, such as the selective tax, and by 
the tax on bank transactions, both of which are immune to evasion and are 
simple and cost-effective to collect; 
5. Exoneration of corporate payrolls: according to a previous proposal by Ives 
Gandra da Silva Martins, the employer’s portion of the INSS payment will 
be eliminated, replaced by the bank transaction tax. 
It is important to stress that the following fears, related to the bank transaction 
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tax, are unfounded: a) its cumulativeness (because the tax rate will be low, and it will 
replace several other taxes, such as the ICMS and the employer’s contributions to the 
INSS); b) difficulties in zero-rating exports (which is possible by using a list of 
rebates prepared with the assistance of the official input-product matrices, a practice 
that is accepted and recommended by the World Trade Organization (WTO)); c) the 
impact of cumulativeness on the financial markets (given that, in the Alternative 
Proposal, transactions in the financial and capital markets will be exempt from the 
bank transaction tax); and d) a possible bank disintermediation (because the proposal 
provides for prohibition of endorsements and the issuance of non-personal checks 
payable to the bearer, in addition to requiring that all payments be processed through 
Brazil’s banking system, without which a transaction would lose its formal validity). 
The Alternative Proposal, in addition to seeking to address the traditional 
requirements of efficiency and equity, makes significant strides in three essential 
aspects related to the redesign of the current tax system: simplicity, immunity to 
evasion, and low cost, both public and private. Furthermore, it broadens the universe 
of taxpayers, as it reaches the informal market and includes tax evaders in the 
taxpayers’ universe. It also underscores the rights and guarantees of taxpayers. New 
taxes and rate increases will require a referendum, and the use of Executive Orders 
(Medidas Provisórias) for tax legislation will be prohibited. Furthermore, legal 
ceilings will be established for existing tax rates in order to contain the government’s 
escalating fiscal appetite. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the impact of the bank transactions tax 
across economic sectors and on final consumer prices was estimated with the help 
the official input-output matrix. The simulations show it collects more efficiently and 
with less impact on final consumer prices than a VAT, as will be shown below. 
On the other hand, the orthodox proposal passed in the Congressional Special 
Committee on Tax Reform outlined a reform model that goes in the opposite 
direction, and fails to tend to the most pressing needs of Brazil’s tax system. New 
taxes were created, rates were raised, and items that carry significant weight in costs 
to the productive sector were overcharged. Some elements of public spending were 
positively altered, albeit insufficiently. 
The same report, after intense political and economic debate, was altered, but 
never gained enough support to be approved at the floor of the Chamber of Deputies. 
It is conservative and it aggravates the defects of the current system.199 The bill 
creates a conventional, paper-driven, and bureaucracy-laden VAT to jointly replace 
the IPI (the federal VAT on industrial products), the current state VAT (the ICMS), 
and social contributions. However, to raise the same revenue as the sum of the 
abolished taxes, the total rate of the new VAT will need to be excessively high. The 
services sector, for example, will see its tax burden double. This will stimulate tax 
evasion and avoidance. 
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 For a complete evaluation of the report presented by Deputy Mussa Demes in the Tax Reform 
Committee, see [CINTRA, 2000]. 
 - 208 - 
The bill also has glaring technical flaws, such as the introduction of the “little 
boat” method of collecting the VAT, which, in interstate trade, will lead to the 
creation of systemic and certainly non-liquid credit balances against the government. 
And it commits the dramatically nonsensical mistake of creating new taxes, such as 
the Retail Sales Tax (called IVV), an underhanded compensation to municipalities 
that stand to lose their Services Tax (called ISS), which would be transferred to the 
central government in order to increase the tax base of the new VAT, and therefore 
stand a chance of requiring that a lower tax rate be applied. 
It is important to remember the condemnation uttered by the world’s top tax 
experts concerning the introduction of this type of tax (retail sales tax) in countries 
such as Brazil. “In the case of Brazil, high administrative costs mean that retail sales 
are not a good base for sub national governments. The retail sales tax is an example 
of administrative costs ruling out a theoretically attractive alternative. The retail 
sales tax has been successfully used to finance both state and local governments in 
developed countries. The preponderance of small retail outlets with rudimentary 
record-keeping would make the RST very costly to administer in Brazil”.200 
In attempting to incorporate isolated suggestions in order to garner support, the 
official bill loses its conceptual consistency. It contains many details that are unusual 
in constitutional texts. It is out of the ordinary that, in order to remit the new VAT to 
the destination state, a non-mandatory constitutional text would allow for choice 
between different alternatives, such as the use of the “little boat” technique, or the 
creation of a compensation fund, or any “other procedures”. 
Culminating with what could be called an anti-reform, such proposal allows for 
the creation of thirteen new tax species, all of which are paper-driven, technocratic, 
and highly evadable, for which partial compensation is offered by extinguishing only 
four existing taxes. In summary, the Committee demonstrated that it was incapable 
of producing a reasonable tax reform bill. According to Professor Ives Gandra da 
Silva Martins, the current tax system is a bad one, but it would become even worse if 
such bill were implemented.201 
There is no escaping the impression that the government does not really want to 
reform the current tax system. Former Minister Antonio Kandir said, in 1997, that 
tax reform is not a priority. Surprisingly, former Minister Pedro Malan asserted that 
only in the “next millennium” would Brazil have a new system. This confirms the 
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huge gap that separates what the government thinks about the problem from what 
society wishes. The government’s tax reform bill202 does not profoundly modify the 
current structure. The country will continue to have an inefficient tax system that is 
unfair and that greatly induces evasion, avoidance, and the accelerated expansion of 
the informal economy. 
Value-added taxes are difficult to administer in federal systems. Brazil is one of 
the few federative countries that have a state VAT, which explains its enormous 
complexity and its lack of administrative control. Federalization of the VAT would 
imply significant operational improvements. But the change would lead to further 
centralization, given that the current ICMS is the most important source of revenue 
for the States. The VAT would be collected by the federal government and shared 
with States and municipalities. But governors and mayors fear to lose their financial 
autonomy and to suffer a significant reduction in their own revenues, not to mention 
the exacerbation of political conditionalities which usually follows revenue sharing. 
In exchange, municipal governments would gain the retail sales tax, the IVV. 
The operation of the IVV requires a tax ethics that does not exist in Brazil. It is 
obviously cultural mimicry to attempt to collect taxes at each consumer point-of-
sale, as in the US. Tax evasion would be enormous and due to the need for new and 
costly auditing systems, its administrative costs would be considerable. Of the 
current ICMS revenue in the State of São Paulo, 90% comes from 1,000 companies. 
To collect as little as half of that amount would require monitoring of no less than 
300,000 retailers throughout the state. 
Summing up, the new bill is centralizing, bureaucratic, and induces heavy 
evasion.  
In editorial, the newspaper “O Estado de S. Paulo”203 showed that the 
government, in addition, still dares, unashamedly, to propose the creation of a new 
fuels tax. There is talk of a “green tax” and of charging the ICMS on the use of São 
Paulo’s water resources. It is not surprising that taxpayers have become so 
discontented. 
Furthermore, several experts have been calling attention to Brazil’s excessive 
tax burden. The weight of taxes already surpasses that of rich countries such as the 
United States and Japan. In recent years it has threatened to hit 40% of GNP, a level 
without equal among developing countries. This results in low productivity, and 
discourages economic activity, while stimulating tax evasion. 
Tax avoidance, including evasion and the growth of the informal economy, is 
increasing at a frightening rate. The Federal Revenue admits that for each real 
collected by the public sector, another real is lost to tax evasion.  
In spite of all, economic authorities have stood practically inert. On one hand, 
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they make disastrous reform proposals to existing tax structure. These are touch-ups 
that create more problems than solutions. On the other hand, the government is 
constantly attempting to fine-tune the system, but in an uncoordinated way, which 
only aggravates the complexity and inconsistency of the current structure, which has 
become an incomprehensible quilted patchwork of taxes and contributions. 
To continue down this path will result in two undesirable facts: oppression by 
public bureaucracy over the formal economy, and accelerated expansion of the 
informal economy. Those who presently pay taxes will pay more; others, on an 
increasing scale, will pay less and less, or nothing at all. 
The growing centralization that would result from implementing the 
government’s proposal can be analyzed under yet another prism. To unify the ICMS, 
IPI, and ISS, and at the same time to avoid loss of revenue and to enable the 
government to guarantee compensation for lost revenue of lost taxes by states and 
municipalities, would imply imposing a VAT with high rates. Revenue from these 
three taxes combined currently accounts for 10.5% of GDP, or 34% of Brazil’s gross 
tax burden. The ICMS accounts for 7.4% of GDP. If we suppose that the incidence 
base for the new VAT is about 20% broader than that of the ICMS, the new tax’s 
rate would have to be as high as 21%, to prevent losses. 
If today, with old VAT rate at 17%, tax avoidance and evasion are already high, 
it is obvious that the reward for evasive behavior will increase in direct proportion to 
the increase in the nominal VAT rate resulting from the proposed tax reform bill. 
The government’s proposal, therefore, will inevitably exacerbate the tax system’s 
major operational problems: avoidance, evasion, and flight to the informal economy. 
THE FRUSTRATED REFORM AND THE DEMONIZATION OF 
CUMULATIVE SOCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
Once the effort to comprehensively reform the tax system was frustrated, 
defenders of tax conservatism focused their efforts on eliminating cumulative social 
contributions.204 
There are three types of social contribution in Brazil. The first, on wage earners 
and employers, is collected by Social Security by withholdings on payrolls. This is 
the most perverse of all because while it raises the cost of labor, it discourages the 
creation of new jobs, induces the adoption of capital intensive production techniques, 
and stimulates the informal job market.  
The second type of social contribution, such as PIS and Cofins, were imposed 
on a firm’s gross revenues. Corporate segments have been arguing ferociously for 
their elimination, and as of 2002 they have become partially non-cumulative.  
And the third type, the contribution on financial transactions, the bank debit 
transaction tax (CPMF), against which certain corporate sectors and parts of the 
                                                 
204
 See for example, [VARSANO et alii, 2001]; see also [SILVA and LIMA, 2001]. 
 - 211 - 
government bureaucracy fight with equal vigor, because of its alleged cascading 
effect. In fact, after a bitter dispute in Congress, it was abolished in Brazil at the end 
of 2007. 
The reasons why they have been arguing for the elimination of the PIS, Cofins, 
and the bank transactions tax (CPMF)  have already been duly discussed and 
rebutted. We saw that it is a mistake to oppose such contributions because of their 
cumulative nature.205 One can, however, accept extinguishing the PIS and the Cofins 
based on the fact that they are both declaratory taxes, full of bureaucracy, and as 
such, susceptible to evasion. 
It is interesting to note that the tax base of social contributions levied on firms’ 
gross revenue is approximately equal to the tax base of the CPMF.206  In other words, 
firms´ gross revenue or gross corporate sales is a concept quite similar to the national 
account concept of Gross Value of Production. Thus, the cumulative PIS/Cofins are 
very similar to taxes on bank transactions, such as the CPMF. The difference, 
however, is that the former is collected through a declaratory process based on the 
value of reported sales. And though it has a rate that is 9.6 times higher than the 
CPMF (3.65, compared to 0.38), it collects only 2.5 times as much revenue. Even if 
we allow for a tax base 50% smaller for the PIS/Cofins, the comparison with the 
bank debit transactions tax (CPMF) demonstrates that evasion of paper-driven 
contributions on sales is staggering.207 
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cumulative.  The transfer of this cumulative effect to the final price of goods and services is inevitable, 
going against widely accepted tax principles that recommend incidence on value-added” (p. 103). 
This latter assertion ignores the fact that it is not incidence distributed along the phases of the 
productive process that characterizes cumulativeness.  If it were, the VAT would be equally 
cumulative!  In the same way, the insinuation that, unlike cumulative taxes, the VAT would not 
impact final prices of merchandise is inaccurate.  The non-incidence of taxation on final prices would 
occur only in the case of totally inelastic demand curves, which the authors did not assume.  Finally, 
the assertion that the taxes could “create additional inflationary pressures” (p. 103) does not deserve 
comments. On that same issue, Everardo Maciel stated, “I hear lots of people saying ‘we need to 
remove cumulativeness from social contributions in order to exonerate production’. This is false 
because, inversely, such action increases tax burden on production (…). Social contributions are 
levied on two types of corporate revenue, operational and non-operational. If we adopt a value-added 
system such as the ICMS, it will only be levied on operational revenue.  See [MACIEL, 2001]  
206
 For a detailed breakdown of this similarity, see [CINTRA, 1994(e)] p. 112. 
207
 See [CINTRA, 1994(h)]  
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A study by the IBGE/FGV showed similar findings. In estimating the impact of 
the bank transactions tax (CPMF) and of the PIS/Cofins in the various sectors of the 
economy, its authors noted that, “whereas the measured impact of the bank debit 
transaction tax (CPMF) were in the range of 10% of the measured impact caused by 
the use of PIS/Pasep and Cofins, in 2000 total bank transaction tax revenue was 
equal to nearly 30% of total revenue from PIS/Pasep and Cofins.”208 The origin of 
this discrepancy, evidently, is the lesser possibilities for evasion by the paperless, 
non-declaratory base of the bank transactions tax (CPMF), as compared to the paper-
driven, declaratory base of the PIS/Cofins. 
Therefore, the proposal to replace the PIS, Cofins, and the CPMF for a non-
cumulative contribution proves totally inadvisable. According to studies conducted 
by the Research Institute of Applied Economics, (IPEA), the elimination of those 
cumulative contributions would require a non-cumulative declaratory tax with a rate 
of about 10% (or if the financial sector is exempted, as has been suggested by some, 
of 11.5 %,). Therefore, if all those taxes are replaced by a unified VAT, the mere 
issuance of an invoice will imply a tax burden of approximately 37% on value-added 
(17% for ICMS, 10% for IPI, and 10% of the non-cumulative contributions).209 
In fact, former Secretary of the Federal Revenue, Everardo Maciel, in testimony 
before the Special Committee on Cumulative Taxation in the Chamber of Deputies, 
on 2 April 2002, stated that a change from a turnover tax system to a value-added 
system raised three concerns: 1) the operational change would increase tax evasion, 
given that the more complex the system is, the more susceptible it is to a wide range 
of avoidance tactics; 2) a consequence of the first concern is that the change could 
have repercussions in fiscal revenues; and 3) the shift would cause changes in 
relative prices in the economy, given that some taxpayers will see their tax burdens 
increase, while for others it will decrease. 
But what really stands out in this debate is the insistence on the elimination of 
gross revenue and bank transaction taxes in contrast with the tolerance shown for 
excessive payroll taxes. In truth, one of the fundamental points of any tax reform bill 
is that it must lessen the burden on corporate payrolls.210 
Brazil taxes wages excessively. This explains why the population of wage-
earners increases very little and why the average salary is incapable of supporting 
                                                 
208
 See [FIESP, 2001] p.21. 
209
 Following a different methodology (with no provision for differing levels of informality, nor 
allowing for tax credits in the acquisition of investment goods), Fiesp (Industry Federation of the State 
of São Paulo) estimates the noncumulative tax rate for replacing only the PIS and Cofins at between 
6% and 7%.  See [FIESP, 2001]. 
210
 See interview given to the newspaper, O Estado de S.Paulo. “É preciso tirar a economia da 
informalidade”, in which the respected economist Aloísio Araújo raises the serious issue of Brazil’s 
informal economy and, mentioning James Heckman, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics who 
during a visit to Brazil spoke extensively about the excessive costs of regulating the labor market in 
Latin America- states that “excessive taxation encourages informality”. 
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permanent increases in production.  
The cause of this contrast between low wages and a high tax burden on them 
lies in the structure of Brazil’s tax system. The government, incapable of controlling 
evasion in a system made up of declaratory taxes on production, seeks an easy way 
out to guarantee its revenues, and assigns to formal wage-earners a tax burden that is 
higher than in other countries. The tax on formal wage earners is one of the highest 
in the world. In Brazil, a monthly salary of US$ 840 is taxed at a nominal rate of 
27.5%, whereas in the United States the same monthly salary is taxed at 15%.211 
The 8.5% rate on payrolls collected as workers indemnity fund in case of 
unjustified dismissals has become a quasi fiscal contribution that differs little from 
other taxes on wages. Additionally, INSS (social security) payments add about 35% 
to the payroll tax burden. It is not surprising therefore, that only half of Brazil’s work 
force is formally on the payroll and that the infamous “Brazilian cost differential” 
has become an upward spiral of inefficiency and loss of competitiveness imposed on 
domestic production. 
The proposal to lighten the burden on payrolls by eliminating employer 
contributions to the INSS (the official Social Security System) could turn out to be 
an important stimulus for expanding the process of including the informal work force 
into the regular economy and for stimulating the creation of new jobs. But the major 
benefit is that eliminating the INSS contribution of 20% included in the tax wedge 
on labor would allow for an increase in real wages, without pressures on costs and 
prices. The resulting increase in the consumer market would stimulate aggregate 
demand and investment, and would make an effective contribution toward 
supporting further GDP growth. 
It is possible to exonerate payrolls, to increase take-home wages, to reduce tax 
evasion, to create jobs, to reduce the “Brazilian cost differential” and to lower prices. 
There is a Constitutional Amendment Bill in the Chamber of Deputies aiming at 
exonerating corporate payrolls by eliminating the employer social security 
contribution to the INSS and by replacing it with a social security tax on bank 
transactions.212 According to data of the IBGE, 95% of the supply of new jobs 
created in 2000 was filled by workers who had never been formal wage-earners. This 
fact becomes ever more common as time passes, with damaging consequences to the 
well-being of the workers and their families, in addition to meaning an unsustainable 
                                                 
211
 According to data compiled by Arthur Andersen Consulting, the total cost of worker’s social 
benefit programs in Brazil is equal to 60.24% of the payroll, whereas the average in 15 other countries 
surveyed, including Mexico, Germany, Canada, China, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, United 
States, Scotland, and Indonesia is only 13.67%. See [ELETROS, 2000]. [THE ECONOMIST, 
2000(b)] points to the increasing difficulty involved in taxing production factors that have greater 
mobility, such as capital earnings, stating that: “the harder it gets to tax mobile people and businesses, 
the bigger the burden that will have to be borne by the immobile”. This fact ends up causing 
governments to overtax factors that are less mobile, such as labor. 
212
 PEC 256/00, by Deputies Fetter Jr., Marcos Cintra, Mares Guia, Roberto Argenta, Alberto 
Mourão, Roberto Brandt et al, available at www.marcoscintra.org/singletax 
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overload on the social security system. 
Furthermore, removing taxes from corporate payrolls by eliminating the 
employer payment of the INSS would serve as the instrument for correcting the 
flagrant injustice that is committed against the services sector (highly labor 
intensive), should its tax burden be increased, as proposed in the bill of the Special 
Committee on Tax Reform. It is well known that payrolls in the services sector 
ranges from 40% to 70% of the value of gross sales. In this case, employer payments 
to the INSS of 20% to 22% on payroll mean that firms in the service sector must 
contribute from 8% to 15.4% of gross sales to finance the official social security 
system. Such peculiarities of the services sector call for corrective measures capable 
of relieving the high tax burden that labor-intensive activities would have to bear. 
If the employers’ contributions to the INSS are replaced by the Social Tax on 
bank transactions at a rate of 0.6% on bank debits and credits, as is proposed by PEC 
No. 256/00 (a constitutional amendment bill), the social security system would 
collect the same revenue that the INSS presently collects from its payroll-based tax. 
This is merely a revenue substitution that in no way alters the destination of social 
security funds, including earmarked revenue for educational expenses and the so-
called “S System” (used to fund employers administered programs in workers 
training). 
The rates proposed for the Social Tax, presupposes exemption for intrabank and 
other financial and capital market transactions, especially stocks and bonds 
transacted in the securities exchanges. There would also be a need to guarantee that 
transactions above pre-set legislated limits would only have legal validity if 
processed and cleared through the country’s banking system. This would ensure that 
the tax base of the Social Tax would retain the same revenue potential as the bank 
debit transaction tax (CPMF). 
The major benefits of the Social Tax and of eliminating the employer payroll 
payment to INSS are listed, as follows: 
1. Lightening the tax burden on corporate payrolls, reducing tax burden and 
production costs especially in the service sectors, which are highly labor-
intensive; 
2. Stimulating demand for labor; demand for formal jobs would also be 
stimulated, reducing excessive outsourcing caused by high labor costs; 
3. Fighting unemployment; nowadays, unemployment and underemployment 
affect 20% of the economically active population in the country’s major 
metropolitan areas; 
4. Stimulating formalization of labor relations, as the growth of informal jobs 
worsens the quality of labor relations; social security guarantees would be 
extended to all workers, and there would no longer be stimulus for hiring 
illegal or informal workers; 
5. Allowing reduction of tax burden on the cost of labor; cost reduction would 
lead to lower production costs and inflation control; 
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6. Increasing the competitiveness of Brazilian products vis-à-vis their foreign 
competitors through the elimination of the INSS employer payroll payment 
(which cannot be exonerated in exports); exports would benefit and 
domestic products would find fair competitive conditions to face imported 
products. 
Reducing labor costs could pave the way for wage increases in all sectors. It 
would be particularly important, and utterly possible, that wages be increased at least 
by the amount of the Social Tax on bank transactions paid by wage-earners, so as not 
to further burden after-tax wage earnings. 
BANK TRANSACTIONS AS THE FOUNDATION OF A NEW SOCIAL 
SECURITY CONTRIBUTION213 
In order to balance the social security budget, economists are unanimous in their 
call for more jobs and higher economic growth.  Some see a need for GDP to grow 
by 6% to 7% annually, in addition to the need for changes in social security 
legislation. But no specific solution has been proposed. 
In recent months, the government, through the Finance Ministry, has spoken of 
exonerating companies’ payrolls from labor contributions and of finding new ways 
to finance social security. The objective is to decrease the cost of labor.  
Presently, social security contributions amount to 36.55% of payrolls, as shown 
in TABLE 26. In addition to these direct charges, firms must pay indirect taxes and 
contributions levied on gross income and on value-added, such as ICMS, IPI, Cide, 
PIS, Cofins, and ISS. In 2005, firms paid R$ 36.5 billion into the INSS, and R$ 42.7 
billion in 2007. Between 2000 and 2003, INSS revenue remained constant, whereas 
in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 there was a small increase (see TABLE 22). Such 
revenue growth is mostly due to the formalization of jobs and to increases in the 
minimum wage, not necessarily to newly created jobs. 
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 This section, written by Luigi Nese, President of the Services Confederation of Brazil, is based on 
a series of policy research and issue reports commissioned to the Getulio Vargas Foundation on the 
economic impact of adopting a bank transaction contribution to replace the current social security 
contributions based on withholdings of companies payrolls, see [GARCIA, 2003, 2004(a), 2004(b), 
2005].  
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TABLE 26 
Breakdown of Payroll Tax Burden  
20,0% Employers´ contribution to Social Security (INSS)   
3.10% “S” System (training and leisure programs for employees) 
2.50% Contribution for education 
0.20% Land Reform Contribution (Incra) 
2,0% Labor accidents insurance -SAT (average) 
8,0% 
FGTS (contribution for future unemployment 
compensation, credited to employees and paid by 
employers) 
35.8% Total 
 
 
A study by the Brazilian Institute for Tax Planning places Brazil in second 
place, behind Denmark, in the worldwide ranking on payroll taxation (see TABLE 
27). INSS contributions and other taxes levied on company payrolls directly impacts 
employment and wages.  
TABLE 27 
Tax Burden on gross wages 
(2005) 
Countries Tax burden on gross wages (%) 
Denmark 42.9 
Brazil 42.5 
Belgium 41.4 
Germany 41.2 
Finland 31.7 
Sweden 31.2 
Norway 28.8 
Netherlands 28.7 
Uruguay 28.4 
Italy 28.1 
France 26.5 
Canada 25.7 
Argentina 27.7 
United States 24.3 
Switzerland 21.5 
Spain 19.2 
Portugal 16.5 
Japan 16.2 
Mexico 9.1 
Korea 8.7 
                    Source: Brazilian Institute for Tax Planning (IBPT). 
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A NEW PROPOSAL 
In order to unburden company payrolls, the National Confederation of Services 
(CNS) and the Federation of Services of the State of São Paulo (Fesesp) are 
proposing the adoption of a new tax base for financing the INSS system.214 “Bank 
transactions” is the suggested new tax base to replace payroll. To provide technical 
support for the proposal, the Getulio Vargas Foundation was commissioned to 
conduct a study on the repercussions such a change would have on the economy.  
What would be the impact on the Brazilian economy if companies were no 
longer required to pay the INSS payroll contribution to the government-sponsored 
pension funds?  
This question could be put in a different way, namely, if this tax ceased to 
exists, would companies be able to increase investments and employment, while 
reducing prices? To answer this question one must first indentify a revenue source 
capable of generating the same amount that companies paid into the INSS. In this 
study, the alternative source of revenue is the bank transactions tax, and a simulation 
was performed to measure the impact of different bank transactions rates, in addition 
to the CPMF of 0.38%, and to observe the aggregate macroeconomic impacts, both 
on the overall economy and on each productive sector.  
The study was based on the following facts: 
• To reduce tax burden on payrolls, companies seek legal alternatives to 
making direct wage payments, such as earnings and profit sharing, 
distribution of transportation coupons, of meal tickets and of utilities 
payments, in addition to engaging in informal work contracts, such as 
temporary employment.
 
• Life expectancy has increased for Brazilians. Currently, there is only 1.8 
active worker to support each retired member of the labor force, a ratio that 
was 10 to 1 just 40 years ago.
 
• Article 195 of the Constitution states that: “social security will be funded 
by society as a whole, through direct and indirect means...”
 
• In order to remain competitive in a globalized economy, businesses must 
reduce costs, innovate, and improve the quality of products and services.
 
• The legal costs associated with labor-related lawsuits must be reduced 
(there are currently 30 million labor-related lawsuits in Brazil’s court 
system). There is an urgent need for a simpler and more straightforward 
labor legislation, capable of providing assurances and guarantees to 
employers and employees
 
The Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) study, based on IBGE data up to 2006, 
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 Significantly, in the service sector the payroll accounts for 40% to 80% of total costs. Thus, tax 
burden is much higher than on industry and trade. In these latter sectors tax burden accounts for 
between 3% and 15% of total cost of production. 
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showed that by replacing the INSS payroll tax with a bank transaction contribution, 
(calculated at a 0.458% rate), GDP would increase by 0.98%, the employment rate 
by 0.92%, and aggregate demand by 1.09%.  Considering that INSS revenue, which 
that year amounted to R$ 32.1 billion, would remain the same, such change would 
also have beneficial impacts on inflation indices, with the consumer price index 
(IPC) dropping by 0.32% and the general price index (IGP) falling by 0.48%, as 
shown in TABLE 29. 
TABLE 28  
INSS revenue (R$ 000)  
(2000 - 2007) 
Contributions 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Employers INSS contributions 30,704,539 33,104,286 35,486,286 35,871,880 
  Senar 41,181 50,895 99,542 136,609 
  Senai 229,957 291,741 303,768 357,916 
  Sesi 298,601 359,230 387,808 452,150 
  Senac 314,494 360,750 395,736 459,543 
  Sesc 606,797 703,897 778,599 898,539 
  Incra 243,889 304,361 319,168 378,492 
  SDR 45,114 50,230 58,047 65,706 
  Sest 67,913 86,028 91,066 107,412 
  Senat 45,985 56,959 59,668 71,770 
  Airway fund 33,725 36,423 41,587 48,406 
  Maritime Fund – DPC 22,656 27,646 29,164 35,530 
  Sebrae 582,141 680,569 773,666 790,582 
  Sescoop 19,997 23,224 24,967 28,963 
Total “S” System 2,552,450 3,031,953 3,362,786 3,831,618 
   Educational Contribution INSS 1,359,643 1,489,200 1,708,873 1,954,473 
   Education Contribution FNDE 1,431,608 1,634,078 1,951,855 2,050,702 
   Total Education Contribution 2,791,251 3,123,278 3,660,728 4,005,175 
INSS payroll Contribution 26,792,446 28,583,133 30,414,664 30,085,789 
INSS+Incra+Ed. Contribution 29,827,586 32,010,772 34,394,560 34,469,456 
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TABLE 28 (CONTINUATION) 
INSS revenue (R$ 000)  
(2000 - 2007) 
Contributions 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Employers INSS contributions 39,421,944 43,981,995 49,034,673 55,930,651 
  Senar 169,208 168,143 203,385 224,501 
  Senai 438,174 406,429 478,538 557,010 
  Sesi 555,865 565,019 677,440 795,063 
  Senac 560,578 561,441 705,333 853,398 
  Sesc 1,099,352 1,084,000 1,346,864 1,610,486 
  Incra 476,463 411,213 533,420 632,822 
  SDR 172,093 72,129 93,716 111,244 
  Sest 131,112 117,224 136,437 164,244 
  Senat 87,001 77,908 90,607 107,963 
  Airway fund 61,126 39,486 50,435 78,161 
  Maritime Fund – DPC 43,890 46,887 59,584 72,107 
  Sebrae 944,176 827,782 1,045,713 1,261,039 
  Sescoop 35,127 44,252 51,829 68,872 
Total “S” System 4,774,165 4,421,913 5,473,301 6,536,978 
   Educational Contribution INSS 2,200,776 3,124,899 3,888,802 6,702,073 
   Education Contribution FNDE 2,048,444 2,781,452 3,076,606 454,276 
   Total Education Contribution 4,249,220 5,906,351 6,965,408 7,156,349 
INSS payroll Contribution 32,447,003 36,435,183 39,672,570 42,691,600 
INSS+Incra+Ed. Contribution 37,172,686 42,752,747 47,171,398 50,480,771 
      Source: Social Security Institute (INSS). 
 
In 2007, the rate of the new contribution needed to replace the present INSS 
payroll revenue would be 0.45%. It would have to be increased to 0.53% if 
additionally the Incra and the Educational Contributions were also eliminated, as 
shown in TABLE 30. TABLE 31 and ILLUSTRATION 7 show the results of the 
study commissioned by the National Services Confederation to the Getulio Vargas 
Foundation, on the effects of the elimination of the INSS payroll contribution and its 
replacement by a bank transactions tax on growth rates for various sectors of the 
economy, and the decrease in their respective tax burdens. 
It is worth mentioning that the CPMF (a bank transactions tax), which caused so 
much controversy in Brazil, was the result of academic research made by Prof. 
Marcos Cintra, vice president of the Getulio Vargas Foundation. But, rather than 
instituting Cintra’s innovative proposal, which called for a single tax to replace all 
other taxes, the CPMF became, in effect, an addition to the current tax burden. Such 
deviation created fierce opposition, such as by the late Senator Roberto Campos, 
who said: “The simplifying methodology of the single tax was undermined by the 
fact that the government, on two occasions - through the IPMF (1993) and the CPMF 
(1996) - applied the automatic components of the new methodology, while failing to 
apply its simplifying ‘ideology’…it is a sophisticated instrument that has become 
brutish through misuse, as if it were a fencing sword used for cutting grass.” 
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TABLE 29 
Effects of CMF rates on macroeconomic aggregates (2004) 
Additional CMF rate (%) 
Aggregates 0.81525% 0.45820% 0.49973% 
GDP 1.75% 0.98% 1.07% 
Employment 1.65% 0.92% 1,00% 
IGP -0.86% -0.48% -0.52% 
IPC -0.57% -0.32% -0.35% 
Aggregate demand 1.96% 1.09% 1.19% 
            Source: GV consult (2004) 
 
On the other hand, the National Confederation of Industry (CNI), in a recent 
report, stated: “the CPMF is a cumulative tax that distorts the allocation of 
resources and raises the costs of transactions and of bank intermediation in the 
economy, in addition to the fact that it is almost impossible to calculate the portion 
of the CPMF in a product’s final cost.  In summary, from an economic standpoint it 
is a poor-quality tax and a pernicious one when it comes to efficiently allocating 
resources and investment.” It is our belief that such statement reflects deep-rooted 
prejudice rather than an accurate technical analysis of the matter, as was extensively 
shown in various sections of this text. 
A common argument used against the CPMF is that, with high rates, there is an 
incentive for commercial payments and transactions to be carried out outside the 
banking system, causing the economy to regress to a prehistoric system based on 
barter and on cash trade. However, it is important to recall that Brazil has the most 
technologically advanced banking system in the world, and that practically all 
commercial transactions - transfers, tax and fee payments, etc. - are carried out 
through its digital systems.  Therefore, the Central Bank and the Internal Revenue 
Service have adequate instruments to detect and deter attempts to evade the CPMF 
tax. The Internal Revenue Service, under former Secretary Everardo Maciel, used 
this tax (the CPMF) as a tool for controlling tax evasion. The ease with which bank 
transaction information is cross-referenced with other statistics available to the 
government led to significant improvements in the tax-collecting apparatus. 
 - 221 - 
TABLE 30 
Comparison between CMF rate and federal payroll taxes 
(INSS, Incra, and Educational Contribution) 
(2000 – 2007) 
Year INSS payroll tax (R$ 000) 
Necessary CMF rate 
(%) INSS+Incra+Ed. Sal. 
Necessary CMF rate 
(%) 
2000 26,792,446 0.63 29,827,586 0.70 
2001 28,583,133 0.60 32,010,772 0.67 
2002 30,414,664 0.57 34,394,560 0.64 
2003 30,085,789 0.44 34,469,456 0.50 
2004 32,447,003 0.47 37,172,686 0.53 
2005 36,435,183 0.47 42,752,747 0.55 
2006 36,672,570 0.47 47,171,398 0.56 
2007 42,672,570 0.45 50,480,771 0.53 
 
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that in the age of the Internet, of digital credit 
cards, and of every other sort of financial instruments to support the exchange of 
goods and services, there could be a regression to barter economy, given that the 
costs of conducting business outside the banking system would be far greater than 
the benefit of evading a transaction tax. 
The proposed replacement of the INSS payroll tax with a CMF contribution 
would have countless advantages. INSS income would not depend on the evolution 
of the rates of employment since the current CPMF has proven that its revenue is 
stable relative to national income and product levels. It is important to recall that, 
with the increase in life expectancy of Brazilians, there is a decreasing number of 
active workers supporting present retirement benefits. As such, the INSS go easily 
go under if the system that funds social security continues to be based on corporate 
payrolls. 
Opposition to the creation of a new INSS bank transaction contribution could 
possibly come from the labor sector, since it is an across-the-board tax, that is, it 
would be paid by any individuals and corporations that conduct banking transactions, 
and by active and retired workers alike. However, according to the proposal, such 
new tax would be paid entirely by the employer, who would add to active worker’s 
salaries the amount they would have to pay on account of the new social 
contribution, thus exempting wage earners from it. 
The use of such new contribution would have countless advantages, such as 
making evasion more difficult, reducing the number of labor-related lawsuits, and 
spreading the incidence of INSS payments over the whole of society. Modern labor 
saving methods of production, which increase productivity but concomitantly may 
increase unemployment, would not be held responsible for reducing INSS revenue. 
The CNS commissioned a public opinion poll in nine of the country’s capital 
cities, in order to evaluate the proposal and its repercussions among the population. 
The poll asked whether the respondent agreed, or not, to the following concept: 
“There is a proposal to end the INSS payroll tax for businesses. For this to happen 
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the CPMF (present bank transaction tax) would increase from 0.38% to 0.88%, but 
this increase would be reimbursed by businesses to their employees. With this 
change, studies showed that there is a tendency for product prices to fall and for 
employment to increase.” The results were overwhelmingly favorable to the 
proposal: 64% agreed, 25% disagreed, and 11% were indifferent or would not 
answer. 
 
TABLE 31 
               Effects of an additional 0.50% CMF rate after introduction of the new tax system  
Activity Sectors VA (%change) 
Cost 
(%change) 
Initial tax 
Burden* 
(%) 
Tax Burden 
after change 
(%) 
Variation 
(pp) 
Agriculture, wildlife, forestry 3.6 -1.1 14.6 13.1 -1.5 
Livestock and fish 3.6 -2.1 25.5 21.8 -3.8 
Oil and natural gas 2.0 -0.7 22.3 21.3 -0.9 
Iron ore 1.3 -0.3 19.4 19.3 -0.1 
Other extractives 1.8 -0.8 24.4 23.3 -1.1 
Food and beverages 5.6 -0.5 31.4 31.3 -0.1 
Tobacco products 1.1 -0.5 66.7 66.7 0.0 
Textiles 2.7 -1.0 26.3 24.6 -1.7 
Apparel and accessories 3.5 -0.8 20.0 18.9 -1.1 
Leather articles and shoes 3.5 -1.4 39.2 35.5 -3.7 
Wood products, excluding furniture 1.7 -0.8 21.8 20.7 -1.1 
Paper and paper products 2.4 -1.0 29.4 27.6 -1.7 
Newspapers, magazines, records 1.9 -1.4 23.6 21.1 -2.4 
Coke and petroleum refining 2.8 0.2 142.9 150.8 7.9 
Alcohol 2.7 -0.4 41.4 41.1 -0.2 
Chemicals 2.7 -0.4 33.4 34.1 0.7 
Resin and elastomer manufacturing 2.4 -0.3 74.3 75.2 0.9 
Pharmaceutical products 2.6 -1.7 25.1 21.9 -3.2 
Agricultural defensives 3.0 -0.4 30.5 30.7 0.2 
Perfume, hygiene, and cleaning 2.8 -0.9 24.4 22.9 -1.5 
Paints, varnishes, lacquers, etc. 0.5 -1.2 41.0 37.9 -3.2 
Diverse chemical products and 
derivatives 1.8 -1.2 37.3 34.4 -2.9 
Rubber and plastic articles 1.9 -1.2 41.2 38.4 -2.8 
Cement 0.3 -0.5 23.9 23.6 -0.4 
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.5 -1.4 34.5 31.6 -2.8 
Manufacturing of steel and derivatives 1.9 -0.5 23.6 23.2 -0.4 
Non-ferrous metals metallurgy 2.0 -0.6 26.4 25.7 -0.7 
Metal products, excluding machines 
and equipment 1.5 -1.2 25.0 23.1 -2.0 
Machines and equipment. ( 
maintenance and repair) 3.1 -1.5 42.4 38.9 -3.5 
Electronic appliances 3.3 -1.0 38.3 36.3 -2.0 
Office machines and computing 
equipment 3.2 -0.7 59.6 58.3 -1.3 
Machines, and electrical materials 2.1 -1.4 33.9 31.0 -3.0 
Electronics and communications 
equipment 2.9 -0.7 74.4 73.7 -0.7 
Medical/hospital and instruments, 
measuring,  and optical 3.3 -1.3 26.0 23.9 -2.1 
Automobiles, pick-ups, and vans 2.5 -0.7 118.0 116.9 -1.1 
Trucks and buses 0.9 -1.0 86.2 82.9 -3.2 
Automobile parts and accessories 1.8 -1.4 41.3 37.8 -3.6 
Other transportation equipment 3.1 -1.1 50.7 47.4 -3.3 
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TABLE 31 (CONTINUATION) 
Effects of an additional 0.50% CMF rate after introduction of the new tax system  
Activity Sectors VA (%change) 
Cost 
(%change) 
Initial tax 
Burden* 
Tax Burden 
after change Variation 
Furniture and products of diverse 
industries 2.9 -0.8 20.0 19.0 -1.0 
Electricity, gas, water, sewage, and 
urban cleaning 2.7 -0.5 23.9 23.4 -0.4 
Construction 0.2 -1.1 20.0 18.4 -1.7 
Trade 2.3 -2.4 22.3 19.0 -3.3 
Transportation, warehousing, and mail 2.7 -1.4 29.3 27.1 -2.2 
Information services 2.9 -0.7 22.7 21.8 -0.9 
Financial intermediation and 
insurance 0.9 -1.9 35.6 32.6 -3.0 
Real estate and rental services 8.0 0.3 2.3 2.6 0.3 
Maintenance and repair services 3.4 -0.1 11.8 11.8 0.0 
Lodging and board services 2.8 -0.5 34.0 33.6 -0.5 
Services rendered to businesses 1.4 -2.1 37.3 34.1 -3.2 
Private  education 3.4 -2.5 27.5 23.5 -3.9 
Private  health services 3.1 -1.4 25.5 23.3 -2.3 
Other services 2.7 -1.8 18.6 16.0 -2.6 
Public education 0.2 -1.7 10.2 8.0 -2.2 
Public health 0.3 -1.5 17.1 14.8 -2.3 
Public administration and social 
security 0.3 -1.9 15.3 12.6 -2.7 
   Source:  FGV Projects. 
 (*) The concept of tax burden as applied in this study is the same as applied by the IBGE in National  
Accounts for the economy as a whole, which is the total tax collected on the activity’s value-added.  For 
this reason, activities that have low value-added relative to their production value, as well as those 
activities that are subjected to “tax substitution” collecting methods show higher tax burdens,  hich can 
exceed 100% of the value-added. 
ILLUSTRATION 7 
Economic Growth by the Sector 
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NON-DECLARATORY TAX BILLS CURRENTLY IN CONGRESS  
There are several bills in Congress that propose the adoption of non-declaratory 
taxes as a basis for tax reform. In particular, I have introduced two bills: PL 4722/01 
proposes to exonerate Brazilian exports from the PIS/Pasep, the Cofins, and from 
bank transactions tax (CPMF), and PLC 190/01 that proposes to tax imports with 
those same taxes, thus giving equal tax treatment for domestic or imported 
production. Both bills propose the use of the input-product matrix as the mechanism 
for calculating tax rates either for exonerating exports or for taxing imports. 
There are other bills before Congress that deserve to be mentioned and that 
should be discussed as alternatives to the complex current system. One of these is 
PEC 47/99, which I authored, presented to the Special Committee on Tax Reform. It 
creates the Single Tax gradually, through offsets to other taxes, and extinguishes 
several other inefficient and complex forms of taxation in use in Brazil. Another bill 
is PEC 183/99, also called the Alternative Proposal, which creates the bank 
transaction tax and the selective (excise) taxes. Also PL 256/00, which I introduced 
together with other deputies, which creates the Social Tax on bank transactions to 
replace the employers’ contribution to the INSS (social security). Finally, PEC 
474/01, should be mentioned, which I and others authored and that introduces the 
Single Federal Tax and incorporates the knowledge and experience acquired over 
years of observation and research on the Single Tax proposal in Brazil. 
Constitutional amendment (PEC 228/04) authored by deputy Luiz Carlos Hauly, 
proposes a significant simplification of the tax system. It includes a tax structure 
made up of a progressive income tax, a tax on financial transactions net of social 
security contributions, and an excise tax on alcoholic beverages, electricity, 
communication services, fuels, vehicles, tires, auto-parts, electronic products, home 
appliances and equipment, sanitation services and firearms.  
There was a general feeling of frustration when it was realized that the reform 
proposal endorsed by the Special Committee on Tax Reform in 1999 was nothing 
more than a timid and conventional attempt to correct some isolated problems in 
Brazil’s tax system. Furthermore, it failed to ignite public opinion or to move 
forward in the urgent need to simplify and universalize the tax collection system for 
the country.  
In contrast, the Federal Single Tax bill (PEC 474/2001), more fully analyzed in 
earlier chapters of this text, seeks to implement a new and revolutionary tax system 
in Brazil. 
As a first step, it proposes to implement the single tax only at the federal level 
(called FST), replacing several federal taxes with just one tax on bank transactions. 
Next, the proposal calls for a popular referendum in order to include interested states 
and municipalities into this same tax format. 
The FST is an innovative and revolutionary tax system that will provide extreme 
simplification to the structure of taxes in Brazil. Its implementation will lead to a 
steep drop in tax collection costs to the government and to private agents. Tax 
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evasion, avoidance, and corruption will be significantly reduced, making the system 
fair and more efficient. 
The idea of the FST is simple: a 1.7% tax on each credit and debit transaction 
performed in the banking system. Federal taxes will be extinguished (IRPF, IRPJ, 
CSLL, IPI, Cofins, CPMF, social security payments to the INSS, IOF, ITR, and all 
types of withholdings). The only taxes that will remain in place will be the FST, 
some extra-fiscal taxes (instruments for regulating economic activities, such as 
foreign trade taxes), and user fees. Criteria for revenue sharing among the various 
levels of government will not be changed, and actual transfers will be automatically 
performed using software to be developed specifically for this purpose. Taxation in 
the financial and capital markets will be deferred, avoiding cumulative taxation of 
financial turnover and capital transfers. The value of the principal in any financial 
transaction will be immune to the FST for as long as it remains within the financial 
circuit and is not transferred to bank cash deposits. FST will have the effect of 
redistributing the tax burden, introducing greater social justice, and relieving the 
excessive tax incidence on wage-earners, on the middle class, and on organized 
businesses, which today bear an abusive tax burden in Brazil. 
For 2007, the tax rates must be recalculated. The goal of the FST is to ensure the 
same revenue as currently collected, about R$ 396 billion at the federal level. 
Simulations as show in TABLE 32 that a 2.072% rate on debits and 2.072% on 
credits for each bank transaction would be sufficient to raise revenue equal to that 
generated by the taxes that will be eliminated. 
TABLE 32 
Current federal revenue and estimated FST rate (2007) 
Tax Current revenue (R$ 000,000) 
FST rate 
Total (%) 
FST on debit and credit 
transactions (%) 
Corp. and Personal Income Tax 130,220 1.362 0.681 
INSS Employer Payment 42,759 0.447 0.224 
Cofins 99,164 1.038 0.519 
IPI 32,867 0.344 0.172 
Bank transactions tax (CPMF) 36,320 0.380 0.190 
CSLL 32,880 0.344 0.172 
IOF 7,795 0.082 0.041 
Contribution for Education 7,156 0.075 0.037 
“S” system 6,674 0.070 0.035 
ITR 331 0.003 0.002 
Total 396,166 4.145 2.072 
 
The FST model would eliminate all revenue raising taxes (fiscal taxes), which 
account for more than 60% of current federal revenue. Extra-fiscal obligations such 
as the FGTS, PIS/Pasep, taxes on foreign trade, social security for civil servants and 
employer social contributions will remain unchanged. 
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There are several advantages to the FST: it reduces the individual tax burden; it 
simplifies the current tax system; it reduces administrative costs to the government, 
to social security, and to states and municipalities by making the fiscal machinery 
leaner, as well as reducing compliance costs to businesses by no longer requiring 
paper returns, judicial actions, and dispensing with tax planning and consultancy 
activities; it stimulates greater productivity and profits; it increases real and nominal 
salaries; it reduces “Brazilian cost differential”; it is universal – no one would easily 
evade it, nor would anyone be exempt from the tax; it is transparent and impersonal; 
it is equitable – by being evasion-proof and proportional to each citizen’s earnings; 
and it would put an end to corruption. 
On the other hand, criticisms of the FST were raised by opponents of the 
proposal. The only criticism that still remains partially unanswered refers to its 
impact on relative prices, and to its distortionary effects on allocative efficiency. 
The FST, despite being cumulative, causes less distortion in relative prices than 
a VAT type tax, as our simulations have shown. In addition, it has less impact on 
costs. According to estimates in TABLE 33 the tax burden of the FST on product 
prices reaches a maximum of 15.34%, whereas incidence of only two taxes, the IPI 
and the INSS, would amount to 36.06% of consumer prices. This comparison 
becomes even more dramatic when one sees that the FST collects 15.25% of GDP, 
whereas the other taxes will have stronger impact on final prices, but will collect 
only 2.92% of GDP. 
The FST proposal, if implemented, would have important positive impacts on 
the economy: 
• In the labor market, the FST will stimulate the creation of new jobs and 
increased labor demand, by eliminating payroll taxes; 
• In the consumer market, the FST will make prices fall as a result of the 
lower tax burden on final prices; furthermore, elimination of payroll taxes 
will increase the purchasing power of wage earners; 
• For businesses, the FST will reduce cost of production, stimulate sales and 
increase investment in machinery and equipment, expanding productive 
capacity; 
• In the public sector, the FST will encourage a shift of emphasis from tax 
auditing (which would become unnecessary as far as the individual 
taxpayers are concerned), to the monitoring and auditing of the public sector 
itself, which is the source of major scandals, inefficiencies, and focal points 
of corruption; 
• Resources that are currently spent on compliance costs and on public costs 
related to auditing and collecting revenue will be significantly reduced; 
• For tax purposes, the boundaries between the formal and the informal 
economy will disappear. 
• For exports, the use of rebates based on physical observations of 
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shipment/transportation of goods or services should provide a more efficient 
system of exonerating sales to foreigners than is actually practiced in 
Brazil.215 
TABLE 33 
Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of FST and of a traditional tax system with two 
federal taxes (IPI and INSS)  
 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
FST Traditional system 
nº Products 2.07% IPI+INSS 
1 Rice 12.14 15.19 
2 Corn 11.32 15.50 
3 Wheat and others cereals 12.39 14.68 
4 Sugar Cane 12.69 15.05 
5 Soybean 12.32 15.14 
6 Other agricultural products 10.83 15.40 
7 Manioc 11.22 15.38 
8 Tobacco 12.60 34.60 
9 Cotton 12.01 15.22 
10 Citric fruits 12.44 15.11 
11 Coffee 12.50 15.11 
12 Forest products 11.07 14.70 
13 Cattle and other live animals 13.22 15.71 
14 Cow Milk 13.29 15.64 
15 Live pigs 13.46 15.69 
16 Live poultry 13.36 15.75 
17 Chicken eggs 11.19 15.94 
18 Fish 13.18 15.76 
19 Oil and natural gás 11.27 11.91 
20 Iron ore 13.67 15.63 
21 Coal 12.61 14.27 
22 Non-ferrous metallic minerals 12.32 13.87 
23 Non-metallic minerals 11.91 14.67 
24 Meat processing 12.98 16.12 
25 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen pork 13.45 16.05 
26 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen poultry 12.75 16.16 
27 Processed fish meat 13.55 16.11 
28 Canned fruit, legumes and other vegetables 14.03 16.01 
29 Non-refined soybean oil and by-products 14.73 16.05 
30 Vegetables except corn and animal oils 13.94 16.03 
                                                 
215
 The various forms and proposals to deal with this problem are complex, highly bureaucratic, and 
imply high compliance and administrative costs to taxpayers and to the government. “Refunding of 
credits is the ‘Achilles heel’ of the VAT…while straightforward in principle, serious problems arise in 
practice, including opportunities for fraud and corruption”. See [HARRISON, and KRELOVE, 
2005].  
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TABLE 33 (CONTINUATION) 
Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of FST and of a traditional tax system with two 
federal taxes (IPI and INSS)  
 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
FST Traditional system 
nº Products 2.07% IPI+INSS 
31 Processed soybean oil 13.21 16.15 
32 Refrigerated, sterilized and pasteurized milk 13.34 16.14 
33 Dairy products and ice-cream 12.65 16.90 
34 Processed rice and by-products 11.80 16.17 
35 Wheat flour 14.37 16.07 
36 Manioc flour 11.96 15.93 
37 Corn oil and corn products 13.00 16.12 
38 Sugar products 14.22 17.50 
39 Ground coffee 12.80 16.15 
40 Instant coffee 13.95 16.10 
41 Other food products 12.73 16.16 
42 Beverages 13.77 31.02 
43 Tobacco products 14.18 36.06 
44 Processed cotton 12.04 14.69 
45 Textiles 11.38 14.88 
46 Other textiles products 11.68 14.93 
47 Clothing 10.70 15.72 
48 Leather products except shoes 12.06 21.31 
49 Shoes 11.86 17.27 
50 Wood products except furniture 12.40 22.43 
51 Cellulose and other paper inputs 12.69 17.16 
52 Paper cardboard and packaging 11.62 22.54 
53 Newspapers, magazines and sound recordings 10.30 17.28 
54 Liquefied oil gas 12.93 13.91 
55 Gasoline 15.34 12.78 
56 Gasalcohol 12.61 13.82 
57 Heating oil 14.14 13.12 
58 Diesel oil 13.09 13.01 
59 Other oil products 12.79 12.65 
60 Alcohol 13.53 15.70 
61 Inorganic chemical products 11.13 12.70 
62 Organic chemical products 10.50 10.49 
63 Resin and elastomer 10.61 12.82 
64 Pharmaceutical products 9.12 15.34 
65 Pesticides 11.77 14.84 
66 Perfumery, soaps and cleaning products 11.75 26.33 
67 Paints, vanish, enamels and lacquers 11.72 16.68 
68 Other chemical products 11.05 20.47 
69 Rubber products 11.78 18.34 
70 Plastic products 11.48 18.27 
71 Cement 12.61 17.55 
72 Other non-metallic mineral products 12.23 15.45 
73 Pig iron 13.33 17.80 
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TABLE 33 (CONTINUATION) 
Impact on sector prices and on relative prices of FST and of a traditional tax system with two 
federal taxes (IPI and INSS)  
 
Tax burden (%) Inter-industrial Matrix - Brazil 2006 
FST Traditional system 
nº Products 2.07% IPI+INSS 
74 Semi-finished rolled steel and steel tubes 12.35 16.68 
75 Non-ferrous metallic products 12.44 15.03 
76 Cast steel 13.74 16.63 
77 Metal products - except machinery and equipment 11.80 17.33 
78 Machinery and equipment 11.63 15.77 
79 Home appliances 12.04 20.14 
80 Office and computer equipment 11.26 19.50 
81 Electric machines and equipment 11.45 17.90 
82 Electronics and communication equipment 9.80 17.87 
83 Medical and hospital equipment 9.59 22.51 
84 Automobiles, vans and pick-ups 13.41 19.86 
85 Buses and trucks 12.81 22.14 
86 Auto industry parts and equipments 11.33 16.08 
87 Other transport equipment 11.94 19.50 
88 Furniture 10.17 21.86 
89 Recycled scrap 13.22 17.60 
90 Electricity, gas, water, sewer and urban sanitation 10.24 14.91 
91 Construction 11.32 16.66 
92 Trade 9.03 15.32 
93 Freight 11.73 15.64 
94 Passenger transportation 10.52 15.32 
95 Mail 11.15 15.61 
96 Information services 9.26 15.15 
97 Insurance and finance 8.84 15.65 
98 Real estate rental 7.30 14.16 
99 Imputed rental values 13.84 15.90 
100 Maintenance and repair 9.30 16.60 
101 Lodge and food 10.79 20.46 
102 Services to firms 8.58 13.76 
103 Private education 8.81 16.16 
104 Private health services 13.64 16.02 
105 Services to families 9.43 16.43 
106 Community services 10.53 16.41 
107 Domestic services 14.00 16.25 
108 Public education 13.84 16.15 
109 Public health care 13.13 15.33 
110 Government and social security 13.16 15.50 
Maximum 15.34 36.06 
Minimum 7.30 10.49 
Deviation 1.89% 4.35% 
        Rates: 20% INSS; and IPI, where applicable. 
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Summarizing, the FST can be the basis for a broad tax reform agreement. It is 
not an easy task to accommodate the interests of the major social groups involved in 
the issue, such as workers, business, individual tax payers, and the government. Each 
group wants to take the opportunity to tend to their own interests, configuring a 
conflict of interests that is impossible for a conventional tax reform to overcome.  
The FST, by allowing gains for all parties involved – the public sector, wage-
earners, and business owners – creates conditions for a productive dialogue on tax 
reform that is long overdue in Brazil. For the public sector, the FST allows for 
reduction of operational costs, dismantling of bureaucracy, furthering of 
administrative modernization, and increased efficiency in revenue collection. It 
facilitates necessary fiscal adjustment. For workers, it is a new opportunity for 
increases in real wages by transferring, even if partially, social security and tax 
withholdings expenditures into salaries. And for the business community, it allows 
for reduced costs, increased markets, and higher profit margins. The only losers will 
be tax evaders and to a lesser extent, the underground economy.  
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ANNEX I 
A – ASSUMPTIONS IMPLIED IN THE SIMULATIONS 
 
The following assumptions were accepted: 
Tax rates: 
1. A 20% payroll employer’s contribution to INSS  [National Social Security 
Institute]; 
2. The sectoral rates for IPI, [Industrialized Products Tax], ICMS [Tax on 
Circulation of Goods and Services], and ISS [Services Tax] are averages 
based on the product mix of each of the 110 Products included in IBGE’s 
2005 input-output matrix (TABLE A-1); 
3. The tax evasion rates applied in the simulations are based on IBGE 
estimates of the proportion of the formal activities (the legal economy) in 
the various sectors of the economy;216 
4. Tax revenue estimates for the single tax on transactions were based on the 
2007 tax revenue of CPMF  [Provisional Contribution on Financial 
Transactions] ; 
5. The tax rates needed to achieve a specified revenue target were based on 
data contained in “Carga Tributária no Brasil – 2007”, published on 
December 2008 on the website of the Receita Federal, 
www.receita.fazenda.gov.br. Nominal GDP for 2007 was estimated at 
R$ 2.6 trillion. 
6. In the single tax on transactions model, which implies the elimination of all 
federal, state, and municipal taxes that have essentially fiscal characteristics, 
the initial estimates of the single tax rate necessary to keep government 
revenue constant were based on data on monthly payment flows of one 
important bank, available from June 1990 to May 1996. The monthly 
volumes of banking debits and credits are reproduced in the TABLE A-2 
below. 
                                                 
216
 Information reproduced from [PEREIRA and IKEDA, 2001] p.8. It is worth noticing that 
“formalization rates” as informed in the above mentioned paper is not the same as “evasion rates”, 
since tax avoidance and tax evasion are also commonly practiced by formally registered firms. Thus, 
there is a clear under estimation of the tax evasion rates used in the simulations, pointing to the fact 
that distortions in relative prices caused by the use of  VAT’s may actually be stronger than the 
estimates presented in this text. 
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Simulation 1: 
The single tax on transactions rate of 2.81% resulted in estimated revenue of 
R$ 701 billion (27% of GDP). The estimated revenue for the conventional tax 
system, using the rates for ICMS, ISS, IPI indicated in TABLE A-1 and INSS payroll 
tax rate of 20%, amounted to R$ 282 billion (10.9% of GDP). 
Simulation 2: 
In order to compare two different tax systems, it is necessary to fix tax rates so 
that revenue generated by each system is the same. To accomplish this, the estimated 
rates for the conventional taxes would have to be raised by 82% (having set a ceiling 
of 80% for the sum of the rates of the two value-added taxes, ICMS, and IPI). But 
instead of using such unrealistic assumptions, we chose a different path: in order for 
both systems to generate equivalent revenues, the rate of single tax on transactions 
was set at 1.13%, keeping the rates of the conventional taxes as currently applied, 
from which resulted tax revenues of 10.9% of GDP, as mentioned in Simulation 2 in 
the main text. 
Simulation 3: 
In this exercise we attempted to estimate the effects that would result by 
eliminating the cumulative social taxes (i.e., Cofins [Contribution to Social Security 
Financing], PIS [Social Integration Program], CPMF [Provisional Contribution os 
Financial Transactions] and ISS [Services Tax] from the Brazilian tax system. In 
2007, they raised revenue equivalent to 3.4% of GDP, or R$ 88,3 billion. To replace 
the revenue from these eliminated contributions, rates for the remaining conventional 
taxes (ICMS, IPI and INSS) had to be increased by 33.56%. 
Simulation 4: 
In this exercise we attempted to re-estimate the model in Simulation 1 by 
including rates of tax evasion published by BNDES. The nominal rates of the 
conventional taxes (ICMS, IPI, and ISS) were increasead according to each sector’s 
estimated rate of tax evasion. The implicit hypothesis in this procedure is that the 
effective tax rate for each sector is lower than the formal (or nominal) rate, resulting 
in lower tax burdens and, consequently, in tax credits limited to these lower effective 
tax payments. Because of tax evasion, nominal tax rates for conventional taxes had 
to be raised in order to guarantee the equivalent revenue. The increase in the INSS 
contribution was based on the proportion between the sum of effective rates and the 
sum of theoretical rates, which resulted in the need to raise the INSS rate by 10.8%. It 
is worth noting that, in this model, dutiful taxpayers ended up paying for the tax 
evaders, which appears to be what actually happens. Through this procedure, 
revenue is kept at the same level as before the tax evasion factor was included, but 
the system becomes affected by greater differences among tax rates. 
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TABLE A-1  
Average sectoral tax rates for ICMS, IPI, and ISS, used in the simulations 
Products ICMS IPI ISS 
1 Rice 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2 Corn 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
3 Wheat and others cereals 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
4 Sugar Cane 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
5 Soybean 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
6 Other agricultural products 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
7 Manioc 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
8 Tobacco 12.0% 30.0% 0.0% 
9 Cotton 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
10 Citric fruits 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
11 Coffee 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
12 Forest products 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
13 Cattle and other live animals 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
14 Cow Milk 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
15 Live pigs 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
16 Live poultry 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
17 Chicken eggs 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
18 Fish 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
19 Oil and natural gas 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
20 Iron ore 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
21 Coal 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
22 Non-ferrous metallic minerals 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
23 Non-metallic minerals 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
24 Meat processing 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
25 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen pork 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
26 Fresh, refrigerated or frozen poultry 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
27 Processed fish meat 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
28 Canned fruit, legumes and other vegetables 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
29 Non-refined soybean oil and by-products 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
30 Vegetables except corn and animal oils 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
31 Processed soybean oil 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
32 Refrigerated, sterilized and pasteurized milk 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
33 Dairy products and ice-cream 12.0% 2.5% 0.0% 
34 Processed rice and by-products 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
35 Wheat flour 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
36 Manioc flour 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
37 Corn oil and corn products 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
38 Sugar products 7.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
39 Ground coffee 7.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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TABLE A-1 (CONTINUATION) 
Average sectoral tax rates for ICMS, IPI, and ISS, used in the simulations 
Products ICMS IPI ISS 
40 Instant coffee 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
41 Other food products 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
42 Beverages 25.0% 40.0% 0.0% 
43 Tobacco products 25.0% 29.2% 0.0% 
44 Processed cotton 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
45 Textiles 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
46 Other textiles products 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
47 Clothing 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
48 Leather products except shoes 18.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
49 Shoes 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
50 Wood products except furniture 12.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
51 Cellulose and other paper inputs 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
52 Paper cardboard and packaging 12.0% 15.0% 0.0% 
53 Newspapers, magazines and sound recordings 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
54 Liquefied oil gas 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
55 Gasoline 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
56 Gasalcohol 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
57 Heating oil 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
58 Diesel oil 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
59 Other oil products 18.0% 4.0% 0.0% 
60 Alcohol 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
61 Inorganic chemical products 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
62 Organic chemical products 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
63 Resin and elastomer 18.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
64 Pharmaceutical products 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
65 Pesticides 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
66 Perfumery, soaps and cleaning products 25.0% 25.0% 0.0% 
67 Paints, vanish, enamels and lacquers 18.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
68 Other chemical products 18.0% 15.0% 0.0% 
69 Rubber products 18.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
70 Plastic products 12.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
71 Cement 12.0% 4.0% 0.0% 
72 Other non-metallic mineral products 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
73 Pig iron 18.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
74 Semi-finished rolled steel and steel tubes 18.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
75 Non-ferrous metallic products 18.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
76 Cast steel 18.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
77 Metal products - except machinery and equipment 18.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
78 Machinery and equipment 12.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
79 Home appliances 18.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
80 Office and computer equipment 18.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
81 Electric machines and equipment 18.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
82 Electronics and communication equipment 18.0% 15.0% 0.0% 
83 Medical and hospital equipment 18.0% 12.0% 0.0% 
84 Automobiles, vans and pick-ups 12.0% 15.0% 0.0% 
85 Buses and trucks 12.0% 15.0% 0.0% 
86 Auto industry parts and equipments 12.0% 5.0% 0.0% 
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TABLE A-1 (CONTINUATION) 
Average sectoral tax rates for ICMS, IPI, and ISS, used in the simulations 
Products ICMS IPI ISS 
87 Other transport equipment 12.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
88 Furniture 12.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
89 Recycled scrap 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
90 Electricity, gas, water, sewer and urban sanitation 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
91 Construction 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 
92 Trade 18.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
93 Freight 12.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
94 Passenger transportation 12.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
95 Mail 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 
96 Information services 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 
97 Insurance and finance 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 
98 Real estate rental 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 
99 Imputed rental values 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
100 Maintenance and repair 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 
101 Lodge and food 6.0% 0.0% 2.5% 
102 Services to firms 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 
103 Private education 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
104 Private health services 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
105 Services to families 0.0% 0.0% 5.0% 
106 Community services 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
107 Domestic services 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
108 Public education 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
109 Public health care 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
110 Government and social security 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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B – BANKING TRANSACTIONS (1990-1996) 
TABLE A-2 
Volume of debit and credit entries on current accounts of bank clients;  
data from accounting books of a large private bank  
Month/year 
Total credits 
current prices 
(Cr$ 000) 
Total debits  
current prices 
(Cr$ 000) 
IGP-DI  
Dec. 2000 = 100 
Jun-90 1,533,298,910.00 1,537,550,041.00 0.00001178 
Jul-90 1,822,582,439.00 1,827,128,605.00 0.00001330 
Aug-90 1,587,112,437.00 1,592,129,950.00 0.00001502 
Sept-90 2,086,060,050.92 2,091,860,346.50 0.00001679 
Oct-90 2,411,111,638.31 2,417,822,554.91 0.00001971 
Nov-90 2,695,552,482.21 2,703,358,058.62 0.00002296 
Dec-90 3,244,146,012.99 3,253,290,019.67 0.00002674 
 
Month/year Total credits (R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Total debits  
(R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Jun-90 47,347,339.94 47,478,612 
Jul-90 49,814,338.63 49,938,593 
Aug-90 38,411,879.17 38,533,315 
Sept-90 45,191,185.91 45,316,840 
Oct-90 44,472,467.90 44,596,249 
Nov-90 42,691,844.33 42,815,468 
Dec-90 44,118,499.38 44,242,853 
 
Month/year 
Total credits 
current prices 
(Cr$ 000) 
Total debits  
current prices 
(Cr$ 000) 
IGP-DI  
Dec. 2000 = 100 
Jan-91 2,953,355,730.99 2,951,229,860.41 0.00003207 
Feb-91 3,763,608,152.25 3,765,245,536.25 0.00003884 
Mar-91 4,173,298,707.68 4,173,020,590.57 0.00004165 
Apr-91 4,217,692,000.00 4,233,189,000.00 0.00004529 
May-91 4,352,789,000.00 4,254,071,000.00 0.00004825 
Jun-91 5,209,312,000.00 5,218,229,000.00 0.00005300 
Jul-91 5,045,839,000.00 5,050,080,000.00 0.00005980 
Aug-91 5,808,619,000.00 5,838,460,000.00 0.00006907 
Sept-91 7,051,713,000.00 7,060,451,000.00 0.00008025 
Oct-91 9,474,334,000.00 9,503,800,000.00 0.00010100 
Nov-91 17,806,261,000.00 17,935,588,000.00 0.00012701 
Dec-91 20,129,261,000.00 20,060,040,000.00 0.00015513 
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TABLE A-2 (CONTINUATION) 
Volume of debit and credit entries on current accounts of bank clients;  
data from accounting books of a large private bank 
Month/year Total credits (R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Total debits  
(R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Jan-91 33,489,469.38 33,465,636 
Feb-91 35,238,458.51 35,253,789 
Mar-91 36,432,978.00 36,430,550 
Apr-91 33,861,074.40 33,985,490 
May-91 32,806,683.57 32,062,653 
Jun-91 35,738,431.57 35,799,607 
Jul-91 30,680,605.09 30,706,392 
Aug-91 30,581,518.15 30,738,627 
Sept-91 31,953,028.51 31,992,623 
Oct-91 34,112,446.65 34,218,539 
Nov-91 50,979,360.67 51,349,624 
Dec-91 47,183,653.43 47,021,397 
 
Month/year 
Total credits 
current prices 
(Cr$ 000) 
Total debits  
current prices 
(Cr$ 000) 
IGP-DI  
Dec. 2000 = 
100 
Jan-92 22,547,019,000.00 22,548,508,000.00 0.0001968 
Feb-92 23,592,648,000.00 23,460,583,000.00 0.0002455 
Mar-92 31,375,053,000.00 30,575,897,000.00 0.0002964 
Apr-92 39,010,822,000.00 38,763,434,000.00 0.0003513 
May-92 44,898,418,000.00 44,669,416,000.00 0.0004302 
Jun-92 66,676,716,000.00 66,448,266,000.00 0.0005223 
Jul-92 72,686,732,290.37 72,332,079,881.00 0.0006356 
Aug-92 92,132,020,650.83 91,725,682,234.50 0.0007980 
Sept-92 121,105,397,420.19 120,595,674,882.01 0.0010164 
Oct-92 165,364,982,000.00 165,411,073,000.00 0.0012699 
Nov-92 197,022,852,000.00 196,631,023,000.00 0.0015775 
Dec-92 295,625,858,000.00 297,149,629,000.00 0.0019513 
 
Month/year Total credits (R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Total debits  
(R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Jan-92 41,667,422.05 41,670,173.76 
Feb-92 34,938,511.95 34,742,936.00 
Mar-92 38,495,052.31 37,514,542.35 
Apr-92 40,377,611.45 40,121,555.93 
May-92 37,951,397.48 37,757,828.39 
Jun-92 46,417,388.91 46,258,352.10 
Jul-92 41,582,132.62 41,379,245.47 
Aug-92 41,983,639.67 41,798,475.32 
Sept-92 43,327,720.40 43,145,357.63 
Oct-92 47,352,660.77 47,365,859.04 
Nov-92 45,417,781.41 45,327,456.84 
Dec-92 55,091,174.76 55,375,136.16 
Total 514,602,493.79 512,456,919.00 
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TABLE A-2 (CONTINUATION) 
Volume of debit and credit entries on current accounts of bank clients;  
data from accounting books of a large private bank  
Month/year 
Total credits 
current prices 
(Cr$ 000) 
Total debits  
current prices 
(Cr$ 000) 
IGP-DI  
Dec. 2000 = 
100 
Jan-93 241,461,453,000.00 242,635,852,000.00 0.0025119 
Feb-93 304,752,887,000.00 305,604,451,000.00 0.0031778 
Mar-93 479,044,180,000.00 479,853,272,000.00 0.0040616 
Apr-93 588,707,398,000.00 590,489,761,000.00 0.0052078 
May-93 646,800,217,000.00 650,770,945,000.00 0.0068883 
Jun-93 875,546,815,000.00 873,804,721,000.00 0.0090044 
Jul-93 1,101,831,135,000.00 1,105,196,704,000.00 0.0118822 
Month/year 
Total credits 
current prices 
(CR$ 000) 
Total debits  
current prices 
(CR$ 000) 
IGP-DI  
Dec. 2000 = 
100 
Aug-93 1,518,701,000.00 1,544,318,000.00 0.0158664 
Sept-93 1,912,573,000.00 1,929,226,000.00 0.0217353 
Oct-93 2,729,538,000.00 2,764,890,000.00 0.0293731 
Nov-93 4,048,968,000.00 4,063,258,000.00 0.0402294 
Dec-93 6,916,187,000.00 7,401,746,000.00 0.0548005 
 
Month/year Total credits (R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Total debits  
(R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Jan-93 34,954,866.95 35,124,878 
Feb-93 34,872,478.75 34,969,922 
Mar-93 42,888,980.70 42,961,419 
Apr-93 41,106,819.48 41,231,274 
May-93 34,144,690.97 34,354,306 
Jun-93 35,358,217.43 35,287,864 
Jul-93 33,719,701.60 33,822,699 
Aug-93 34,806,663.82 35,393,749 
Sept-93 31,997,716.67 32,276,325 
Oct-93 33,791,388.64 34,229,067 
Nov-93 36,598,867.81 36,728,036 
Dec-93 45,893,286.29 49,115,278 
 
Month/year 
Total credits 
current prices 
(CR$ 000) 
Total debits 
current prices 
(CR$ 000) 
IGP-DI  
Dec. 2000 = 
100 
Jan-94 6,394,679,000.00 7,523,902,000.00 0.0779209 
Feb-94 7,815,124,000.00 9,640,008,000.00 0.1109671 
Mar-94 13,243,235,000.00 16,497,548,000.00 0.1607137 
Apr-94 18,116,295,000.00 23,208,436,000.00 0.2289528 
May-94 28,292,834,000.00 35,020,635,000.00 0.3227089 
Jun-94 42,298,139,000.00 52,968,457,000.00 0.4730267 
Month/year 
Total credits 
current prices 
(R$ 000) 
Total debits 
current prices 
(R$ 000) 
IGP-DI  
Dec. 2000 = 
100 
Jul-94 27,258,628.00 22,776,028.00 0.4989013 
Aug-94 28,799,615.00 27,099,407.00 0.5155646 
Sept-94 23,830,262.00 23,818,694.00 0.5235558 
Oct-94 21,777,245.00 21,780,842.00 0.5369065 
Nov-94 - - 0.5501681 
Dec-94 27,110,163.00 27,184,428.00 0.5533041 
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TABLE A-2 (CONTINUATION) 
Volume of debit and credit entries on current accounts of bank clients;  
data from accounting books of a large private bank  
Month/year Total credits (R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Total debits  
(R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Jan-94 29,842,288.50 35,112,071 
Feb-94 25,609,955.18 31,590,045 
Mar-94 29,964,599.50 37,327,917 
Apr-94 28,773,374.80 36,861,015 
May-94 31,881,063.88 39,462,115 
Jun-94 32,509,513.82 40,719,171 
Month/year Total credits (R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Total debits  
(R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Jul-94 54,637,316.63 45,652,373 
Aug-94 55,860,342.47 52,562,583 
Sept-94 45,516,179.49 45,494,093 
Oct-94 40,560,606.10 40,567,293 
Nov-94 45,816,791.55 44,999,100 
Dec-94 48,995,861.48 49,131,094 
 
Month/year 
Total credits 
current prices 
(R$ 000) 
Total debits  
current prices 
(R$ 000) 
IGP-DI  
Dec. 2000 = 100 
Jan-95 29,211,673.00 29,282,874.00 0.5608290 
Feb-95 20,622,799.00 20,627,144.00 0.5672785 
Mar-95 30,713,451.00 30,875,363.00 0.5775463 
Apr-95 23,887,570.00 24,070,617.00 0.5908298 
May-95 30,042,045.00 29,970,966.00 0.5931932 
Jun-95 30,202,552.00 30,082,080.00 0.6087348 
Jul-95 29,237,968.00- 29,162,542.00 0.6223705 
Aug-95 - - 0.6303991 
Sept-95 29,719,044.00 29,681,517.00 0.6235908 
Oct-95 31,696,006.00 31,649,318.00 0.6250250 
Nov-95 34,192,850.00 34,128,240.00 0.6333378 
Dec-95 34,645,506.00 32,667,096.00 0.6350479 
 
Month/year Total credits (R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Total debits  
(R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Jan-95 52,086,596.06 52,213,547.41 
Feb-95 36,353,916.97 36,361,579.87 
Mar-95 53,179,201.21 53,459,549.30 
Apr-95 40,430,542.05 40,740,353.75 
May-95 50,644,622.47 50,524,799.78 
Jun-95 49,615,285.03 49,417,379.48 
Jul-95 46,978,397.20 46,857,204.11 
Aug-95 49,169,609.94 48,199,857.26 
Sept-95 47,657,928.92 47,597,750.03 
Oct-95 50,711,579.81 50,636,866.00 
Nov-95 53,988,327.17 53,886,310.52 
Dec-95 54,555,739.99 51,440,368.51 
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TABLE A-2 (CONTINUATION) 
Volume of debit and credit entries on current accounts of bank clients;  
data from accounting books of a large private bank 
Month/year 
Total credits 
current prices 
(R$ 000) 
Total debits  
current prices 
(R$ 000) 
IGP-DI  
Dec. 2000 = 100 
Jan-96 36,409,233.00 35,886,339.00 0.6464152 
Feb-96 30,004,494.00 30,661,524,00 0.6513280 
Mar-96 33,070,535.00 33,858,915.00 0.6527609 
Apr-96 36,127,974.00 34,888,731.00 0.6573302 
May-96 34,825,525.00 35,802,690.00 0.6683734 
 
Month/year Total credits (R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Total debits  
(R$ 000 - Dec. 2000)  
Jan-96 56,324,838.88 55,515,927 
Feb-96 46,066,644.17 47,070,793 
Mar-96 50,662,555.38 51,870,316 
Apr-96 54,961,681.19 53,076,411 
May-96 52,104,896.17 53,566,904 
                         Note: IGP-di (general price index-internal supply) 
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C –REDUCED BRAZILIAN NATIONAL ACCOUNTS AND INPUT-OUTPUT 
DATA 2005 (12 SECTORS) 
TABLE A-3 
Resources 2005 
Supply of goods and services (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product Total supply at 
consumers prices 
Trade 
Margin 
Transport 
Margin 
Import 
Tax 
IPI 
Tax 
Agriculture 217,902 22,356 2,374 68 0 
Minerals 146,223 2,636 3,344 9 0 
Manufacturing 1,957,518 261,107 27,920 8,820 24,115 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 166,541 0 0 0 0 
Building Construction 172,456 0 0 0 0 
Commerce 10,628 (-) 286,099 0 0 0 
Transport, storage and mail 164,332 0 (-) 33,638 0 0 
Information services 177,865 0 0 0 0 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 214,210 0 0 0 0 
Real estate activities and rent 212,994 0 0 0 0 
Other services 482,419 0 0 0 0 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
415,943 0 0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment      
Total 4,339,031 0 0 8,897 24,115 
 
Supply of goods and services (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product ICMS tax Other taxes 
minus subsidies 
Total taxes net 
of subsidies 
Total supply in 
basic prices 
Agriculture 5,037 4,180 9,285 183,887 
Minerals 776 1,182 1,967 138,276 
Manufacturing 91,288 53,183 177,406 1,491,085 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 23,271 5,813 29,084 137,457 
Building Construction 0 5,230 5,230 167,226 
Commerce 0 0 0 296,727 
Transport, storage and mail 4,732 6,268 11,000 186,970 
Information services 19,287 11,748 31,035 146,830 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 0 11,782 11,782 202,830 
Real estate activities and rent 0 1,553 1,553 211,441 
Other services 9,150 17,494 26,644 455,775 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 415,943 
CIF/FOB Adjustment     
Total 153,541 118,433 304,986 4,034,045 
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TABLE A-3 (CONTINUATION) 
Resources 2005 
Production by Activities (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product 01 
Agriculture 
02 
Minerals 
03 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture 0 0 0 
Minerals 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 0 0 881 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 132,266 0 0 
Building Construction 0 166,736 1 
Commerce 1 0 282,371 
Transport, storage and mail 0 0 905 
Information services 0 0 172 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 0 0 0 
Real estate activities and rent 336 936 1,462 
Other services 32 0 8,598 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment    
Total 132,635 167,672 294,390 
 
Production by Activities (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product 04 Production and distribution 
of electricity, gas, and water 
05 
Building 
Construction 
06 
Commerce 
Agriculture 0 0 0 
Minerals 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 0 0 881 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 132,266 0 0 
Building Construction 0 166,736 1 
Commerce 1 0 282,371 
Transport, storage and mail 0 0 905 
Information services 0 0 172 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 0 0 0 
Real estate activities and rent 336 936 1,462 
Other services 32 0 8,598 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment    
Total 132,635 167,672 294,390 
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TABLE A-3 (CONTINUATION) 
Resources 2005 
Production by Activities (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product 07 Transport, 
Storage and mail 
08 
Information 
services 
09 
Financial services, 
insurance and pension 
funds 
Agriculture 0 0 0 
Minerals 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 0 44 0 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 0 0 0 
Building Construction 0 0 0 
Commerce 99 (-) 1,266 0 
Transport, storage and mail 180,366 0 0 
Information services 0 141,106 0 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 0 0 198,895 
Real estate activities and rent 406 385 436 
Other services 27 0 0 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment    
Total 180,898 140,269 199,331 
 
Production by Activities (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product 
10 
Real estate 
activities 
and rent 
11 
Other 
services 
12 
Administration, 
Health management 
and public education 
Total 
Production 
Agriculture 0 0 142 179,292 
Minerals 0 2 0 108,729 
Manufacturing 1 126 1,639 1,328,623 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 0 0 2,408 134,700 
Building Construction 0 0 0 167,041 
Commerce 76 12,088 783 249,600 
Transport, storage and mail 0 0 2,054 183,325 
Information services 0 0 159 141,437 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 0 0 0 198,895 
Real estate activities and rent 176,159 16,628 549 198,701 
Other services 22 417,524 9,194 435,397 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 415,943 415,943 
CIF/FOB Adjustment     
Total 176,258 446,368 432,871 3,786,683 
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TABLE A-3 (CONTINUATION) 
Resources 2005 
Imports (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product CIF/FOB 
adjustment 
Merchandise 
Imports Services Imports 
Agriculture 0 4,595 0 
Minerals 0 29,547 0 
Manufacturing 0 162,462 0 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 0 2,757 0 
Building Construction 0 0 185 
Commerce 0 0 2,127 
Transport, storage and mail (-) 9,546 0 13,191 
Information services 0 0 5,393 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds (-) 254 0 3,787 
Real estate activities and rent 0 0 12,740 
Other services 0 0 20,378 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment 9,800 (-) 9,800 0 
Total 0 189,561 57,801 
   Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) 
TABLE A-4 
Intermediate Uses of Goods and Services (consumer prices) – 2005 
Intermediate consumption by activities 
(current values R$ 000,000) Product level 12 01 
Agriculture 
02 
Minerals 
03 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture 20,445 0 122,304 
Minerals 1,709 6,839 97,346 
Manufacturing 59,783 19,857 599,925 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 1,456 4,356 39,166 
Building Construction 0 1,483 1,643 
Commerce 0 0 3,710 
Transport, storage and mail 2,511 10,951 34,263 
Information services 671 4,165 15,807 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 2,438 2,271 29,049 
Real estate activities and rent 236 4,804 7,456 
Other services 65 6,831 30,554 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment    
Total 89,314 61,557 981,223 
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TABLE A-4 (CONTINUATION) 
Intermediate Uses of Goods and Services (consumer prices) – 2005 
Intermediate consumption by activities 
(current values R$ 000,000) 
Product level 12 04 
Production and distribution 
of electricity, gas, and water 
05 
Building 
Construction 
06 
Commerce 
Agriculture 0 0 0 
Minerals 4,580 2,443 0 
Manufacturing 11,333 64,337 23,290 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 33,204 472 7,143 
Building Construction 9 3,758 194 
Commerce 0 51 5,399 
Transport, storage and mail 2,165 990 14,751 
Information services 1,747 546 4,976 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 2,038 1,615 6,380 
Real estate activities and rent 459 550 8,134 
Other services 6,735 2,783 18,391 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment    
Total 62,270 77,455 88,658 
 
Intermediate consumption by activities 
(current values R$ 000,000) 
Product level 12 07 
Transport, 
Storage and mail 
08 
Information 
services 
09 
Financial services, 
insurance and pension 
funds 
Agriculture 0 0 0 
Minerals 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 52,976 11,688 9,578 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 2,824 2,061 1,513 
Building Construction 24 618 1,236 
Commerce 0 0 0 
Transport, storage and mail 13,847 3,017 2,068 
Information services 2,260 26,027 11,619 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 4,174 3,690 25,521 
Real estate activities and rent 1,976 5,519 1,370 
Other services 11,358 14,424 16,489 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment    
Total 89,439 67,044 69,394 
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TABLE A-4 (CONTINUATION) 
Intermediate Uses of Goods and Services (consumer prices) – 2005 
Intermediate consumption by activities 
(current values R$ 000,000) 
Product level 12 10 Real estate 
activities 
and rent 
11 
Other 
services 
12 
Administration, 
Health management 
and public education 
Total 
Production 
Agriculture 0 2,377 404 145,530 
Minerals 0 40 39 112,996 
Manufacturing 1,819 93,337 33,767 981,690 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 235 13,408 9,577 115,415 
Building Construction 4,230 2,791 10,815 26,801 
Commerce 0 10 0 9,170 
Transport, storage and mail 228 8,012 3,017 95,820 
Information services 394 32,190 23,507 123,819 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 681 4,448 32,455 114,760 
Real estate activities and rent 657 6,685 8,872 46,718 
Other services 2,100 28,759 33,222 171,711 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment     
Total 10,344 192,057 155,675 1,944,430 
 
Final demand (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product level 12 Goods 
Exports 
Services 
Exports 
Public Sector 
Consumption 
Third Sector 
Consumption 
Agriculture 21,451 0 0 0 
Minerals 30,543 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 235,327 0 0 0 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 0 0 0 0 
Building Construction 0 946 0 0 
Commerce 0 1,458 0 0 
Transport, storage and mail 0 5,455 0 0 
Information services 0 953 0 0 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 0 1,653 1,541 0 
Real estate activities and rent 0 2,506 0 0 
Other services 0 24,550 10,069 29,136 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 415,943 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment     
Total 287,321 37,521 427,553 29,136 
 
 - 247 - 
TABLE A-4 (CONTINUATION) 
Intermediate Uses of Goods and Services (consumer prices) – 2005 
Final demand (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product level 12 Consumption 
by families 
Gross fixed 
capital 
formation 
Inventory 
changes 
Final 
demand 
Total 
demand 
Agriculture 39,866 12,168 (-) 1,113 72,372 217,902 
Minerals 395 0 2,289 33,227 146,223 
Manufacturing 555,591 180,347 4,563 975,828 1,957,518 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 51,126 0 0 51,126 166,541 
Building Construction 0 144,709 0 145,655 172,456 
Commerce 0 0 0 1,458 10,628 
Transport, storage and mail 63,057 0 0 68,512 164,332 
Information services 53,093 0 0 54,046 177,865 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 96,256 0 0 99,450 214,210 
Real estate activities and rent 159,859 3,911 0 166,276 212,994 
Other services 245,851 1,102 0 310,708 482,419 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 415,943 415,943 
CIF/FOB Adjustment      
Total 1,265,094 342,237 5,739 4,339,601 4,339,031 
 
Value Added (current values R$ 000,000) 
Operations 01 
Agriculture 
02 
Minerals 
03 
Manufacturing 
Gross value added (Gross 
Internal Product) 105,163 45,353 333,381 
Income Payments 45,302 10,328 163,151 
Wages 36,128 6,997 124,299 
Social Contributions 9,174 3,328 38,772 
Social 
Security/Unemployment Fund 
(FGTS) 
9,174 2,592 36,642 
Private Pension Funds 0 736 2,130 
Imputed Social Contributions 0 3 80 
Gross Operational Surplus and 
other gross income 59,495 34,406 159,811 
Other gross income 48,077 246 15,191 
Gross Operational Surplus 11,418 34,160 144,620 
Other taxes on production 1,131 619 10,731 
Other subsidies on production (-) 765 0 (-) 312 
Value of Production 194,477 106,910 1,314,604 
Employment 18,980,620 275,704 11,673,764 
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TABLE A-4 (CONTINUATION) 
Intermediate Uses of Goods and Services (consumer prices) – 2005 
Value Added (current values R$ 000,000) 
Operations 04 Production and distribution 
of electricity, gas, and water 
05 
Building 
Construction 
06 
Commerce 
Gross value added (Gross 
Internal Product) 70,365 90,217 205,732 
Income Payments 14,719 28,478 90,407 
Wages 11,585 22,756 71,292 
Social Contributions 3,133 5,695 19,051 
Social 
Security/Unemployment Fund 
(FGTS) 
2,862 5,549 18,739 
Private Pension Funds 271 146 312 
Imputed Social Contributions 1 27 64 
Gross Operational Surplus and 
other gross income 54,595 60,971 111,457 
Other gross income 0 21,046 39,636 
Gross Operational Surplus 54,595 39,925 71,821 
Other taxes on production 1,086 773 3,868 
Other subsidies on production (-) 35 (-) 5 0 
Value of Production 132,635 167,672 294,390 
Employment 372,432 5,872,879 14,799,874 
 
Value Added (current values R$ 000,000) 
Operations 07 Transport, 
Storage and mail 
08 
Information 
services 
09 
Financial services, 
insurance and pension 
funds 
Gross value added (Gross 
Internal Product) 91,459 73,225 129,937 
Income Payments 38,822 22,535 50,667 
Wages 31,991 18,884 39,501 
Social Contributions 6,811 3,642 11,166 
Social 
Security/Unemployment Fund 
(FGTS) 
6,789 3,633 10,092 
Private Pension Funds 22 9 1,074 
Imputed Social Contributions 20 9 0 
Gross Operational Surplus and 
other gross income 51,803 48,560 76,853 
Other gross income 17,306 8,146 1,051 
Gross Operational Surplus 34,497 40,414 75,802 
Other taxes on production 1,460 2,545 2,417 
Other subsidies on production (-) 626 (-) 415 0 
Value of Production 180,898 140,269 199,331 
Employment 3,791,040 1,558,030 919,809 
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TABLE A-4 (CONTINUATION) 
Intermediate Uses of Goods and Services (consumer prices) – 2005 
Value Added (current values R$ 000,000) 
Operations 
10 
Real estate 
activities 
and rent 
11 
Other 
services 
12 
Administration, 
Health management 
and public education 
Total 
Production 
Gross value added (Gross 
Internal Product) 165,914 254,311 277,196 1,842,253 
Income Payments 4,472 148,608 243,397 860,886 
Wages 3,857 126,605 187,172 681,067 
Social Contributions 3,857 21,963 17,781 141,130 
Social 
Security/Unemployment Fund 
(FGTS) 
614 21,450 17,700 135,836 
Private Pension Funds 0 513 81 5,294 
Imputed Social Contributions 1 40 38,444 38,689 
Gross Operational Surplus and 
other gross income 161,292 102,929 33,769 955,941 
Other gross income 2,123 48,037 0 200,859 
Gross Operational Surplus 159,169 54,892 33,769 755,082 
Other taxes on production 150 3,166 30 27,976 
Other subsidies on production 0 (-) 392 0 (-) 2,550 
Value of Production 176,258 446,368 432,871 3,786,683 
Employment 568,907 22,792,031 9,300,583 90,905,673 
    Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) 
TABLE A-5 
Production supply and demand (basic prices) – 2005  
Resources Intermediate consumption by activities (current values R$ 000,000) Product Value of 
Production 
01 
Agriculture 
02 
Minerals 
03 
Manufacturing 
Agriculture 179,292 16,588 0 104,143 
Minerals 108,729 1,144 6,289 65,336 
Manufacturing 1,328,623 46,720 14,680 417,444 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 134,700 999 4,268 38,249 
Building Construction 167,041 0 1,420 1,573 
Commerce 294,600 7,419 2,042 62,451 
Transport, storage and mail 183,325 4,101 10,962 46,088 
Information services 141,437 554 3,852 14,373 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 198,895 2,203 2,039 25,732 
Real estate activities and rent 198,701 229 826 6,748 
Other services 435,397 63 5,924 26,506 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
415,943 0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment     
Total 3,786,863 80,020 52,302 808,643 
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TABLE A-5 (CONTINUATION) 
Production supply and demand (basic prices) – 2005  
Intermediate consumption by activities 
(current values R$ 000,000) 
Product 04 
Production and distribution 
of electricity, gas, and water 
05 
Building 
Construction 
06 
Commerce 
Agriculture 0 0 0 
Minerals 4,220 1,692 0 
Manufacturing 7,375 41,152 16,277 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 29,842 324 4,902 
Building Construction 9 3,414 186 
Commerce 1,291 8,751 6,671 
Transport, storage and mail 2,263 2,212 13,218 
Information services 1,641 322 4,110 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 1,809 1,430 5,661 
Real estate activities and rent 419 133 7,120 
Other services 5,874 2,341 16,107 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment    
Total 54,743 61,771 74,152 
 
Intermediate consumption by activities 
(current values R$ 000,000) 
Product 07 
Transport, 
Storage and mail 
08 
Information 
services 
09 
Financial services, 
insurance and pension 
funds 
Agriculture 0 0 0 
Minerals 0 0 0 
Manufacturing 38,916 7,537 6,397 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 2,578 2,023 1,038 
Building Construction 23 592 1,184 
Commerce 6,067 1,402 1,549 
Transport, storage and mail 15,486 3,074 2,082 
Information services 2,074 23,025 7,843 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 3,712 3,311 23,050 
Real estate activities and rent 775 3,699 1,234 
Other services 10,680 12,691 14,400 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment    
Total 80,311 57,354 58,777 
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TABLE A-5 (CONTINUATION) 
Production supply and demand (basic prices) – 2005  
Intermediate consumption by activities 
(current values R$ 000,000) 
Product 10 Real estate 
activities 
and rent 
11 
Other 
services 
12 
Administration, 
Health management 
and public education 
Total 
Production 
Agriculture 0 1,697 281 122,709 
Minerals 0 28 29 78,738 
Manufacturing 1,155 62,991 21,535 682,178 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 162 9,204 6,574 100,163 
Building Construction 4,051 2,674 10,356 25,482 
Commerce 220 13,822 4,599 116,185 
Transport, storage and mail 239 9,555 3,556 112,836 
Information services 325 25,276 19,228 102,623 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 607 3,896 29,891 103,341 
Real estate activities and rent 618 4,548 7,607 33,956 
Other services 1,801 25,492 30,268 152,147 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment     
Total 9,178 159,183 133,924 1,630,358 
 
Final demand (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product Exports Public Sector Consumption 
Consumption by 
lucrative endless 
Institutions 
Consumption by 
families 
Agriculture 18,043 0 0 28,195 
Minerals 27,728 0 0 235 
Manufacturing 224,412 0 0 320,604 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 0 0 0 34,537 
Building Construction 946 0 0 0 
Commerce 13,217 0 0 139,835 
Transport, storage and mail 10,059 0 0 56,344 
Information services 953 0 0 37,861 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 1,653 1,541 0 92,360 
Real estate activities and rent 2,506 0 0 158,344 
Other services 24,550 10,069 29,136 218,393 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 415,943 0 0 
CIF/FOB Adjustment     
Total 324,067 427,943 29,136 1,086,708 
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TABLE A-5 (CONTINUATION) 
Production supply and demand (basic prices) – 2005  
Final demand (current values R$ 000,000) 
Product Gross fixed 
capital 
formation 
Inventory 
changes Final demand Total demand 
Agriculture 11,193 (-) 848 56,583 179,292 
Minerals 0 2,028 29,991 108,729 
Manufacturing 97,073 4,356 646,445 1,328,623 
Production and distribution of 
electricity, gas, and water 0 0 34,537 134,700 
Building Construction 140,613 0 141,559 167,041 
Commerce 25,363 0 178,415 294,600 
Transport, storage and mail 4,086 0 70,489 183,325 
Information services 0 0 38,814 141,437 
Financial services, insurance, 
and pension funds 0 0 95,554 198,895 
Real estate activities and rent 3,895 0 164,745 198,701 
Other services 1,102 0 283,250 435,397 
Administration, Health 
management and public 
education 
0 0 415,943 415,943 
CIF/FOB Adjustment     
Total 283,325 5,536 2,156,325 3,786,683 
   Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) 
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 ANNEX II 
BREAKDOWN OF COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR PUBLICLY HELD 
COMPANIES- BRAZIL 2001 
TABLE A-6 
How much does it cost to pay taxes? 
All corporations 
All corporations (amounts in R$ 000,000) 
Gross corporate income R$ 48,131.840 Total corporations 
Corporate area Value % partial % total 
Corporate Board 4,007 3.24 2.56 
Fiscal counsel 70 0.06 0.04 
Executive Board 5,494 4.45 3.51 
Controller 33,487 27.12 21.42 
Legal counsel 10,598 8.58 6.78 
Information technology 8,813 7.14 5.64 
Archives 1,872 1.52 1.20 
Indirect taxes 37,848 30.65 24.20 
Costs 1,718 1.39 1.10 
Human resources 4,619 3.74 2.95 
Transfer prices 2,394 1.94 1.53 
Import taxes 6,752 5.47 4.32 
Treasury 1,375 1.11 0.88 
Internal  auditing 1,282 1.04 0.82 
Records 3,154 2.55 2.02 
Total internal  costs 123,483 100.00 78.97 
Incidence on gross income 0.26%   
Auditors and consultants 4,069 12.37 2.60 
Lawyers 11,608 35.30 7.42 
Miscellaneous 2,401 7.30 1.54 
Outsourced files 605 1.84 0.39 
Customs agents 3,341 10.16 2.14 
Information technology 10,864 33.03 6.95 
Total external costs 32,888 100.00 21.03 
Incidence on gross income 0.07%   
Total compliance costs 156,371  100.00 
Incidence on gross income 0.32%   
                       Source: [BERTOLUCCI, 2001] p. 51 
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TABLE A-7 
How much does it cost to pay taxes? 
Corporations with gross income up to R$ 100,000,000/year 
Corporations with gross income up to R$ 100,000,000/year 
(amounts in R$ 000,000) 
Gross corporate income R$ 154,194 Total corporations 
Corporate area Value % partial % total 
Corporate Board 176 8.69 6.88 
Fiscal counsel 9 0.44 0.35 
Executive Board 107 5.28 4.18 
Controller 937 46.27 36.63 
Legal counsel 78 3.85 3.05 
Information technology 143 7.06 5.59 
Archives 11 0.54 0.43 
Indirect taxes 69 3.41 2.70 
Costs 0 0.00 0.00 
Human resources 267 13.19 10.44 
Transfer prices 0 0.00 0.00 
Import taxes 12 0.59 0.47 
Treasury 192 9.48 7.51 
Internal auditing 14 0.69 0.55 
Records 10 0.49 0.39 
Total internal costs 2,025 100.00 79.16 
Incidence on gross income 1.31%   
Auditors and consultants 127 28.83 4.96 
Lawyers 217 40.71 8.48 
Miscellaneous 64 12.01 2.50 
Outsourced files 0 0.00 0.00 
Customs agents 27 5.07 1.06 
Information technology 98 18.39 3.83 
Total external costs 533 100.00 20.84 
Incidence on gross income 0.35%   
Total compliance costs 2,558  100.00 
Incidence on gross income 1.66%   
                           Source:  [BERTOLUCCI, 2001] p.152 
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TABLE A-8 
How much does it cost to pay taxes? 
Corporations with gross income from R$ 100,000,000 to R$ 1,000,000,000/year 
Corporations with gross income from R$ 100,000,000 to  
R$ 1,000,000,000/year 
(amounts in R$ 000,000) 
Gross corporate income R$ 3,736,199 Total corporations 
Corporate area Value % partial % total 
Corporate Board 1,235 6.30 4.89 
Fiscal counsel 0 0.00 0.00 
Executive Board 2,333 11.90 9.23 
Controller 2,397 12.23 9.48 
Legal counsel 1,649 8.41 6.52 
Information technology 1,511 7.71 5.98 
Archives 394 2.01 1.56 
Indirect taxes 4,634 23.64 18.33 
Costs 615 3.14 2.43 
Human resources 1,184 6.04 4.68 
Transfer prices 1,992 10.16 7.89 
Import taxes 840 4.28 3.32 
Treasury 436 2.22 1.73 
Internal  auditing 214 1.09 0.85 
Records 172 0.88 0.68 
Total internal costs 19,606 100.00 77.57 
Incidence on gross income 0.52%   
Auditors and consultants 820 14.46 3.24 
Lawyers 2,747 48.46 10.87 
Miscellaneous 247 4.36 0.98 
Outsourced files 0 0.00 0.00 
Customs agents 1,363 24.04 5.39 
Information technology 492 8.68 1.95 
Total external costs 5,669 100.00 22.43 
Incidence on gross income 0.15%   
Total compliance costs 25,275  100.00 
Incidence on gross income 0.68%   
                         Source: [BERTOLUCCI, 2001] p.153 
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TABLE A-9 
How much does it cost to pay taxes? 
Corporations with gross income from R$ 1,000,000,000 to R$ 5,000,000,000/year 
Corporations with gross income from R$ 1,000,000,000 to  
R$ 5,000,000,000/year 
(amounts in R$ 000,000) 
Corporate area Value % partial % total 
Corporate Board 2,585 3.38 2.72 
Fiscal counsel 59 0.08 0.06 
Executive Board 2,566 3.35 2.70 
Controller 13,045 17.05 13.75 
Legal counsel 5,680 7.42 5.99 
Information technology 5,479 7.16 5.78 
Archives 1,436 1.88 1.51 
Indirect taxes 30,660 40.07 32.32 
Costs 1,103 1.44 1.16 
Human resources 3,006 3.93 3.17 
Transfer prices 402 0.53 0.42 
Import taxes 5,900 7.71 6.22 
Treasury 647 0.85 0.68 
Internal auditing 974 1.27 1.03 
Records 2,972 3.88 3.13 
Total internal costs 76,514 100.00 80.66 
Incidence on gross income 0.39%   
Auditors and consultants 1,912 10.42 2.02 
Lawyers 3,808 20.75 4.01 
Miscellaneous 2,085 11.36 2.20 
Outsourced files 333 1.81 0.35 
Customs agents 1,951 10.63 2.06 
Information technology 8,261 45.02 8.71 
Total external costs 18,349 100.00 19.34 
Incidence on gross income 0.09%   
Total compliance costs 94,863  100.00 
Incidence on gross income 0.48%   
                     Source:  [BERTOLUCCI, 2001] p.154 
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TABLE A-10 
How much does it cost to pay taxes? 
Corporations with gross income above R$ 5,000,000,000/year 
Corporations with gross income above R$ 5,000,000,000/year 
(amounts in R$ 000,000) 
Gross corporate income R$ 24,610,181 Total corporations 
Corporate area Value % partial % total 
Corporate Board 11 0.04 0.03 
Fiscal counsel 2 0.01 0.01 
Executive Board 488 1.93 1.45 
Controller 17,108 67.55 50.82 
Legal counsel 3,191 12.60 9.48 
Information technology 1,680 6.63 4.99 
Archives 18 0.07 0.05 
Indirect taxes 2,485 9.81 7.38 
Costs 0 0.00 0.00 
Human resources 162 0.64 0.48 
Transfer prices 0 0.00 0.00 
Import taxes 0 0.00 0.00 
Treasury 100 0.39 0.30 
Internal  auditing 80 0.32 0.24 
Records 0 0.00 0.00 
Total internal costs 25,325 100.00 75.23 
Incidence on gross income 0.10%   
Auditors and consultants 1,210 14.51 3.59 
Lawyers 4,840 58.05 14.38 
Miscellaneous 5 0.06 0.01 
Outsourced files 272 3.26 0.81 
Customs agents 0 0.00 0.00 
Information technology 2,010 24.11 5.97 
Total external costs 8,337 100.00 24.77 
Incidence on gross income 0.03%   
Total compliance costs 33,662  100.00 
Incidence on gross income 0.14%   
                        Source: [BERTOLUCCI, 2001] p. 155 
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TABLE A-11 
How much does it cost to pay taxes? 
Percentages of participation by major activity 
How much does it cost to pay taxes (% participation by major activity) 
Categories of gross income (in R$ 000,000) 
Activity Up to 100 From 100 to 1,000 
From 1,000 
to 5,000 
From 5,000 
to 15,000 All Corps 
Advisory, Executive 
Board, Tax advisory 11.4 14.1 5.5 1.5 6.1 
Controller, legal, 
information technology 45.3 22.0 25.5 65.3 33.8 
Indirect taxes 2.7 18.3 32.3 7.4 24.2 
Other internal  costs 19.8 23.1 17.3 1.1 14.8 
Total internal costs 79.2 77.6 80.6 75.3 79.0 
Auditors, attorneys, and 
information technology 17.3 16.0 14.7 23.9 17.0 
Other external costs 3.6 6.4 4.6 0.8 4.0 
Total external costs 20.8 22.4 19.3 24.7 21.0 
           Source:  [BERTOLUCCI, 2001] p. 156 
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ANNEX III 
THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIENCE WITH A BANK TRANSACTIONS TAX 
First of all, I would like to congratulate the organizers and sponsors of this 
forum, specially the Parliamentarians for Global Action for the choice of "poverty 
eradication on a world level" as the main theme of this meeting. 
Indeed, it is estimated that one billion people throughout the world suffer the 
pain and misery of utmost poverty. Particularly striking, and painful, is the fact that 
poverty flourishes in the midst of great wealth. Opulence and misery live side by 
side, are door-to-door neighbors’ in many developing countries. Income inequality 
and income concentration are nowadays two of the most common manifestations of 
world globalization. 
Countries, such as Brazil, that chose to retrocede in its import substitution 
policies and to open its economy to world investors, now have to deal with a 
transitional situation which imposes great threats and challenges. 
Short of official development assistance, lacking foreign aid, and unable to 
compete on a global level, such countries suffered a sharp fall in the rate of 
economic growth. Its savings rate fell dramatically, public deficit, and debt grew 
enormously, national industry and services were quickly taken over by multinational 
concerns. They now have to face the socially disrupting effects of growing 
inequality, such as urban violence, unemployment, swollen cities without minimum 
urban equipment, and dwindling social investment in sanitation, health, and 
education. 
Our countries are going through a painful process of integration with the world 
economy, and we now face the challenge of reaching a successful conclusion.  
We do not dispute the benefits of world integration, nor do we underestimate the 
expected future gains that can be reaped out of growing flows of financial and 
commercial transactions on a global scale. But what we fear is that the process of 
building an integrated world economy may be aborted by the inability of the 
developing countries to bear the burden of such a transition to a global economy. 
In response to this challenge, it is not acceptable to draw back, and to adopt the 
isolationist policies that typified the fifties and the sixties in the developing 
countries. That was a strategy that ran its course, that achieved remarkable results at 
its time, but that cannot be made to have the same positive effects again. 
By the same token, it is not wise to allow big government to take over again, 
under the illusion that it can row against the tide of world integration and neutralize 
the prevalence of the private over the public sector. It is well known that 
governments make mistakes, such as mistargeting and other forms of inefficiency; 
governments are prone to corruption, and are easy targets for rent-seekers. 
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The challenge is facing us right in the eye; the bridges behind us have been 
burned, there is no turn around. 
It is an objective of this 21st Forum to "share national level strategies", to "learn 
about best practices", and to "forge new partnerships for poverty eradication". Based 
on the Brazilian experience with the use of a national transactions tax, I would like to 
propose the use of such tax both as an federal component of national tax systems, 
and as an internationally agreed toll tax in world short-term capital movements. 
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE TRANSACTIONS TAX IN BRAZIL 
I first proposed the adoption of a transactions tax in Brazil in January 1990, in 
the context of a modern single-tax model. 
Following an old and respectable tradition in the history of economic thought, 
which dates back at least to the Physiocratic School, the single-tax ideal was never 
implemented. The difficulty, which has turned the single-tax ideal into an almost 
utopian proposal, resides in the until now insurmountable difficulty in identifying a 
tax base sufficiently broad to allow the collection of enough revenues needed by 
governments to finance their activities, without, at the same time, requiring 
excessively high tax rates. As we know, evasion and its natural complement, 
corruption, varies in direct proportion to the nominal tax rates. 
Such a tax base has never been found, in the past. 
But now, the electronic age has opened the way for such a tax base: the set of all 
payments cleared through the banking system.  
It is important to point out that a monetary payment has never been used as a tax 
base because, before the growth of the modern banking system, payments were made 
through the use of commodity-based money, or, more recently, through paper 
money. Such means of payment implied the use of manual, or carry-on, money, and 
this made it impossible to implement a tax system capable of avoiding large-scale tax 
evasion. 
Nowadays, the electronic age has turned the banking system into the locus of all 
payment clearings. Except for small payments, most economic exchanges are made 
through the use of fiat money issued by the banking system, which makes possible 
the use of such clearing houses as the loci where tax collection can occur. 
In Brazil, the long history of inflation has led to the overdevelopment of the 
banking system, especially to the use of sophisticated electronic means of 
administering bank deposits. Speed in clearing bank transactions was an essential 
prerequisite for high profitability in banking activities. Brazil is one of the few 
countries in the world that has an integrated clearing house for the whole banking 
sector, capable of clearing tens of millions of banking documents overnight. 
At the same time, chronic inflation has caused a strong tendency for the 
expulsion of paper money, which not being indexed, lost purchasing power as 
inflation set place in Brazil, reaching in 1985, the monthly rate of 80%. The 
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substitution of bank deposits for paper money turned Brazil into one of the most 
"unmonetized" economies in the world. Paper money outside the banking system 
accounts for less than 2% of GNP, while in other countries it rarely falls below 10% 
of GNP. 
It should be pointed out, however, that there is a worldwide trend towards the 
use of electronic means of exchange -bank deposits, smart cards, on-line 
transactions- which leads us to believe that Keynes was right when stated that paper 
money was a barbaric relic from the past, and should soon be replaced by electronic 
means of exchange. 
Such a detour into the history of money is important since it sets the ground for 
understanding the appearance of concrete possibilities for the achievement of the 
single tax ideal, based on a transactions tax. 
The proposal of a single tax in Brazil raised an emotional controversy, 
particularly when, in 1995, and again in 1998 through 2002, Congress approved the 
use of such tax, although not as a single tax.  
Its cumulative effects were quickly brought to the debate. Those who opposed 
the transactions tax pointed out its alleged negative effects on allocative efficiency. 
Others claimed that Brazilian exports would lose competitiveness due to the 
difficulties in rebating the taxes collected along the production process. Others still, 
pointed out the possible inducements to verticalization and banking 
disintermediation (or hoarding), which could result from even modest rates on 
banking transactions, and that such tax would have low tax yield in stable 
economies, with low inflation rates.  
Actually, all such criticism proved completely wrong. None of the negative 
predictions actually occurred. Quite on the contrary, the revenues collected from the 
transactions tax in both periods of application showed solid revenues and a universal 
pattern of incidence. It proved to be impossible to evade it. From the equity point of 
view, it turned out to be a fair tax, since the most unfair tax is that one which can be 
evaded. 
From the revenue side, each tenth of a percent (0.1%) in its rate structure 
resulted in revenues equivalent to 0.9% of GNP. In 1999 it collected R$ 8.5 billion 
with a rate of 0.2% on each bank account debit entry, both of persons or of firms. 
From 1999 to 2003, the rate was set at 0.38%.[3]  
The use of the transactions tax in Brazil confirmed the following advantages: 
• It is an evasion-proof tax  
• It is a corruption-proof tax  
• It has low collection cost  
• It is simple, non-declaratory, automatically collected, and requires no 
bureaucratic procedures on the part of the taxpayer  
• It causes no significant distortion in market conditions.  
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The transactions tax turned out to be both a powerful tool for achieving federal 
tax equity, and a source of solid revenues for the government. Although it is a 
turnover tax, it caused no significant distortion in the functioning of the market. It 
prevented tax evasion, which in many countries caused a shift of tax incidence to 
sectors least capable of "tax planning" or "tax avoidance", such as small and medium 
firms, and wage earners, with obvious negative equity impact. It also served the 
purpose of taxing the informal economy. It established a pattern of tax incidence, 
that made everybody pay, and if all pay their taxes, all should pay less. 
The use of a transactions tax in Brazil was the first large-scale experiment with 
such a tax. And it proved enormously successful. However, a few lessons were 
learned from it, and deserve attention from tax planners. 
First, if rates are raised, a few safeguard measures should be adopted. To avoid 
the use of checks transfers to be used as quasi-money, they should be turned into 
nominal, non-endorsable orders of payment. Also, appropriate laws should require 
that transactions above a minimum amount should necessarily be cleared through the 
domestic banking system in order to acquire legal existence. 
Second, the transactions tax should not be imposed on financial and capital 
markets. Since it is a turnover tax, at each period of maturity it would be collected on 
the stock of capital, thereby tending to raise the federal interest rate. This feature of 
the transactions tax will be further discussed below, with reference to the Tobin tax. 
Third, time and effort should be addressed to constructing input-output tables, 
with as many entries as possible, in order to evaluate the cost burden caused by the 
transactions tax in each sector of the economy. Such calculations are indispensable if 
exports are to be tax exempt. The Leontief tables should provide the proper levels of 
tax refunds to exporters. In the appendix, a 35 sector estimate of sectoral tax burden 
is presented. Since the transactions tax allows no tax evasion, it requires a much 
lower rate (2.7% in our estimates) to collect the same revenue as a conventional 
value-added tax with a rate of 17%. Therefore, a transactions tax imposes a 
significantly lower tax burden on all sectors of the economy, and therefore 
introduces less distortion in relative prices than a value-added tax. 
In brief, the experiment with a transactions tax in Brazil was fully successful. It 
proved to be a powerful tool to raise revenues, a strong instrument to attain a more 
equitable pattern of income distribution, and a robust deterrent of tax evasion and 
corruption. And with an almost null collection cost. [4] 
THE TOBIN TAX IN THE LIGHT OF THE BRAZILIAN TRANSACTIONS 
TAX 
The experience with a transactions tax in Brazil showed that the banking system 
is the unavoidable locus of all payment clearings in the modern world. It also showed 
that other forms of making payments, such as barter, use of paper money, or offshore 
facilities, usually imply higher costs than the tax savings made possible by such 
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alternative devices.  
Furthermore, it became clear that some simple legislative actions would close 
most tax shelters. 
The Brazilian experience also showed that a solid tax system, with a fair pattern 
of incidence, is a prerequisite for lowering income concentration and eradicating 
poverty. 
On the other hand, a transactions tax should not reach the domestic capital 
markets. Especially in developing countries, where most financial transactions are 
short term due to the uncertainties and risks involved, a turnover tax has two effects: 
a) it raises the domestic interest rate, and b) it lengthens the maturity periods of 
financial markets.  
As issues involving domestic economic policy, these two effects are usually 
undesirable.  
The higher interest rate effect reduces investment and growth; the lengthening 
of maturity periods, on the other hand, is more controversial. Some argue that term 
structure of financial markets should be left totally free to be determined solely by 
market forces, and therefore, should reflect the opportunity cost of money and 
liquidity. Others, however, argue that short term financial markets should be 
contained, and that a toll tax, due to its turnover characteristics, would throw some 
sand in the wheels of financial speculation. 
It is precisely this second opinion, which led James Tobin and others to propose 
the introduction of a transactions tax on capital flows, on a world level. According to 
their opinion, trillions of dollars flow across international borders each year in search 
of investment opportunities. Most of it, however, is short-term highly volatile capital, 
which many analysts believe is the main reason behind world financial instability. 
Thus, a transactions tax on international capital flows would reduce the mobility 
of such financial flows, making capital mobility a more stable source of investment 
financing for the developing countries. According to this view, therefore, the 
transactions tax would reduce economic instability, limit the depth of international 
financial crisis, and would provide an alternative source of funding for eradicating 
world poverty.  
Of course, there will be a need for multilateral coordination to implement such a 
tax on a world basis. Although this should turn out to be a very demanding task, it is 
technically viable, as the Brazilian experience has shown. 
In conclusion, the transactions tax no doubt will be the in the heart of future tax 
systems all over the world. Both federally and on a world basis, such a tax should 
prove to be a valuable tool in providing resources for eradicating poverty, to improve 
income distribution, and to attain social justice across the world. 
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APPENDIX 
IMPACT OF A 17% VALUE-ADDED TAX AND OF A 2.7% TRANSACTIONS TAX ON 
THE TAX BURDEN OVER COST OF PRODUCTION OF VARIOUS INDUSTRIES OF THE 
BRAZILIAN ECONOMY 
 
Tax Burden 
% over taxless cost of production n.º Industries 
VAT (17%) Trans.Tax (2.7%) 
1 Agriculture 29.8 8.9 
2 Mining 26.8 8.2 
3 Oil and natural gas 22.4 7.3 
4 Coal 24.6 7.2 
5 Non-metallic minerals 25.3 8.5 
6 Metallurgy 23.8 9.9 
7 Mechanic 22.1 8.1 
8 Electrical and communications materials 23.6 8.4 
9 Transport materials 22.9 9.6 
10 Wood 26.9 9.2 
11 Furniture 25.5 9.3 
12 Paper and cardboard 25.7 9.7 
13 Rubber 23.9 9.5 
14 Leather and skin 24.6 9.5 
15 Alcohol 31.4 11.1 
16 Oil refining 18.4 4.1 
17 Pharmaceutics 22.7 7.3 
18 Cosmetics 25.0 9.0 
19 Other chemicals 24.0 8.2 
20 Textiles 27.1 10.7 
21 Clothing and shoes 27.0 10.4 
22 Foodstuff 28.2 10.4 
23 Beverage 24.5 9.0 
24 Tobacco 26.8 9.3 
25 Editorial and printing 23.5 8.0 
26 Other industries 25.2 8.5 
27 Electric Energy 23.7 6.9 
28 Sanitation and water supply 20.4 5.3 
29 Construction 25.0 8.5 
30 Commerce 23.8 6.1 
31 Transport and communication services 22.0 5.9 
32 Finance 22.0 4.7 
33 Other services 22.4 5.9 
34 Dummy maintenance 21.2 8.1 
35 Dummy firms 22.5 8.2 
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NOTES 
 
[1] Paper presented at the 21.st Annual United Nations Parliamentary Forum organized by 
Parliamentarians for Global Action, held on September 29-30, 1999 at the United Nations. 
 
[2] Marcos Cintra Cavalcanti de Albuquerque, Ph.D. in economics (Harvard University), is a member 
of the Brazilian National Congress representing the state of São Paulo, vice-president of the Getulio 
Vargas Foundation, and full-professor of the Department of Economics at the São Paulo Business 
School. (Internet: www.marcoscintra.org , Email: mcintra@marcoscintra.org  
 
[3] The use of transactions tax was tried in Argentina for a few years, before it reformed its tax system 
along orthodox lines in 1992. The Argentinean experience was enormously successful, and the 
banking disintermediation (or hoarding) that occurred during a few months was due to an interest rate 
freeze during the peak of hyperinflation in the end of the eighties, rather than to the transactions tax, 
which had its rate increased at the same period. Colombia, and Ecuador also experimented with the 
transactions tax, and Australia has been collecting a similar tax for many years, although with a 
minute rate. 
 
[4] A focus of strong opposition to the transactions tax is seen in sectors of the economy that fear that 
its continuing use might end up being a strong evidence of evasion of the other taxes collected by the 
government. Such evidence, for instance, appears when the transactions tax revenue is compared with 
the revenue attained by the Confins, a turnover tax on gross revenues of firms. Financial transactions 
and firms´ gross revenues should be almost equivalent concepts if there were no tax evasion through 
unreported revenues. However, evidence of generalized tax evasion is easily seen, as the Confins 
revenue is twice as much as that of the transactions tax, although its rate is ten times higher. 
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